Chapter 29 Quiz

Twenty questions to check your grasp of portfolio management: fifteen multiple choice and five short answer. Answers are in the collapsed key at the bottom. All figures are illustrative.

Multiple choice

1. The defining shift from desk underwriting to portfolio management is the change from asking:

  • A. "Is this risk priced adequately?" to "Is this risk legal?"
  • B. "Is this risk any good?" to "What is this risk doing to my book?"
  • C. "Should I bind or refer?" to "Should I bind or decline?"
  • D. "What is the loss ratio?" to "What is the expense ratio?"

2. Diversifying a book across geography, industry, size, and line primarily reduces:

  • A. the expected loss of each individual account
  • B. the volatility of the book's aggregate result
  • C. the premium the book can write
  • D. the need for reinsurance

3. A book of 1,000 commercial property policies, none larger than \$4M, but all in the same named-windstorm county, is best described as:

  • A. well diversified by size, so low risk
  • B. a pool the law of large numbers will stabilize
  • C. essentially one large correlated bet despite the policy count
  • D. immune to catastrophe because no single account is large

4. Accumulation is best defined as:

  • A. the total premium a book writes in a year
  • B. the build-up of many policies' exposure to a single event, place, peril, or counterparty
  • C. the reserve held for losses not yet paid
  • D. the surplus an insurer accumulates over time

5. A book's blended loss ratio is 72%. Segmented, one class is at 112% and growing 22% a year. The most likely explanation for a deteriorating segment that is also fast-growing is:

  • A. the segment is highly profitable and should be grown faster
  • B. your price in that segment is soft, so you are winning the business the market priced higher for a reason (adverse selection)
  • C. random noise that will reverse next year
  • D. the segment is too small to matter

6. The retention ratio measures:

  • A. the share of premium ceded to reinsurers
  • B. the share of a book that renews from one term to the next
  • C. the share of losses retained net of reinsurance
  • D. the share of capital retained as surplus

7. "High retention in a soft market" can be a danger sign because:

  • A. retention should always fall
  • B. the good accounts are being picked off by cheaper competitors while the worse risks renew gratefully — adverse selection through the renewal book
  • C. high retention always means overpricing
  • D. it raises the expense ratio

8. The new-business penalty refers to the fact that:

  • A. regulators penalize insurers for writing new business
  • B. new business almost always runs a worse loss ratio than seasoned renewal business
  • C. new business is always unprofitable and should be avoided
  • D. brokers charge more to place new accounts

9. An undifferentiated growth target ("grow the book 10%") is dangerous mainly because:

  • A. growth is always bad in insurance
  • B. the fastest way to grow is to cut price or loosen standards, so growth-for-its-own-sake buys premium today at the cost of losses tomorrow
  • C. it violates state rate-filing law
  • D. it requires too much reinsurance

10. In a soft market, the disciplined portfolio manager generally should:

  • A. follow the market down to protect growth and retention
  • B. accept slower growth or controlled shrinkage, holding rate and terms
  • C. exit the business entirely
  • D. raise prices aggressively to maximize margin

11. The cycle's "lag" traps even experienced managers because:

  • A. losses from underpriced soft-market business take two or three years to develop, so the worst business looks good on the day it is written
  • B. regulators delay rate approvals
  • C. reinsurance renews annually
  • D. claims are always paid late

12. Which of the following is a portfolio referral trigger (as opposed to an authority trigger)?

  • A. the account's premium exceeds the underwriter's dollar limit
  • B. the account is outside the written guidelines
  • C. the account would push a peril zone near its aggregate cap
  • D. the account requires a signature above the underwriter's letter of authority

13. Portfolio appetite differs from individual risk appetite in that it asks:

  • A. "Is this the kind of risk we write at all?"
  • B. "Given what we already hold, do we have room for one more?"
  • C. "Is the price adequate for this risk?"
  • D. "Are the terms enforceable?"

14. A model reports that two of your lines are "uncorrelated." The judgment a human must add is:

  • A. recomputing the correlation by hand
  • B. asking what could make these supposedly independent lines lose together — something not in the historical data
  • C. trusting the model fully, since it has more data
  • D. ignoring the model entirely

15. Declining a sound, adequately-priced account "for portfolio reasons" is hard largely because:

  • A. it is illegal in most states
  • B. the cost (forgone premium) is immediate and visible while the benefit (a storm that does not break the book) is deferred and invisible
  • C. it always damages the combined ratio
  • D. brokers cannot be told the real reason

Short answer

16. In one or two sentences, explain why diversification changes a book's volatility but not the expected loss of any single risk in it.

17. Name the three numbers a portfolio manager should "read together, never one alone" when judging a segment, and give one trap that each number hides when read on its own.

18. A coastal book is concentrated in one hurricane zone. Explain, using Chapter 28's ideas, why that concentration is expensive every year even if no storm ever arrives.

19. State the three portfolio concentrations a manager must check on the Harbor Steel account before it "fits the book," and the disposition the chapter reaches.

20. Explain why portfolio discipline is described as a fiduciary obligation and not merely a profit discipline — tie it to the book's social-function theme.


Answer key (try the questions first) **Multiple choice** 1. **B** — the unit of analysis changes from the account to the book. 2. **B** — diversification reduces aggregate volatility by breaking correlations; it does not lower any account's expected loss. 3. **C** — high policy count with shared peril exposure is one correlated bet, not a stabilized pool. 4. **B** — accumulation is the build-up of many policies' exposure to one event/place/peril/counterparty. 5. **B** — a soft price wins the business the market priced higher; the segment grows *and* deteriorates (adverse selection at portfolio scale). 6. **B** — share of the book that renews term to term. 7. **B** — the good risks get picked off while the bad ones renew; adverse selection through renewals. 8. **B** — new business runs a worse loss ratio than seasoned renewal business and must be budgeted for. 9. **B** — the easiest growth is bought by cutting price/standards, deferring losses to later years. 10. **B** — discipline means slower growth or controlled shrinkage, holding rate and terms. 11. **A** — the development lag makes underpriced business look good on the day it is written. 12. **C** — a zone-cap trigger is about the book's room, not the underwriter's authority. 13. **B** — portfolio appetite is about aggregate room given what is already held. 14. **B** — the human asks what hidden driver could make "independent" lines lose together. 15. **B** — the asymmetry of an immediate visible cost versus a deferred invisible benefit. **Short answer** 16. Diversification fills the book with risks whose losses do not move together, so the *spread* of the book's possible aggregate outcomes shrinks (the bad outcomes don't all arrive at once). But each account still has the same probability and size of loss it always had, so neither its expected loss nor the book's changes — only the volatility around the expectation. 17. **Loss ratio, retention ratio, and new-business share.** Loss ratio alone: a great loss ratio can hide collapsing retention (the book is shrinking toward risks nobody else wants). Retention alone: high retention can be the residue of a soft cycle (you are keeping only the bad risks). New-business share alone: strong growth can mean you are winning business because you are *cheap*, with losses to come. Read together they reveal whether the book is improving or deteriorating at the margin. 18. Concentration raises the book's probable maximum loss in that zone (Chapter 30), which forces the insurer to hold a larger catastrophe capital charge and buy more reinsurance — both of which cost money every year (Chapter 28). So a concentrated coastal book carries a higher cost of capital and a heavier reinsurance spend regardless of whether a storm ever hits; the concentration is expensive before, and independent of, any loss. 19. (1) **Coastal-property/peril-zone concentration** — does the Port Hadley/Gulf zone have aggregate room or is it at its cap? (2) **Industry-class concentration** — does one more metal fabricator over-weight a class with shared products/casualty exposure? (3) **Broker concentration** — how much of the book already flows through Meridian Risk Partners? **Disposition:** Harbor Steel *fits portfolio appetite if the coastal zone has aggregate room*, with class and broker concentrations within tolerance — a conditional portfolio *yes*, with the zone-capacity question itself answered by the catastrophe model (Chapter 30) and the final bind at the capstone (Chapter 40). 20. A carrier that manages its accumulation responsibly — declining to over-concentrate, buying adequate reinsurance, holding capital against its probable maximum loss — is one that *will still be there to pay* when the catastrophe comes. A book that takes every good coastal risk until one storm renders it insolvent fails not only its shareholders but the very policyholders it concentrated, who bought a promise the insurer can no longer keep. Portfolio discipline and the ability to keep the promise are the same thing, which is why "fits the book" is a fiduciary gate, not a bureaucratic one.