Appendix A: The Constitution of the United States (Annotated)

How to Read This Appendix

The Constitution of the United States is a short document — about 4,500 words in its original 1787 form, plus another 3,000 words across the 27 amendments since ratified. It has governed a continental republic for more than two centuries. It has been read, argued over, litigated, and amended fewer times than most people expect. It is also written in a register of English that few Americans encounter outside of their high school civics class.

This appendix reproduces the full text of the original Constitution as ratified in 1788. The text is the canonical version maintained by the National Archives and Records Administration (archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript). Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation appear as in the engrossed parchment, including the eccentric capitalization conventions of the eighteenth century (Person, House, Year, all rendered with the period's preference for capitalizing nouns of importance).

The appendix uses three layers:

Verbatim text in > blockquote format. This is the law as ratified. Where the original document uses unusual spelling or punctuation, it is preserved.
Plain-English translation in italic. This is what the clause says in modern American English. The translation is not the law. It is a reading aid.
Annotation in regular text. A short note on what the clause does, the cases that have interpreted it, and a cross-reference to the chapter of this textbook where the doctrine is developed.

The 27 amendments appear in Appendix B.

The Constitution divides into seven Articles. Article I creates Congress; Article II creates the presidency; Article III creates the federal courts. Articles IV–VII handle interstate relations, amendment procedure, supremacy, and ratification. Most of the document's working text — and most of its political consequence — lives in Articles I, II, and III.

A note on what this appendix does not do. It does not adjudicate contested interpretive questions. When a clause has been understood differently by different schools of constitutional thought (originalist, textualist, purposivist, living-constitutionalist), the annotation says so and points to the chapter that develops the debate. This appendix is a reference text, not an argument.

The Preamble

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

Plain English: The American people, acting through their state ratifying conventions, are creating this Constitution to make a better national government than the one we had under the Articles of Confederation. We want a stronger union, a working legal system, peace at home, military defense, broad-based prosperity, and the protection of liberty for ourselves and for the generations to come.

The Preamble has limited legal force. The Supreme Court has never struck down a statute on Preamble grounds alone, and the Court held in Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905) that the Preamble does not itself confer power on the federal government. Its power is rhetorical and political.

That power matters. The opening phrase — "We the People of the United States" — is one of the most consequential rhetorical choices in American constitutional history. The Articles of Confederation, the document the Constitution replaced, opened with "We the undersigned Delegates of the States affixed to our Names." Sovereignty, in the Articles framing, flowed from the states. In the Preamble's framing, it flows from the people directly. Whether that shift is descriptive (the people are sovereign) or aspirational (we should treat the people as sovereign) is one of the foundational arguments of American political theory. See Ch. 2 for the founding theory and Ch. 3 for the Preamble's role in constitutional interpretation.

The Preamble lists six purposes. Each has been invoked at various moments to justify federal action: the General Welfare clause as authority for domestic spending programs; the Common Defence clause as authority for military expenditure; the Domestic Tranquility clause as authority for federal involvement in civil-rights enforcement and disaster response. These invocations are political arguments, not direct legal authority. The legal authority for federal action lives in Article I.

Article I — The Legislative Branch

Article I creates Congress. It is by far the longest article — about 2,300 words — and the Founders' decision to give Congress the most pages reflects their intention that Congress be the most powerful branch. Whether that has remained true is one of the central questions of contemporary American politics. See Ch. 7–8 for legislative process; Ch. 11 for the rise of executive power; Ch. 16 for the budget process.

Article I, Section 1 — The Legislative Vesting Clause

All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.

Plain English: The federal lawmaking power belongs to Congress. Congress has two chambers — a Senate and a House of Representatives.

This clause does two things. First, it locates federal lawmaking power exclusively in Congress: the president cannot make law (only execute it), and the courts cannot make law (only interpret it). This is the textual basis for the non-delegation doctrine — the principle that Congress cannot hand off its lawmaking power to the executive branch. The Supreme Court has invoked the non-delegation doctrine sparingly in the modern era (only twice, both in 1935, has the Court struck down a statute as an unconstitutional delegation), but it has reemerged in the major-questions doctrine of the Roberts Court. See Ch. 11 and Ch. 14.

Second, it establishes bicameralism. The Founders' rationale for two chambers, articulated by Madison in Federalist No. 51 and No. 62, was that requiring two distinct bodies to agree on legislation would slow the process and force deliberation. The bicameral structure also reflected the Connecticut Compromise: the House would represent population, the Senate would represent states. Whether bicameralism produces deliberation or paralysis is contested. See Ch. 7.

Article I, Section 2 — The House of Representatives

The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.

No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.

Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative; and until such Enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New-York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three.

When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.

The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.

Plain English: The House is elected every two years, by the same voters who elect the larger chamber of the state's legislature. Representatives must be at least 25, U.S. citizens for at least 7 years, and residents of the state they represent. Seats are apportioned by population, counted by census every 10 years; the original count included three-fifths of enslaved persons in the population basis (a clause superseded by the 13th and 14th Amendments). Vacancies are filled by special election called by the state's governor. The House picks its own Speaker. The House has the exclusive power to impeach federal officials.

This section contains the Constitution's most notorious original passage: the Three-Fifths Clause, counting "three fifths of all other Persons" — that is, of enslaved persons — for purposes of representation and direct taxation. The clause was a compromise between Northern delegates who wanted the enslaved population not counted at all (which would have reduced Southern representation in the House) and Southern delegates who wanted them counted as full persons for representation but not for any other purpose. The clause was rendered legally inoperative by the 13th Amendment (1865), which abolished slavery, and the 14th Amendment (1868), which apportions representation by total population (Section 2). The clause is a permanent reminder that the original Constitution accommodated slavery in its working text. See Ch. 6 for the constitutional history of slavery and Reconstruction.

The two-year term for the House was a deliberate choice. The Founders wanted the House to be the chamber most responsive to short-term shifts in public sentiment — accountable to "the People" in a more direct sense than the Senate. The two-year cycle has produced near-continuous campaign mode for House members, a feature that critics consider a bug. See Ch. 7, Ch. 17, and Ch. 19.

The sole Power of Impeachment vested in the House is one half of the impeachment process. The House impeaches by a simple majority vote on articles of impeachment; the Senate then tries the case (under Article I, Section 3). Three presidents have been impeached by the House (Andrew Johnson 1868, Bill Clinton 1998, Donald Trump 2019 and 2021); none has been removed by the Senate. See Ch. 9 and Ch. 38.

Article I, Section 3 — The Senate

The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote.

Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes. The Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so that one third may be chosen every second Year; and if Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies.

No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.

The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.

The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United States.

The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.

Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of Honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.

Plain English: The Senate has two senators per state, originally chosen by the state legislature (changed to popular election by the 17th Amendment in 1913). Senators serve 6-year terms, staggered so a third are up every 2 years. Senators must be at least 30, U.S. citizens for at least 9 years, and residents of the state they represent. The Vice President presides over the Senate and votes only to break a tie. The Senate elects a President pro tempore for when the VP is absent. The Senate has the exclusive power to try impeachments; conviction requires a two-thirds vote. The Chief Justice presides over presidential impeachment trials. Conviction can only result in removal from office and disqualification from future federal office, not criminal punishment — though the convicted person is still liable to ordinary criminal prosecution.

The Senate's design — equal representation by state, six-year terms, originally indirect election — is the Constitution's most explicit anti-majoritarian feature. The Founders intended the Senate to be a check on what Federalist No. 62 calls "the impulse of sudden and violent passions" that might capture the House. Whether this design serves deliberation or simply over-empowers small-state minorities is one of the most contested questions of contemporary American politics. As of 2026, the 26 smallest states (which can produce a Senate majority) contain about 18% of the U.S. population. See Ch. 7 and Ch. 38.

The 17th Amendment (1913) replaced state-legislature appointment with direct popular election of senators. See Appendix B.

The Senate's sole Power to try all Impeachments is the second half of the impeachment process. Two-thirds is a high bar; no president has been removed by Senate conviction. The Senate has convicted and removed eight federal judges in U.S. history.

The provision that the Chief Justice shall preside over the trial of a sitting president was invoked in the Andrew Johnson trial (Chief Justice Salmon Chase), the Clinton trial (Chief Justice William Rehnquist), and the first Trump trial (Chief Justice John Roberts). The second Trump impeachment (2021) tried him after he had left office; Senator Patrick Leahy presided, on the (contested) view that the Chief Justice presides only over a sitting president.

Article I, Section 4 — Elections

The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.

The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day.

Plain English: States set the rules for federal elections, but Congress can override or modify those rules at any time (except for where senators are chosen). Congress must meet at least once a year, originally on the first Monday in December (changed by the 20th Amendment to January 3).

The Elections Clause is the textual foundation for federal regulation of federal elections. Congress used it to enact the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (in conjunction with the 14th and 15th Amendments) and to require states to use specific procedures for federal elections. The clause has also been invoked by advocates of an Independent State Legislature theory — the contested reading that state legislatures have plenary authority over federal-election rules, free from review by state courts or governors. The Supreme Court rejected the strongest version of this theory in Moore v. Harper (2023). See Ch. 22 and Ch. 36.

Article I, Section 5 — Internal Operations

Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may provide.

Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.

Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, and be entered on the Journal.

Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.

Plain English: Each chamber decides its own membership disputes, sets a quorum at half its membership, and writes its own procedural rules. Each can punish or, by two-thirds vote, expel a member. Each must keep and (mostly) publish a journal of its proceedings. Neither chamber can adjourn for more than three days during a session without the other's consent.

The clause "Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings" is the textual basis for the filibuster in the modern Senate. The filibuster is not in the Constitution. It is a Senate rule (Rule XXII), adoptable and changeable by Senate majorities. As of 2026, ending debate on most legislation requires 60 votes (the cloture threshold); ending debate on judicial and executive-branch nominations requires only a simple majority (changed in 2013 for non-Supreme-Court nominations and 2017 for Supreme Court nominations, both by majority votes invoking the so-called "nuclear option"). Whether the legislative filibuster should also be abolished is one of the central institutional debates of contemporary American politics. See Ch. 7 and Ch. 38.

Article I, Section 6 — Compensation, Privileges, Restrictions

The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States. They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.

No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.

Plain English: Members of Congress are paid from the federal Treasury, at rates Congress sets by law. They cannot be arrested while traveling to or from Congress, except for serious crimes. They cannot be sued or prosecuted for anything they say in Congress (the Speech or Debate Clause). They cannot be appointed to a federal office created during their term, or one whose pay was raised during their term. And no federal officeholder can simultaneously serve in Congress.

The Speech or Debate Clause is a robust protection against legal liability for legislative acts. It has been read by the Court (e.g., Gravel v. United States, 1972) to protect not only floor speech but also committee work and the legislative process broadly construed. It does not protect non-legislative conduct (e.g., constituent services, fundraising, or, as in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, press releases issued outside the chamber).

The Emoluments and Incompatibility clauses at the end embody a separation-of-powers principle: a member of Congress should not be able to vote to create a federal office and then be appointed to it. The most famous modern controversy under this clause was the so-called Saxbe fix during William Saxbe's appointment as Attorney General by Nixon and Hillary Clinton's appointment as Secretary of State by Obama, where Congress reduced the salary of the office in question to its prior level so that the appointee's prior congressional vote raising the pay would not technically disqualify them. The fix is constitutionally contested but has been politically accepted.

The 27th Amendment (ratified 1992 from Madison's 1789 proposal) further constrains congressional pay: a pay change cannot take effect until after the next House election. See Appendix B.

Article I, Section 7 — How Bills Become Law

All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.

Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States: If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by Yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.

Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.

Plain English: All revenue-raising (i.e., tax) bills must start in the House. After both chambers pass an identical version of any bill, it goes to the president, who signs it (in which case it becomes law), vetoes it (in which case both chambers can override by two-thirds vote in each chamber), or does nothing for ten days (in which case it becomes law unless Congress has adjourned, in which case it dies — the so-called "pocket veto"). Other joint actions of Congress (like joint resolutions) generally also require presentment to the president.

This section codifies the legislative process. The Origination Clause (revenue bills must start in the House) reflects a small-state / large-state compromise: revenue power was vested in the chamber most representative of population. The Senate often gets around the clause by gutting House revenue bills and replacing the entire substance with Senate text — a practice the courts have generally accepted.

The Presentment Clause is the textual basis for the veto. The veto is one of the president's three institutional levers (the others being the executive vesting clause and the commander-in-chief clause). Vetoes have been used roughly 2,600 times in U.S. history; overrides occur in less than 5% of cases. The line-item veto, which would let presidents reject specific provisions of bills, was attempted by statute in 1996 and struck down by the Supreme Court in Clinton v. City of New York (1998) as a violation of presentment. See Ch. 9 and Ch. 11.

Article I, Section 8 — The Enumerated Powers of Congress

The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;

To borrow Money on the credit of the United States;

To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;

To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States;

To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures;

To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States;

To establish Post Offices and post Roads;

To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;

To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;

To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations;

To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;

To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;

To provide and maintain a Navy;

To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;

To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;

To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings;—And

To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.

Plain English: Congress can: - Levy taxes (income, sales, tariffs) and spend the proceeds on national defense and public welfare. - Borrow money on the U.S. credit. - Regulate trade and economic activity that crosses state lines or international borders, and trade with American Indian tribes. - Set rules for citizenship and bankruptcy. - Coin money, set its value, set weights and measures. - Punish counterfeiting. - Run the postal system. - Establish copyrights and patents. - Create federal courts below the Supreme Court. - Punish crimes on the high seas and violations of international law. - Declare war. - Raise and fund armies (with appropriations limited to 2 years), maintain a navy, and write military rules. - Call up state militias and organize them. - Govern Washington DC and federal installations. - Pass any laws "necessary and proper" to execute the listed powers and any other constitutional powers.

This section is the heart of the federal government's domestic authority. Each clause has generated its own line of doctrine.

The Taxing and Spending Clause is the foundation for the modern federal welfare state — Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, ACA subsidies, agricultural subsidies, education spending — through the spending power, which lets Congress condition federal funds on state compliance with federal policy preferences (subject to limits articulated in South Dakota v. Dole, 1987, and NFIB v. Sebelius, 2012). See Ch. 4 and Ch. 16.

The Commerce Clause ("To regulate Commerce . . . among the several States") is the most-litigated provision of Article I. The Court read it broadly during the New Deal (Wickard v. Filburn, 1942, holding that wheat grown for personal consumption could be regulated because it cumulatively affected interstate commerce). The Court began narrowing the reading in United States v. Lopez (1995) and United States v. Morrison (2000). NFIB v. Sebelius (2012) held that the Commerce Clause does not authorize Congress to compel inactivity into commercial activity (the individual mandate of the ACA was upheld instead under the taxing power). See Ch. 4 for the federalism implications and Ch. 14 for the doctrinal history.

The Necessary and Proper Clause (the last paragraph) is the source of Congress's "implied powers." McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) is the foundational case: Chief Justice John Marshall held that the clause authorizes any means rationally related to the execution of an enumerated power, even if the means itself is not enumerated. The clause was the textual hook for the First Bank of the United States, the Federal Reserve, the FBI, and innumerable other modern federal institutions. See Ch. 4.

The War Powers Clause ("To declare War") has been read in tension with the president's commander-in-chief power throughout U.S. history. Congress has formally declared war only five times (most recently against the Axis powers in 1941–42). Every armed conflict since — Korea, Vietnam, Iraq twice, Afghanistan — has been conducted under congressional authorizations short of formal war declaration, presidential claims of inherent authority, or both. The War Powers Resolution of 1973 attempts to constrain unilateral presidential war-making; presidents from Nixon onward have generally rejected its constitutionality while complying with its notification requirements. See Ch. 11 and Ch. 32.

Article I, Section 9 — Limits on Congress

The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.

The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.

No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.

No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.

No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.

No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.

No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.

No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.

Plain English: Congress is forbidden from: - Banning the slave trade before 1808 (a shameful constitutional accommodation; Congress did ban international slave trade in 1808, the first day it was constitutionally permitted). - Suspending habeas corpus, except during rebellion or invasion when public safety requires it. - Passing bills of attainder (laws that punish specific named individuals without trial) or ex post facto laws (laws that retroactively criminalize past conduct). - Levying direct taxes except in proportion to population (largely superseded by the 16th Amendment's authorization of an income tax). - Taxing exports. - Favoring one state's ports over another's in trade regulation. - Spending money without an appropriation by law, and the government must publish accounts of receipts and spending. - Granting titles of nobility. - Federal officials cannot accept gifts, payments, offices, or titles from foreign states without congressional consent (the Foreign Emoluments Clause).

The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause has been controversial when invoked. Lincoln suspended habeas during the Civil War; the Court's response (Ex parte Merryman, 1861, Ex parte Milligan, 1866) was complex. Congress has formally suspended habeas four times in U.S. history (most recently in the Philippines in 1905). Habeas-related litigation has been intense since 9/11 over Guantánamo detentions; Boumediene v. Bush (2008) held that detainees there have habeas rights. See Ch. 5 and Ch. 32.

The Foreign Emoluments Clause drew renewed attention during the Trump administration (2017–21) regarding business income from foreign governments at Trump-owned properties. Two lawsuits raising the issue (CREW v. Trump; Blumenthal v. Trump) reached the Supreme Court but were dismissed as moot when Trump left office in 2021. The clause is now active again in the second Trump administration; litigation patterns are still developing as of 2026. See Ch. 9.

Article I, Section 10 — Limits on the States

No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.

No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Imports or Imposts and Duties shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.

No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.

Plain English: States are forbidden from: - Conducting their own foreign policy (treaties, alliances, war). - Coining their own money or printing their own paper currency. - Passing bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, or laws breaking existing contracts. - Granting titles of nobility. - Taxing imports or exports without congressional consent (with a narrow exception for state inspection costs). - Maintaining their own military in peacetime, entering into compacts with other states or foreign nations, or going to war (except in actual or imminent invasion), without congressional consent.

This section establishes that the federal government has exclusive authority over foreign affairs, currency, and certain core sovereignty functions. Together with the Supremacy Clause (Article VI) and the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine (a court-created reading of the Commerce Clause), Section 10 creates the basic structure of American federalism. See Ch. 4.

The Contract Clause ("No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts") was once one of the most-litigated provisions of the Constitution. It has receded in importance since the New Deal, when the Court held in Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell (1934) that emergency state legislation modifying contract terms could be constitutional. The clause remains relevant in contemporary litigation over state legislative impairment of public-employee pension contracts.

Article II — The Executive Branch

Article II creates the presidency. It is much shorter than Article I — about 1,000 words — and considerably less specific. The Founders knew what they wanted from Congress; what they wanted from the executive was contested at the convention and remained contested in the early republic. Many of the most consequential interpretive questions in Article II — the scope of the Vesting Clause, the unitary executive theory, the nondelegation reach of the Take Care Clause — remain contested today. See Ch. 9–11.

Article II, Section 1 — The Presidency

The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows

Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.

[The original electoral procedure described in the next paragraph was superseded by the 12th Amendment in 1804. See Appendix B.]

The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United States.

No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.

In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.

The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which shall neither be encreased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of them.

Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation:—"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."

Plain English: The president holds executive power, serves a 4-year term, and is elected (along with the vice president) by the Electoral College. Each state has a number of electors equal to its total congressional delegation; states decide how to choose them. The president must be a natural-born citizen, at least 35, and a U.S. resident for at least 14 years. If the president is removed, dies, resigns, or is incapacitated, the vice president succeeds. Congress sets presidential pay, which can't be changed during the president's term. The president takes the oath of office before assuming the role.

The Executive Vesting Clause ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President") is the textual foundation for two contested constitutional theories:

The unitary executive theory, which holds that all executive power within the federal government must flow from the president, and therefore Congress cannot insulate executive officers from presidential removal. The theory reached its strongest current expression in Seila Law v. CFPB (2020) and Collins v. Yellen (2021), which struck down for-cause removal restrictions on the heads of certain independent agencies. The Roberts Court has been broadly receptive to unitary executive arguments, though the doctrine remains contested. See Ch. 11.
Inherent presidential power, the broader claim that the Vesting Clause grants powers beyond those specifically enumerated in Article II. This was the foundation for Justice Sutherland's expansive reading of presidential foreign-affairs power in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. (1936). It has been invoked by many administrations (across both parties) to justify executive action in domains where Congress has not legislated.

The Electoral College is the constitutional mechanism for choosing the president. Each state selects electors equal in number to its congressional delegation (House seats + 2 senators); the District of Columbia gets 3 (under the 23rd Amendment). The 270-vote majority is the threshold. The original procedure had each elector cast two votes for president; the candidate with the most votes became president, the runner-up became vice president. This produced the disastrous 1800 election (a tie between Jefferson and Burr, his own running mate) and was replaced by the 12th Amendment, which separates the presidential and vice-presidential ballots. See Appendix B and Ch. 22.

The Electoral College's design has produced four elections (1824, 1876, 1888, 2000, 2016) in which the popular-vote winner did not become president. (1824 is contested as a popular-vote count; the modern reform debate generally focuses on 2000 and 2016.) Whether to abolish, reform, or preserve the Electoral College is a longstanding institutional debate. See Ch. 22 and Ch. 38.

The natural-born Citizen requirement is the only citizenship-based qualification for any federal office. Its scope (does it include children of U.S. citizens born abroad? children born in U.S. territories?) has been litigated only at the margins. The leading scholarly view is that it includes anyone who is a U.S. citizen at birth, by any legal mechanism, as opposed to citizenship by naturalization.

The succession provision for presidential incapacity was elaborated by the 25th Amendment (1967), which spells out specific procedures for both temporary and permanent succession, plus the procedure for filling a vacant vice presidency. See Appendix B.

Article II, Section 2 — The Powers of the President

The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.

He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.

The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.

Plain English: The president is commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The president can demand written opinions from cabinet officers and grant pardons for federal crimes (except in impeachment cases). The president negotiates treaties (which need a two-thirds Senate vote to ratify) and nominates ambassadors, judges, Supreme Court justices, and other federal officers (most of whom need Senate confirmation). For low-level offices, Congress can vest appointment in the president, in courts, or in cabinet heads. The president can make recess appointments when the Senate isn't in session, but they expire at the end of the next session.

The Commander-in-Chief Clause is one of the most contested provisions in the Constitution. Its scope, and its relationship to Congress's power to declare war and raise armies (Article I, Section 8), has been argued in every major American conflict. The traditional accommodation: Congress controls the existence and funding of the armed forces, the president controls their deployment and tactical use. The accommodation is increasingly strained by extended deployments under congressional authorizations short of formal war declarations and by ambiguity around the unilateral use of force in the absence of any authorization. See Ch. 11 and Ch. 32.

The Pardon Power is described in unusually unconstrained terms. The president can pardon "Offences against the United States" — federal crimes — without consulting Congress, the courts, or anyone else. The only textual limit is the exception for impeachment (a president cannot pardon their way out of impeachment). The Court has read the power broadly: pardons can be conditional, can precede formal charges (as in Ford's pardon of Nixon), and can be granted to large classes of people (as in Carter's draft-evader pardon and various recent presidents' end-of-term clemency actions). Whether a president can pardon themselves is unsettled. The OLC opinion of 1974 ("No one may be a judge in their own case") suggests no, but the Supreme Court has never ruled on it. See Ch. 9 and Ch. 11.

The Treaty Power requires two-thirds Senate ratification. The two-thirds requirement has made formal treaty ratification politically difficult since the early 20th century. Modern presidents make many international commitments through alternative mechanisms — congressional-executive agreements (which need only majority support), executive agreements (which require none), and political commitments. The Iran nuclear deal (2015), the Paris climate accord (2015 entry, 2017 announced withdrawal, 2021 rejoining), and the Trans-Pacific Partnership are recent prominent examples of major international commitments handled outside Article II treaty procedures. See Ch. 32.

The Appointments Clause distinguishes between principal officers (who require Senate confirmation) and inferior officers (whose appointments Congress can vest elsewhere). What counts as a principal officer has generated significant litigation, most recently around the Department of Government Efficiency and similar entities. The Roberts Court's Lucia v. SEC (2018) and related decisions have read the principal-officer category broadly, requiring more positions to go through Senate confirmation. See Ch. 11.

The Recess Appointments Clause was substantially limited by NLRB v. Noel Canning (2014), which held that the Senate, not the president, decides when the Senate is in recess. Since 2014 the Senate has used pro forma sessions during periods that would otherwise be recesses, effectively foreclosing recess appointments. Some scholars see this as a desirable correction to executive overreach; others as a destabilizing departure from longstanding practice. See Ch. 11.

Article II, Section 3 — Duties

He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.

Plain English: The president must periodically report to Congress on the state of the country (the State of the Union) and recommend legislation. The president can call special sessions of Congress, settle adjournment disputes, receive foreign diplomats, and must "take care that the Laws be faithfully executed." The president signs commissions for federal officers.

The Take Care Clause — "he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" — is a small phrase doing enormous constitutional work. It has been read in three quite different ways:

As a duty on the president to execute the laws (and therefore as a constraint on prosecutorial discretion to ignore them);
As a power of the president to ensure the executive branch executes the laws (and therefore as authority to remove executive officers who don't);
As a limit on the president — the president must execute the laws as Congress wrote them, not as the president might wish them to be.

The major-questions doctrine of the Roberts Court (West Virginia v. EPA, 2022; Biden v. Nebraska, 2023) draws on the third reading: when an executive agency claims authority to make decisions of "vast economic and political significance," it must point to clear congressional authorization. The doctrine has been criticized as untethered to the Constitution's text and praised as a needed restoration of the legislative-executive balance. See Ch. 11 and Ch. 14.

The Receive Ambassadors Clause has been read since the Washington administration as authorizing the president to recognize (or not recognize) foreign governments. The clause was pivotal in Zivotofsky v. Kerry (2015), in which the Court held that the recognition power is exclusive to the president.

Article II, Section 4 — Impeachment of Executive Officers

The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.

Plain English: The president, vice president, and other federal officials can be impeached and removed for treason, bribery, or "other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."

The phrase "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" is one of the most contested terms in the Constitution. It was borrowed from English parliamentary practice, where it referred to political wrongdoing — abuse of office, betrayal of public trust, gross dereliction of duty — not necessarily to indictable crimes. The most authoritative modern statement comes from the House Judiciary Committee staff report on Nixon impeachment (1974), which concluded that "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" includes serious political wrongs even where no statute is violated. Whether that reading is correct, and whether the bar is essentially political (whatever a House majority and two-thirds of the Senate think it is) or has objective content, is genuinely contested. See Ch. 9 and Ch. 38.

Article III — The Judicial Branch

Article III creates the federal judiciary. It is the shortest of the three structural articles — about 400 words — and the briefest treatment reflects the Founders' relative unfamiliarity with strong, independent national courts. Most of the federal judicial system as we know it was built by Congress (using its Article III Section 1 authority to "constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court") and by the Supreme Court itself (most consequentially in Marbury v. Madison, 1803, which established judicial review). See Ch. 12–14.

Article III, Section 1 — The Judicial Vesting

The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme Court and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.

Plain English: Federal judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court and in lower courts that Congress creates. Federal judges serve "during good Behaviour" — effectively life tenure — and their pay cannot be cut while they're in office.

The good behaviour standard is the textual foundation for federal judicial life tenure. A federal judge can be removed only by impeachment and conviction (a process that has happened 15 times in U.S. history, all involving lower-court judges; no Supreme Court justice has ever been removed). Whether life tenure remains the right policy in an era when justices serve 30+ years and timing of vacancies has become highly partisan is a live debate; proposals for 18-year staggered terms have bipartisan support among legal academics but would likely require a constitutional amendment. See Ch. 14 and Ch. 38.

The clause that judicial pay cannot be diminished prevents Congress from punishing the courts financially. The clause was strengthened by United States v. Will (1980), which held that even delaying a scheduled cost-of-living adjustment violates the clause if it has the effect of reducing real compensation.

Article III, Section 2 — Jurisdiction

The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State;—between Citizens of different States,—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.

The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law direct.

Plain English: Federal courts hear cases involving the Constitution, federal law, treaties, ambassadors, admiralty, the United States as a party, disputes between states, disputes between citizens of different states (diversity jurisdiction), and other listed categories. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction (i.e., is the trial court) for cases involving ambassadors and states; in everything else it's an appellate court, with Congress having authority to set exceptions and regulations. Federal criminal trials must use juries and must be held in the state where the crime occurred.

This section sets the scope of federal judicial power. The two most important categories are:

Federal-question jurisdiction ("Cases . . . arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties") — the basis for federal judicial review of constitutional claims and federal-statutory claims.
Diversity jurisdiction ("between Citizens of different States") — the basis for federal courts hearing state-law cases between parties from different states, originally to prevent state-court bias against out-of-state parties.

The provision that the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction "with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make" is the textual basis for jurisdiction-stripping proposals — congressional bills that would remove the Supreme Court's authority to hear certain categories of cases. The Court has read the Exceptions Clause narrowly (Ex parte McCardle, 1869, is the most cited precedent), though the limits of the doctrine have never been definitively tested. See Ch. 14 and Ch. 38.

The case-or-controversy requirement (implicit in the use of "Cases" and "Controversies") is the foundation for the modern doctrine of justiciability — the rules about who can sue, when, and over what. The doctrines of standing (you must have suffered a particularized injury), mootness (the case must still present a live dispute), ripeness (the case must be sufficiently developed), and the political-question doctrine (some questions are committed to the political branches by the Constitution) are all read out of the case-or-controversy language. Marbury v. Madison (1803), Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992), and Spokeo v. Robins (2016) are the canonical cases. See Ch. 14.

Article III, Section 3 — Treason

Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.

The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.

Plain English: Treason is defined narrowly: levying war against the U.S., or actively helping its enemies. Conviction requires either two witnesses to the same overt act or a confession in open court. Congress sets the punishment for treason, but the punishment cannot extend to the convicted person's heirs or descendants.

This is the only crime defined in the Constitution itself. The Founders deliberately wrote a narrow definition to prevent the kind of politically motivated treason prosecutions common in English history. There have been very few federal treason prosecutions in U.S. history; the narrow definition has done what it was meant to do. The phrase "levying War" was read in the Aaron Burr trial (1807) to require an actual assemblage of force, not mere conspiracy. See Ch. 5.

Article IV — Relations Among the States

Article IV addresses interstate relations, the admission of new states, and federal protection of state governments.

Article IV, Section 1 — Full Faith and Credit

Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.

Plain English: Each state must respect the laws, records, and court judgments of other states. Congress can set the rules for how this works.

The Full Faith and Credit Clause binds states together as a single legal community. A judgment in a Texas court is enforceable in California; a marriage valid in Massachusetts is recognized in Mississippi. The clause has had renewed importance in the past two decades around marriage recognition (Obergefell v. Hodges, 2015, removed most of the underlying conflict by establishing a federal constitutional right to same-sex marriage) and may have renewed importance again in the post-Dobbs era as states with different abortion laws confront one another's judgments and out-of-state-travel statutes. See Ch. 4 and Ch. 15.

Article IV, Section 2 — Privileges and Immunities; Extradition

The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.

A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.

[The Fugitive Slave Clause that originally appeared here was nullified by the 13th Amendment.]

Plain English: Citizens of any state get the basic rights of citizens of whatever state they visit. States must extradite criminal fugitives to the state where the crime was committed.

The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV prevents states from discriminating against out-of-state citizens in fundamental matters. (It is distinct from, and predates, the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 14th Amendment.) The doctrine has produced cases involving differential bar admission, taxation, and access to natural resources.

Article IV, Section 3 — New States

New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.

The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any Claims of the United States, or any particular State.

Plain English: Congress admits new states, but cannot create a new state by carving up an existing state or merging existing states without the consent of those states' legislatures. Congress also governs U.S. territories.

The Admissions Clause is the constitutional foundation for the entrance of all 37 states admitted after the original 13. The clause has been read by Congress to require an "equal footing" — new states enter on equal terms with the original states. Whether Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia can or should be admitted as states is a contemporary debate. DC statehood has been advanced through the bill H.R. 51 in recent Congresses; neither has cleared the Senate. See Ch. 38.

Article IV, Section 4 — Guarantee Clause

The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened), against domestic Violence.

Plain English: The federal government guarantees each state a "Republican Form of Government" (i.e., a representative-democratic system, not a monarchy or direct democracy) and provides protection against foreign invasion and, on state request, domestic insurrection.

The Guarantee Clause has been read by the Court to be non-justiciable — a political question committed to Congress, not the courts. Luther v. Borden (1849) is the foundational case. The clause has been invoked unsuccessfully in challenges to direct-democracy mechanisms (initiatives and referenda) on the theory that they violate "republican" form; the Court has consistently held that determining what counts as a republican form is for Congress, not the courts.

Article V — Amendment

The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.

Plain English: There are two paths to amend the Constitution. Either (1) two-thirds of each chamber of Congress proposes an amendment, then three-fourths of state legislatures (or state conventions, if Congress so specifies) ratify it; or (2) two-thirds of state legislatures call a national convention to propose amendments, which then must be ratified by three-fourths of states. Two original-Constitution restrictions on Congress (slave trade, direct taxation) couldn't be amended before 1808. And no state can be deprived of equal Senate representation without its consent.

Article V is one of the most demanding amendment procedures of any constitution in the world. The 27 ratified amendments came through Path 1 (congressional proposal); the convention path has never been used to propose an amendment, though there have been many partial efforts at it.

The equal Suffrage in the Senate provision is one of two unamendable provisions in the original Constitution (the other, regarding the slave trade, expired in 1808). The provision has the unusual structure that a state's consent could waive the protection — at least in theory. But practical politics has prevented any movement that would reduce a state's Senate representation. The provision is a structural lock on the small-state guarantee; abolishing the equal-Senate principle would require either a state's consent or a constitutional convention that ignored the limit (a path widely considered illegitimate). See Ch. 3 and Ch. 38.

Article VI — Supremacy and Oaths

All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation.

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.

Plain English: The new federal government will honor the debts of the prior government under the Articles of Confederation. The Constitution, federal laws made under it, and U.S. treaties are the "supreme Law of the Land," binding on state judges even when state law conflicts. All federal and state officials must swear an oath to support the Constitution; no religious test for public office is allowed.

The Supremacy Clause is the constitutional foundation for federal preemption — when federal law conflicts with state law, federal law wins. The clause is doing the work, every day, in a thousand regulatory disputes (from preemption of state employment law by federal labor law, to preemption of state pesticide regulation by federal environmental law). See Ch. 4.

The No Religious Test Clause — buried at the end of an article that few people read — is a remarkably consequential commitment. It made the United States, in 1788, the first major government in the world to abolish religious tests for public office. Combined with the First Amendment's later adoption, it established the constitutional framework for religious neutrality in government employment.

Article VII — Ratification

The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.

Plain English: When 9 of the 13 states ratify the Constitution through state conventions, it goes into effect for those 9 (and any others that ratify later).

The 9-of-13 threshold was deliberately set lower than unanimity. The Articles of Confederation had required unanimous consent for amendment, and the Founders had concluded that this requirement was the principal cause of the Confederation's paralysis. The 9-state threshold was reached on June 21, 1788 (New Hampshire's ratification), and the Constitution went into effect for the ratifying states on March 4, 1789 (the date set by the Confederation Congress). North Carolina ratified later that year; Rhode Island held out until May 29, 1790, becoming the last of the original 13 to ratify.

Signers (1787)

The Constitution was signed on September 17, 1787, at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. 39 of the 55 delegates who attended the Convention signed it. Three delegates who attended the entire Convention refused to sign — Edmund Randolph (VA), George Mason (VA), and Elbridge Gerry (MA) — because they thought the document needed a Bill of Rights, was too centralizing, or both. (Mason and Gerry were vindicated when the Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791; Randolph eventually became a strong Federalist.) Several other delegates had left the Convention before September 17.

The 39 Signers, by State:

New Hampshire — John Langdon, Nicholas Gilman.

Massachusetts — Nathaniel Gorham, Rufus King.

Connecticut — William Samuel Johnson, Roger Sherman.

New York — Alexander Hamilton.

New Jersey — William Livingston, David Brearley, William Paterson, Jonathan Dayton.

Pennsylvania — Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Mifflin, Robert Morris, George Clymer, Thomas FitzSimons, Jared Ingersoll, James Wilson, Gouverneur Morris.

Delaware — George Read, Gunning Bedford Jr., John Dickinson, Richard Bassett, Jacob Broom.

Maryland — James McHenry, Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer, Daniel Carroll.

Virginia — John Blair, James Madison Jr.

North Carolina — William Blount, Richard Dobbs Spaight, Hugh Williamson.

South Carolina — John Rutledge, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Charles Pinckney, Pierce Butler.

Georgia — William Few, Abraham Baldwin.

Presiding — George Washington (Virginia, President of the Convention).

Attest — William Jackson, Secretary of the Convention.

The signers are, collectively, the small group of men who designed the framework of American government. They were lawyers, planters, merchants, soldiers, and one printer (Franklin). They were nearly all wealthy, all white, all male, and most owned enslaved persons. They were also, by the standards of constitution-makers in any era, an unusually capable assembly: they produced in four months a working framework that has lasted, with 27 amendments, for more than two centuries.

The men who refused to sign — Mason, Gerry, Randolph — and the men who organized opposition to ratification (Patrick Henry, Samuel Adams, Melancton Smith, the writers of the Anti-Federalist papers) were also part of the founding. The Constitution we live under is a product of the convention's signers; the Bill of Rights we live under is a product of the convention's critics. Both belong in the founding story. See Ch. 2.

The text of this Appendix is the canonical version maintained by the National Archives. For the original parchment and high-resolution images, see archives.gov/founding-docs.

The amendments to the Constitution appear in Appendix B. The Declaration of Independence — the political document that preceded the Constitution and articulated the philosophical basis for American independence — appears in Appendix C.