Case Study 1 — Climb Against the Boot: One Win and One Bill

All teams, players, games, and statistics in this case study are fictional composites.

Setup

Week 11, at St. Louis. The Stallions are the opposite of the Austin Outlaws. Where Austin spreads you out and motions you into knots, St. Louis lines up in 21 personnel (two backs, one tight end) and 12 personnel (one back, two tight ends) and runs outside zone — the stretch run where the whole line steps sideways and the back reads for a crease — until your linebackers are leaning. Then quarterback Tyler Haugen fakes that same run and throws behind them. Fullback Gus Mahler leads the run game and leaks into the flat on play-action; running back Antoine Day is a one-cut runner.

Owen Kessler's four-game scouting sample on the Stallions (fictional) had one line Russ circled twice:

Stallions tendency (4-game sample) Value
Play-action passes vs. a one-high, eight-man-box look 9 of 14, 15.2 yards per attempt
Play-action passes vs. a two-high look 6 of 11, 7.0 yards per attempt
Favorite play-action shot Bootleg with a deep crosser (tight end) and a clear-out go route

Count, compute, conclude. Against a one-high, eight-man box, Haugen's play-action completed about 64% at more than 15 yards a throw. Against two-high, about 55% at 7 yards. What it means: St. Louis wants to see a loaded box, because a loaded box is a box full of linebackers who will step up on the fake. Owen's caveat: 14 and 11 attempts are tiny samples. "I'd use it as a reason to plan, not a reason to panic."

Here was the problem in the staff room on Wednesday.

Big Lou Fontenot (defensive line): If we sit in two-high all day against 21 personnel, they'll run outside zone at a six-man box until we quit.

Gabe Lindqvist (secondary): And if we load the box, Haugen boots out and throws the deep over behind Bell and Ames.

Russ: So we show them the box they want and take it away at the snap. Climb.

Climb, from this chapter: a one-high look with the strong safety at 8 yards — an apparent eighth man in the box — who bails to a deep zone at the snap while the free safety slides to the other side. Against St. Louis, Russ wanted the quarters version, Climb 4: four deep after the climb, so that a deep crosser coming across the field would run into a safety instead of open grass.

Mike Sorensen (head coach): How would I attack that, if I'm their coordinator?

Russ: Run the ball at it. When Tre climbs, he leaves the alley. That's the bill. I'll pay it a few times if it takes away the boot.

What Happens

Snap 1 — Second quarter, 1st-and-10 at the Stallions' 34

St. Louis comes out in 21 personnel: tight end attached right, fullback Mahler offset right, Day deep. The Sentinels are in base personnel against the two backs, with Grant Weller as the Sam linebacker.

PRE-SNAP: CLIMB 4 vs. 21 PERSONNEL (one-high, eight-man-box look)

                              F   (14 yds, middle)


                                           $  (8 yds, outside the Y)
    C                  W        M        S                   C
                   E     T     N     E
    X                 O  O  O  O  O  Y                       Z
                            Q     B
                            R

📊 Diagram (described): St. Louis has a split end on the left, a tight end attached on the right, a flanker wide right, a quarterback under center, a fullback offset right, and a running back deep. The Sentinels show a one-high look: the free safety alone in the deep middle at 14 yards, and the strong safety down at 8 yards outside the tight end, making an apparent eight-man box with four linemen and three linebackers. Both corners are over the wide receivers.

Haugen sees exactly what he hoped for. Middle closed, eight in the box, linebackers at normal depth. He gives the outside-zone fake to Day going right, then boots left. The tight end releases underneath the line and runs the deep over from right to left, climbing to about 20 yards. The split end on the left runs a go to clear out the corner. Mahler leaks out to the left flat.

POST-SNAP: CLIMB 4 vs. BOOTLEG LEFT

 [DEEP 1/4]      [DEEP 1/4]           [DEEP 1/4]       [DEEP 1/4]
     C               F <--- slid        $ (climbed)         C
     ^               ^                  ^                   ^
     |  X go          <-----------------------  Y deep over
                                                   (20 yds)
  [CURL/FLAT]             [HOOK]              [CURL/FLAT]
     W                      M                     S
 B flat  <---  Q boot <--

📊 Diagram (described): At the snap the strong safety climbs from 8 yards to a deep quarter on the right-center, and the free safety slides from the middle to the deep quarter on the left-center. Both corners take the outside deep quarters. The quarterback fakes the run to the right and bootlegs to the left. The tight end crosses the field from right to left at about 20 yards, running directly into the free safety's quarter. The split end runs a go on the left with the corner on top. The fullback leaks to the left flat, where the Will linebacker is dropping to the curl-to-flat. The Mike and the Sam take the hook and the right curl-to-flat.

Bell and Ames both took a step downhill on the fake — linebackers will; Chapter 21 is about how much. But the deep over is not running behind them into open grass. It is running into Royce, who slid from the middle to the left-center quarter and is sitting at 18 yards with his eyes on Haugen. The go on the left has Simmons on top. Haugen, on the move and with Rollins chasing from the backside, does the smart thing: he dumps it to Mahler in the flat. Ames, recovering from his false step, rallies and tackles him after 4 yards. 2nd-and-6.

Tess (from the booth): He looked at the over twice. Royce was sitting on it.

Snap 2 — Third quarter, 1st-and-10 at the Sentinels' 46

Same personnel, same look from the Sentinels, same call — Russ wanted Haugen to see the eight-man box again. This time St. Louis doesn't fake outside zone. It runs it.

Day takes the handoff and presses the edge to the right. Weller sets the edge on the tight end. Big V Tuipulotu holds the double team inside. Every gap inside is owned. But at the snap, Holloway — the eighth man the Stallions' line had counted — has turned and run to a deep quarter. The alley outside Weller and inside the right corner, which Holloway would have filled from 8 yards, is now filled by nobody until Holloway turns back around from 14 yards deep. Day cuts into it. Holloway comes back downhill and makes the tackle, but at a sharp angle and from a long way away: 11 yards, first down.

The run was one yard short of the book's definition of an explosive run (12 or more yards). Russ did not consider that a technicality to celebrate.

Russ (on the headset): That's the bill. We knew it was coming. Tess, how many times have they run it against Climb?

Tess: That's the first. They've thrown against it twice.

Russ: Then we've got one more Climb in our pocket today, and it's for a passing down.

St. Louis ran outside zone at the Sentinels' standard two-high-to-Spin-3 looks for the rest of the drive, with the rotating safety coming down into the alley instead of up and out of it, and gained 2, 3, and 1 yard. Field goal.

Analysis

Why snap 1 worked. Haugen's play-action is built on a belief formed before the snap: eight men in the box means a closed middle, single-high coverage, and linebackers who will step up on the fake — so the deep over will run behind them into the space between the deep-third corner and the single middle safety. Climb kept the pre-snap claim (eight-man box, one-high) and replaced the post-snap reality (four deep). The linebackers did step up on the fake. It didn't matter, because the space behind them had a safety in it. This is the threshold concept in action: the shell was a claim, and Haugen's decision was made on the claim.

Why snap 2 cost them. A disguise moves bodies, and moved bodies leave gaps. The run fit that the Stallions' line was blocking assumed eight defenders in the run fit. After the climb, seven remained against seven blockers (five linemen, the tight end, and the fullback). With blockers equal to defenders, the ball carrier is effectively the extra man, and the defense's last free player was 14 yards deep. In Chapter 5 language, Holloway was the alley player before the snap and nobody was the alley player after it.

Why the bill was acceptable. Owen's numbers suggested the play-action shot against a loaded box was the Stallions' most efficient play (15.2 yards per attempt in a small sample). An 11-yard run is a bad play; a 35-yard completion on a deep over is a worse one, and on the Stallions' film it was the more likely bad play. Russ chose which bill he'd rather pay, and he rationed the call — this is the "about one snap in twelve" usage from the chapter, aimed at passing tendencies.

What Russ would do differently. He called Climb on snap 2 partly to keep showing the same look. In the postgame review he said the call on first-and-10 in plus territory was "greedy" — the Stallions' first-down run rate from 21 personnel was over 60% in Owen's sample, so a Climb on that down was betting against the most likely play. Climb belongs on downs where play-action is most likely: second-and-long, and first down only when the run tendency is low.

Discussion Questions

  1. Snap 1's pre-snap picture and snap 2's were identical. What did the Stallions know before snap 2 that they didn't know before snap 1? What did the Sentinels know?
  2. If you were the Stallions' offensive coordinator, how would you use the information from snap 1 on the rest of the game? Give one run call and one pass call.
  3. Ames took a false step on the play-action fake on snap 1 and the play still worked. Why is that not a reason to ignore the false step in film review?
  4. Climb 4 was used instead of Climb 2 (Cover 2 after the climb). What would have happened to the deep over and the go route against two deep halves with squatting corners?
  5. Owen's samples were 14 and 11 play-action attempts. How should a coordinator weigh numbers that small against what the film shows?

Your Turn

You're preparing for the Stallions in a rematch. Write a three-line call rule for Climb: (1) the downs and distances where you'll use it, (2) the personnel and formations where you won't, and (3) the run-fit adjustment that tells someone to replace Holloway in the alley when he climbs (who, and from where). Then draw the pre-snap and post-snap pictures of your adjusted version.