Chapter 34 — Quiz

Twelve multiple-choice and four short-answer questions. The multiple-choice items target retention of the doctrinal and empirical core; the short-answer items target argumentative facility and the discipline of distinguishing empirical from normative claims. Answers and rationale are at the bottom.

Multiple choice

Q1. Buckley v. Valeo (1976) established which of the following as the only constitutionally cognizable interest justifying campaign-finance restrictions?

A. Equality of political voice across income levels B. Preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption C. Protecting incumbents from undue challenger spending D. Ensuring viewpoint diversity in political advertising

Q2. The "contribution-expenditure distinction" announced in Buckley allows the government to:

A. Cap both contributions and independent expenditures B. Cap contributions but generally not independent expenditures C. Cap independent expenditures but not contributions D. Cap neither, leaving both fully unregulated

Q3. Citizens United v. FEC (2010) held that:

A. Corporations are persons with full constitutional rights identical to natural persons B. Contribution limits to candidates violate the First Amendment C. The First Amendment prohibits restrictions on independent political expenditures by corporations and unions D. Disclosure requirements for political spending are unconstitutional

Q4. Which of the following is the case that produced the legal architecture for super PACs by holding that contribution limits to independent-expenditure-only PACs were unconstitutional?

A. Citizens United v. FEC (2010) B. McCutcheon v. FEC (2014) C. SpeechNow.org v. FEC (2010, D.C. Circuit) D. Buckley v. Valeo (1976)

Q5. McCutcheon v. FEC (2014) struck down which type of contribution limit?

A. The individual contribution limit per candidate per election B. The aggregate contribution limit on a single donor's total federal-cycle giving C. The corporate contribution prohibition D. The contribution limit to political action committees

Q6. As of the 2025–26 cycle, the FEC limit on an individual's contribution to a single federal candidate per election is approximately:

A. $200 B. $1,000 C. $3,500 D. $10,000

Q7. A "501(c)(4)" organization in the campaign-finance context is best described as:

A. A federal candidate's principal campaign committee B. A super PAC registered with the FEC C. A tax-exempt "social welfare" non-profit that may engage in political activity but is not required to disclose its donors D. A 527 political organization with full disclosure requirements

Q8. The Kalla and Broockman (2016) randomized field experiment is most often cited as evidence that:

A. Money buys roll-call votes in Congress B. Money buys access — donor constituents are significantly more likely to receive meetings with congressional offices than non-donor constituents C. Public financing increases candidate diversity D. Disclosure deters corporate political spending

Q9. Which of the following is true of the small-donor share of federal candidate fundraising?

A. It has declined from above 30% in 2000 to below 15% in recent cycles B. It has remained roughly constant since 2000 C. It has grown from under 15% in the early 2000s to roughly 30–35% in major federal races by 2024 D. It exceeds 75% in most competitive Senate races

Q10. Which pair of fundraising platforms most directly enabled the recent growth in small-donor federal contributions?

A. Bundle.com and CampaignBuilder B. ActBlue (Democratic-aligned, founded 2004) and WinRed (Republican-aligned, launched 2019) C. GiveDirect and PoliPAC D. FECNet and OpenSecrets Live

Q11. Which of the following is not among the named mega-donors who have given at scale to recent federal elections?

A. Sheldon Adelson B. George Soros C. Elon Musk D. All of the above are named mega-donors

Q12. Which of the following is closest to the 2024 federal-election cycle total spending across all sources (candidates, parties, PACs, super PACs, 527s, disclosed (c)(4) political spending)?

A. $2 billion B. $6 billion C. $15–20 billion D. $100 billion

Short answer

SA1. State the contribution-expenditure distinction in your own words. Briefly summarize the strongest argument for maintaining it and the strongest argument for abandoning it. (3–4 sentences each.)

SA2. Distinguish between quid pro quo corruption and "systemic" or "structural" corruption. Which definition is operative in Citizens United? Which definition do reform advocates argue should be operative?

SA3. Briefly summarize the empirical record on public-financing reforms in NYC, Maine, Connecticut, and Seattle. What does the evidence show, and what does it not show?

SA4. Pair one Democratic-aligned mega-donor and one Republican-aligned mega-donor. For each, identify their wealth source and one major political vehicle they have funded. Why does honest discussion of campaign finance require pairing examples in this way?

Answers and rationale

Q1: B. Buckley explicitly rejected equality of political voice as a constitutionally sufficient interest ("The concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment").

Q2: B. Contribution limits to candidates were upheld; expenditure limits, including limits on candidates' use of personal funds and on independent expenditures, were struck.

Q3: C. Note: A is the popular formulation but not the actual holding. Citizens United did not announce that "corporations are persons"; it held that the First Amendment prohibits restrictions on independent political expenditures by corporations and unions.

Q4: C. SpeechNow is the case that built the super-PAC architecture, though Citizens United's logic was the doctrinal foundation.

Q5: B. Aggregate limits, not individual limits.

Q6: C. Indexed to inflation; the primary and the general are separate elections, so the per-cycle effective cap to a single candidate is roughly twice this.

Q7: C. A (c)(4) is not required to disclose donors. Hence "dark money."

Q8: B. The Kalla–Broockman finding is on access, not vote-flipping. The distinction is essential.

Q9: C. The small-donor share has grown substantially.

Q10: B. ActBlue and WinRed.

Q11: D. All of the above are documented mega-donors. Adelson and Musk Republican-aligned; Soros Democratic-aligned.

Q12: C. Roughly $15–20 billion across all sources.

SA1 model answer: Contributions are direct gifts to a campaign and can be capped (under Buckley) because they create direct dependency. Expenditures are independent spending — your own ad supporting a candidate without coordinating with the campaign — and generally cannot be capped because they are core political speech. For maintaining: allowing the state to cap independent political spending would license speech regulation by the regulator's preferences, with all the historical risks that entails. For abandoning: an independent expenditure of $5 million is more valuable to a candidate than a $3,500 contribution; the "independence" is increasingly a legal fiction in a world of fully integrated super-PAC operations.

SA2 model answer: Quid pro quo corruption is direct exchange — money for a specific official act. Systemic or structural corruption is the long-run distortion of the representational relationship that occurs when large concentrations of money systematically advantage donor-class preferences. Citizens United operates on the quid pro quo definition. Reform advocates argue the broader definition should govern, both because the harms are real and because the narrower definition leaves no constitutional room to address them.

SA3 model answer: The empirical record is consistent: well-designed public financing broadens the candidate pool, increases small-donor participation, and modestly reduces dependence on large donors. NYC's 8-to-1 match has produced more diverse candidate pools and higher small-donor participation. Maine and Connecticut show similar patterns at the state level. Seattle's voucher program has expanded the donor pool but with low redemption rates. What the evidence does not show is that public financing eliminates outside money or large super-PAC spending; the structural pull toward outside groups remains. Public financing changes the marginal donor base, not the macro structure.

SA4 model answer (one possible version): Democratic-aligned: Michael Bloomberg, financial-data founder, self-funded 2020 presidential primary plus Independence USA PAC; Republican-aligned: Sheldon Adelson, casino magnate, major funder of American Crossroads and other Republican vehicles. Pairing matters because mega-donor concentration is a feature of both parties' financial architecture. Discussions that name only one side's mega-donors mislead the reader about the structural pattern, regardless of whether the partisan totals are exactly equal in any given cycle.