Case Study 16-1: Manufacturing Climate Doubt — The Tobacco Strategy Applied to Science

Overview

When the internal documents of American tobacco companies were made public through litigation in the 1990s, they revealed something more significant than the tobacco industry's own deceptions: they revealed a strategy. The strategy — manufacture scientific uncertainty to prevent regulatory action — had been applied with remarkable consistency across decades and multiple scientific controversies. This case study traces the application of the tobacco strategy to climate change, drawing on the foundational research of Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway, subsequent academic work, and documents revealed in litigation against fossil fuel companies.

The Tobacco Template

The modern playbook for manufacturing scientific doubt was developed by the tobacco industry in the 1950s and 1960s, in response to the first clear scientific evidence linking smoking to lung cancer. A 1953 meeting of tobacco industry executives at the Plaza Hotel in New York City produced a strategy that would define corporate science denial for decades.

The core strategic insight, as documented in industry documents, was that the industry could not win on the science — the evidence was too strong. Instead, the goal was to manufacture uncertainty: to create the public impression that the science was genuinely contested, that experts disagreed, and therefore that consumers and policymakers should not act on incomplete evidence.

The specific tactics included:

Funding alternative researchers: The tobacco industry created research programs specifically designed to fund scientists who would produce doubt-manufacturing research and testimony. The goal was not to discover the truth — the industry's own internal research confirmed the health harms of tobacco — but to produce credentialed spokespeople and a paper trail of funded research.

The "Doubt is our product" memo: A 1969 internal memo from a Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation executive stated: "Doubt is our product since it is the best means of competing with the 'body of fact' that exists in the minds of the general public." This document, made public in litigation, has become the defining statement of the manufactured doubt strategy.

Exploiting journalistic balance: Mainstream journalism's norm of presenting "both sides" was systematically exploited. If the industry could put a credentialed scientist before a reporter, the resulting story would present industry-funded doubt alongside scientific consensus, creating a false impression of equal-footed scientific controversy.

Political strategy: The tobacco industry invested heavily in lobbying, campaign contributions, and legal challenges to regulation. The manufactured scientific doubt provided political cover for legislators who wished to avoid regulating an industry that employed many constituents.

From Tobacco to Climate: The Same Cast

The connection between tobacco denial and climate denial is not metaphorical — in several important cases, it involves the same individuals and organizations.

S. Fred Singer spent decades challenging scientific consensus on acid rain, the ozone hole, and climate change. He was associated with multiple organizations receiving fossil fuel funding, including the Heartland Institute and the Science and Environmental Policy Project. Singer denied the link between second-hand smoke and cancer, denied that CFCs were responsible for ozone depletion, and throughout his life denied the scientific consensus on human-caused climate change. His career exemplifies the "freelance doubter" model: a credentialed scientist who moved from controversy to controversy in service of industries with financial interests in doubt.

The George C. Marshall Institute was co-founded by Frederick Seitz, who had previously been paid by R.J. Reynolds Tobacco to administer a research program. The Institute produced reports challenging climate science using essentially the same playbook: appeal to authority (the founders' scientific credentials), focus on specific uncertainties while ignoring the broader evidence, and position challenges as defending scientific rigor rather than serving industry interests.

The Heartland Institute, which continues to operate and hosts annual "International Conference on Climate Change" events, was previously known for producing tobacco industry-funded reports challenging the health evidence on tobacco. When its donor lists were revealed through a 2012 document leak, they showed funding from fossil fuel companies including ExxonMobil and Koch Industries.

Exxon Knew: The Corporate Documentation

The most significant development in the climate denial story since Oreskes and Conway's book has been the investigation into ExxonMobil's internal climate research and its relationship to the company's public communications.

Investigative journalism by InsideClimate News and the Columbia School of Journalism, beginning in 2015, revealed through internal documents obtained by journalists that ExxonMobil had conducted substantial internal research on climate change beginning in the late 1970s. Key findings:

Exxon's own scientists confirmed warming: Internal Exxon memos, reports, and scientific presentations from the late 1970s and 1980s described anthropogenic climate change in terms consistent with current scientific understanding. A 1982 internal report titled "CO2 Greenhouse Effect" acknowledged that by 2040, atmospheric CO2 concentrations could reach 400 ppm (the actual concentration crossed 400 ppm in 2013) and described the potential consequences.

Exxon funded public doubt while acknowledging private certainty: Simultaneously with its internal climate research, ExxonMobil was funding public campaigns to manufacture doubt about the same science its own researchers found credible. The company was a significant funder of the American Petroleum Institute's Global Climate Science Communications Plan, a 1998 strategy document that explicitly stated the goal of manufacturing uncertainty: "Victory will be achieved when... average citizens 'understand' (recognize) uncertainties in climate science."

The Advertising Campaign: ExxonMobil purchased advertorial space ("op-ad" format) in the New York Times regularly from 1972 to 2002, producing hundreds of pieces that collectively manufactured doubt about climate science. These pieces were widely cited by policymakers and journalists as evidence of scientific controversy.

Specific Litigation and Legal Developments

The gap between Exxon's private acknowledgment of climate science and its public manufacturing of doubt has been the basis for significant legal actions:

New York Attorney General Investigation (2015-2019): The New York AG opened an investigation into whether ExxonMobil had committed securities fraud by misrepresenting climate-related financial risks to investors. ExxonMobil maintained two sets of climate projections — one used internally for business planning and one used for public investor communications — which the AG alleged misled investors. ExxonMobil prevailed in the New York case in 2019 after the judge found the securities fraud standard not met.

Massachusetts, Connecticut, and other state AGs: Multiple state attorneys general have filed or are pursuing cases using different legal theories, including consumer protection laws. These cases remain active in various stages.

Municipal and county litigation: Dozens of US cities and counties have filed climate liability suits against major fossil fuel companies, arguing that the companies knowingly misrepresented climate risks to consumers and that public entities are facing significant climate adaptation costs as a result.

Documentary evidence: Through discovery in the New York case and related proceedings, documents have emerged confirming in substantial detail the pattern that Oreskes and Conway reconstructed from public sources: internal acknowledgment of climate science combined with external funding of doubt manufacturing.

The PR Architecture of Doubt

The manufactured doubt operation on climate change was not simply a matter of industry-funded scientists making statements. It operated through a sophisticated institutional architecture:

Think tanks: Organizations like the Heartland Institute, the Competitive Enterprise Institute, the Global Climate Coalition, and the Cato Institute's environmental program produce reports, op-eds, and congressional testimony designed to appear as independent scientific commentary while serving the strategic interests of their funders.

Astroturf organizations: The Global Climate Coalition, which operated from 1989 to 2002, was funded by fossil fuel companies and other industries but presented itself as a broad coalition. When its scientific review papers were revealed, they showed that the Coalition's own internal scientific advisers had acknowledged the validity of the climate science consensus — while the Coalition's public communications manufactured doubt.

Scientific petition projects: The Oregon Petition Project claimed to have collected signatures from 31,000 American scientists skeptical of climate science consensus. Analysis found that the project had no verification of credentials, that "scientist" included anyone with a bachelor's degree in a science-related field, and that many signatories could not be traced. The project was associated with Frederick Seitz.

Congressional testimony: A revolving door of doubt-manufacturing scientists and think tank researchers has provided congressional testimony creating the legislative impression of scientific controversy, enabling legislators to avoid climate regulation on the grounds of "scientific uncertainty."

The Tobacco Strategy's Limits and Legacy

The tobacco strategy has been remarkably effective in delaying regulatory action but has ultimately failed to prevent scientific consensus from becoming socially recognized. The FDA eventually regulated tobacco. The Montreal Protocol addressed ozone depletion despite manufactured doubt. International agreements including the Paris Agreement have reflected scientific consensus on climate even as domestic US policy has fluctuated.

The legacy of the tobacco strategy for climate includes: - Multiple decades of delay in significant climate regulation - A substantial part of the global temperature increase we have already experienced may be attributable to this delay - The demonstration that manufactured doubt can be effective without requiring credible science - An increasingly documented paper trail that creates legal and reputational risks for companies that continue to fund doubt manufacturing

For science communication, the tobacco strategy's documentation provides something valuable: a comprehensive evidence base for explaining to the public how manufactured doubt works. When people understand the strategy — when they can identify the specific techniques being used — they are better equipped to resist it. This is the application of inoculation theory at the societal scale.

Discussion Questions

1. The tobacco strategy required credentialed scientists willing to publicly dispute consensus positions. What motivates scientists to participate in doubt manufacturing? Are financial interests sufficient explanation, or are there ideological and identity factors as well?

2. Documents revealed in litigation showed that ExxonMobil's own scientists acknowledged climate change while the company funded doubt manufacturing. Legal theories for addressing this conduct include securities fraud, consumer protection fraud, and public nuisance. What would each theory require to prove, and which seems most likely to succeed?

3. Oreskes and Conway describe the doubt manufacturers as motivated partly by ideology (opposition to government regulation) and partly by financial interest. How should we think about the moral responsibility of the ideologically motivated participants who may have genuinely believed they were defending free markets?

4. The tobacco strategy was eventually exposed in litigation. Are there mechanisms short of litigation that could expose corporate science denial more quickly? What institutional changes — in scientific publishing, in journalism, in corporate disclosure requirements — might help?

5. The "Exxon Knew" revelations showed that oil companies acknowledged climate science internally decades ago. How does this knowledge change how we should assess the companies' current stated commitment to climate action?

Key Sources

• Oreskes, Naomi, and Erik M. Conway. Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming. Bloomsbury Press, 2010.
• Supran, Geoffrey, and Naomi Oreskes. "Assessing ExxonMobil's Climate Change Communications (1977-2014)." Environmental Research Letters 12(8), 2017.
• Banerjee, Neela, Lisa Song, and David Hasemyer. "Exxon's Own Research Confirmed Fossil Fuels' Role in Global Warming Decades Ago." InsideClimate News, September 16, 2015.
• Dunlap, Riley E., and Peter J. Jacques. "Climate Change Denial Books and Conservative Think Tanks: Exploring the Connection." American Behavioral Scientist 57(6), 2013.
• American Petroleum Institute. "Global Climate Science Communications Plan." Internal document, 1998. (Available through public interest groups and academic repositories.)
• Cook, John, et al. "Consensus on Consensus: A Synthesis of Consensus Estimates on Human-Caused Global Warming." Environmental Research Letters 11(4), 2016.