Chapter 10 Further Reading
Foundational Academic Papers
Market Microstructure Theory
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Glosten, L. R., & Milgrom, P. R. (1985). "Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders." Journal of Financial Economics, 14(1), 71-100. - The foundational model of how bid-ask spreads arise from adverse selection. Essential reading for understanding why spreads exist. The model directly applies to prediction markets where informed traders are common.
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Kyle, A. S. (1985). "Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading." Econometrica, 53(6), 1315-1335. - Introduces the concept of market depth and the lambda parameter (price impact per unit of order flow). Complements Glosten-Milgrom by modeling a strategic informed trader rather than competitive market makers.
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Stoll, H. R. (1978). "The Supply of Dealer Services in Securities Markets." Journal of Finance, 33(4), 1133-1151. - Early decomposition of the spread into adverse selection, inventory holding cost, and order processing cost components. Provides the theoretical basis for the three-part decomposition discussed in Section 10.1.
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Huang, R. D., & Stoll, H. R. (1997). "The Components of the Bid-Ask Spread: A General Approach." Review of Financial Studies, 10(4), 995-1034. - Empirical methodology for decomposing spreads into their components. The techniques can be adapted for prediction market data.
Market Impact and Execution
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Almgren, R., & Chriss, N. (2001). "Optimal Execution of Portfolio Transactions." Journal of Risk, 3, 5-40. - The definitive framework for optimal execution that balances market impact against price risk. The Almgren-Chriss model is the basis for the execution strategies discussed in Section 10.6.
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Bouchaud, J. P. (2010). "Price Impact." Encyclopedia of Quantitative Finance. - Comprehensive survey of price impact models, including the square-root law. Accessible overview of why impact scales sub-linearly with order size.
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Gatheral, J. (2010). "No-Dynamic-Arbitrage and Market Impact." Quantitative Finance, 10(7), 749-759. - Theoretical constraints on market impact functions. Shows that the square-root law arises naturally from no-arbitrage conditions.
Prediction Market-Specific Research
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Manski, C. F. (2006). "Interpreting the Predictions of Prediction Markets." Economics Letters, 91(3), 425-429. - Discusses how to interpret prediction market prices as probabilities, including the role of transaction costs and the overround in distorting prices away from true probabilities.
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Wolfers, J., & Zitzewitz, E. (2004). "Prediction Markets." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18(2), 107-126. - Comprehensive overview of prediction markets, including discussion of market microstructure issues like spreads and fees that affect price accuracy.
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Arrow, K. J., Forsythe, R., Gorham, M., Hahn, R., Hanson, R., Ledyard, J. O., ... & Neumann, G. R. (2008). "The Promise of Prediction Markets." Science, 320(5878), 877-878.
- Influential short paper arguing for the value of prediction markets, with acknowledgment of transaction cost barriers.
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Berg, J. E., Nelson, F. D., & Rietz, T. A. (2008). "Prediction Market Accuracy in the Long Run." International Journal of Forecasting, 24(2), 285-300.
- Analysis of Iowa Electronic Markets accuracy, including how transaction costs and fee structures affect market efficiency.
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Rothschild, D. (2009). "Forecasting Elections: Comparing Prediction Markets, Polls, and Their Biases." Public Opinion Quarterly, 73(5), 895-916.
- Empirical analysis of prediction market accuracy that accounts for bid-ask spreads and overround in interpreting market prices.
Transaction Costs in Practice
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Harris, L. (2003). Trading and Exchanges: Market Microstructure for Practitioners. Oxford University Press.
- The definitive practitioner-oriented textbook on market microstructure. Covers spreads, market impact, execution strategies, and market maker economics in exhaustive detail. Highly recommended as a companion to this chapter.
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Hasbrouck, J. (2007). Empirical Market Microstructure. Oxford University Press.
- More technical and econometric approach to measuring transaction costs, spread decomposition, and market quality. Good for readers who want to do their own empirical analysis.
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Kissell, R. (2013). The Science of Algorithmic Trading and Portfolio Management. Academic Press.
- Comprehensive treatment of execution algorithms, market impact models, and transaction cost analysis from a practitioner's perspective.
Fee Structure Design and Market Design
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Budish, E., Cramton, P., & Shim, J. (2015). "The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130(4), 1547-1621.
- Innovative analysis of how market structure and fee design affect trading costs and market quality. Relevant to understanding how prediction market platforms could improve their design.
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Malinova, K., & Park, A. (2015). "Subsidizing Liquidity: The Impact of Make/Take Fees on Market Quality." Journal of Finance, 70(2), 509-536.
- Empirical analysis of how maker-taker fee structures affect spreads, volume, and market quality. Directly relevant to the fee design analysis in Case Study 2.
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Colliard, J. E., & Foucault, T. (2012). "Trading Fees and Efficiency in Limit Order Markets." Review of Financial Studies, 25(11), 3389-3421.
- Theoretical analysis of how trading fees affect market efficiency. Shows that fee structure matters as much as fee level.
Blockchain and DeFi Transaction Costs
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Capponi, A., & Jia, R. (2021). "The Adoption of Blockchain-Based Decentralized Exchanges." Available at SSRN.
- Analysis of transaction costs on decentralized exchanges, including gas fees, MEV (Miner Extractable Value), and AMM-specific costs. Relevant to understanding Polymarket's cost structure.
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Daian, P., Goldfeder, S., Kell, T., Li, Y., Zhao, X., Bentov, I., ... & Juels, A. (2020). "Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning in Decentralized Exchanges, Miner Extractable Value, and Consensus Instability." IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy.
- Exposes hidden transaction costs in blockchain-based markets, including frontrunning and sandwich attacks. Important for understanding the full cost of trading on platforms like Polymarket.
Overround and Probability Extraction
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Shin, H. S. (1993). "Measuring the Incidence of Insider Trading in a Market for State-Contingent Claims." Economic Journal, 103(420), 1141-1153.
- The Shin method for removing overround from betting/prediction market prices. Provides a more sophisticated alternative to proportional normalization, accounting for informed trading.
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Clarke, S. R., & Norman, J. M. (1995). "Home Ground Advantage of Individual Clubs in English Soccer." The Statistician, 44(4), 509-521.
- While focused on sports, this paper discusses methods for extracting true probabilities from betting odds, including handling the overround.
Online Resources and Data
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Polymarket Documentation — https://docs.polymarket.com/
- Official documentation for Polymarket's API and fee structure. Essential for traders building automated systems on the platform.
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Kalshi Documentation — https://kalshi.com/docs/
- Kalshi's official API documentation and fee schedule.
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Metaculus — https://www.metaculus.com/
- While not a trading market, Metaculus provides well-calibrated probability forecasts that can serve as a reference for evaluating prediction market prices and overround.
Recommended Reading Order
For readers new to market microstructure: 1. Start with Harris (2003) — Trading and Exchanges for the practitioner foundation 2. Read Glosten & Milgrom (1985) for the theoretical basis of spreads 3. Review Almgren & Chriss (2001) for execution strategy 4. Then explore the prediction market-specific papers
For readers with market microstructure background: 1. Start with the prediction market papers (Manski, Wolfers & Zitzewitz) 2. Review blockchain-specific costs (Capponi & Jia, Daian et al.) 3. Study the overround literature (Shin) for probability extraction techniques