Chapter 40 Quiz: The Future of Sports Betting

Instructions: Answer all 25 questions. This quiz is worth 100 points. You have 60 minutes. A calculator is permitted; no notes or internet access. For multiple choice, select the single best answer.


Section 1: Multiple Choice (10 questions, 3 points each = 30 points)

Question 1. In a betting exchange, "laying" an outcome means:

(A) Placing a bet that the outcome will occur (backing)

(B) Betting against the outcome occurring, effectively acting as the bookmaker for that bet

(C) Canceling a previously placed bet

(D) Placing a limit order at a price below the current market

Answer **(B) Betting against the outcome occurring, effectively acting as the bookmaker for that bet.** Laying is the complement of backing. When you lay an outcome, you are accepting bets from backers, taking on the liability of paying out if the outcome occurs. In exchange, you collect the backer's stake if the outcome does not occur. The ability to lay is the fundamental innovation of betting exchanges, enabling strategies like trading, market making, and cross-market arbitrage that are impossible with traditional sportsbooks.

Question 2. The primary revenue model of a betting exchange is:

(A) Embedding margin (vigorish) in the odds

(B) Charging a commission on net winnings per market

(C) Selling customer data to sportsbooks

(D) Charging monthly subscription fees

Answer **(B) Charging a commission on net winnings per market.** Unlike traditional sportsbooks that embed margin in the odds (vig), exchanges charge a commission (typically 2--5%) on the net winnings of the winning party in each market. Commission is only charged on winning markets; losing bets incur no commission. This model aligns the exchange's incentives with market activity rather than bettor losses.

Question 3. The "oracle problem" in decentralized betting refers to:

(A) The difficulty of predicting sports outcomes accurately

(B) The challenge of reliably bringing real-world data (like game results) onto the blockchain

(C) The high cost of running nodes on a blockchain network

(D) The legal challenge of operating without a gambling license

Answer **(B) The challenge of reliably bringing real-world data (like game results) onto the blockchain.** Smart contracts on a blockchain cannot directly access off-chain data. The oracle problem is how to reliably, accurately, and quickly report real-world events (sports results) to the blockchain for bet settlement. Various solutions exist (Chainlink, UMA, crowd-sourced resolution), each with tradeoffs between speed, cost, security, and decentralization. Oracle manipulation is a significant risk for decentralized betting platforms.

Question 4. Which of the following is NOT an advantage of decentralized betting platforms over traditional sportsbooks?

(A) Provable fairness through auditable smart contract code

(B) No counterparty risk because funds are held by the smart contract

(C) Higher liquidity than traditional sportsbooks due to global participation

(D) Transparency of odds and total liquidity on-chain

Answer **(C) Higher liquidity than traditional sportsbooks due to global participation.** Most decentralized betting platforms currently suffer from **lower** liquidity compared to major traditional sportsbooks, not higher. While global participation is theoretically possible, the reality is that user adoption remains limited, and many potential users are deterred by the complexity of cryptocurrency wallets and the lack of regulatory clarity. The other options (provable fairness, no counterparty risk, transparent odds) are genuine advantages of decentralized platforms.

Question 5. Micro-betting markets typically carry higher hold percentages than standard pre-game markets because:

(A) Regulators require higher margins on micro-bets

(B) Information asymmetry, model uncertainty, and the recreational orientation of the product justify wider margins

(C) Micro-bets have fewer possible outcomes

(D) The technology required is less expensive, allowing operators to charge more

Answer **(B) Information asymmetry, model uncertainty, and the recreational orientation of the product justify wider margins.** Micro-betting hold percentages (10--25%) exceed standard spreads (4--6%) for several reasons: bettors watching live broadcasts may see events before the data feed (information asymmetry requiring margin compensation), predicting individual plays is inherently noisier than game outcomes (model uncertainty), and micro-betting is primarily an entertainment product for price-insensitive recreational bettors. These factors combine to allow and necessitate wider margins.

Question 6. In the context of AI-driven sportsbook operations, "reinforcement learning for line setting" means:

(A) Using neural networks to analyze player performance data

(B) Training an AI agent to learn optimal pricing strategies by interacting with bettors and maximizing expected profit

(C) Automatically generating marketing content for social media

(D) Using computer vision to track player movements during games

Answer **(B) Training an AI agent to learn optimal pricing strategies by interacting with bettors and maximizing expected profit.** Reinforcement learning (RL) agents learn by trial and error, adjusting their behavior based on rewards (profit) and penalties (losses). In line setting, an RL agent can discover optimal pricing strategies --- like shading lines toward the public side on high-profile games to exploit recreational bias --- by learning from the responses of different bettor types to different price points. This goes beyond simple outcome prediction to optimize the business objective directly.

Question 7. "Greening up" on a betting exchange refers to:

(A) Depositing additional funds into your exchange account

(B) Backing and then laying (or vice versa) the same outcome at different odds to lock in a guaranteed profit

(C) Placing environmentally sustainable bets on renewable energy events

(D) Withdrawing profits to a separate bank account

Answer **(B) Backing and then laying (or vice versa) the same outcome at different odds to lock in a guaranteed profit.** Greening up is a trading strategy unique to exchanges. If you back Team A at 3.00 and their price drops to 2.00 during the event, you can lay Team A at 2.00 for a calculated stake that equalizes your profit across both outcomes. The result is a guaranteed profit regardless of the final result, analogous to closing a profitable position in financial markets.

Question 8. The largest obstacle to US betting exchange adoption is:

(A) American bettors do not understand the exchange model

(B) Limited liquidity, regulatory barriers in most states, and consumer unfamiliarity

(C) Exchanges are illegal under federal law

(D) Traditional sportsbooks offer better odds than exchanges

Answer **(B) Limited liquidity, regulatory barriers in most states, and consumer unfamiliarity.** While exchanges are not federally prohibited, they face regulatory challenges in most US states where existing frameworks are designed for traditional sportsbook models. Limited liquidity (few US bettors use exchanges, creating a chicken-and-egg problem) and consumer unfamiliarity with the back/lay concept compound the challenge. US exchange attempts (Prophet Exchange, Sporttrade) have launched but with limited traction compared to Betfair's dominance in Europe.

Question 9. A key integrity concern specific to micro-betting that does not apply to traditional game-outcome betting is:

(A) Insider trading by team executives

(B) The dramatically expanded number of potentially manipulable events and the lower corruption threshold per event

(C) Point shaving by star players

(D) Referee bias in officiating decisions

Answer **(B) The dramatically expanded number of potentially manipulable events and the lower corruption threshold per event.** When every individual play is a betting market, the number of manipulable events increases from a few per game (game outcome, spread, total) to potentially hundreds. Furthermore, a corrupt participant does not need to fix the game --- they merely need to influence a single play (e.g., a deliberate false start, a double fault on a specific serve). The financial incentive needed to corrupt a single play is much smaller than for a game outcome, lowering the corruption threshold.

Question 10. As global sports betting regulation matures, the trend is toward:

(A) Deregulation and removal of licensing requirements

(B) Convergence around common principles including KYC/AML, responsible gambling, and advertising restrictions

(C) Each country developing completely unique regulatory frameworks

(D) Prohibition of online betting in favor of retail-only operations

Answer **(B) Convergence around common principles including KYC/AML, responsible gambling, and advertising restrictions.** While significant jurisdictional variation persists, the global trend is toward regulatory convergence around common principles: mandatory KYC/AML compliance, responsible gambling requirements (deposit limits, self-exclusion), advertising restrictions (particularly regarding minors), data localization, and integrity monitoring. International cooperation through organizations like IAGR and IBIA accelerates this convergence.

Section 2: True/False (5 questions, 3 points each = 15 points)


Question 11. True or False: Betting exchanges typically offer lower effective margins than traditional sportsbooks, making them more cost-effective for serious bettors.

Answer **True.** A well-liquid exchange market typically has a total market percentage of 100--101%, compared to 104--105% for a traditional sportsbook offering -110/-110. Even after adding the exchange's commission (2--5% on net winnings), the effective cost to the bettor is typically 1--3 percentage points lower than at a traditional sportsbook. This structural cost advantage is the exchange's primary appeal to volume bettors.

Question 12. True or False: NLP (Natural Language Processing) systems used by sportsbooks can detect injury announcements on social media and adjust odds within seconds, often faster than human traders.

Answer **True.** Advanced NLP systems continuously monitor news feeds, social media, and team announcements in real time. When a key player's injury is announced on social media, the NLP system can trigger an automated odds adjustment within seconds, often before human traders have processed the information. This capability is part of the AI-driven trading revolution described in Section 40.1.

Question 13. True or False: Decentralized betting platforms have resolved the KYC/AML compliance challenge by implementing on-chain identity verification.

Answer **False.** KYC/AML compliance remains one of the most significant regulatory challenges for decentralized betting platforms. Most decentralized platforms allow pseudonymous participation, which conflicts with KYC and AML requirements in regulated jurisdictions. While some protocols are exploring zero-knowledge proof-based identity verification, this is still nascent and has not been widely adopted or accepted by regulators. This tension between privacy-preserving blockchain design and regulatory imperatives remains unresolved.

Question 14. True or False: Micro-betting is projected to potentially represent 30--50% of all sports betting handle in the future.

Answer **True.** Some industry estimates suggest that micro-betting could eventually represent 30--50% of all sports betting handle. The combination of high frequency (100--200+ markets per game), increasing mobile engagement, and the entertainment appeal of next-play wagering is driving rapid growth. However, the higher margins on micro-bets mean that their share of revenue may exceed their share of handle.

Question 15. True or False: The arms race between bettors and sportsbook AI will eventually make profitable betting completely impossible.

Answer **False.** While AI is making markets more efficient, complete efficiency is unlikely because: new information continuously enters the system, model uncertainty is irreducible for many sports events, behavioral biases in recreational bettors persist, structural features of regulated markets create exploitable distortions, and niche/low-liquidity markets receive less automated attention. The bar for profitable betting will rise, but it will not reach infinity. Opportunities will persist for bettors who adapt with sophisticated methods, alternative data, and niche-market focus.

Section 3: Fill in the Blank (3 questions, 4 points each = 12 points)


Question 16. On a betting exchange, the difference between the best available back price and the best available lay price is called the __________, which functions as the market's effective margin.

Answer **Spread** (also accepted: "bid-ask spread" or "back-lay spread") The spread is the gap between the highest price at which someone is willing to back (buy) and the lowest price at which someone is willing to lay (sell). A tighter spread indicates a more liquid, efficient market with lower transaction costs. On major Betfair markets, the spread might be 0.02 in decimal odds (e.g., 2.10/2.12), while on illiquid markets it can be much wider.

Question 17. A blockchain mechanism that brings real-world data (such as sports results) onto the blockchain for smart contract execution is called a __________.

Answer **Decentralized oracle** (also accepted: "oracle" or "blockchain oracle") Oracles bridge the gap between off-chain real-world data and on-chain smart contracts. In sports betting, oracles report game results so that smart contracts can automatically settle bets and distribute payouts. The reliability and speed of oracle systems are critical to the viability of decentralized betting platforms.

Question 18. The practice of a bettor backing an outcome on a traditional sportsbook at higher odds and simultaneously laying the same outcome on an exchange at lower odds for a guaranteed profit is called __________.

Answer **Arbitrage** (also accepted: "cross-market arbitrage" or "arbing") This is a specific form of arbitrage that exploits price discrepancies between traditional sportsbooks and betting exchanges. The bettor locks in a guaranteed profit regardless of outcome because the sportsbook's back price exceeds the exchange's lay price. This strategy requires accounts on both platforms, fast execution, and careful calculation of stakes.

Section 4: Short Answer (3 questions, 5 points each = 15 points)


Question 19. Explain why the "long-term equilibrium" of sports betting markets is unlikely to be perfectly efficient, despite the increasing sophistication of AI pricing models. Identify at least three factors that preserve market inefficiency.

Answer Perfect market efficiency in sports betting is unlikely due to several persistent factors: **1. Irreducible uncertainty:** Sports outcomes contain inherent randomness that no model can fully capture. Injuries, weather changes, motivational factors, and random variation ensure that probability estimates always carry meaningful uncertainty, creating room for disagreement between models. **2. Behavioral biases:** Recreational bettors consistently exhibit biases (public favorite bias, recency bias, narrative-driven betting) that create systematic deviations from efficient pricing. Because recreational volume is substantial, these biases persist in market prices despite sharp bettor activity. **3. Structural market features:** Regulatory constraints (advertising rules, tax-driven margin floors, geolocation requirements), product design choices (parlays and SGPs with embedded high margins), and account management practices (limiting sharp bettors) all create distortions that pure pricing efficiency cannot eliminate. Additional factors include continuous information arrival (new data constantly shifts true probabilities), niche market inefficiency (low-volume markets receive less AI attention), and the time lag between information discovery and price incorporation.

Question 20. Describe the key advantages and disadvantages of a liquidity pool-based automated market maker (AMM) for sports betting, compared to a traditional order book model (as used by Betfair).

Answer **AMM Advantages:** - **Always available liquidity:** An AMM always offers a price, unlike an order book which requires counterparties. Bettors can always place bets without waiting for a match. - **Simpler user experience:** Bettors interact with a pool rather than navigating an order book, reducing the complexity barrier for new users. - **Passive liquidity provision:** Liquidity providers can deposit funds and earn returns without actively managing orders, making it accessible to non-sophisticated participants. **AMM Disadvantages:** - **Higher effective margins:** AMM pricing formulas typically produce wider spreads than competitive order books, especially for large bets that significantly impact pool pricing. - **Impermanent loss risk:** Liquidity providers face the risk that one-sided betting patterns drain the pool on the winning side, resulting in losses that can exceed earned fees. - **Less price discovery:** Order books aggregate the views of many sophisticated participants, producing more accurate prices. AMMs rely on formulas rather than market consensus. - **Price manipulation vulnerability:** Large bets can move AMM prices significantly, potentially creating manipulation opportunities that are harder to exploit in deep order books.

Question 21. How does the rise of micro-betting change the required skillset for a quantitative sports bettor, compared to traditional pre-game modeling?

Answer Micro-betting demands a fundamentally different skillset from pre-game modeling in several ways: **1. Speed and infrastructure:** Pre-game models can run overnight and update weekly. Micro-betting requires models that execute predictions in milliseconds, processing game state updates in real time. This demands software engineering skills (low-latency systems, streaming data processing) in addition to statistical modeling. **2. Granular domain knowledge:** Pre-game models operate at the team level. Micro-betting requires understanding individual plays: formation tendencies, situational play-calling patterns, pitcher-batter matchup dynamics, or serve patterns in tennis. The domain knowledge must be more granular and specific. **3. Data engineering:** The volume and velocity of data for micro-betting is orders of magnitude greater than pre-game. Processing play-by-play data in real time, maintaining game state, and generating features on the fly requires substantial data engineering infrastructure. **4. Different edge sources:** Pre-game edges often come from informational advantages (better injury assessment, superior statistical models). Micro-betting edges may additionally come from latency advantages (faster data access), situational pattern recognition, and the fact that automated pricing models for micro-markets are still maturing and may contain exploitable systematic errors.

Section 5: Code Analysis (2 questions, 6 points each = 12 points)


Question 22. Examine the following code that simulates a betting exchange matching engine:

def match_orders(back_orders, lay_orders):
    """Match back and lay orders on an exchange."""
    trades = []
    for back in back_orders:
        for lay in lay_orders:
            if back["price"] >= lay["price"]:
                trade_amount = min(back["amount"], lay["amount"])
                trades.append({
                    "price": lay["price"],
                    "amount": trade_amount,
                })
                back["amount"] -= trade_amount
                lay["amount"] -= trade_amount
    return trades

(a) Identify two problems with this matching engine implementation.

(b) Write a corrected version that properly handles price priority and removes fully filled orders.

Answer **(a)** Two problems: **Problem 1: No price priority.** The engine iterates through orders in their original list order, not by price priority. In a proper exchange, the best back order (highest price) should be matched with the best lay order (lowest price) first. The current code may match inferior prices before superior ones. **Problem 2: Exhausted orders remain in the loop.** When an order's amount reaches zero (fully filled), it is not removed from the list or skipped. Subsequent iterations continue checking the exhausted order, wasting computation and potentially causing zero-amount trades. Additionally, the matching price should be the earlier-placed order's price (price-time priority), not always the lay price. **(b)** Corrected version:
def match_orders(back_orders, lay_orders):
    """Match back and lay orders with proper price-time priority."""
    # Sort: best back (highest price) first, best lay (lowest price) first
    backs = sorted(back_orders, key=lambda x: -x["price"])
    lays = sorted(lay_orders, key=lambda x: x["price"])

    trades = []
    b_idx = 0
    l_idx = 0

    while b_idx < len(backs) and l_idx < len(lays):
        back = backs[b_idx]
        lay = lays[l_idx]

        if back["price"] < lay["price"]:
            break  # No more matchable orders

        trade_amount = min(back["amount"], lay["amount"])
        if trade_amount > 0:
            # Match at the price of the resting order
            match_price = lay["price"]
            trades.append({"price": match_price, "amount": trade_amount})
            back["amount"] -= trade_amount
            lay["amount"] -= trade_amount

        if back["amount"] <= 0:
            b_idx += 1
        if lay["amount"] <= 0:
            l_idx += 1

    return trades
The corrected version sorts both sides by price priority, matches best-to-best, properly advances past filled orders, and terminates when no more compatible prices exist.

Question 23. Examine the following code that calculates the return for a liquidity pool in a decentralized betting protocol:

def pool_return(
    pool_size: float,
    total_handle: float,
    margin: float,
    actual_win_pct: float,
) -> float:
    """Calculate the return for a betting liquidity pool."""
    expected_ggr = total_handle * margin
    actual_ggr = total_handle * (1 - actual_win_pct)
    return actual_ggr / pool_size

(a) Explain why actual_ggr = total_handle * (1 - actual_win_pct) is incorrect.

(b) What does actual_win_pct mean in this context, and how should the actual GGR be calculated?

(c) Write a corrected version of the function.

Answer **(a)** The formula `total_handle * (1 - actual_win_pct)` treats `actual_win_pct` as if every bettor wins or loses the same proportion of their wager. In reality, GGR depends on the specific odds at which winning bets were placed, not just the win rate. A bettor who wins a +500 bet generates a very different payout than one who wins a -200 bet, even though both have "won." **(b)** `actual_win_pct` likely represents the fraction of bets that won, but GGR is not simply `handle * (1 - win_rate)`. GGR = handle - total payouts. Payouts depend on the odds of each winning bet. The correct calculation requires knowing the total payout amount, not just the win rate. **(c)** Corrected version:
def pool_return(
    pool_size: float,
    total_handle: float,
    total_payouts: float,
    gas_fees: float = 0.0,
    oracle_fees: float = 0.0,
) -> dict[str, float]:
    """Calculate the return for a betting liquidity pool.

    Args:
        pool_size: Initial capital in the pool.
        total_handle: Total amount wagered through the pool.
        total_payouts: Total amount paid out to winning bettors.
        gas_fees: Blockchain transaction costs.
        oracle_fees: Oracle resolution costs.

    Returns:
        Dictionary with GGR, net return, and return percentage.
    """
    ggr = total_handle - total_payouts
    net_return = ggr - gas_fees - oracle_fees
    return_pct = net_return / pool_size * 100

    return {
        "ggr": ggr,
        "net_return": net_return,
        "return_pct": return_pct,
    }
The corrected version takes `total_payouts` as an input rather than trying to derive it from a win rate, and also accounts for operational costs (gas fees, oracle fees) that reduce the pool's net return.

Section 6: Applied Problems (2 questions, 8 points each = 16 points)


Question 24. You are considering three platforms for placing a $1,000 bet on an NFL game:

Platform Odds (Team A) Effective Cost
Traditional Sportsbook -110 Standard vig
Betting Exchange 1.95 (back) 3% commission on net win
Decentralized Protocol 1.93 1% protocol fee, $5 gas cost

Assume the true probability of Team A winning is 52%.

(a) (2 points) Calculate the expected value of the $1,000 bet on each platform.

(b) (2 points) Calculate the expected cost (negative EV) per bet on each platform.

(c) (2 points) If you place 200 such bets per year, what is the expected annual impact of platform choice?

(d) (2 points) Beyond pure expected value, identify one advantage and one disadvantage of each platform.

Answer **(a)** Expected value calculations: **Traditional Sportsbook (-110):** - Decimal odds: 1.909 - Win: 0.52 x $909.09 = $472.73 - Lose: 0.48 x (-$1,000) = -$480.00 - EV = $472.73 - $480.00 = **-$7.27** **Betting Exchange (1.95, 3% commission):** - Win: 0.52 x ($950 - 0.03 x $950) = 0.52 x $921.50 = $479.18 - Lose: 0.48 x (-$1,000) = -$480.00 - EV = $479.18 - $480.00 = **-$0.82** **Decentralized Protocol (1.93, 1% fee, $5 gas):** - Effective profit if win: $930 x 0.99 - $5 = $920.70 - $5 = $915.70 - Wait, let me recalculate: odds 1.93 means profit = $930 on a $1,000 bet. - After 1% fee: $930 x 0.99 = $920.70 - After gas: $920.70 - $5 = $915.70 - Win: 0.52 x $915.70 = $476.16 - Lose: 0.48 x (-$1,000 - $5) = 0.48 x (-$1,005) = -$482.40 - EV = $476.16 - $482.40 = **-$6.24** **(b)** Expected cost per bet: - Sportsbook: $7.27 (0.73% of stake) - Exchange: $0.82 (0.08% of stake) - Decentralized: $6.24 (0.62% of stake) **(c)** Annual impact over 200 bets: - Sportsbook: 200 x $7.27 = **$1,454 expected loss** - Exchange: 200 x $0.82 = **$164 expected loss** - Decentralized: 200 x $6.24 = **$1,248 expected loss** - **Platform choice impact: $1,290/year difference between sportsbook and exchange.** **(d)** Advantages and disadvantages: | Platform | Advantage | Disadvantage | |----------|-----------|--------------| | Sportsbook | Highest liquidity, fastest execution, promotional offers | Highest effective cost, account limiting for winners | | Exchange | Lowest cost, ability to lay/trade, no account limits for winners | Limited US availability, liquidity may be thin on some markets | | Decentralized | No counterparty risk, transparent operations, censorship resistant | Gas costs on every transaction, oracle risk, regulatory uncertainty |

Question 25. An AI-powered sportsbook is deploying the following technologies. For each, explain (a) how it works, and (b) the strategic implication for bettors:

(i) (2 points) NLP monitoring of social media for injury information

(ii) (2 points) Reinforcement learning for dynamic line adjustment

(iii) (2 points) Behavioral segmentation model that classifies bettors in real time

(iv) (2 points) Computer vision analysis of pre-game warmups via stadium cameras

Answer **(i) NLP Social Media Monitoring:** - **How it works:** NLP models continuously scan Twitter/X, Instagram, team accounts, and news feeds for keywords indicating injuries, lineup changes, or other material information. When detected, the system automatically flags the information and may trigger line adjustments within seconds, often before official announcements. - **Bettor implication:** The window to exploit injury information is shrinking rapidly. Bettors who relied on being first to act on social media injury reports may find that the sportsbook has already adjusted odds by the time they can place a bet. Speed advantages must now be measured in seconds, not minutes. **(ii) Reinforcement Learning for Line Adjustment:** - **How it works:** An RL agent learns optimal pricing strategies through trial-and-error interaction with bettor behavior. The agent observes bet flow (volume, source, timing) and adjusts lines to maximize expected profit, learning to shade prices based on observed bettor patterns (e.g., adding extra points on popular teams where recreational volume is predictable). - **Bettor implication:** Lines are no longer set by fixed rules or static models. The RL agent adapts to bettor strategies over time. If many bettors exploit a particular pattern, the RL agent will learn to close that gap. Bettors must continually innovate rather than relying on fixed strategies. **(iii) Behavioral Segmentation:** - **How it works:** ML classification models analyze each bettor's activity in real time: bet types, timing, sizing, sport preferences, response to promotions, and win/loss patterns. Bettors are classified into segments (casual, engaged, semi-sharp, sharp, VIP) and receive different treatment (limits, promotions, odds) based on their classification. - **Bettor implication:** Your betting behavior is being profiled continuously. Exhibiting sharp bettor patterns (consistently beating the closing line, betting at odd hours on obscure markets, rapid bet placement after line moves) will flag your account for limit reductions. Bettors must manage their "appearance" or expect restrictions. **(iv) Computer Vision Pre-Game Analysis:** - **How it works:** Cameras in stadiums and training facilities capture player movements during warmups. Computer vision models analyze gait, range of motion, and activity levels to detect potential injuries or physical limitations not yet publicly known. This information feeds into the odds compilation process. - **Bettor implication:** The sportsbook may have information about player physical condition that is not available to the public. A bettor who watches warmups in person may still have an edge (faster observation), but the gap is closing. Computer vision represents a new informational advantage for operators that bettors must account for.

Scoring Summary

Section Questions Points Each Total
1. Multiple Choice 10 3 30
2. True/False 5 3 15
3. Fill in the Blank 3 4 12
4. Short Answer 3 5 15
5. Code Analysis 2 6 12
6. Applied Problems 2 8 16
Total 25 --- 100

Grade Thresholds

Grade Score Range Percentage
A 90-100 90-100%
B 80-89 80-89%
C 70-79 70-79%
D 60-69 60-69%
F 0-59 0-59%