Chapter 32: Quiz — Political Polarization and Algorithmic Amplification

Instructions: Choose the best answer for each question. Answer key appears at the end.

Question 1 "Affective polarization" refers to:

A) The degree to which Democrats and Republicans hold different policy positions on specific issues B) The mutual hostility, distrust, and negative emotional feelings that members of different political groups have toward each other C) The tendency of social media algorithms to amplify emotionally charged political content D) The effect of political advertising on voter affect and engagement

Question 2 According to research on ideological versus affective polarization in the United States, which of the following is most accurate?

A) Both ideological and affective polarization have increased dramatically since the 1990s B) Ideological polarization (on specific policy positions) has increased less dramatically than affective polarization (mutual hostility between parties) C) Affective polarization has remained relatively stable while ideological polarization has increased dramatically D) Both forms of polarization increased before 2000 but have stabilized since the rise of social media

Question 3 Bail et al.'s 2018 Twitter bot study found that exposing partisan social media users to content from the opposing political side:

A) Significantly reduced polarization for both liberal and conservative participants B) Reduced polarization for liberals but not conservatives C) Had no significant effect on political polarization for either group D) Increased polarization, particularly among conservative participants who became more conservative after exposure to liberal content

Question 4 Facebook's internal research, revealed through the 2021 whistleblower disclosures, documented that the company gave the "angry" emoji reaction approximately how many times the weight of a simple "like" in its ranking algorithm?

A) Two times B) Five times C) Ten times D) The same weight as a like, but with broader distribution

Question 5 The Boxell, Gentzkow, and Shapiro (2017) finding that complicates the social media polarization narrative found that:

A) Social media users were significantly more polarized than non-users in every age group B) Polarization increased more among demographic groups with lower internet use, particularly those over age 65 C) Social media reduces polarization in communities with high education levels D) Polarization is significantly lower in countries with higher rates of social media use

Question 6 Which of the following is the most accurate description of Eli Pariser's "filter bubble" hypothesis and its empirical status?

A) The hypothesis that algorithms create complete information cocoons; research has found that information environments are more hermetically sealed than Pariser described B) The hypothesis that algorithms create complete information cocoons; research has found that actual filter bubbles are less hermetically sealed than Pariser described, though algorithms do "tilt" toward confirming information C) The hypothesis that algorithms are programmed to deliberately expose users to opposing viewpoints D) The hypothesis that social media creates filter bubbles; research has fully confirmed this, finding complete information isolation for most social media users

Question 7 The UN Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (2018) concluded regarding Facebook's role in the Rohingya genocide:

A) That Facebook had been largely uninvolved and bears no responsibility for the violence B) That Facebook bore indirect responsibility through general misinformation but that other factors were primary C) That Facebook had played a "determining role" in spreading hate speech and incitement that contributed to the violence D) That Facebook's content moderation was adequate but overwhelmed by the scale of coordinated information operations

Question 8 Which feature of the Myanmar case made Facebook's content moderation failure particularly severe?

A) Facebook had been specifically warned by the Myanmar government about the potential for violence B) Facebook was effectively the internet for many Myanmar users (via mobile bundles), and the company employed only a handful of Burmese-speaking moderators C) Facebook had implemented a specific program in Myanmar that was deliberately designed to amplify anti-Rohingya content D) The Myanmar military had no formal relationship with Facebook, making coordination to remove their content legally impossible

Question 9 In the Brazil WhatsApp misinformation case, the platform's encryption was particularly significant because:

A) It prevented law enforcement from monitoring political communications B) It prevented the content moderation approaches (fact-checking, labeling) that work on public social media from being applied to WhatsApp messages C) It allowed foreign governments to interfere in Brazilian elections without detection D) It encrypted the identities of account holders, preventing legal accountability for spreading false information

Question 10 The Molly Brady et al. 2023 Science study tested whether switching from an algorithmic to a chronological feed reduced political polarization during the 2020 US election. What did it find?

A) Switching to chronological feeds significantly reduced affective polarization B) The chronological feed produced more polarized users because they saw more total political content C) Switching from algorithmic to chronological ranking had minimal effects on measures of political polarization D) The study was unable to recruit a sufficient sample to detect effects

Question 11 According to research on misinformation spread on social media, Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral (2018) found that false news compared to true news on Twitter:

A) Spread at roughly the same rate but to different audiences B) Spread 70% more slowly because Twitter users applied higher skepticism to novel information C) Was 70% more likely to be retweeted and reached audiences more quickly and broadly D) Spread primarily through bot networks rather than human sharing decisions

Question 12 Which of the following best describes the "structural" explanation for political polarization as presented in the chapter?

A) Political polarization is caused primarily by media structures (cable news, social media) that fragment the information environment B) Political polarization results from structural factors like rising economic inequality, geographic sorting, and the decline of cross-cutting institutions C) Political polarization is structurally inevitable in two-party democratic systems and has nothing to do with media D) The structure of social media platforms (specifically, their recommendation algorithms) is the primary driver of polarization

Question 13 Facebook's internal 2018 presentation slides, revealed through whistleblower disclosures, acknowledged what regarding the company's algorithm?

A) That the algorithm was neutral and did not differentially amplify political content B) That "our algorithms exploit the human brain's attraction to divisiveness" and that unchecked, the algorithm drove users toward "ever more extreme content" C) That the algorithm had been specifically tuned to reduce polarizing content since 2016 D) That political content was a small fraction of total content and had negligible effects on polarization

Question 14 Meta's 2022-2023 policy of reducing algorithmic amplification of political content was characterized by critics as:

A) An effective and well-evidenced intervention to reduce political polarization B) An overreach by a private company into decisions that should be made by governments C) Commercially motivated—reducing political content reduced regulatory risk and user complaints—without addressing the underlying algorithmic incentives D) Proven ineffective because political content immediately migrated to other platforms

Question 15 In the India WhatsApp lynching cases, the mechanism connecting social media content to physical violence operated through which of the following?

A) Government actors using WhatsApp to coordinate police violence B) Misinformation about strangers being child traffickers spread rapidly through WhatsApp groups, inciting mob violence before claims could be verified C) Encrypted messages from foreign intelligence services directing domestic actors to commit violence D) Platform algorithms directing users to accounts run by violent extremist groups

Question 16 Research by Bail et al. on why exposure to opposing political views on social media increased rather than decreased polarization among conservatives suggested which mechanism?

A) The conservatives were exposed to false information from liberal accounts B) Conservative participants simply ignored the liberal content and increased liberal exposure made them feel their own side was under threat C) Encountering opposing views in the identity-threatening social media environment activated identity threat responses that hardened partisan identity D) The Twitter bots were detected as inauthentic, causing participants to distrust all political content

Question 17 The chapter's concept of the "gap between intent and effect" applies to social media and political polarization in which of the following ways?

A) Platform engineers deliberately designed social media to be politically polarizing to serve the interests of political advertisers B) Platforms did not intend social media to function as a polarization engine, but engagement optimization created conditions that political actors and algorithms exploited to produce polarization as an emergent outcome C) The effects of social media on polarization are exactly as intended by platforms, since polarized users generate more engagement D) The intent of social media was always political; the commercial effects were the unintended consequence

Question 18 The chapter's discussion of cable news and partisan media is relevant to the social media polarization debate because:

A) Cable news and social media share ownership, making their effects additive and coordinated B) Cable news content is primarily distributed through social media, making them functionally the same channel C) Political polarization was already increasing before social media existed, which complicates attributing polarization primarily to social media D) Cable news is less polarizing than social media, establishing a baseline for what media without algorithms looks like

Question 19 The phrase "Meaningful Social Interactions" (MSI) refers to:

A) An academic metric for measuring the quality of political deliberation on social media B) A Facebook internal metric introduced in 2018 that correlated with increases in political and partisan content in News Feed, often described internally as "divisive, sensational, or misinformative" C) A regulatory standard proposed by the European Union for evaluating social media's effects on democratic discourse D) A WhatsApp feature designed to facilitate high-quality political conversations between users with different views

Question 20 Which of the following represents the most evidence-consistent position on social media and political polarization?

A) Social media is the primary and definitive cause of political polarization in the United States and globally B) Social media has no significant effect on political polarization; cable news and structural factors explain polarization entirely C) Social media plausibly contributes to affective polarization through documented mechanisms but is one factor among many, including cable news, elite polarization, and structural conditions, and causal attribution is difficult D) Social media reduces political polarization by increasing cross-partisan exposure, as demonstrated by cross-cutting information appearing in most users' feeds

Question 21 Velocity Media's "neutrality with friction" approach to political content involved:

A) Removing all political content from the platform and redirecting political discussion to partner news sites B) Not algorithmically promoting political content while also not suppressing it, with limited comments on political posts by default for users without an established connection to the poster C) Requiring users to verify their political party affiliation before viewing political content D) Applying a 24-hour delay to all political content before it could be shared, to allow fact-checkers to evaluate it

Question 22 The "News Feed Arc" described in the chapter refers to which historical development?

A) Facebook's deliberate decision in 2012 to become a political information platform B) The gradual, unplanned transformation of Facebook's News Feed from a social communication tool to a primary channel for political news consumption, with major consequences for political information quality C) The arc of Facebook's news partnership program from 2014 to its termination in 2022 D) The documented trajectory of News Feed algorithm changes and their correlation with rising polarization from 2012 to 2020

Answer Key

1. B — The mutual hostility, distrust, and negative emotional feelings that members of different political groups have toward each other
2. B — Ideological polarization has increased less dramatically than affective polarization
3. D — Increased polarization, particularly among conservative participants who became more conservative
4. B — Five times
5. B — Polarization increased more among demographic groups with lower internet use, particularly those over age 65
6. B — Actual filter bubbles are less hermetically sealed than Pariser described, though algorithms do "tilt" toward confirming information
7. C — That Facebook had played a "determining role" in spreading hate speech and incitement
8. B — Facebook was effectively the internet for many Myanmar users and employed only a handful of Burmese-speaking moderators
9. B — Encryption prevented the content moderation approaches that work on public social media from being applied
10. C — Switching from algorithmic to chronological ranking had minimal effects on political polarization
11. C — False news was 70% more likely to be retweeted and reached audiences more quickly and broadly
12. B — Structural factors like rising economic inequality, geographic sorting, and decline of cross-cutting institutions
13. B — That "our algorithms exploit the human brain's attraction to divisiveness"
14. C — Commercially motivated—reducing political content reduced regulatory risk without addressing underlying incentives
15. B — Misinformation about strangers being child traffickers spread rapidly through WhatsApp groups, inciting mob violence
16. C — Encountering opposing views in the identity-threatening social media environment activated identity threat responses
17. B — Platforms did not intend polarization, but engagement optimization created conditions that produced it as an emergent outcome
18. C — Political polarization was already increasing before social media existed
19. B — A Facebook internal metric that correlated with increases in divisive, sensational, or misinformative political content
20. C — Social media plausibly contributes to affective polarization but is one factor among many; causal attribution is difficult
21. B — Not algorithmically promoting political content while not suppressing it, with limited comments by default
22. B — The gradual, unplanned transformation of News Feed from social communication tool to political news channel