Further Reading: The Archaeology of Error
Essential Background
Kuhn, T. S. (1962/2012). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (4th ed.). University of Chicago Press. The foundational work on paradigm shifts. Kuhn introduced the idea that science doesn't progress by steady accumulation but through revolutionary changes in fundamental frameworks. This book builds on Kuhn's insights while extending them beyond science to all knowledge-producing fields. (Tier 1)
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. The definitive account of individual cognitive biases. Where Kahneman documents how individuals go wrong, this book documents how institutions go wrong. Reading both provides the complete picture. (Tier 1)
Tavris, C. & Aronson, E. (2007/2015). Mistakes Were Made (But Not by Me). Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Explores self-justification and cognitive dissonance — the psychological mechanisms by which individuals and institutions resist acknowledging error. An essential complement to the structural analysis in this book. (Tier 1)
The H. Pylori Story
Marshall, B. J. (2005). Helicobacter Connections. Nobel Lecture. Marshall's own account of the discovery and the resistance it faced. Available online through the Nobel Prize website. Compelling first-person narrative. (Tier 1)
Thagard, P. (1998). "Ulcers and Bacteria I: Discovery and Acceptance." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C, 29(1), 107–136. An academic analysis of the H. pylori case through the lens of philosophy of science. Examines why the discovery was resisted and what that tells us about how scientific change actually works. (Tier 1)
The 2008 Financial Crisis as Epistemic Failure
Lewis, M. (2010). The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine. W. W. Norton. The most accessible account of the crisis, focused on the few people who saw it coming. Excellent for understanding the outsider problem and incentive misalignment. (Tier 1)
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011). The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report. U.S. Government Printing Office. The official investigation. Dense but thorough. Particularly valuable for understanding the structural and regulatory failures. Available free online. (Tier 1)
Broader Epistemology
Popper, K. (1959/2002). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Routledge. The classic argument for falsifiability as the criterion of scientific knowledge. Chapter 3 of this book engages directly with Popper's framework. (Tier 1)
Lakatos, I. (1978). The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. Cambridge University Press. Lakatos's refinement of Kuhn and Popper, introducing the concepts of "progressive" and "degenerating" research programs. A key framework for Chapter 3 (unfalsifiability). (Tier 1)
Schulz, K. (2010). Being Wrong: Adventures in the Margin of Error. Ecco. An elegant exploration of the experience of being wrong, including the key insight referenced in this chapter: the feeling of being wrong is identical to the feeling of being right. (Tier 1)
Systemic Error Across Fields
Freedman, D. H. (2010). Wrong: Why Experts Keep Failing Us — and How to Know When Not to Trust Them. Little, Brown. A survey of expert failure across multiple domains. Broader than Kahneman but shallower than this book's structural analysis. Good supplementary reading. (Tier 1)
Ritchie, S. (2020). Science Fictions: How Fraud, Bias, Negligence, and Hype Undermine the Search for Truth. Metropolitan Books. Focused on the replication crisis and structural problems in scientific research. Excellent preparation for Chapter 10. (Tier 1)
Arbesman, S. (2012). The Half-Life of Facts: Why Everything We Know Has an Expiration Date. Penguin. Examines the rate at which established facts are overturned. Provides a quantitative perspective on knowledge change that complements this book's structural analysis. (Tier 1)
For Instructors
Research on teaching epistemic humility in higher education suggests that case-based approaches (like those used throughout this book) are more effective than abstract philosophical arguments at shifting students' understanding of knowledge certainty. (Tier 2 — attributed to scholarship in science education and philosophy pedagogy)