Chapter 1 Further Reading: Annotated Bibliography

What Is Truth? Epistemological Foundations

Primary Philosophical Sources

1. Plato. Meno and Theaetetus. (circa 380–369 BCE) Recommended translations: G.M.A. Grube (Meno, Hackett); M.J. Levett, revised Myles Burnyeat (Theaetetus, Hackett)

These two dialogues are the fountainhead of Western epistemology. In Meno, Socrates distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief using the analogy of road directions: both a person who correctly guesses the way to Larissa and a person who knows the way will give correct directions, but the knower's belief is "tethered" by understanding in a way the lucky guesser's is not. Theaetetus subjects the definition of knowledge to Socratic scrutiny, working through proposals that knowledge is perception, then true belief, then true belief plus an account — without reaching a definitive answer. Essential reading for anyone who wants to understand the origins of the JTB framework and its problems.

2. Descartes, René. Meditations on First Philosophy. (1641) Recommended edition: translated by Donald Cress, Hackett

The most famous exercise in epistemological skepticism in Western philosophy. Descartes deploys radical doubt — considering whether an evil demon might be deceiving him about everything — as a method for finding a foundation of certain knowledge. His response, the cogito ("I think, therefore I am"), establishes a starting point for rebuilding knowledge from first principles. While Descartes' specific project is now viewed skeptically, his method of systematic doubt, his concern with justification, and his distinction between clear/distinct perceptions and confused ones remain foundational. The Meditations illustrates why epistemology matters and what's at stake in questions about the foundations of knowledge.

3. Gettier, Edmund L. "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" Analysis 23, no. 6 (1963): 121–123.

Three pages that changed the course of analytic epistemology. Gettier presents two clean counterexamples to the JTB account of knowledge, showing that a justified true belief can fall short of knowledge when the justification and truth are connected only by luck. The paper's brevity belies its impact: it spawned decades of philosophical responses attempting to repair or replace the JTB account. Essential reading not only for its content but as a model of philosophical argumentation — clear, economical, and decisive.

4. Aristotle. Metaphysics, Book IV, Chapter 7. (circa 350 BCE) Recommended edition: translated by W.D. Ross, Oxford

Aristotle's formulation of the correspondence theory of truth — "To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true" — remains the most cited articulation of the common-sense view. The broader context in Metaphysics Book IV also contains Aristotle's defense of the principle of non-contradiction, which he argues is the most certain of all principles. His defense of non-contradiction against relativism prefigures contemporary arguments against post-truth discourse.

Epistemology: Contemporary

5. Goldman, Alvin I. Knowledge in a Social World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Goldman's magnum opus on social epistemology, developing his reliabilist framework into a comprehensive account of how social practices, institutions, and communication networks contribute to or undermine the production of knowledge. Goldman distinguishes between "weak" and "strong" senses of social epistemology and develops criteria for evaluating epistemic systems: Do they produce true beliefs? Do they minimize false beliefs? He applies this framework to journalism, law, science, and democracy. The book provides the philosophical foundation for thinking systematically about epistemic institutions — crucial for understanding how media systems can either support or undermine good collective belief formation.

6. Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

A landmark in the intersection of epistemology and social philosophy. Fricker identifies two forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice (when a speaker receives less credibility than they deserve due to identity prejudice) and hermeneutical injustice (when gaps in shared interpretive resources prevent someone from making sense of their own experience). The book opened productive conversations about how social power shapes knowledge production, whose voices are heard, and whose experiences are legible as knowledge. Essential for any critical analysis of media and misinformation that takes seriously questions of who gets to be a credible source.

7. Sosa, Ernest. A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Sosa's development of virtue epistemology argues that knowledge is belief that is accurate because of the believer's reliable intellectual competences — their "epistemic virtues." Distinguishing between "animal knowledge" (reliable first-order belief formation, like a thermometer measuring temperature) and "reflective knowledge" (belief that is also appropriately understood and placed within a broader epistemic framework), Sosa offers a rich account that speaks to questions of intellectual character. Accessible as an introduction to the virtue epistemology tradition.

8. Kitcher, Philip. Science in a Free Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Kitcher, one of the leading philosophers of science, examines how scientific knowledge is produced in social contexts. He addresses the division of cognitive labor in science, explaining why it is rational for different scientists to pursue different approaches to the same problem — and how convergence of independent lines of evidence generates the justified confidence we have in scientific consensus. Kitcher also addresses the challenges of communicating scientific knowledge in democratic societies and the conditions under which deference to scientific authority is rational. Essential for understanding why "doing your own research" cannot replace calibrated deference to scientific communities.

Psychology of Belief and Misinformation

9. Kahneman, Daniel. Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011.

A comprehensive synthesis of decades of cognitive psychology research on how humans think. Kahneman's "System 1 / System 2" framework distinguishes fast, automatic, associative thinking from slow, deliberate, analytical thinking. Most cognitive biases — availability heuristic, anchoring, confirmation bias, representativeness — are products of System 1 processing applied in contexts where System 2 thinking is needed. Essential background for understanding the psychological mechanisms underlying misinformation susceptibility. Well-written and accessible to non-specialists.

10. Lewandowsky, Stephan, Ullrich K.H. Ecker, and John Cook. "Beyond Misinformation: Understanding and Coping with the 'Post-Truth' Era." Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition 6, no. 4 (2017): 353–369.

A rigorous review of the cognitive science of misinformation, examining why false information is so persistent, what mechanisms sustain it, and what interventions are most effective at countering it. The paper introduces the "misinformation ecosystem" concept, covering the psychological, social, and media-structural factors that allow misinformation to thrive. Particularly valuable for its discussion of the "continued influence effect" — the persistence of misinformation even after correction — and the conditions under which corrections succeed or fail.

11. Nyhan, Brendan, and Jason Reifler. "When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political Misperceptions." Political Behavior 32, no. 2 (2010): 303–330.

The original paper introducing the concept of the "backfire effect" — the claimed phenomenon where corrections of false political beliefs strengthen those beliefs. While subsequent research has not consistently replicated the effect in its strongest form, the paper remains important for initiating rigorous empirical study of belief correction. Read it alongside the subsequent literature (including Nyhan and Reifler's own updates) for a complete picture of what the evidence actually shows about when and how corrections work.

12. van der Linden, Sander. Foolproof: Why Misinformation Infects Our Minds and How to Build Immunity. W.W. Norton, 2023.

A recent, accessible synthesis of the inoculation theory of misinformation — the idea that exposure to weakened doses of manipulative techniques builds cognitive resistance to the real thing. Van der Linden covers the psychological research on why misinformation is persuasive, the limits of debunking, and the evidence for prebunking as a more effective alternative. He discusses the "Bad News" and "Go Viral" inoculation games developed by his research group. Accessible and practically oriented, bridging academic research and public application.

Post-Truth and Media

13. Oreskes, Naomi, and Erik M. Conway. Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming. New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2010.

The definitive historical account of "manufactured doubt" as a deliberate political and corporate strategy. Oreskes and Conway trace the same small group of scientists and PR strategies from the tobacco industry's campaigns against smoking-cancer links in the 1950s through to climate change denial in the 2000s. The book demonstrates that the playbook — find fringe scientists, emphasize uncertainty, use media "both-sidesing" — was developed consciously and deployed repeatedly. Essential reading for understanding the political economy of misinformation and why "the science is uncertain" arguments should be viewed critically.

14. Wardle, Claire, and Hossein Derakhshan. "Information Disorder: Toward an Interdisciplinary Framework for Research and Policy Making." Council of Europe Report DGI(2017)09, 2017.

The foundational policy document introducing the influential typology of information disorder: misinformation (false content shared without harmful intent), disinformation (false content shared with harmful intent), and malinformation (true content shared with harmful intent to damage). Wardle and Derakhshan provide a systematic framework for analyzing who creates false information, what formats it takes, and how it spreads. Essential for anyone working in media literacy policy or research. Available free online from the Council of Europe.

15. Baehr, Jason. The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

A clear and comprehensive introduction to virtue epistemology, covering the intellectual virtues (open-mindedness, intellectual humility, intellectual courage, thoroughness, fair-mindedness) and their role in generating knowledge and good epistemic practices. Baehr distinguishes reliabilist virtue epistemology (which focuses on reliable truth-producing faculties) from responsibilist virtue epistemology (which focuses on intellectual character). His discussion of intellectual autonomy, intellectual humility, and epistemic courage is particularly relevant to media literacy. More philosophically demanding than the other applied readings, but richly rewarding.

Note on Finding Sources

For Gettier's original paper: it is short enough to be reprinted in numerous epistemology anthologies; look for Epistemology: An Anthology edited by Ernest Sosa et al. (Blackwell) or The Theory of Knowledge edited by Louis Pojman (Wadsworth).

For Plato's dialogues: the Hackett Publishing Company editions are reliable and affordable. The Complete Works edited by John Cooper (Hackett, 1997) contains both Meno and Theaetetus in excellent translations.

For contemporary misinformation research: the journals Misinformation Review (Harvard Kennedy School), Political Communication, and Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition are primary publication venues. Most research is available through Google Scholar or ResearchGate.