Chapter 35: Key Takeaways

Smart Contract Market Mechanisms


On-Chain Market Lifecycle

  • Every on-chain prediction market follows five stages: market creation, token minting (splitting), trading, resolution, and redemption.
  • The fundamental invariant: total collateral deposited = total supply of each outcome token. Split creates tokens; merge destroys them. The system is always fully collateralized.
  • Three architecture patterns dominate: monolithic (single contract), modular (separate token/trading/oracle contracts), and hybrid (off-chain matching, on-chain settlement). Polymarket uses the hybrid pattern.

Conditional Token Framework (CTF)

  • The CTF is a single ERC-1155 contract that manages outcome tokens for all markets. Each token is identified by a unique ID derived from the collateral token, condition ID, and index set.
  • The conditionId is deterministically computed: keccak256(oracle, questionId, outcomeSlotCount).
  • Index sets are bitmasks representing subsets of outcomes. For a 3-outcome market, index set 5 (binary 101) means "outcome 0 or outcome 2."
  • A valid partition is a set of non-overlapping index sets that together cover all outcomes. The split operation requires a valid partition.
  • Collection IDs enable deep positions across multiple conditions using XOR composition. XOR is commutative and associative, so order does not matter.
  • splitPosition converts collateral into outcome tokens; mergePositions converts a complete set back. These are exact inverses.
  • After resolution, redeemPositions allows holders of winning tokens to claim collateral. Losing tokens become worthless.

Augur's Oracle and Dispute Resolution

  • Augur uses a decentralized oracle based on REP token staking. The designated reporter submits an initial report; anyone can dispute by staking REP on a different outcome.
  • Dispute stakes roughly double each round, creating exponential cost escalation. Sustaining a false outcome through N rounds costs approximately $100 \times 2^N$ REP.
  • The fork mechanism is the ultimate backstop: if disputes reach 2.5% of total REP supply, the REP token splits permanently. REP holders choose a side, and the "correct" universe retains value.
  • Augur's security bound: maximum secure market size = total REP supply * REP price * fork threshold percentage. At REP = $10 and 11M supply, this is approximately $2.75M.
  • The Invalid outcome (Augur v2) handles ambiguous questions. All tokens receive equal payout, incentivizing clear question design.
  • Reflexivity problem: Augur's security depends on REP price, which depends on Augur's usage, which depends on its security.

Polymarket Architecture

  • Polymarket uses a hybrid architecture: CTF for token logic, UMA Optimistic Oracle for resolution, and an off-chain CLOB for order matching.
  • The Neg Risk Adapter converts multi-outcome markets into correlated binary markets. Each outcome gets its own YES/NO pair, with the constraint that YES prices sum to approximately 1.
  • Off-chain order matching provides low-latency execution without gas costs per order placement. Only settlement (fills) happens on-chain.
  • Polymarket operates on Polygon PoS for low fees and fast confirmations, using USDC as collateral.

Token Economics

  • In a binary market: YES price + NO price = 1 (minus fees and spread). Deviations create arbitrage opportunities.
  • Complete set arbitrage: If YES + NO > 1, mint a set (cost: 1) and sell both (revenue: > 1). If YES + NO < 1, buy both and merge.
  • The annualized return of a prediction market position depends on the purchase price, the true probability, and the time to resolution.
  • Outcome tokens are composable DeFi primitives: they can be traded on DEXes, used as collateral in lending, and integrated into structured products.

Security Considerations

  • Reentrancy is the most dangerous vulnerability in prediction market contracts. The checks-effects-interactions pattern is mandatory for any function that transfers funds.
  • Front-running / MEV affects on-chain AMM-based markets. CLOB architectures with off-chain matching (Polymarket) are less vulnerable.
  • Oracle manipulation is the highest-impact attack vector. The cost of corrupting the oracle must exceed the value at risk in the market.
  • Smart contract audits are essential. All major prediction market protocols undergo multiple audits and maintain bug bounty programs.
  • Access control: Only the designated oracle should be able to resolve a market. Modifier checks (onlyOracle) must be applied consistently.

Architecture Comparison

Feature Augur Polymarket Omen (Gnosis)
Token standard ERC-20 (v1), ERC-1155 (v2) CTF (ERC-1155) CTF (ERC-1155)
Trading mechanism LMSR AMM (v1), CLOB (v2) Off-chain CLOB AMM (various)
Oracle REP-based voting UMA Optimistic Oracle Centralized or Reality.eth
Chain Ethereum L1 Polygon Gnosis Chain / Ethereum
Key trade-off Most decentralized oracle, highest gas costs Best UX, some centralization in matching Simple, low cost, weaker oracle

Quick Reference: CTF Operations

Operation Input Output Gas (approx)
prepareCondition oracle, questionId, outcomeCount conditionId 50,000
splitPosition collateral amount outcome tokens (1 of each) 150,000
mergePositions complete token set collateral 120,000
reportPayouts payout vector (state change) 80,000
redeemPositions winning tokens collateral 180,000