Chapter 32 — Self-Check Quiz

Multiple Choice (12 questions)

1. Which Article and Section of the Constitution gives Congress the power to declare war? - A. Article I, Section 7 - B. Article I, Section 8 - C. Article II, Section 2 - D. Article II, Section 3

2. What is the constitutional threshold for Senate ratification of a treaty under Article II, Section 2? - A. Simple majority - B. Three-fifths - C. Two-thirds of senators present - D. Three-fourths of all senators

3. When was the most recent formal declaration of war by the United States? - A. 1917 (World War I) - B. 1941–1942 (World War II) - C. 1950 (Korea) - D. 1991 (Gulf War)

4. Approximately how many federal employees does the Department of Defense have (active-duty plus civilian)? - A. About 500,000 - B. About 1 million - C. About 2.2 million - D. About 5 million

5. Which of the following is NOT one of the foreign-policy traditions described in this chapter? - A. Realism / restraint - B. Liberal internationalism - C. Neoconservatism - D. Mercantilist isolationism

6. Which intellectual tradition is most closely associated with Stephen Wertheim and the Quincy Institute? - A. Liberal internationalism - B. Neoconservatism - C. Realism / restraint - D. Progressive internationalism

7. The 1973 War Powers Resolution requires the President to: - A. Obtain congressional authorization before any deployment of forces - B. Notify Congress within 48 hours of introducing forces into hostilities and withdraw within 60 days absent authorization - C. Limit any military action to 30 days absent a declaration of war - D. Obtain Supreme Court approval for military action

8. Which of the following statements about U.S.-China policy is most accurate as of 2026? - A. There is no bipartisan consensus; the parties are sharply divided on whether to compete with China - B. There is bipartisan consensus on competition; the disagreement is about tactics - C. The U.S. has formally returned to the engagement consensus of 1979–2017 - D. The U.S. has formally cut diplomatic ties with the PRC

9. Which agency is primarily responsible for the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) sanctions list? - A. State Department - B. Department of Defense - C. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control - D. Department of Commerce

10. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was an agreement between Iran and: - A. The United States only, ratified by the Senate - B. The P5+1 (U.S., UK, France, Russia, China, Germany) plus the EU, as an executive agreement on the U.S. side - C. The United States and Israel - D. The Arab League

11. Approximately what was the U.S. Department of Defense base budget for fiscal year 2024? - A. About $400 billion - B. About $890 billion - C. About $1.5 trillion - D. About $3 trillion

12. Which of the following represents the "America First" / nationalist conservative tradition's view of NATO? - A. NATO should be dissolved immediately - B. NATO is the foundational American alliance and should be expanded - C. NATO is valuable but European members should bear more of the cost - D. NATO is irrelevant to American interests

Short Answer (4 questions)

13. (3–5 sentences) Explain the difference between a treaty (Article II) and an executive agreement, and why presidents have increasingly used executive agreements over the past several decades.

14. (4–6 sentences) Steel-man both the executive-flexibility and congressional-prerogative positions on war powers. Each side has constitutional and prudential arguments — present them in their strongest form.

15. (4–6 sentences) Describe the bipartisan shift on China policy from approximately 2017 onward, and explain where the current disagreement lies. Your answer should distinguish between consensus on the strategic challenge and disagreement about tactics.

16. (4–6 sentences) Pick any one of the six foreign-policy traditions presented in the chapter (realism, liberal internationalism, neoconservatism, progressive internationalism, "America First" nationalism, or libertarian non-interventionism). Steel-man it in its strongest form, including identifying one or two leading thinkers associated with the tradition.


Answer Key

Multiple Choice

  1. B — Article I, Section 8 enumerates Congress's powers, including "to declare War."
  2. C — Article II, Section 2 requires "two thirds of the Senators present" for treaty ratification.
  3. B — The last formal declarations of war were in 1941–1942 against the Axis powers.
  4. C — About 1.4 million active-duty plus 770,000 civilian employees, totaling roughly 2.2 million.
  5. D — "Mercantilist isolationism" is not one of the six traditions described. The chapter discusses realism, liberal internationalism, neoconservatism, progressive internationalism, "America First" nationalism, and libertarian non-interventionism.
  6. C — Wertheim and the Quincy Institute are associated with the realism / restraint tradition.
  7. B — The WPR specifies 48-hour notification and 60-day withdrawal (extendable to 90 days) absent congressional authorization.
  8. B — The bipartisan consensus on competition with China formed roughly 2017–2020 and has held; tactical disagreements (decoupling pace, Taiwan posture, technology controls) are where current debate lies.
  9. C — OFAC at Treasury maintains the SDN list and administers most U.S. sanctions programs.
  10. B — The JCPOA was a P5+1 plus EU agreement; on the U.S. side it was an executive agreement, not a Senate-ratified treaty.
  11. B — The FY 2024 base defense budget was approximately $890 billion.
  12. C — "America First" thinkers generally accept NATO's role while pushing harder on burden-sharing.

Short Answer (sample full-credit responses)

13. A treaty under Article II, Section 2 requires Senate ratification by two-thirds of senators present, while an executive agreement is concluded by the President under existing statutory or constitutional authority and does not require Senate ratification. Congressional-executive agreements require simple-majority approval in both houses. Presidents have increasingly used executive agreements because the two-thirds Senate threshold is politically difficult to clear in a polarized Senate, and many international agreements require timely conclusion to be effective. Critics argue the shift erodes Senate prerogatives; defenders argue executive agreements have a long historical pedigree and that international engagement requires usable instruments.

14. Executive flexibility: Modern threats (terrorism, fast-moving regional crises, hostage situations) require rapid decision-making that congressional deliberation cannot match; the President's Article II Commander-in-Chief authority and responsibility for force protection require flexibility; congressional consultation through funding decisions and through the intelligence committees provides meaningful oversight without procedural rigidity. Congressional prerogative: The Constitution's text is clear (Article I, Section 8 — Congress declares war); the Founders specifically rejected executive war-initiation; modern practice has produced exactly the open-ended, undeclared wars the Founders sought to prevent; reasserting congressional authority through AUMF reform, war-powers enforcement, and time-limited authorizations is a constitutional duty.

15. From roughly 1979 to 2017, the bipartisan U.S. consensus was engagement with China — the bet that economic integration would moderate Chinese behavior. By 2017, that consensus had collapsed, and a new bipartisan consensus formed around competition: Trump-1 launched tariffs, Biden retained them and expanded technology export controls, Trump-2 expanded both. The current disagreement is tactical: how aggressive to be on technology decoupling, how much to invest in Pacific defense posture, whether to maintain "strategic ambiguity" or shift to "strategic clarity" on Taiwan, and whether climate cooperation can continue alongside competition. Hawks favor accelerated decoupling and explicit deterrence; engagers (a smaller group) favor selective decoupling and continued cooperation in some domains.

16. (Sample for liberal internationalism.) Liberal internationalism holds that the post-1945 international order — anchored in the UN, NATO, the Bretton Woods institutions, and the network of alliances — is an American achievement and an American interest. The era of great-power peace from 1945 to today is historically anomalous, and it was produced by American power, American institutions, and American willingness to bear costs. Allies are force multipliers, not burdens. Leading thinkers include Robert Kagan (in his liberal-internationalist mode), John Ikenberry, and Anne-Marie Slaughter. Critics argue the order has overextended American commitments and undervalued domestic costs; defenders respond that the alternative (great-power conflict; abandonment of allies; retreat from the world) is more expensive, every time it has been tried.