Chapter 24 Further Reading

The literature on interest groups and lobbying is large and politically diverse. The selections below cover the empirical, theoretical, and reform debates with sources representing the range of perspectives in good faith.

The foundational empirical and theoretical works

Kay Lehman Schlozman, Sidney Verba, and Henry E. Brady, The Unheavenly Chorus: Unequal Political Voice and the Broken Promise of American Democracy (Princeton, 2012). The definitive empirical study of who participates in American interest-group politics and on what terms. Documents the upper-class accent of organized interests, the disparity between business and other organized voices, and the systematic under-representation of low-income Americans in the lobbying ecosystem. Methodologically rigorous, politically disciplined. The principal source for the chapter's "lobbying inequality" framework. Essential reading for any serious student of American interest-group politics.

Lee Drutman, The Business of America Is Lobbying: How Corporations Became Politicized and Politics Became More Corporate (Oxford, 2015). A close empirical and historical analysis of corporate lobbying, including the rise of in-house corporate Washington offices, the institutional transformation of trade associations, and the way Washington-area lobbying culture operates day to day. Drutman is generally critical of the existing system but his diagnostic work is widely respected across ideological lines. Strong on the practical ecology of who actually does what in the lobbying business.

Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard, 1965; reprint editions widely available). The foundational theoretical text. Explains why concentrated interests with high per-capita stakes organize while diffuse interests with low per-capita stakes do not. Required reading for anyone who wants to understand why the lobbying ecosystem looks the way it does. Olson's framework has been refined and challenged but never displaced.

Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (Yale, 1961). The classic pluralist statement. Argues that political power in American politics is fragmented across many overlapping coalitions and that no single group dominates broadly. The empirical claim has been revised substantially since 1961 — pluralism has come under sustained critique from Schlozman/Verba/Brady and others — but the book remains the strongest version of the pluralist case. Read it together with the critiques to see the substantive disagreement.

Hugh Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment," in Anthony King, ed., The New American Political System (American Enterprise Institute, 1978). The original "policy network" essay. Argues that the iron-triangle model captures only a small slice of how policy is actually made and that most contested policy areas operate through much larger and more fluid networks. Foundational for the iron-triangle/policy-network distinction in the chapter.

On the revolving door

Lawrence Lessig, Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress — and a Plan to Stop It (Twelve, 2011; revised ed. 2015). The most carefully argued reformist treatment of structural corruption in American politics. Lessig defines a concept of "dependence corruption" that does not require any individual quid-pro-quo and applies it to the revolving door, campaign finance, and the broader political-economy ecosystem. Disagree with him or not, the analytic framework is sharp and has shaped contemporary reform debates.

James A. Thurber, ed., Lobbying and Policymaking: The Public Pursuit of Private Interests (CQ Press, 2014, with later editions). A scholarly handbook on the lobbying industry, with chapters by working academics on disclosure rules, the revolving door, the role of think tanks, the structure of lobbying firms, and the ethics of lobbying as a profession. Less politically charged than Lessig or Drutman; useful as a reference.

Kim Lane Scheppele, "The Right to Petition and the First Amendment," in Stanford Law Review (and related articles). Scheppele's work on the petition clause, including its origins in English law and its underexplored role in American constitutional doctrine, is essential for understanding the constitutional grounding of lobbying. Few legal scholars take the petition clause as seriously; Scheppele's work is a corrective.

Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (Harvard, 2000). Includes Dworkin's essay on campaign finance and equality, one of the strongest theoretical defenses of the view that money in politics distorts democratic equality. A useful philosophical complement to the constitutional doctrine.

Robert C. Post, Citizens Divided: Campaign Finance Reform and the Constitution (Harvard, 2014). Post's Tanner Lectures, taking the Citizens United decision seriously and arguing for a doctrinal reformulation of First Amendment protection of political speech that would permit more reform than the current Court allows. Engages the strongest version of the Citizens United majority's reasoning and offers a serious counter-position.

On specific industries and interest groups

Daniel Carpenter and David A. Moss, eds., Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit It (Cambridge, 2013). Multi-author treatment of regulatory capture across multiple industries (financial regulation, FDA, FCC, FERC). The empirical sections are strong; the policy recommendations are politically diverse.

Beth Leech, Lobbyists at Work (Apress, 2013). A series of interviews with working lobbyists about what they actually do day to day. Useful corrective to the abstract theoretical literature: the people doing the work see themselves as professionals providing information, not as corruption brokers.

Adam Winkler, Gunfight: The Battle Over the Right to Bear Arms in America (W.W. Norton, 2011). The historical context for the NRA story in case study 2. Traces the long history of American gun regulation and gun-rights advocacy from the founding to the present. Politically careful; respected across ideological lines.

Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer — and Turned Its Back on the Middle Class (Simon & Schuster, 2010). Analyzes how organized interest-group politics has shaped American economic policy in ways that have favored concentrated wealth. Politically pointed, empirically substantive.

On reform

Robert G. Kaiser, So Damn Much Money: The Triumph of Lobbying and the Corrosion of American Government (Knopf, 2009). A journalistic treatment of the modern lobbying industry, focused on the firm Cassidy & Associates and the broader transformation of Washington since the 1970s. Strong on narrative; weaker on empirical rigor than Drutman or Schlozman/Verba/Brady; useful for the texture of the industry.

Common Cause and Public Citizen publish regular reports on lobbying disclosure, the revolving door, and reform proposals. Their political orientation is leftward-reform, but their empirical work on disclosure compliance is widely cited and used by analysts across ideological lines. Available at commoncause.org and citizen.org.

The Federalist Society publishes panels, white papers, and Federalist Society Review essays addressing lobbying reform from a perspective generally skeptical of expanded restrictions on First-Amendment-protected activity. Available at fedsoc.org. The panels with disagreement among panelists are particularly useful for steel-manning multiple positions.

The Heritage Foundation and the Cato Institute publish reform-relevant work from conservative and libertarian perspectives respectively. Cato's work on FARA reform, lobbying disclosure compliance, and constitutional limits on lobbying restrictions is particularly relevant.

On data sources and methodology

OpenSecrets.org (formerly the Center for Responsive Politics website). The most comprehensive freely available database of federal lobbying disclosure, PAC and super PAC contributions, and revolving-door tracking. The site's methodology pages explain how raw LD-2 filings are processed into the synthesized data the site presents. Indispensable for any empirical work on lobbying.

Sunlight Foundation (now operating in more limited form, but its archived reports and tools remain available). The original developer of much of the digital lobbying-disclosure transparency infrastructure. Methodological materials remain useful.

Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports on lobbying-disclosure compliance. The GAO is required by the LDA to audit a sample of LD-2 filings annually; its reports identify common deficiencies and compliance gaps. Available at gao.gov.

Periodic reading

For students who want to follow the lobbying industry as it operates in real time:

  • Politico Influence (weekly newsletter from Politico)
  • Roll Call (Capitol Hill coverage including lobbying)
  • The Hill's "K Street Insiders" coverage
  • American Lawyer (legal-industry coverage including lobbying-firm news)
  • The New York Times's "Politics" section and Washington Post's "Power Post" for case-by-case coverage

The interest-group ecosystem changes month to month at the margin and quarter to quarter in significant ways. The texts above provide the durable analytical frameworks; the periodicals supply the moving picture against which to apply them.