Chapter 28: Key Takeaways
The SMART Framework for Market Questions
- Specific: Every question must identify a precise event, entity, and measurement. "Will the economy improve?" fails; "Will US real GDP growth exceed 2.0% in Q3 2026 per the BEA advance estimate?" succeeds.
- Measurable: Resolution must depend on objective, quantifiable criteria with an identified data source.
- Assessable (Resolvable): The answer must be determinable in practice, not just in theory. Avoid questions whose resolution data does not actually exist.
- Relevant: The question must attract informed traders who have genuine private information to contribute.
- Time-bound: Every market must have a clear resolution date or a triggering event with a backstop deadline.
Resolution Criteria Are a Contract
- Resolution criteria define a binding agreement between the platform and its traders. They must be explicit, objective, and robust to edge cases.
- Use the resolution source hierarchy: Tier 1 (government statistics, regulatory filings) is preferred over Tier 2 (institutional data), Tier 3 (major media), Tier 4 (domain-specific sources), and Tier 5 (platform/community judgment).
- Always specify a backup resolution mechanism and conditions under which the market resolves N/A.
- Stress-test every market against the edge case checklist: subject ceasing to exist, metric discontinuation, metric redefinition, partial outcomes, reversals, temporal technicalities, reasonable disagreement, and self-referential influence.
Common Wording Pitfalls
- Ambiguous "or": Always specify inclusive ("at least one of") or exclusive ("exactly one of") disjunction.
- Scope creep: Pin every key term to a specific standard or definition at market creation time.
- Moving goalposts: Define success criteria with objective, pre-specified thresholds.
- Self-referential markets: Avoid markets whose outcome depends on their own price.
- Insider-triggerable markets: Focus on outcomes that no single party can unilaterally determine.
- Temporal ambiguity: Use explicit dates, times, and time zones (e.g., "before 11:59 PM ET on March 31, 2026").
- Negation: Prefer positive framing; let the price reflect the probability of the negative outcome.
Outcome Space Design
- Binary markets maximize liquidity concentration and are simplest to understand. Best for yes/no and threshold questions.
- Multi-outcome (categorical) markets must be mutually exclusive and exhaustive. Always include an "Other" catch-all. Limit to 5--10 outcomes for practical liquidity.
- Scalar markets capture full distributional information without requiring pre-specified thresholds but are more complex to implement.
- Bracket markets discretize continuous outcomes. Use equal-probability brackets (based on prior distributions) rather than equal-width brackets to maximize information content.
- Validate mutually exclusive and exhaustive properties formally: $\bigcup O_i = \Omega$ and $O_i \cap O_j = \emptyset$ for $i \neq j$.
Market Lifecycle Management
- The lifecycle phases are: Creation, Seeding, Active Trading, Approaching Resolution, Resolution, Settlement, Archived.
- Creation timing should align with periods of meaningful uncertainty and public interest.
- Seeding requires initial liquidity (via AMM) and an initial price reflecting a reasonable prior -- not a default 50/50 split.
- Resolution should be prompt, transparent, and appealable with a defined dispute window (24--72 hours is standard).
Liquidity and Subsidization
- The cold start problem is fundamental: markets need traders for liquidity, but traders avoid illiquid markets. Subsidization via AMM funding is the primary solution.
- Initial subsidy should reflect the base rate: setting a 50/50 price when the base rate is 5% wastes subsidy to easy arbitrage.
- Declining subsidies using exponential decay $s(t) = s_0 \cdot e^{-\lambda t}$ gracefully transition from subsidized to organic liquidity.
- Subsidy allocation across markets should maximize $\sum V_i(s_i)$ subject to a budget constraint, weighting by information value, expected participation, and marginal liquidity impact.
Incentive Design
- Participation incentives (sign-up bonuses, trading rewards) overcome the barriers of time cost, capital risk, and uncertainty aversion.
- Accuracy incentives (Brier score leaderboards, accuracy bonuses) align trader behavior with the market's information-aggregation purpose.
- Liquidity incentives (fee rebates, liquidity mining) compensate market makers for adverse selection risk.
- Reputation systems serve multiple purposes: signal quality, governance, access gating, and social proof.
- Gamification should reward accurate forecasting, not just trading volume.
Quality Metrics
- Participation metrics: Unique traders, trading volume, trader diversity (Herfindahl Index $= \sum s_i^2$; lower is more diverse).
- Liquidity metrics: Bid-ask spread ($\frac{p_{\text{ask}} - p_{\text{bid}}}{p_{\text{mid}}} \times 100\%$), depth, slippage.
- Accuracy metrics: Brier score ($BS = \frac{1}{n}\sum(f_i - o_i)^2$), log score, calibration curves.
- Resolution quality metrics: Dispute rate, resolution time, N/A rate.
- Composite quality score: $Q = \sum w_j \cdot \tilde{m}_j$ with recommended weights: calibration 30%, participation 20%, liquidity 20%, low dispute rate 15%, low N/A rate 15%.
Automated Market Creation
- Template-based generation can produce hundreds of consistent-quality markets from parameterized templates covering common question patterns.
- LLM-assisted question writing can draft questions, detect ambiguities, enumerate edge cases, and score questions against the SMART framework -- but always requires human review.
- Auto-resolution is feasible for markets tied to structured data sources (APIs for BLS, BEA, election results) and should still include a dispute window.
Key Formulas
| Concept | Formula |
|---|---|
| Brier score | $BS = \frac{1}{n}\sum_{i=1}^n (f_i - o_i)^2$ |
| Herfindahl Index | $HHI = \sum_{i=1}^n s_i^2$ |
| Bid-ask spread | $\frac{p_{\text{ask}} - p_{\text{bid}}}{p_{\text{mid}}} \times 100\%$ |
| Exponential subsidy decay | $s(t) = s_0 \cdot e^{-\lambda t}$ |
| Volume-based subsidy decay | $s(t) = \max(0,\; s_0 - k \cdot V_{\text{organic}}(t))$ |
| Composite quality score | $Q = \sum_j w_j \cdot \tilde{m}_j$ |
| Reputation score | $R = w_1 \cdot \text{Accuracy} + w_2 \cdot \text{Volume} + w_3 \cdot \text{Consistency} + w_4 \cdot \text{Tenure}$ |
Design Principles (Summary Card)
- Clarity above all. Ambiguity is the enemy of information aggregation.
- Resolution is a contract. Make it explicit, objective, and robust.
- Design for the trader. Every decision should serve clarity, trust, and efficiency.
- Liquidity requires investment. Markets do not bootstrap themselves.
- Measure and iterate. Use data-driven quality metrics to continuously improve design.
- Automate carefully. Balance scale with quality control and human oversight.