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Seduction is a loaded word. Say it aloud in a classroom and watch what happens to people's faces. Some students will smile — a knowing, slightly conspiratorial smile, as if they've been let in on a secret. Others will frown, hearing in the word...

Learning Objectives

  • Define attraction science and its constituent disciplines
  • Explain why studying seduction through a critical lens matters
  • Identify the major recurring themes of this textbook
  • Apply basic skepticism to attraction research claims

Chapter 1: Why Study Seduction? The Science Behind the Game

The Word Nobody Says Neutrally

Seduction is a loaded word. Say it aloud in a classroom and watch what happens to people's faces. Some students will smile — a knowing, slightly conspiratorial smile, as if they've been let in on a secret. Others will frown, hearing in the word something coercive, manipulative, maybe predatory. A few will simply look curious, waiting to see which direction the conversation goes. Those three reactions — pleasure, suspicion, curiosity — tell you almost everything you need to know about why this book exists.

The word seduce comes from the Latin seducere: to lead away, to lead aside, to draw someone off the expected path. Its earliest uses in English carried a distinctly sinister undertone — it meant to corrupt, to mislead, to lure into wrongdoing. Over centuries the word's connotations have shifted and multiplied, so that today "seduction" can mean anything from a deliberately predatory manipulation to a playful flirtation to the entirely benign experience of being captivated by a piece of music. We now speak of being seduced by an idea, by a beautiful view, by a well-made meal. The word has traveled far from its sinister origins, and it now sits at an uncomfortable crossroads between fascination and harm.

That crossroads is exactly where this textbook lives.

This is not a pickup guide. It is not a manual for becoming more attractive, for getting more dates, for closing more deals, or for any of the other instrumental goals that populate the self-help section of your local bookstore. If you came here hoping for a ranked list of psychological tricks to deploy on unsuspecting romantic targets, you are in for a significant reorientation — but I hope you'll find the reorientation worthwhile. What this book offers instead is something rarer and, I would argue, more genuinely useful: a rigorous, critical, empirically grounded examination of how and why human beings attract one another. We will look at the science as science — with all its contradictions, its provisional findings, its alarming gaps, and its occasional breathtaking insights.

We will also look at who the science is about, who conducted it, who was systematically excluded from it, and what happens when findings get stripped of their caveats and served up as universal truths. We will ask, again and again, the three questions that will organize this entire course:

  1. What does the evidence actually say?
  2. Who is this research about — and who is missing?
  3. What are the ethical implications?

These are not rhetorical questions. They are analytical tools, and by the end of this book, using them should feel as natural as breathing.


A Conference in Montréal: The Okafor-Reyes Study Begins

On a rainy Thursday afternoon in October — the kind of gray October that settles over Montréal like a second sky — Dr. Adaeze Okafor arrived at the Society for Personality and Social Psychology's annual symposium on cross-cultural relationships carrying two things: a coffee that had gone cold on the taxi ride from the airport, and a twenty-minute presentation she had already revised four times that morning.

Okafor is a social psychologist at the University of Michigan, though she'd be the first to complicate that identifier. Born in Enugu, Nigeria, raised in Ann Arbor from age nine, she is the kind of scholar who thinks about what it means to be a "universal" finding the way a structural engineer thinks about load-bearing walls — with a professional suspicion that collapse is possible and a deep interest in knowing exactly where the stress concentrates. Her research focuses on cross-cultural relationship norms, particularly how Western psychological frameworks distort or simply fail to translate the relational worlds of people outside the WEIRD sample: the Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic populations that have historically provided the majority of psychology's data. She has spent the better part of a decade arguing — politely but persistently — that psychology has told itself a story about human desire that is really a story about a particular kind of human desire, located in particular university towns, in particular economic conditions, in a particular historical moment, and then projected outward onto the species as a whole.

Dr. Carlos Reyes arrived at the same conference from Buenos Aires, where he holds a position at the Universidad de Buenos Aires in evolutionary psychology. He is, by his own description, an improbable evolutionary psychologist — a man who reads feminist theory alongside Robert Trivers, who is equally comfortable citing Sarah Blaffer Hrdy and David Buss, and who has spent the better part of fifteen years trying to build a version of evolutionary psychology that doesn't embarrass itself in mixed company. He is warm, self-deprecating about his own discipline's excesses, and possessed of a genuinely rigorous empirical instinct. He had come to Montréal to present preliminary thinking on a cross-cultural project he was hoping to launch — a study ambitious enough that he knew he couldn't do it alone. His morning talk had been titled, with characteristic candor, "What Buss Got Right and What Buss Didn't Know He Was Assuming," a title that told you more or less everything you needed to know about how he positioned himself within his own field.

They met during the afternoon coffee break, which is to say they reached for the same coffee dispenser at approximately the same moment and then had the mildly awkward conversation that follows such near-collisions.

"I heard your talk this morning," Reyes said, after they'd introduced themselves. "The critique of Buss's mate preference data. The WEIRD problem."

"And I heard yours," Okafor replied, with a smile that held something cautious in it. "The cross-cultural attraction study you're proposing."

"Ah." He seemed to register something. "You have concerns."

"I have questions," she said. "Which is slightly different."

"Tell me one."

She considered. "Your proposed study starts with a hypotheses list drawn from sexual selection theory. High-quality resources, health indicators, symmetry, youth-fertility cues. You want to see if these preferences replicate cross-culturally."

"That's right."

"And if they do, you'll conclude the preferences are evolutionarily ancient."

"Tentatively, yes."

"But here's my question." She set down the coffee. "If a study designed to find universal preferences finds universal preferences, how much of that is biology and how much is the global reach of Western media? We've exported American and European beauty standards to every place with a television and an internet connection. By the time you get to your twelve-country sample, you may not be measuring biological preferences. You may be measuring the successful cultural imperialism of Vogue."

Reyes was quiet for a moment. He had heard versions of this argument before, but rarely put with such precision. "That's a legitimate confound," he said finally. "The question is how to design around it."

"You can't fully design around it," Okafor said. "That's my point. What you can do is treat cultural contamination as a variable rather than a confound to eliminate — measure media exposure, globalization indices, contact with Western aesthetics, and partial out that variance. Then whatever remains might be closer to what you're looking for."

What followed was a two-hour conversation that outlasted the coffee break, most of the afternoon sessions, and eventually relocated to a restaurant on Rue Saint-Denis where they talked until the kitchen closed. Their disagreement — and it was a genuine disagreement, collegial but substantive — concerned a fundamental question about how to frame a cross-cultural study of attraction. Reyes wanted to begin with evolutionary hypotheses: if certain mate preferences (for resources, for health signals, for symmetry) appear robustly across cultures, that tells us something important about the biological substrates of human desire. You start with the theory and let the data confirm or disconfirm it.

Okafor was skeptical of that starting point. Beginning with evolutionary hypotheses, she argued, predetermines which findings look like signal and which look like noise. If you arrive expecting to find universal preferences, you will be primed to code ambiguous data as confirmation and to treat cultural variation as deviation from a norm rather than as evidence in its own right. "You're not neutral when you walk into the field," she told him. "None of us are. But you should at least know which direction you're leaning." She described a study she had run in Lagos three years earlier, interviewing women about mate preferences. The women's responses fit the evolutionary predictions in some ways — resource acquisition did matter — but the qualitative texture of what "resources" meant, what "security" meant, what traits they associated with each other, were arranged differently than Western theory predicted. The quantitative data had looked like confirmation; the qualitative data had been a significant complication. If she'd only collected surveys, she said, she would have walked away with a distorted picture of agreement.

"And inductive methods are neutral?" Reyes asked. He was genuinely curious, not dismissive. "You still have to decide what to measure, which behaviors count as attraction, which self-reports to trust. Every methodological choice is a theoretical choice in disguise."

"Agreed," Okafor said. "Which is why I'm proposing mixed methods. You get your quantitative cross-national surveys. I get my qualitative interviews. We analyze them separately, then compare. Neither of us gets to disappear the other's data." She paused. "And we pre-register the hypotheses. Everything. So there's no question afterward about what we were looking for and what we found accidentally."

Reyes tilted his head. He was the kind of researcher who found pre-registration somewhat constraining, who believed that the most interesting findings were often the unexpected ones. But he also knew the replication crisis had made his field look bad, and that the evolutionary psychology claims that had not replicated — the ovulation cycle literature, particularly — had been among the ones where pre-registration would have helped most. "All right," he said. "Pre-registered. Mixed methods. But I want the quantitative component to be genuinely large — we're talking national samples, not university samples."

"Absolutely," she said. "University samples are how we got into this mess."

By the end of the evening, they had agreed to collaborate on what would become the Global Attraction Project — a five-year, twelve-country study that would examine cross-cultural attraction patterns using exactly the kind of mixed-method approach Okafor had advocated. Reyes would oversee the quantitative survey arm; Okafor would lead the qualitative interview component. Neither would have full control. Both would have to account for the other's findings.

They would spend the next year designing the study together. The countries they selected — the United States, Nigeria, Japan, Brazil, India, Sweden, Morocco, South Korea, Australia, Mexico, Germany, and South Africa — were chosen to maximize variation in economic development, religious tradition, gender equity indices, and collectivist-individualist orientation. The design would take another year to finalize, for reasons we will examine in Chapter 3. As of the chapter you are reading now, the study is in its planning stages.

We return to Okafor and Reyes throughout this book — not because their study delivers neat, tidy answers, but because the argument they had in Montréal, and the arguments they continue to have across Zoom calls and conference rooms and long emails sent at odd hours across time zones, models something important: the way that scientific knowledge about attraction actually gets made. It is not a process of revelation. It is a process of productive disagreement between people who care about getting it right.

That, in its essence, is what the science of attraction looks like from the inside.


What Is Attraction Science? A Multidisciplinary Landscape

The academic study of attraction and seduction does not belong to any single discipline. It is a territory claimed, contested, and mapped differently by at least five distinct fields, each with its own methods, its own preferred questions, and its own characteristic blind spots.

Social psychology is perhaps the most directly relevant field. Social psychologists study attraction as an interpersonal phenomenon — how people evaluate others, what factors predict liking, how similarity and proximity and physical appearance and self-disclosure all interact to produce the experience we call "being attracted to someone." Classic work by Donn Byrne on the similarity-attraction effect (1971), Elliot Aronson and Darwyn Linder's gain-loss theory of attraction (1965), and Elaine Hatfield's foundational research on passionate love (1988) all sit within this tradition. The flagship study of social psychological attraction research is arguably Robert Zajonc's 1968 "mere exposure effect" experiment — demonstrating that simply seeing a stimulus more often makes us like it more — which transformed how researchers understood familiarity's role in attraction. Social psychology tends to use experimental methods and surveys, which gives it tremendous control but also restricts it largely to laboratory settings and convenience samples. The replication crisis has hit this field particularly hard: a significant fraction of its canonical findings have not survived large-scale replication attempts, requiring careful, skeptical engagement with even the most-cited work.

Evolutionary psychology approaches attraction as the product of selection pressures operating over millions of years. The core argument — associated with researchers like David Buss, Steven Pinker, and, in more nuanced form, Sarah Blaffer Hrdy — is that humans, like other animals, have evolved psychological mechanisms that predispose us toward certain mate preferences. Males, the classic argument goes, should prefer cues of fertility (youth, symmetry, health); females should prefer cues of resource acquisition and genetic quality. David Buss's 1989 cross-cultural study of mate preferences, published in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, appeared to support these predictions across 37 societies and remains the most-cited work in the field. Sarah Blaffer Hrdy's "Mothers and Others" (2009) and her earlier "The Woman That Never Evolved" (1981) offer a corrective evolutionary view that emphasizes female agency, cooperative breeding, and the complex selection pressures that shaped both sexes — work that evolutionary psychology has sometimes been slow to absorb. But as Okafor's Montréal critique made clear, the interpretation of such data is not straightforward, and the field has generated as much controversy as it has insight. The evolutionary psychology of attraction has also repeatedly attracted accusations of confirming ideological priors — the finding that men are universally programmed to prefer younger women, for instance, carries enormous ideological freight regardless of whether the data actually support the claim.

Neuroscience has entered the attraction picture with force in the last thirty years, as imaging technologies have allowed researchers to look at what happens inside the brain when people fall in love, experience lust, or process a beautiful face. Helen Fisher's neuroimaging work (Fisher, Aron & Brown, 2005) identified three distinct but overlapping brain systems — lust, romantic attraction, and attachment — associated with different neurotransmitters and hormones. The dopaminergic reward system lights up during early romantic love in ways that look remarkably similar to addiction pathways. Oxytocin and vasopressin appear to mediate bonding behaviors in both humans and non-human animals; the work of C. Sue Carter and colleagues on prairie voles and pair bonding has been influential in shaping hypotheses about human attachment neuroscience. This work is genuinely fascinating, and it is also often overhyped, stripped of context, and turned into pop-science claims about how love is "just chemicals" — a reductionism that neuroscientists themselves tend to reject vigorously. Knowing which brain region activates during romantic love does not explain romantic love; it locates one piece of its physical substrate, which is quite a different thing.

Sociology brings an entirely different toolkit. Rather than asking what happens inside individuals, sociology asks about the structures within which attraction and relationship formation occur: dating markets, social norms, institutional arrangements, race and class stratification, and the cultural scripts that tell people what desire is supposed to look like. The sociological tradition of studying courtship — from the mid-century work of Willard Waller on dating-and-rating complexes to more recent work by Kristen Barber, Andrea Press, and Arlie Hochschild on emotional labor and intimacy — emphasizes that attraction does not happen between free-floating individuals. It happens between people embedded in social structures that profoundly shape who they notice, who they approach, and who they believe they "deserve." The flagship sociological contribution to attraction science may be Illouz's "Consuming the Romantic Utopia" (1997) and her later "Cold Intimacies" (2007), which trace how capitalism has transformed romantic love into a commodity — reshaping not just the contexts of courtship but the very feelings involved.

Communication studies focuses on the processes by which attraction is expressed, negotiated, and sustained. How do people signal interest? How do they read (and misread) the signals of others? What role does language play, versus nonverbal cues, versus digital mediation? Scholars like Mark Knapp, whose work on relational development stages (1978) remains influential, and more recently researchers examining computer-mediated communication and online impression management, operate in this tradition. The contribution of communication studies has become increasingly central as digital mediation becomes the dominant mode of early courtship: when first encounters happen on apps and text-first rather than face-to-face, the communication processes through which attraction is signaled and interpreted change fundamentally, and communication scholars are uniquely equipped to study those changes.

These five fields do not always talk to each other politely. Evolutionary psychologists sometimes dismiss sociological accounts as refusing to engage with human biology; sociologists sometimes dismiss evolutionary psychology as telling ideologically convenient stories dressed up as science. Neuroscientists are occasionally guilty of assuming that identifying a neural correlate explains a phenomenon, when in fact it merely redescribes it at a different level of analysis. Communication scholars sometimes find themselves underread by colleagues who consider process less interesting than mechanism.

This textbook takes the view that all five perspectives are necessary and that none is sufficient. The experience of being drawn to another person — that specific, irreducible, sometimes overwhelming pull — is simultaneously biological, psychological, social, cultural, and communicative. Any account that ignores one of these dimensions will be, at best, incomplete.

💡 Key Insight

Attraction science is inherently multidisciplinary. A complete account of why humans are drawn to one another must integrate evolutionary biology, social psychology, neuroscience, sociology, and communication — not because these fields agree with each other, but precisely because they don't. The tensions between them are where the most interesting questions live.


Why This Matters: The Stakes of Understanding Attraction

You might be thinking: isn't this just an interesting intellectual puzzle? Why does it matter, practically speaking, whether we understand the science behind attraction?

The answer is that the science of attraction — or rather, the popularized, often distorted version of it that circulates in culture — is already shaping people's lives, frequently for the worse.

Consider the pickup artist (PUA) industry, which we examine in detail in Chapter 29. Beginning in the early 2000s and accelerating through the internet age, a commercial enterprise developed around the idea that attraction is a game with exploitable rules — a game that men could learn to "win" through the right combination of psychological techniques. The techniques in question were often borrowed, without credit or context, from legitimate social psychology research: concepts like social proof, scarcity, reciprocity, and self-disclosure were extracted from Cialdini's work on influence (1984) and repackaged as tools for manipulation. The resulting cultural artifact — forums like "The Attraction Forums," books like The Game (Neil Strauss, 2005), "Mystery Method" (Erik von Markovik, 2007), "The Red Pill" communities on Reddit, and "boot camps" charging thousands of dollars — explicitly framed attraction as something done to a target rather than as a mutual, intersubjective experience. These works borrowed selectively and without acknowledgment from legitimate social scientists: Cialdini's influence work appears in "negging" scripts; Robert Axelrod's cooperation research underlies "push-pull" techniques; attachment theory gets distorted into advice to manufacture anxiety to create addiction. The ethical consequences of this framing have been documented: women reporting feeling manipulated and objectified, men reporting anxiety and shame when the "techniques" failed, and an entire community organized around the dehumanization of potential partners.

The specific harm to women from PUA culture is not merely psychological. Research by Duval and colleagues (2019) and journalistic documentation by reporters covering the "manosphere" have connected radicalized PUA communities to elevated rates of sexual entitlement beliefs and, in the most extreme cases, to violence. The incel-adjacent ideology that has driven mass violence (discussed in Chapter 32) is not entirely separate from PUA culture — it shares the same core premise that sexual access to women is something men are owed. When that premise gets frustrated, the response in some individuals is rage.

The harm to men within PUA culture is different but real. Research on men who invest heavily in "seduction communities" finds elevated rates of anxiety, shame, depression, and relationship dissatisfaction. When attraction is treated as a performance-and-technique problem, and the techniques don't "work," the failure feels catastrophic rather than ordinary — because the entire architecture of the community's worldview says that failure is the man's fault for not having learned the right moves. The men who wash out of PUA communities often leave with more negative self-concepts than when they arrived. Understanding attraction science accurately — with its caveats, its limits, its ethical dimensions — is a partial antidote to this kind of misuse.

At a more personal level, the way we understand attraction shapes how we treat ourselves. Misguided "scientific" claims about what makes people attractive — claims about weight, height, income, symmetry, personality — cause genuine harm when people internalize them as verdicts on their own worth. Millions of people have concluded, based on pseudoscientific pronouncements about attractiveness hierarchies, that they are fundamentally undesirable. That conclusion is both empirically wrong (attraction is far more variable, context-dependent, and idiosyncratic than any hierarchy implies) and psychologically damaging. The research on the relationship between attractiveness beliefs and mental health is clear: people who believe their attractiveness is fixed, biological, and low are more likely to be depressed, to disengage from the social world, and to treat others badly as a consequence of their sense of deprivation.

And at the broadest social level, attraction science has implications for how we design institutions — from dating apps that use algorithmic matching to legal definitions of harassment to public health programs addressing sexual coercion. Getting the science right, and getting its interpretation right, is not merely an academic exercise.

🔵 Ethical Lens

Every time you encounter a scientific claim about attraction — whether in a journal article, a TED talk, a magazine feature, or a social media post — it is worth asking: what is this claim being used to justify? Science describes how things are. It does not automatically determine how things should be. The gap between "people tend to prefer X" and "people should prefer X" or "you should be X" is one of the most important gaps in all of applied social science, and we will return to it constantly throughout this book.


The Replication Crisis: A First Introduction

Here is something your textbook probably should have told you sooner in your academic career: a substantial fraction of published psychological research does not replicate.

That sentence deserves a moment. The replication crisis — also called the reproducibility crisis — refers to the systematic finding, beginning around 2011 and accelerating dramatically through the 2010s, that many canonical psychological studies, when repeated by independent researchers using the same methods, fail to produce the same results. The Open Science Collaboration's landmark 2015 study attempted to replicate 100 published psychology experiments and found that only about 39 percent showed effects in the same direction and of similar magnitude when retested (Open Science Collaboration, 2015). Thirty-nine percent. Psychology has spent the decade since grappling with what this means.

The implications for attraction research are significant. Some of the most-cited, most-widely-publicized findings in the field have proven difficult or impossible to replicate. The "sexy cues of ovulation" literature — a body of work claiming that women's mate preferences, behavior, and even smell shift detectably across the menstrual cycle — has been particularly hard-hit, with large-scale preregistered replications failing to find effects that earlier studies reported confidently (Gangestad & Thornhill, 2008, and subsequent challenges, particularly Harris, 2011; Wood et al., 2014). Studies on implicit racial preferences in attraction, on the effects of power posing on hormones (relevant because power-posing research was frequently cited in attraction contexts), on the ego-depletion effect in social judgment — all have shown substantially weaker effects or failed outright in replication.

This does not mean that attraction science is worthless. It means that individual studies — especially small-sample studies conducted at a single university with undergraduate volunteers — should be held lightly. The question to ask is not "did a study find this?" but "how many studies have found this, how large were the samples, were the methods pre-registered, and have independent labs reproduced the result?"

📊 Research Spotlight

The Open Science Collaboration (2015) attempted to replicate 100 psychology studies published in major journals between 2008 and 2012. Only about 39% replicated successfully — a finding that sent shockwaves through the discipline. Attraction research has not been immune: a 2017 meta-analysis by Meltzer and colleagues found substantial heterogeneity in studies of physical attractiveness and relationship outcomes, suggesting that effect sizes in the original literature were inflated by small samples and publication bias. The lesson is not nihilism — it is calibrated skepticism.

Part of what drove the replication crisis was a set of methodological practices that, while not intentionally fraudulent, created systematic pressure toward publishing positive results. Researchers engaged in what statisticians call p-hacking — running multiple analyses and reporting only the ones that achieved statistical significance — not necessarily because they were dishonest, but because they were working within a publication culture that rewarded positive findings and buried null results. Sample sizes were often far too small to detect the effects researchers were claiming to detect. Studies were rarely pre-registered, meaning the research community had no way to distinguish hypotheses formed before data collection from hypotheses generated after looking at the data (a practice called HARKing — Hypothesizing After Results are Known).

The good news is that psychology has responded. Pre-registration of studies — publishing the hypothesis and analysis plan before collecting data — is now strongly encouraged at major journals. Replication studies are increasingly valued. Large, multi-site collaborations (exactly like the kind Okafor and Reyes are designing) are seen as the gold standard. Effect sizes and confidence intervals receive more attention than bare p-values.

Throughout this book, when we discuss a research finding, we will flag its replication status, its sample characteristics, and its methodological quality. We will never present a single study as the final word on anything. That is not pessimism — it is what good science looks like.

🧪 Methodology Note

WEIRD Bias: The acronym WEIRD, coined by Henrich, Heine & Norenzayan (2010) in a landmark critique published in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, stands for Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic. The authors demonstrated that psychology's subject pool — overwhelmingly drawn from undergraduate students at American and European universities — is a profound statistical outlier among the humans who have ever lived. WEIRD populations are unusual in their individualism, their reliance on analytic (rather than holistic) reasoning, their attitudes toward fairness and cooperation, and their visual perception. Attraction research is heavily WEIRD. This does not invalidate it, but it does mean that findings should not be casually generalized to the seven billion people who don't fit that profile.


The History of Studying Attraction: From Darwin to Today

The scientific study of human attraction is younger than you might expect. For most of human history, attraction was the province of poets, philosophers, and theologians — people concerned with love's meaning, not its mechanism. The idea that desire could be studied empirically, with controlled variables and measurable outcomes, required two preconditions: the development of empirical psychology as a discipline (which arrived in earnest with Wilhelm Wundt's Leipzig laboratory in 1879), and a cultural willingness to treat romantic and sexual behavior as a legitimate subject of scientific inquiry (which took considerably longer to arrive).

Charles Darwin, whose The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex (1871) is the founding document of evolutionary thinking about attraction, was working in a purely observational mode — cataloguing patterns in non-human animal mate choice and extrapolating, carefully, to humans. Darwin's concept of sexual selection — the idea that competition for mates drives the evolution of traits beyond those necessary for mere survival — gave attraction science its first theoretical framework. But Darwin was cautious, and his Victorian context prevented him from investigating human sexuality with the directness that later researchers would bring.

The first psychological attention to attraction as such came in the early twentieth century, largely through the back door of psychoanalysis. Freud's accounts of libido, transference, and the erotic dimensions of the therapeutic relationship touched on attraction without studying it empirically. What Freudian theory contributed — for better and worse — was a vocabulary: desire, repression, projection, sublimation. These concepts, though unfalsifiable in their original Freudian forms, shaped the questions that later empirical researchers would ask.

The modern empirical study of attraction is typically dated to the late 1950s and 1960s — the same era that produced the cognitive revolution in psychology. Theodore Newcomb's 1961 "The Acquaintance Process" followed male college students over an academic year, measuring their attitudes and tracking friendship formation, and found strong evidence for the role of attitudinal similarity in liking. Donn Byrne's "bogus stranger" paradigm, developed in the early 1960s, created a replicable laboratory procedure for studying the similarity-attraction link. These studies established attraction as a legitimate empirical question and launched what became social psychology's "interpersonal attraction" research program.

The 1970s brought three major developments. First, Elaine Hatfield and Ellen Berscheid's work on passionate love — culminating in the Passionate Love Scale (1986) and Hatfield's later theorizing on "companionate" versus "passionate" love — brought the emotional phenomenology of attraction under scientific scrutiny. Second, the Dutton and Aron suspension bridge study (1974) introduced misattribution of arousal as a mechanism of attraction and inaugurated a generation of research on embodied cognition in romantic contexts. Third, David Rubin's Love Scale (1970) created a psychometric instrument for measuring love itself — an act of intellectual bravery that earned him significant criticism from colleagues who considered love too complex for a Likert scale.

The 1980s and 1990s brought evolutionary psychology into the attraction conversation with force. David Buss's 1989 cross-cultural study of mate preferences, Robert Trivers's earlier parental investment theory (1972), and the burgeoning field of behavioral ecology provided a theoretical architecture for understanding attraction as adaptive — as the product of selection pressures rather than mere culture. Simultaneously, John Bowlby's attachment theory, developed for infant-caregiver relationships, was being extended to adult romantic attachment by Cindy Hazan and Phillip Shaver (1987) — producing one of the most productive research programs in the field's history.

The 2000s and 2010s brought three more revolutions: neuroimaging (Helen Fisher's brain-scanning work on love and lust), the internet (which created unprecedented data about who chooses whom and gave rise to the algorithmic study of mate selection), and the replication crisis (which forced the field to reckon with how much of what it thought it knew was actually robust). The Global Attraction Project that Okafor and Reyes are launching is, in this sense, a product of all three: using digital data collection tools, bringing neuroscience-derived measures, and designed with the pre-registration and methodological rigor that the replication crisis made necessary.

📊 Research Spotlight: The trajectory from Darwin (1871) to Fisher's fMRI studies (2005) to Okafor and Reyes's pre-registered cross-national survey (2025) spans 150 years of increasing methodological sophistication. What has remained constant is the question: why do humans find certain people irresistibly compelling? What has changed dramatically is the set of tools available to answer it, and the recognition that simple answers to that question were always going to be wrong.


Who Funds Attraction Research and Why It Matters

Research costs money. Someone has to pay for the undergraduate research assistants, the participant compensation, the survey platforms, the laboratory space, the statistical software, the researcher's salary. Where that money comes from shapes — not always overtly, but reliably — what questions get asked, how they get framed, and what findings get amplified.

In attraction science, funding comes from three primary sources: federal agencies, universities, and the private sector. Each has its own characteristic distortions.

Federal funding for attraction research comes primarily through the National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Institutes of Health (NIH, particularly through the National Institute of Mental Health), and, to a lesser extent, the National Institute on Aging. Federal funding tends toward basic science — foundational questions about how attraction works — and is subject to peer review and public transparency requirements. Its distortions are mostly the distortions of the field itself: it funds what reviewers find credible, which means it tends to fund questions that fit within existing paradigms and methodologies. The WEIRD sample problem is partly a federal funding problem: it is much easier and cheaper to run studies at a university where the lab is located than to execute cross-national studies, so most federally funded attraction research is, by default, local.

NIH has occasionally funded attraction research in the context of sexual health — particularly research on HIV prevention, adolescent sexual behavior, and intimate partner violence — which has given sexual health researchers a funding stream that pure attraction researchers don't always have access to. The policy implications of this funding structure: research that can be linked to health outcomes gets funded; research that can't, doesn't.

University funding through startup grants, internal research funds, and departmental support is smaller in scale but allows more exploratory work. It is particularly important for early-career researchers who don't yet have the publication record to compete for large federal grants. The distortion here is prestige: university funding tends to flow toward researchers already at prestigious institutions, who are embedded in professional networks that define what counts as important work.

Private sector funding is the most consequential recent development in attraction science, and the most underscrutinized. Dating apps — Match Group (which owns Tinder, OKCupid, Hinge, and Match.com), Bumble, Grindr, and others — generate enormous quantities of data about human partner choice, and they have begun funding research collaborations with academic psychologists and sociologists. Some of this research is genuinely valuable: OKCupid's own data analyses (published in Rudder's Dataclysm, 2014) produced some of the most revealing real-world findings about racial preferences in attraction ever published. Hinge's partnership with researchers on commitment patterns has generated peer-reviewed publications.

But dating app funding creates specific, identifiable distortions. Apps are businesses whose revenue depends on user engagement and subscriptions. They have a commercial interest in research that shows their product enables good relationships — not research that shows their product creates addictive scrolling behavior, amplifies racial discrimination, or harms mental health. When a dating app funds research on user wellbeing, it is worth asking: did the contract include publication rights and data ownership restrictions? Who had final review of the manuscript? The best academic researchers who partner with industry insist on publication rights and independent data access, but these are not universal conditions.

💡 Key Insight: The funding landscape for attraction research is not neutral. Federal funding is distorted by the academy's own paradigmatic assumptions; private sector funding is distorted by commercial interests. Neither source is uniformly corrupting — much excellent research has been done with both — but a sophisticated reader of attraction science tracks funding sources the way a sophisticated reader of pharmaceutical research tracks whether the drug company funded the trial.

A related issue is publication bias — the well-documented tendency for journals to publish positive findings (studies that find an effect) and reject null findings (studies that find nothing). In attraction research, this means that the literature overrepresents positive effects — studies that found a preference, a pattern, a relationship — and underrepresents the many studies that found no effect or a smaller effect than expected. Pre-registration partially addresses this by creating a public record of what was hypothesized before data collection, making it possible to detect when a "positive" finding was actually a re-framed null finding. But pre-registration is not yet universal, and the published literature still reflects decades of unpublished null results.

For you as a reader and future practitioner of whatever field you're entering: this context does not mean that attraction science is corrupt or useless. It means that the critical consumer of research always asks who paid for this, what they had to gain from a positive result, and whether the finding has been replicated by researchers without those interests. These questions apply to every field of science. They apply with particular force to a field whose findings carry such immediate personal and commercial relevance.


The Ethics of Studying Desire

Before a research project about human attraction can proceed, it must survive a conversation with an Institutional Review Board — the committee that reviews research plans at universities and hospitals to ensure that human subjects are protected from harm. IRBs are sometimes characterized by impatient researchers as obstacles to knowledge, and it is true that the process can be slow and that IRBs occasionally misunderstand research designs. But the IRB exists for good historical reasons, and nowhere are those reasons more apparent than in studies of attraction and sexuality.

Attraction research raises ethical issues that don't arise in studies of, say, memory or perception. First, the subject matter is intimate. Asking people about their attraction patterns, their sexual preferences, their histories of desire — these are questions that touch on the self in ways that demand careful handling. Participants need to know what they are signing up for. They need to be able to withdraw without penalty. They need to have their responses protected against disclosure. Attraction data is identifying in ways that other psychological data is not: knowing someone's mate preferences and attraction history reveals things about them that could damage their reputation, their relationships, and in some cases their safety.

Second, attraction research has a particular vulnerability to deception studies. Some of the most influential attraction experiments involved some form of deception — participants who didn't know what was really being studied, confederates posing as potential romantic partners, or cover stories designed to prevent demand characteristics from distorting results. The classic Dutton & Aron (1974) suspension bridge study, in which men who met an attractive female confederate on a high, swaying bridge were more likely to call her afterward than men who met her on a low, stable bridge, involved exactly this kind of deception. Deception raises ethical questions: Is the knowledge gained worth the breach of trust? Are participants adequately debriefed afterward? What happens when someone has a genuine emotional reaction to a deception scenario? The woman who was the confederate in the suspension bridge study later wrote about the experience of performing attraction as a job, raising questions the original paper did not engage with.

Third, stimulus materials in attraction research have a documented racial ethics problem. Studies that show participants photographs of people of different races and ask them to rate attractiveness are a standard methodology in the field — and they embed racial hierarchies in their design. If your stimulus set uses professional model headshots for white targets and stock photos for Black targets, your study contains a confound that will produce racialized results unrelated to actual preference. Research on racial bias in attractiveness ratings has been plagued by these methodological problems for decades, making it difficult to distinguish genuine preference patterns from artifacts of unequal stimulus quality. IRBs reviewing attraction studies are increasingly aware of this, but unequal stimulus materials remain a persistent problem.

Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, attraction research has a documented history of producing findings that get weaponized. Studies purporting to show biological bases for racial preferences in attraction, studies on gender differences in sexual strategies, studies on the effects of alcohol on attraction — all have been misappropriated by bad actors to justify discrimination, harassment, or coercion. Researchers working in this area have an obligation to think carefully not just about what their study will find, but about how its findings might be used — and misused. The "dual use" problem — the use of scientific findings for purposes other than those the scientists intended — is real and consequential, and attraction science is one of the fields where it operates most visibly.

🔵 Ethical Lens: IRB Concerns in Attraction Research

When reviewing proposals for attraction studies, IRBs typically scrutinize several issues: (1) Informed consent — are participants fully aware of the nature of the study, particularly when deception is involved? (2) Vulnerability — are participants recruited from populations that might feel coerced, such as students in a professor's own course? (3) Data security — given the intimate nature of attraction data, how will identifiers be protected? (4) Debriefing — for deception studies, will participants be fully informed afterward, and will they have access to support if the experience is distressing? (5) Stimulus equity — are materials depicting people of different groups equivalent in quality and presentation? (6) Dual use — how might the findings be used by parties outside the research community, and have the researchers considered this?

This book is not an ethics course, but ethics runs through it continuously. The study of attraction is inseparable from questions about power — who has it, who doesn't, and what happens when scientific findings become instruments of its exercise or its abuse.


Three Questions for the Semester

As you move through this book, three questions will serve as your constant compass. I'd recommend writing them somewhere you'll see them repeatedly. They apply to almost every chapter, every research finding, every media headline about attraction science you will encounter.

Question One: What Does the Evidence Actually Say?

This sounds simple, but it requires work. Evidence is not the same as assertion. "Studies show" is not evidence — it's a phrase that can precede almost anything. When someone cites a study, the appropriate response is not automatic acceptance or automatic skepticism, but a set of follow-up questions: What was the sample? How large? From what population? How was the variable of interest measured? Have the results been replicated? What is the effect size — not just whether an effect was found, but how big it is and whether it would be detectable in real-world conditions?

Throughout this book, we practice this skill. We look at actual research designs. We ask what the numbers mean. We notice when findings are described more confidently than the data warrant, and we notice when legitimate findings are dismissed for ideological reasons. The goal is calibrated judgment — neither credulous nor cynical.

Question Two: Who Is This Research About — and Who Is Missing?

The standard subject in mid-twentieth-century American social psychology was a white, heterosexual, able-bodied undergraduate at an American university. For decades, this subject was treated as a generic "person," and findings about this narrow slice of humanity were written up as facts about human beings.

The field has changed significantly in the last twenty years, though it has not changed enough. Research on same-sex attraction, on bisexuality, on non-binary and trans people's experiences of desire, has grown substantially — but it remains proportionally underrepresented and is often published in more marginalized venues. Research on attraction across racial and ethnic groups has expanded but is still riven with methodological problems, particularly around how race is treated as a variable. Research on attraction at older ages, in people with disabilities, in working-class or low-income communities, in non-Western cultures — all of this exists but occupies the margins of the field.

This means that when we read about "how attraction works," we should ask immediately: for whom? In what sample? Whose experience of attraction counts as the default, and whose is treated as a deviation from it? These questions are not just about fairness (though they are about that). They are about scientific validity. A theory of attraction that only accounts for one demographic isn't a general theory — it's a special case pretending to be universal.

⚖️ Debate Point: Is There a Universal Grammar of Attraction?

Evolutionary psychologists tend to argue that certain preference patterns — for symmetry, health, youth, and resource acquisition — appear across cultures with enough consistency to suggest a shared biological substrate. Cultural psychologists and sociologists tend to argue that what looks universal is actually an artifact of global media homogenization, colonial influence on beauty standards, and the WEIRD bias in most research samples. Both sides have evidence. Both sides have overreached at times. The honest position is that some features of attraction appear robustly cross-cultural while others show enormous variation — and that disentangling which is which requires exactly the kind of study Okafor and Reyes are attempting: large samples, multiple countries, mixed methods, and researchers willing to disagree with their own priors.

Question Three: What Are the Ethical Implications?

Science describes. It does not prescribe. But descriptions have consequences, and the history of science applied to human relationships is littered with cases where descriptive claims were converted — sometimes by researchers, more often by popularizers — into prescriptions, justifications, or verdicts.

"Men are biologically predisposed to prefer younger women" is a descriptive hypothesis. Whether it is empirically accurate (the picture is more complicated than the claim suggests) is a separate question from what follows from it if it were accurate. Does it mean men's preferences should be accommodated? That they can't be changed? That women over 35 should accept being less desired? None of these follow, even in principle. Describing a tendency is not the same as endorsing it or naturalizing it.

This distinction — between is and ought, between description and prescription, between natural and good — is one of the most important philosophical guardrails in any discussion of the biology and psychology of attraction. We will return to it every time someone tries to use evolutionary claims to justify discrimination, or conversely, every time someone argues that because something is cultural it is infinitely malleable and biology is irrelevant.


The Book's Approach: Critical, Intersectional, Methodologically Honest

Let me be direct about the commitments that shape this textbook, so you can evaluate them for yourself.

Critical means that we take nothing at face value — neither scientific findings nor cultural assumptions about attraction. When a study finds that women prefer dominant men, we ask: how was "dominance" measured? Is the finding robust? What does it mean for women who prefer something different? What happens to men who are pressured to perform dominance? When popular culture tells us that playing "hard to get" works, we ask: works for whom? To what end? With what effect on the person playing the game and the person being played?

Intersectional means that we take seriously the ways that race, gender, class, sexuality, disability, age, and other social positions shape the experience of attraction — not as add-ons to a generic account, but as constitutive of it. Attraction does not happen in a social vacuum. It happens between people who have been sorted and ranked by social systems they didn't choose. A Black man's experience of being desired or not desired in a predominantly white dating market is not identical to a white man's experience. A disabled woman navigating the assumption that she is asexual is not having the same experience as an able-bodied woman. An older gay man whose identity formed before Stonewall carries a different relationship to desire than a twenty-year-old queer person who grew up with marriage equality. These differences matter empirically as well as ethically, and we take them seriously throughout.

Methodologically honest means that we report what the evidence actually shows, including when it is weak, contested, or absent. We do not resolve ambiguity by picking the side we like. We flag when our own perspective might be shaping our interpretation. We acknowledge that some questions in attraction science remain genuinely open, and we resist the temptation to close them prematurely.

Evidence Summary: What We Know with Confidence (and What We Don't)

What attraction science has established with reasonable confidence: (1) Proximity and repeated exposure increase liking across a wide range of contexts (the mere exposure effect, Zajonc, 1968). (2) Perceived similarity — in values, interests, and attitudes — is a robust predictor of attraction and relationship satisfaction (Byrne, 1971; Sprecher & Regan, 2002). (3) Physical attractiveness is subject to consistent cross-cultural preferences in some dimensions (facial symmetry, clear skin) while varying substantially in others (body weight, height ideals, hair preferences). (4) Attachment style — the patterns of relating learned in early caregiving relationships — predicts adult romantic behavior with moderate consistency. What remains contested: (1) The strength and source of gender differences in mate preferences. (2) Whether cycle-based shifts in mate preferences are real or artifactual. (3) The degree to which racial preferences in attraction are biologically primed vs. socially constructed. (4) How much any of this changes across digital versus face-to-face contexts.


Nature and Nurture: The Dialectic Introduced

No theme runs deeper through this textbook than the tension between biological and cultural explanations of attraction. It is a tension so old and so persistently misunderstood that it deserves direct attention from the very first chapter.

The naive version of the debate — nature versus nurture, biology versus culture, the inborn versus the learned — is a false dichotomy so thoroughly debunked that almost no serious scientist holds it anymore. And yet it keeps returning in popular discourse, because it is so satisfying to pick a side. Evolutionary psychologists are accused of genetic determinism that excuses every impulse as "hardwired"; social constructionists are accused of pretending the body doesn't exist. Both accusations are largely unfair, but both track real tendencies in how the fields are sometimes argued in public.

The accurate picture is more interesting and more complicated. Human beings are biological organisms whose nervous systems, endocrine systems, and behavioral tendencies were shaped by millions of years of evolution. We are also cultural animals whose experience, meaning-making, and behavior are saturated by the particular social worlds we inhabit. These two facts are not in competition. A preference for certain facial features may have evolved because, in ancestral environments, those features were correlated with health — and may simultaneously be modified, amplified, suppressed, or redirected by cultural norms, individual experience, and the specific affordances of the situation.

When Okafor and Reyes debated framing in Montréal, they weren't really arguing about whether biology or culture matters. They were arguing about which comes first in the analysis, and about where the burden of proof lies. Okafor argues that cultural explanations should be the default and that evolutionary claims require special evidence. Reyes argues that evolutionary frameworks provide testable predictions that cultural accounts often don't, and that refusing to engage with biology doesn't make it go away. Both are partially right. Their disagreement is productive precisely because it resists resolution.

⚖️ Debate Point: What Does "Evolved" Mean for Attraction?

When evolutionary psychologists say that a preference is "evolved," they mean that there is evidence it was subject to selection pressure — that ancestors who had the preference left more descendants than those who didn't. This is a historical claim, not a deterministic one. Evolved tendencies can be overridden, redirected, and transformed by culture and experience. The fact that humans evolved a taste for sugar does not mean sugar consumption is healthy or inevitable; it means that sweetness was a reliable cue for caloric nutrition in an ancestral environment where calories were scarce. Similarly, the fact that humans may have evolved certain baseline mate preferences does not mean those preferences are destiny, or that they are immune to cultural modification, or that everyone has them equally. The debate in attraction science is not about whether evolution matters — it does — but about how much evolutionary priors constrain versus how flexibly cultural factors can redirect them.


Intersectionality: Who Gets to Desire and Be Desired?

The concept of intersectionality, developed by legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989) to describe how race and gender together shape Black women's experiences of discrimination in ways that neither framework alone could capture, has become one of the most important analytical tools in contemporary social science. Applied to attraction, it forces a question that the field has historically evaded: whose desire is treated as normal, and whose is pathologized, trivialized, or rendered invisible?

Heterosexual desire has historically been the assumed default in attraction research, with same-sex desire studied separately as a variant requiring explanation. The very framing embedded a hierarchy. Similarly, middle-class white desire has typically been the standard against which other experiences were measured. The romantic and sexual experiences of working-class people, of people of color, of disabled people, of older adults — these have been studied less, taken less seriously, and represented in fewer of the "foundational" studies that attraction textbooks traditionally cite.

This has consequences that go beyond academic equity. When we develop theories of how attraction works based primarily on data from one demographic group, we risk building a science that not only fails to describe most of humanity but actively pathologizes difference. If the data say that "people" prefer partners of similar race, and the data come mostly from white samples, we are making a claim about white people's racial preferences and calling it a universal human tendency. That is not science — it is a category error dressed up as science.

Throughout this book, intersectionality functions as both a critical lens and an empirical standard. It is a lens because it asks us to notice who is centered and who is marginalized in any given analysis. And it is an empirical standard because it demands that our theories actually account for the full range of human variation in attraction — not just the variation visible in the most-studied populations.

⚠️ Critical Caveat

Intersectionality in attraction research is not a license to dismiss all generalizations. The goal is not to conclude that attraction is so variable that nothing can be said in general — that is a form of intellectual nihilism that helps no one. The goal is to notice when generalizations are actually particulars in disguise, to identify which patterns are truly robust across groups and which dissolve when we expand our sample, and to build theories that account for both commonality and difference without privileging the experience of any one group as the human default.


Chapter Roadmap: What Comes Next

Part I of this book (Chapters 1–5) builds the foundations you'll need for everything that follows. Chapter 2 traces the history of courtship — how the practices and norms surrounding attraction have changed across time and culture, and what that history tells us about how much we should trust contemporary assumptions. Chapter 3 goes deep on research methods: how attraction is measured, what those measurements actually capture, and how to evaluate a study's quality. Chapter 4 examines the language of desire — how the words we use to describe attraction shape what we see and don't see. Chapter 5 introduces the ethical framework that will guide the rest of the book, building on the introductory ethics discussion here.

Parts II through IV examine the mechanisms of attraction — the biological, psychological, and communicative processes through which it operates. Part V situates attraction in social and cultural context. Part VI addresses the "dark side" of attraction science: manipulation, coercion, harassment, and the ways desire becomes weaponized. Part VII turns to applied questions — how attraction works in specific contexts like workplaces, online environments, and long-term relationships. Part VIII integrates the threads.

Throughout, you will encounter the Okafor-Reyes Global Attraction Project as a running example of how cross-cultural research in this area actually gets done. You will encounter real data — some of it surprising, some of it confirming intuitions, some of it deeply uncomfortable — and you will practice the skill of reading that data critically rather than accepting or rejecting it based on whether it confirms your prior beliefs.

You will not come away from this book with a formula for becoming more attractive. But you will come away with something considerably more useful: the ability to evaluate claims about attraction carefully, to understand your own desires and those of others with more nuance, and to think clearly about the ethical dimensions of a domain where clear thinking is often in short supply.

That seems worth a semester.


What Critical Thinking About Attraction Actually Looks Like

A question worth addressing directly before we begin: does studying attraction scientifically spoil it? Does knowing the evolutionary, neurological, and sociological mechanisms behind the experience of falling for someone make the experience feel smaller, more mechanical, less magical?

The worry is understandable but, I would argue, misplaced — and worth addressing because it comes up, in various forms, throughout the semester.

Consider an analogy. Music theorists who can analyze a Bach fugue in terms of its voice leading, its harmonic language, its motivic development — do they enjoy music less than people who simply hear it? The evidence suggests the opposite: deep knowledge of structure tends to intensify rather than diminish aesthetic experience. The musician who hears a deceptive cadence knows why it creates the particular tension it does, and that knowledge makes the resolution more satisfying, not less. What you gain from analysis is not a replacement for the experience — it is a richer vocabulary for noticing and appreciating what is happening.

The same principle applies here. Understanding that propinquity (proximity) increases liking because of repeated exposure effects does not make your affection for someone you see every day less real. Understanding that your nervous system processes rejection through pain circuits does not mean your heartbreak is not genuine. Understanding that physical attractiveness judgments are partly shaped by culturally variable ideals does not mean your experience of finding someone beautiful is a cultural artifact with nothing personal in it. The mechanisms are part of the story; they are not the whole story; and knowing them does not close the story down.

What critical thinking about attraction does spoil — and this, I would argue, is precisely the point — is the naive belief that our responses to other people are free of structure, bias, or social influence. That we are attracted to whoever we find attractive based on some perfectly individual and authentic inner compass that neither culture nor prior experience has touched. That the people we find unattractive simply don't appeal to us, full stop, without any systematic structure to that non-appeal. That men and women want what they want because of pure natural instinct, untouched by the century of media we've consumed, the families we grew up in, the racial hierarchies our societies enforced.

Understanding attraction does not make the feeling go away. It makes the feeling accountable — to evidence, to ethics, to the full complexity of the other person involved. That, in the end, seems like an improvement.

Summary

This chapter has introduced the terrain we will cover, the tools we will use, and the dispositions we will try to cultivate. The word "seduction" carries historical weight — connotations of manipulation and harm — and this textbook takes that weight seriously rather than dissolving it. The science of attraction is genuinely multidisciplinary, drawing on social psychology, evolutionary psychology, neuroscience, sociology, and communication; none of these fields has the complete picture, and the tensions between them are productive. The replication crisis has humbled psychology and should humble us as consumers of attraction research. The history of the field — from Darwin's observational natural history through the experimental revolution of the 1960s to the digital-neuroimaging-replication era of the present — reveals a science that has grown considerably more sophisticated while remaining aware of how much it doesn't yet know. The questions of who funds attraction research, and what interests that funding serves, remind us that science is a human enterprise embedded in economic and institutional structures that shape its questions as much as its answers. The ethics of studying desire are real and consequential, complicated by the intimate nature of the subject, the vulnerability of deception designs, the racial politics of stimulus materials, and the weaponization risk of findings about human attraction. And three questions — What does the evidence say? Who is it about? What are the ethical implications? — will structure our inquiry throughout.

Dr. Adaeze Okafor and Dr. Carlos Reyes, standing at the edge of a five-year research collaboration they had not quite agreed to yet, were arguing about where to begin. It is a fitting image for this book. The argument about where to begin — what to take as given, what to treat as requiring explanation, whose experience to center — is one that runs through all of attraction science. Joining that argument, rather than pretending it has already been settled, is what critical inquiry looks like.

Welcome to the course.


Chapter 2 turns to history: How did human courtship practices develop, and what does their variation across time and culture tell us about the nature of attraction itself?