Chapter 32 Exercises: Election Interference — Case Studies and Countermeasures

Section A: Conceptual and Definitional Exercises

Exercise 1: Election Interference Typology

Classify each of the following as: (a) infrastructure hacking, (b) voter roll manipulation, (c) influence operation, (d) electoral administration disinformation, (e) domestic disinformation, or (f) foreign interference. Note where multiple categories apply.

a. A state-linked hacking group gains read-only access to a state voter registration database and copies voter information. b. A domestic political podcast claims, falsely, that voting machines automatically scan ballots for political party before tabulating them. c. Automated social media accounts amplify false claims that a polling place has been moved. d. A foreign government uses its international broadcasting service to criticize a candidate's policy positions using accurate information. e. A domestic political operative sends emails to voters in opposition-leaning districts falsely claiming the election date has been changed. f. A foreign intelligence service steals campaign emails and selectively releases them to create a false impression of the campaign's strategy. g. A domestic media outlet publishes a story based on leaked campaign documents without disclosing how the documents were obtained.

Exercise 2: The Foreign-Domestic Distinction

The chapter argues that domestic election disinformation typically produces more false content by volume than foreign operations, while foreign operations produce qualitatively distinct threats (hacking, attribution difficulties, international law implications).

Part A: Design a framework for deciding when domestic election disinformation should be considered election interference. What criteria would distinguish "robust partisan speech" from "election interference" in a domestic context?

Part B: Under current US law, it is illegal for foreign nationals to spend money influencing US elections but legal for domestic actors to produce virtually any election-related content, regardless of its accuracy. Is this distinction morally justified? What principle underlies it?

Part C: Brazil's 2018 election featured business owners funding WhatsApp disinformation campaigns through domestic contractors — technically domestic, but involving systematic coordination and significant spending. Does this fit within your framework from Part A?

Exercise 3: Technical Election Security Analysis

The chapter describes multiple layers of election security: paper ballots, post-election audits, decentralized administration, chain-of-custody procedures, and federal support through CISA.

Part A: For each of the following hypothetical attack scenarios, identify which security layer(s) would prevent or detect the attack: - A hacker remotely alters vote tallies in election management software - An insider at an election office marks excess ballots for a preferred candidate - A foreign intelligence service corrupts voter registration data to suppress turnout in specific precincts - A disinformation campaign falsely claims voting machines produced fraudulent results

Part B: Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) provide statistical evidence that a reported election outcome is correct. Explain the basic statistical logic of an RLA in terms accessible to a non-statistician. Why does the required sample size decrease as the margin of victory increases?

Part C: CISA Director Chris Krebs's "most secure election" statement was accurate but politically controversial. Design a communication strategy for an election official who wants to accurately convey the robustness of election security without being perceived as dismissing legitimate security concerns or as making a partisan political statement.

Exercise 4: Comparing 2016 and 2020 US Elections

The chapter discusses election interference in both 2016 and 2020 but emphasizes important differences between them.

Part A: Complete this comparison table:

Part B: The 2016 election featured primarily foreign election interference, while the 2020 election's most consequential interference was primarily domestic (the "Big Lie"). What does this shift tell us about how election interference has evolved? What countermeasures are appropriate for each type?

Exercise 5: Global South Pattern Analysis

Examine the election interference patterns documented in the Philippines (2016), Brazil (2018 and 2022), India, Kenya, and Nigeria.

Part A: Identify three patterns that appear across multiple Global South cases that do not appear prominently in European or US cases. For each pattern, explain what features of the local context explain its prevalence.

Part B: WhatsApp-based disinformation plays a larger role in Global South electoral disinformation than in Western democracies. What features of WhatsApp (technical, social, economic) explain this? What countermeasures are possible given WhatsApp's end-to-end encryption?

Part C: The "Big Lie" playbook developed in the US context was subsequently observed in Brazil's 2022 election, with Bolsonaro making structurally identical claims to Trump's about electronic voting systems. What does this cross-national narrative transfer suggest about how election interference tactics spread globally?

Section B: Case Study Analysis Exercises

Exercise 6: French 2017 Election Counter-Response Analysis

Based on Case Study 1 (Macron Leaks) and any additional research:

Part A: The Macron Leaks were released 44 hours before the French election, within France's legal 44-hour pre-election media silence period. Evaluate France's strategic response: (a) French media honored the silence period; (b) the Macron campaign preemptively announced that they had been hacked and that leaked materials included fabrications; (c) English-language social media discussion was not covered by French law.

Was the French response the correct one? What were the risks of each element? What would have happened if the campaign had not pre-announced the hack?

Part B: Could France's counter-response be replicated in the United States, given differences in election law (France has pre-election media silence; the US does not) and media culture? What adaptations would be required?

Exercise 7: Brazil January 8 Analysis

The January 8, 2023, riots in Brazil followed a pattern structurally similar to the US January 6, 2021, events: a losing candidate made false claims about election integrity; these claims were amplified by a coordinated information ecosystem; they ultimately motivated supporters to attack democratic institutions.

Part A: Analyze the specific disinformation claims about Brazil's electronic voting system. Were these claims based on any legitimate concerns about the system, or were they entirely fabricated? What does the answer tell us about how election integrity disinformation operates?

Part B: Both January 6 (US) and January 8 (Brazil) occurred after extended periods of election integrity disinformation. What does this pattern suggest about the relationship between election disinformation and political violence? Are there conditions under which election disinformation is likely to produce violent responses vs. electoral abstention vs. legal challenges?

Part C: How did social media platform responses to January 6 (including the suspension of Trump's accounts) affect the subsequent events in Brazil? Did the suspension of Trump's accounts provide a "playbook" for Brazilian authorities, or did it create a model that Bolsonaro's supporters sought to avoid?

Exercise 8: Platform Policy Comparison

Examine the election-related policies of Facebook/Meta, Twitter/X, Google/YouTube, and TikTok.

Part A: For each platform, evaluate: - What specific policies address election disinformation? - What is the enforcement mechanism and capacity? - How have policies changed since 2016? - What specific gaps or weaknesses exist?

Part B: Twitter/X's post-Musk election policies represent a significant departure from pre-2022 practices. Based on available evidence, what has been the measurable effect of these policy changes on election-related disinformation on the platform?

Part C: TikTok's rapid growth as a political information source for younger voters raises specific concerns about its Chinese parent company ByteDance's potential influence over content moderation. Evaluate the evidence for and against the claim that TikTok's algorithms favor content consistent with Chinese government interests.

Section C: Applied Exercises

Exercise 9: Voter Suppression Message Classification

Examine the following messages and classify each as: (a) voter suppression disinformation, (b) legitimate voter information, (c) ambiguous/borderline content requiring contextual evaluation.

For each classified as voter suppression disinformation or ambiguous, explain what specific false or misleading element(s) make it problematic and what accurate information should replace it.

a. "Don't forget — Republicans vote Tuesday, Democrats vote Wednesday!" b. "If you have any outstanding parking tickets, you may be flagged and turned away at the polls." c. "Due to high voter turnout expected, additional voting times have been added: polls will stay open until midnight on Election Day." d. "Undocumented immigrants can be arrested if they show up at polling places, even to accompany a citizen family member." e. "Your vote is not anonymous — election officials can see how you voted and there have been reports of voter information being sold." f. "Text 'VOTE' to register your vote from home and avoid long lines at the polls." g. "If you voted in the primary, you don't need to vote again in the general election."

Exercise 10: Risk-Limiting Audit Design

A county election official has asked you to explain risk-limiting audits to a skeptical county commissioner who believes the electronic voting system is inherently unreliable.

Part A: Explain what a risk-limiting audit is, how it works, and what it proves, in approximately 300 words accessible to a non-technical audience.

Part B: Draft a 200-word response to the following specific objection: "If you're only auditing a sample of ballots, how can you be sure the rest are accurate?"

Part C: The county's election had a margin of 12,000 votes out of 400,000 cast (3% margin). How does this margin affect the required sample size for an RLA, and why? (Qualitative explanation, not statistical calculation.)

Exercise 11: Election Official Communication Strategy

You are a communications adviser to a state election director preparing for the next major election. Your director has asked you to develop a proactive communication strategy to reduce the effectiveness of anticipated election integrity disinformation.

Part A: Identify five specific election administration procedures or outcomes that are likely to become the target of disinformation narratives (based on 2020 and 2022 patterns). For each, draft a one-paragraph proactive explanation that could be published before the election.

Part B: Design a rapid-response protocol for the election night period, when results will be changing as different ballot types are counted. Who should be authorized to speak? What should they say when asked about changing totals? What specific false claims should they be prepared to refute?

Part C: Identify three "trusted messengers" beyond the election office itself who could amplify accurate election information to specific communities: (a) communities skeptical of government, (b) communities skeptical of major media, (c) communities with historically lower voter turnout.

Exercise 12: Influence Operation Detection Exercise

You are reviewing social media activity during a closely contested local election. You identify a network of 50 accounts that are all posting about the same candidate, using similar language, and claiming to be local residents. Some evidence of coordination exists (similar posting times, shared hashtag patterns), but you cannot determine whether they are paid operatives or genuine enthusiastic supporters.

Part A: What additional information would you need to determine whether these accounts constitute coordinated inauthentic behavior or genuine grassroots support?

Part B: What is the appropriate response at each of the following evidence levels: - Only behavioral anomalies (synchronization, similarity) - Behavioral anomalies + proof of accounts purchasing followers - Behavioral anomalies + communication evidence of paid coordination - All of the above + foreign IP address evidence

Part C: Write an appropriate public statement for a nonpartisan election monitoring organization that describes the network without over-claiming attribution.

Exercise 13: Legal Framework Analysis

Research the legal provisions governing election disinformation in two of the following jurisdictions: United States, European Union, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Australia, Singapore.

For each jurisdiction: a. What laws specifically address election disinformation? b. What is the enforcement mechanism and responsible authority? c. What content is prohibited vs. permitted? d. What transparency requirements apply to political advertising? e. How have these laws been applied in practice?

Write a 500-word comparative analysis identifying: (a) the most important legal provisions; (b) significant gaps; (c) which jurisdiction's approach best balances free expression with election protection.

Section D: Research and Writing Exercises

Exercise 14: Mueller Report Primary Source Analysis

Read the Introduction and Section I of Volume I of the Mueller Report (publicly available at justice.gov).

a. What standard of evidence does the report apply when making attribution claims? b. How does the report distinguish between evidence sufficient for criminal indictment and evidence sufficient for intelligence conclusions? c. What specific GRU operations does the report document? d. What limitations does the report acknowledge in its own analysis? e. Write a 300-word assessment of the report as a primary source: What does it prove? What does it not prove? What remains uncertain?

Exercise 15: Senate Intelligence Committee Report Analysis

The Senate Intelligence Committee produced five volumes on Russian active measures in the 2016 election (all publicly available at intelligence.senate.gov).

Choose one volume (suggested: Volume 2 on social media) and write a 500-word analytical summary addressing: a. The report's main findings b. Its primary evidence and methodology c. What questions it leaves unanswered d. Its implications for platform policy and election security

Exercise 16: Jamieson "Cyberwar" Reading Response

Read relevant sections of Kathleen Hall Jamieson's Cyberwar: How Russian Hackers and Trolls Helped Elect a President (Oxford University Press, 2018).

Jamieson argues that Russian interference was outcome-determinative in the 2016 election. Write a 600-word structured response that: a. Summarizes Jamieson's evidence and argument b. Identifies the strongest evidence supporting her claim c. Identifies the most significant methodological challenges to her argument d. Considers the counterargument that domestic factors were more important e. Reaches your own tentative assessment with appropriate uncertainty acknowledgment

Exercise 17: Comparative Case Study — Three Elections

Compare the election interference experiences of France 2017, Brazil 2022, and any third country of your choice (suggested: Philippines 2016, Kenya 2017, or Germany 2017).

Your comparative analysis (approximately 800 words) should address: a. The nature and origin of interference in each case b. The local political context that made each country vulnerable or resilient c. The effectiveness of counter-responses in each case d. What lessons each country's experience offers for others

Exercise 18: Policy Brief — Platform Accountability for Election Disinformation

Write a 750-word policy brief recommending specific regulatory requirements for major social media platforms regarding election disinformation. Your brief should:

a. Define what platforms would be covered (by size, activity type, etc.) b. Specify required actions (transparency reporting, labeling, removal, audits) c. Identify the regulatory authority responsible for enforcement d. Establish appropriate penalties for non-compliance e. Address free expression concerns f. Estimate implementation costs and feasibility

Section E: Advanced and Synthesis Exercises

Exercise 19: "Election Security vs. Election Integrity" Semantic Analysis

The chapter notes that "election security" and "election integrity" have become semantic markers for different epistemic communities.

Conduct a content analysis of 20 news articles or social media posts using each term. For each term, document: a. Who is using the term? b. In what context? c. What specific claims or concerns are associated with the term? d. What is the implied evidence standard for the claims?

Write a 400-word synthesis essay analyzing what these semantic patterns reveal about how political communities construct different frameworks for evaluating the same empirical question (whether elections are conducted accurately).

Exercise 20: Pre-Bunking Campaign Design

Design a six-month pre-election prebunking campaign targeting election integrity disinformation. Your design should specify:

a. Target audiences (who is most vulnerable to election integrity disinformation? why?) b. Key disinformation techniques to inoculate against (not specific claims, but techniques) c. Communication channels (social media, community organizations, school curricula, media) d. Message format and tone e. Timeline (what should be communicated when, relative to the election) f. Evaluation metrics (how will you know if the campaign worked?) g. Budget estimate and resource requirements

Exercise 21: The WhatsApp Problem

WhatsApp's end-to-end encryption makes it resistant to centralized content moderation while making it a significant vector for election disinformation in several democracies.

Part A: Describe three specific technical or policy interventions that could reduce WhatsApp-based election disinformation without breaking end-to-end encryption. Evaluate each for effectiveness and potential for abuse.

Part B: Brazil and India have both implemented forwarding limits on WhatsApp — restricting how many times a message can be shared. Evaluate the evidence for the effectiveness of forwarding limits. What types of disinformation do they reduce? What types are they ineffective against?

Part C: Write a 300-word position statement from each of the following perspectives on the proposal to require WhatsApp to implement forwarding limits in the 30 days before national elections: - A civil liberties organization - A national election commission - WhatsApp's corporate communications team - A democracy researcher

Exercise 22: Deterrence Framework for Election Interference

The chapter notes that criminal prosecution of foreign election interference actors is practically unenforceable when those actors are protected by foreign governments.

Part A: Design a deterrence framework for state-sponsored election interference that does not rely on criminal prosecution. Consider: sanctions, diplomatic costs, counter-operations, platform enforcement, public attribution, and international legal frameworks.

Part B: What threshold of evidence should justify each deterrence mechanism you identify?

Part C: What makes election interference different from other forms of state-sponsored cyberoperations for deterrence purposes? How should this affect deterrence strategy?

Exercise 23: Ethical Analysis — The Honest Ads Act

The Honest Ads Act (repeatedly introduced in the US Congress) would require political advertising disclosure for online platforms equivalent to requirements for broadcast advertising.

Part A: Summarize the Act's main provisions.

Part B: Make the strongest case for the Act from a democratic transparency perspective.

Part C: Make the strongest case against the Act from a free expression perspective.

Part D: Propose modifications that would strengthen the Act's privacy and accuracy provisions while addressing free expression concerns.

Exercise 24: Cross-Chapter Synthesis

Connect the election interference material in this chapter to Chapter 7 (Social Media and Echo Chambers) and Chapter 31 (State-Sponsored Disinformation).

Write a 600-word synthesis essay addressing: "The effectiveness of election interference depends less on the technical sophistication of the attack than on the receptiveness of the target society's information environment. Evaluate this claim."

Your essay should draw on specific evidence from all three chapters and should consider both what makes societies vulnerable and what makes them resilient.

Exercise 25: Future of Election Interference

AI-generated deepfakes, synthetic candidates, and autonomous influence operations represent emerging election interference capabilities.

Write a scenario analysis (approximately 600 words) describing how a sophisticated state actor might use these capabilities in an election five years from now. Your scenario should: a. Describe the specific technical capabilities used b. Explain how they would be deployed in the election campaign c. Identify which existing countermeasures would and would not be effective d. Propose three specific new countermeasures appropriate to the scenario

Exercise 26: Democratic Resilience Assessment

Based on the comparative evidence in this chapter, develop a "Democratic Resilience Index" for election integrity — a set of indicators that would predict how resilient a democracy is to election interference.

Part A: Identify 8-10 specific indicators (institutional, legal, media ecosystem, social, civic culture). For each indicator, specify how it would be measured.

Part B: Using your index, rate three democracies: France, Brazil, and your home country. Present your ratings with justification.

Part C: For the country that rates lowest on your index, recommend three specific investments that would most improve its resilience, with justification for why you prioritize these over other possible investments.