Chapter 26 Quiz: Performance Reviews and the Measured Employee
Answer all questions. Multiple choice questions have one best answer unless otherwise noted. Short answer questions should be 2–4 sentences.
Part I: Multiple Choice
1. Frederick Taylor's Principles of Scientific Management (1911) argued that worker efficiency could be maximized by:
a) Giving workers more autonomy to determine their own methods b) Breaking jobs into component tasks, timing each, and requiring workers to follow the optimal method c) Paying workers based on seniority rather than output d) Allowing workers to participate in management decisions
2. The "epistemological asymmetry" that Taylorism created refers to:
a) Workers knowing more about their jobs than managers b) Management gaining knowledge about work performance that workers themselves did not possess c) The gap between Taylor's theories and actual factory conditions d) Different workers having different levels of education
3. In General Electric's stack ranking system under Jack Welch, what happened to the bottom 10% of performers every year?
a) They were placed on a performance improvement plan b) They received additional training c) They were terminated d) They were transferred to a different division
4. The most significant documented problem with stack ranking systems in practice was:
a) They were too expensive to administer b) They systematically incentivized sabotaging colleagues' performance rather than collaborative excellence c) They were too lenient with poor performers d) They required too much manager time
5. OKRs (Objectives and Key Results) differ from earlier performance management systems primarily because:
a) They eliminate all quantitative measurement b) Goals are typically public within the organization and explicitly separated from compensation in many implementations c) Only managers set the objectives; employees only set the key results d) They require annual rather than quarterly review cycles
6. Goodhart's Law states that:
a) Workers always perform better when monitored b) When a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure c) Measurement always improves the thing being measured d) Performance reviews create more stress than they reduce
7. In call center monitoring, "silent monitoring" refers to:
a) The automatic transcription of calls by AI software b) A supervisor listening to live calls without the employee or customer being notified c) Monitoring that occurs only during quiet periods d) Review of recorded calls after the fact
8. Which statement BEST describes the problem with automated productivity scores that measure mouse movement and keystroke activity?
a) These measurements are too expensive to collect b) They measure proxy behaviors rather than actual productivity, systematically misclassifying workers who do legitimate work that doesn't involve screen interaction c) They are only accurate for workers in tech roles d) Workers can easily see and contest their scores
9. Employee badge data illustrates "function creep" when:
a) The badge system is used for the security access control purpose it was designed for b) Badge data collected for security purposes is subsequently used for workforce analytics, productivity monitoring, or labor relations intelligence c) Employees are informed about all the uses of their badge data d) Badge readers malfunction and collect inaccurate data
10. The research evidence on whether monitoring improves performance suggests:
a) Monitoring consistently and significantly improves performance across all contexts b) Monitoring consistently reduces performance by increasing stress c) The effects are mixed — monitoring may improve short-term compliance metrics but reduce intrinsic motivation, job satisfaction, and long-term performance quality d) Monitoring has no measurable effect on performance
11. Microsoft's "Productivity Score" feature, launched in 2020, was controversial because:
a) It was inaccurate in most testing b) It allowed managers to view individual employees' scores by name, making the quantification of individual behavioral patterns visible and consequential c) It was too expensive for most organizations d) It required employees to install software on personal devices
12. The "Weingarten right" protects unionized workers by:
a) Requiring employers to share all performance data with workers b) Prohibiting all forms of electronic monitoring in unionized workplaces c) Allowing workers to request union representation before an investigatory interview that might lead to discipline d) Requiring performance reviews to be conducted annually rather than more frequently
13. Karen Levy's research on truck driver monitoring is relevant to call center monitoring because:
a) Truck drivers and call center workers belong to the same union b) Both occupations use the same monitoring software c) Her analysis that intensive monitoring attempts to capture the informal margins of work — the moments between formal tasks where workers typically maintain some autonomy — applies across both contexts d) Both occupations face the same legal monitoring regulations
14. Amazon's "Time Off Task" (TOT) system generated controversy primarily because:
a) It tracked which routes were most efficient b) Automated warnings were triggered by circumstances beyond workers' control (bathroom waits, helping colleagues, understaffed restrooms) without the ability to distinguish intentional idleness from imposed delays c) It required workers to log their own time d) It was only applied to new hires
15. The "performance review as surveillance ritual" analysis describes the document signature at the end of the review as significant because:
a) It represents the employee's agreement with the evaluation b) It creates a permanent record that can be cited in disciplinary or termination proceedings, even if the employee disagreed with the evaluation c) It is legally required by the EEOC d) It signals the completion of the manager's performance duty
Part II: Short Answer
16. Explain Goodhart's Law and give one example from the chapter of how it manifests in performance management systems.
Your answer:
17. What does Aiha Nguyen mean by the "visibility/accountability mismatch" in workplace surveillance? In what way does this concept apply to Jordan's experience at the Meridian Logistics warehouse?
Your answer:
18. This chapter argues that performance monitoring has historical continuity from Taylor's stopwatch to contemporary digital monitoring systems. What three features of performance surveillance have remained constant across this historical evolution? What has changed?
Your answer:
Answer Key (Instructor Version)
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16. Goodhart's Law: "When a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure." When metrics become consequential for accountability, workers (and organizations) optimize for the metric rather than the underlying outcome. Examples from the chapter include stack ranking incentivizing sabotage of colleagues rather than excellence; call center workers hitting handle-time targets by closing calls prematurely; Amazon warehouse workers "working to the scanner" to maximize picks rather than quality; Jordan gaming their movement patterns to produce better rate scores.
17. Nguyen's visibility/accountability mismatch: workplace surveillance makes workers more visible to management without making management decisions more accountable to workers. Jordan is extremely visible (every movement tracked), but has no access to the data being collected about them, no ability to contest the methodology, and no voice in the design of the measurement system. The monitoring flows one direction — management can see Jordan; Jordan cannot see what management is seeing.
18. Constants: (1) Management holds the performance data; workers do not. (2) Management defines what counts as performance; workers perform for the definition. (3) The surveillance architecture is designed for management purposes, not worker purposes. What has changed: the granularity of measurement has increased dramatically (from hourly observations to continuous millisecond data); the scale has expanded from individual workers to entire workforces; and the surveillance has become less visible to workers (Taylor's stopwatch was observable; digital monitoring is often invisible).