Chapter 25 — Self-Check Quiz
Twelve multiple-choice questions and four short-answer questions. Answers and brief explanations are at the end. Use this as a self-check after reading the chapter; do not skip to the answers.
Multiple-choice questions
1. Ideological polarization, affective polarization, and sorting are:
a) Three names for the same phenomenon b) Three distinct dimensions that have grown together but are not identical c) Three competing theories, of which only one is empirically supported d) Three terms used interchangeably in the political-science literature
2. The DW-NOMINATE score is best described as:
a) A survey of legislators' self-reported ideology b) A measure of how often legislators speak on the floor c) A model of legislator positions derived from every roll-call vote in congressional history d) A composite measure of fundraising, endorsements, and primary opponents
3. Affective polarization, as measured by ANES feeling thermometers, has grown primarily because:
a) Americans now love their own party more than they used to b) Americans now dislike the opposing party more than they used to c) Americans now see no difference between the parties d) Americans now hold more moderate positions overall
4. The "big sort" (Bishop) refers to:
a) The deliberate political segregation of voters by party leaders b) The growing tendency of Americans to live in counties dominated politically by one party c) The federal government's organization of voters by district d) A policy of intentional gerrymandering by the Department of Justice
5. Which of the following is the strongest empirical statement of the asymmetric polarization claim?
a) Democrats have moved further left than Republicans have moved right b) Both parties have polarized by exactly the same amount c) Congressional Republicans have moved further from the center than congressional Democrats over 1970-2025, by standard quantitative measures d) Polarization has been driven entirely by social media
6. Primary electorates tend to produce more ideologically extreme candidates than the general electorate would, primarily because:
a) Primary voters are forced to vote for extremists by party rules b) Primary turnout is lower and primary voters are more ideologically engaged c) Primaries are the only elections in which extremists are allowed to run d) Primary voters are systematically misinformed
7. Negative partisanship refers to:
a) Voters supporting third-party candidates because they reject both major parties b) Voters being mobilized more by dislike of the opposing party than by affection for their own c) Voters refusing to participate in elections d) Voters consistently choosing the more moderate candidate in each election
8. The Cook Partisan Voting Index (PVI) measures:
a) The fundraising advantage of incumbents b) How much more Republican or Democratic a district is than the country as a whole c) The percentage of voters who turn out in midterm elections d) The number of competitive seats in a state
9. Comparing U.S. polarization to other advanced democracies, the most accurate statement is:
a) The U.S. is the most polarized advanced democracy by every measure b) The U.S. is among the more polarized advanced democracies but not uniquely so c) The U.S. is less polarized than most advanced democracies d) Polarization data is unavailable for most other countries
10. The "perception gap" research (More in Common) finds that:
a) Americans accurately perceive the views of the opposing party b) Americans systematically overestimate how extreme the median member of the opposing party is c) Americans accurately perceive their own party's views but not their own d) The perception gap is largest among politically disengaged Americans
11. Ranked-choice voting, as implemented in Maine and Alaska, has produced:
a) Dramatic reductions in legislator extremism b) Modest, generally positive effects on competitiveness and tone, with no transformative depolarizing effect c) A complete failure that has been reversed in both states d) An immediate rise in polarization
12. The most honest summary of the depolarization-reform conversation is:
a) Several reforms (RCV, open primaries, anti-gerrymandering) reliably solve polarization b) No reform has any effect; polarization is structurally locked in c) We do not know how to depolarize a polarized democracy; some reforms produce modest improvements on certain margins d) Reform is impossible because the Constitution prevents it
Short-answer questions
Q13. In one paragraph (around 150 words), explain the difference between sorting and polarization and give one example of each. Why does the chapter say that sorting reinforces polarization without being the same thing?
Q14. In one paragraph, summarize both the strongest version of the asymmetric-polarization claim and the strongest objection to it. Do not take a side; the goal is to articulate both positions clearly.
Q15. In one paragraph, describe one optimistic and one pessimistic argument about whether America can "unsort." What evidence supports each?
Q16. In one paragraph, explain why the chapter says that polarization is "not someone else's problem." What does this mean for how a citizen should think about their own role in the polarization dynamic?
Answer key
1. b. The chapter introduces these as three distinct dimensions and stresses that they have grown together but are not identical.
2. c. DW-NOMINATE uses every roll-call vote in congressional history to place each member on a scale.
3. b. ANES data show stable in-party warmth (~70) but sharply declining warmth toward the opposing party (47 → 18).
4. b. Bishop's argument is that Americans have, through millions of separate decisions, ended up living in increasingly politically homogeneous counties.
5. c. This is the Mann/Ornstein/McCarty position, which the chapter treats as empirically supported but contested.
6. b. Lower turnout and higher engagement among primary voters produce more ideologically extreme primary winners.
7. b. Abramowitz and Webster's central finding.
8. b. PVI is calculated based on the previous two presidential elections.
9. b. Comparative data shows the U.S. is high but not unique; Israel, Brazil, the U.K., France, and others have substantial polarization.
10. b. The systematic overestimation of the other side's extremism is the central finding; the gap is largest among the most engaged.
11. b. The chapter is careful to describe RCV's effects as modest, generally positive, but not transformative.
12. c. The chapter explicitly states this conclusion in 25.9.4.
Q13. Sorting is alignment of party with other identities; polarization is increased extremity of positions or feelings. Sorting example: Black voters becoming overwhelmingly Democratic and white evangelicals overwhelmingly Republican. Polarization example: the disappearance of overlap in House DW-NOMINATE distributions. Sorting reinforces polarization because when partisanship overlaps with multiple identities, party becomes a "mega-identity" and political loss is experienced as loss for one's whole bundle.
Q14. Asymmetric claim: by DW-NOMINATE, House Republicans have moved ~0.45 right since 1970 while Democrats moved ~0.20 left — more than twice the magnitude. Strongest objection: the issue space changes; new issues drive contemporary votes; on these, Democratic positions have moved substantially leftward of mid-century positions, but NOMINATE may not capture this since leadership controls floor content.
Q15. Optimistic: cross-pressured voters still exist (10-15%); younger voters less rigidly partisan; perception-gap research shows correctable misperception. Pessimistic: sorting structurally locked in; information environment doesn't reward depolarization; negative partisanship self-sustaining; engaged younger voters polarize as fast as older.
Q16. Polarization manifests in everyday choices — where to live, what to read, whom to befriend. Citizens are participants, not just observers. Recognizing this means examining one's own information diet and willingness to engage seriously with opposing views, not just waiting for elite reform.