Chapter 35 Self-Check Quiz

Twelve multiple-choice questions and four short-answer prompts. Answers are at the end. Use this as a pre-class self-check or a study tool.

Multiple Choice

1. The portmanteau "gerrymander" derives from:

a) Salem witch trials cartography b) A Massachusetts state-senate district drawn by Governor Elbridge Gerry in 1812 c) An English political pamphlet from 1745 d) A Virginia congressional district drawn during Reconstruction

2. Which of the following is NOT a basic technique of partisan gerrymandering?

a) Packing b) Cracking c) Stacking d) Both packing and cracking are techniques; (c) is fabricated terminology

3. Reynolds v. Sims (1964) established the principle of:

a) Race-neutral redistricting b) One person, one vote, applied to state legislative districts c) The non-justiciability of partisan-gerrymandering claims d) Strict scrutiny for race-predominant maps

4. Shaw v. Reno (1993) held that maps in which race is the predominant factor are subject to:

a) Rational-basis review b) Intermediate scrutiny c) Strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause d) Categorical prohibition under the Voting Rights Act

5. Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004) is significant because:

a) The Court struck down Pennsylvania's congressional map as a partisan gerrymander b) The Court held partisan-gerrymandering claims justiciable in federal court but did not develop a manageable standard c) The Court held all racial-gerrymandering claims non-justiciable d) The Court applied the Gingles framework to a partisan-gerrymandering claim

6. Rucho v. Common Cause (2019) held that:

a) Partisan gerrymandering is constitutional b) Partisan-gerrymandering claims are non-justiciable political questions in federal court c) The Voting Rights Act preempts state partisan-gerrymandering claims d) Independent commissions are required by the Equal Protection Clause

7. Allen v. Milligan (2023) is significant because:

a) It struck down Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act b) It overruled Shelby County v. Holder c) It reaffirmed Section 2 vote-dilution doctrine and required Alabama to draw a second majority-Black district d) It applied the Independent State Legislature theory

8. Moore v. Harper (2023) rejected:

a) The strong version of the Independent State Legislature theory b) The Gingles framework c) Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act d) The compactness requirement under state constitutions

9. Independent redistricting commissions have been adopted (in some form, for congressional maps) in all of the following states EXCEPT:

a) California b) Arizona c) Michigan d) Texas

10. Geographic sorting of voters refers to:

a) Sorting voters by demographic similarity into majority-minority districts b) The spatial concentration of Democrats in urban areas and Republicans in rural areas, producing lopsided districts even under neutral lines c) The use of compactness algorithms to draw districts d) A type of racial gerrymandering prohibited by Shaw

11. REDMAP, launched by the Republican State Leadership Committee in 2009, is:

a) A constitutional amendment proposal limiting partisan redistricting b) A targeted-spending strategy for state-legislative races to control post-2010 redistricting c) A bipartisan reform organization d) An algorithmic redistricting tool

12. Of approximately 435 U.S. House districts, how many are in the genuinely competitive range (Cook PVI of R+5 to D+5) as of 2024?

a) Approximately 30 b) Approximately 100 c) Approximately 165 d) Approximately 220

Short Answer

13. Distinguish, in 4–6 sentences, between racial gerrymandering as prohibited by Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (race-based dilution) and racial gerrymandering as subject to strict scrutiny under Shaw v. Reno (race-as-predominant-factor maps). Why does this distinction matter for mapmakers?

14. Briefly explain the efficiency gap (Stephanopoulos and McGhee 2014). What does the metric measure, and what is one principled critique of using it as the sole test of partisan-gerrymandering?

15. Explain why the 2010-cycle Republican gerrymanders are widely considered the most aggressive single-cycle gerrymanders in modern U.S. history. Reference at least one specific state and at least one specific quantitative measure.

16. Steel-man (in 5–7 sentences) the conservative argument that more-competitive districts may produce more polarized representatives, not less. Your answer should not endorse the position; it should present it at its strongest.

Answer Key

1. b — Elbridge Gerry's 1812 Massachusetts district. The salamander-shaped district was lampooned in the Boston Gazette.

2. d — Packing and cracking are the two basic techniques; "stacking" is not standard gerrymandering terminology.

3. b — Reynolds v. Sims applied one-person-one-vote to state legislative districts. Wesberry v. Sanders (1964) applied the same principle to congressional districts.

4. c — Strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

5. b — Justice Kennedy's controlling concurrence held that partisan-gerrymandering claims were justiciable in principle but no manageable standard had yet been developed.

6. b — Federal courts cannot adjudicate partisan-gerrymandering claims after Rucho. State courts and state constitutions remain available.

7. c — Milligan reaffirmed Section 2 doctrine and required Alabama to draw a second majority-Black district. Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion.

8. a — Moore rejected the strong Independent State Legislature theory, preserving state-court review of state legislatures' federal-elections rules.

9. d — Texas retains legislature-drawn redistricting. California (Prop 11/20), Arizona (2000 initiative), and Michigan (2018 initiative) have independent commissions.

10. b — The spatial concentration of Democratic voters in urban areas creates structural disadvantage in single-member-district plurality systems even under neutral maps.

11. b — REDMAP was the Redistricting Majority Project, a strategic targeted-spending program in state-legislative races.

12. a — Approximately 30 of 435 districts are in the R+5 to D+5 range, down from about 165 in 1996.

13. Section 2 prohibits practices and procedures (including maps) that result in dilution of minority voting power, when the Gingles preconditions are met (sufficient size and compactness, political cohesion, white bloc voting). The constitutional doctrine of Shaw v. Reno applies strict scrutiny to maps in which race is the predominant line-drawing factor, even if the goal is to increase minority representation. The two doctrines pull in opposite directions: Section 2 may require race-conscious mapmaking; the Equal Protection Clause may forbid it. Mapmakers must navigate the gap, drawing maps that comply with the VRA's race-conscious requirements without making race so predominant as to trigger strict scrutiny. Allen v. Milligan (2023) clarified that there is, in practice, a workable path through the gap.

14. The efficiency gap measures the asymmetry in "wasted" votes between the two parties — votes cast for losing candidates plus surplus votes for winning candidates beyond 50%+1 — divided by total votes. The intuition is that gerrymanders waste the opposing party's votes through packing and cracking. One principled critique: the efficiency gap implicitly assumes a roughly proportional relationship between vote share and seat share, which the U.S. single-member-district plurality system does not produce; geographic sorting alone produces non-proportional outcomes. The gap can therefore flag neutral maps as biased simply because of how voters are distributed.

15. The 2010-cycle Republican maps in Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, North Carolina, and Ohio scored as outliers under multiple quantitative measures (efficiency gap, partisan symmetry, mean–median, simulation-comparison). In Wisconsin, the 2018 election produced a Democratic statewide majority but only 36% of state-assembly seats — a partisan asymmetry rarely seen in modern U.S. legislative outcomes. Pennsylvania's congressional map produced 13–5 Republican delegations in years when statewide congressional vote totals were close to 50–50. Aggregate estimates from Princeton, Brennan Center, and academic sources put the 2010-cycle Republican U.S. House advantage at 10–15 seats above the geographic-sorting baseline.

16. In a safe district, the incumbent need not fear primary defeat from a more ideologically extreme challenger and can govern toward the median voter of the district. In a competitive district, by contrast, the incumbent's first electoral threat is from primary opponents, who are typically more ideologically extreme than the district median, because primary voters are smaller and more activist; the incumbent must therefore signal alignment with the activist base in the primary and then perform polarized cues in the general to mobilize that base. Some studies of congressional voting behavior in the 2010s find that members in safe seats are closer to their districts' median voters than members in competitive seats are to theirs. The argument has support among political scientists including portions of the AEI–Brookings Election Reform working group. The implication is that competitive-district reform may not deliver the moderation that reformers expect.