Case Study 17.1 — Field Press in the Playoffs: Simmons, Gaines, and Petrakis's Answer

All teams, players, plays, and statistics in this case study are fictional. The rules and techniques are real.

Setup

Divisional playoff, Austin Outlaws at Sacramento Sentinels. This is the third meeting of the season. Austin won Week 6, 34–27. We won Week 15, 23–20. Everyone in both buildings has seen every snap of both games at least three times.

Owen Kessler's third-down report for the playoff game had one line I circled twice:

Austin, 3rd-and-1 to 3, from 2x2 (Owen's full-season sample) Value
Pass plays 17
Targets to Trey Gaines 9 of 17
Gaines targets that were slants or quick outs 7 of 9
Completions on those 7 6
Average time to throw on those 7 about 2.3 seconds

Translation: on third-and-short, Darius Vance's favorite answer is the quick throw to his best receiver, and he gets it out fast. Off coverage on Gaines concedes exactly the throw Austin wants. That's the kind of tendency press was invented for.

So the third-and-short plan for the playoff game was "Nickel Over Spin 1, Field Press." Spin 1 is our Cover 1 from a two-high look: one safety comes down at the snap to play man or hole, and the other spins to the deep middle. "Field Press" puts only Malik Simmons — our field corner, number 24, the best press corner on the roster — in press. Cole Brennan, on the boundary, plays his Spin 1 technique from Hands depth.

Gabe Lindqvist spent Wednesday's individual period on one drill: Simmons against a scout-team receiver running nothing but slants and quick outs from a normal split, with Gabe standing behind the receiver and signaling the release so Simmons couldn't guess. Fifty reps. Simmons won 41 of them by Gabe's count. "He didn't open early once," Gabe told me. "Not once."

What Happens

Snap 1: First quarter, 3rd-and-3 at the Sacramento 38

Austin is in 11 personnel, 2x2: Harlan attached on the boundary side, Sutton wide outside him; Powers in the field slot, Gaines outside him in a normal split, right about on the numbers.

PRE-SNAP (Game 3, Q1, 3rd-and-3 at SAC 38: Spin 1, Field Press)

            $                                     F


                            M     W
                      E   T    N        E
  C                                             *      C
  X                  Y  O  O  O  O  O           H     Z
                              Q
                              R

📊 Diagram (described): The Outlaws are in 11 personnel with two receivers on each side. On the boundary side (left), Harlan is attached as the tight end and Sutton is split wide. On the field side (right), Powers is in the slot and Gaines is outside him. Vance is behind the center with Ruffin behind him. The Sentinels show two high safeties: Holloway on the tight-end side and Royce on the field side. Simmons is pressed one yard in front of Gaines with a slight inside shade. Vo is tight over Powers. Brennan, on Sutton, is at Hands depth (about two and a half yards), drawn on the same row for simplicity. Four linemen and two linebackers, Bell and Ames. Eleven defenders.

At the snap, Royce spins to the deep middle. Holloway comes down on Harlan. Bell has Ruffin. Ames is the hole player — the "rat" in the short middle. Vo has Powers. Simmons has Gaines.

Gaines does what Owen said he'd do. He jab-steps outside — one hard step, shoulders turned, trying to make Simmons open to the sideline — and then plants to slant inside. Simmons doesn't move on the jab. He kick-steps, square, eyes on Gaines's near hip. When the hips turn inside, Simmons punches with both hands on the chest plate, two yards off the line, and slides his body into the slant's path. Gaines has to bend the route flatter and later. By the time he clears Simmons, he's three yards deeper than the slant was designed to be and Simmons is in his hip pocket, in phase.

Vance's first read is gone. You can see his front foot hitch and reset. He looks to Powers on a short option route; Vo is sitting on it. He climbs the pocket. DeShawn Rollins, who has been running a speed rush around the right tackle all quarter, has turned the corner on this one because of the extra second. Sack. Seven-yard loss. Fourth-and-10 from our 45. Austin punts.

POST-SNAP (Snap 1: Simmons wins the slant; field side only)

                                   F  <- deep middle
                   W  <- hole/rat
                                        Z   <- slant bent flat
                                       /C   <- Simmons in phase
                                      /
                                * H  /      <- Vo sits on Powers
                                    Z C     <- jab out, plant in;
                                               two-hand punch
              E  T  N  E ==> Rollins: speed rush, sack at 2.9 sec
             O  O  O  O  O
                   Q

📊 Diagram (described): A partial diagram of the field side after the snap. Gaines jab-steps outside and then slants inside. Simmons stays square, punches him at about two yards, and stays in his hip pocket as the slant bends flatter and deeper than designed. Vo covers Powers's short option route. Ames is in the short middle as the hole player and Royce is in the deep middle. With the first two reads covered, Vance holds the ball, and Rollins's speed rush gets home for a sack at about 2.9 seconds.

On the sideline I said one word to Gabe: "Fifty." He knew what I meant.

Snap 2: Third quarter, 3rd-and-2 at the Sacramento 29

Lyle Petrakis, Austin's offensive coordinator, is one of the best play callers I've ever coached against. He'd seen Simmons press Gaines on two third downs in the first half and win both. He did not keep calling the same play.

Same personnel, same 2x2 picture. Our call: same — Spin 1, Field Press. But just before the snap, Gaines comes in short motion toward the formation — a two-step "zoom" that has him moving at the snap, angling toward Powers.

Our rule from 17.8: you can't press a moving receiver. Simmons does what he's taught. He backs off a yard, stays square, and plays Hands technique with inside leverage. That's the right rule. It's also exactly what Petrakis wanted. A moving Gaines, with a running start, breaks outside on a quick out at four yards. From Hands depth, with inside leverage and Gaines moving away from him at full speed, Simmons is a step late. Catch, five yards, first down.

The drive stalled three plays later and they kicked a field goal. But I want you to see the chess match. We took away the quick slant with press. Petrakis took away our press with motion. Our rule converted press to Hands. His route went to the side Hands with inside leverage gives up.

Gabe (on the headset, after the snap): "Right technique, right leverage, wrong down for it. On third-and-two with zoom motion, he should have been outside."

Me: "Put it in the rule. Zoom motion toward the ball on short yardage — the corner flips to outside leverage. The motion's going inside, the slot's inside; the only space left is outside."

That's in our motion rules now. Petrakis will find the next thing. That's the job.

Analysis

Why Snap 1 worked. Three things lined up. First, the tendency: Owen's sample said Austin throws the quick ball to Gaines on third-and-short, and the quick ball is what press beats. Second, the personnel: Simmons is the corner on our roster whose completion rate allowed drops the most in press without a rise in big plays. We didn't ask Brennan to do it. Third, the rush clock: press doesn't need to cover Gaines for five seconds. It needs to take away the first read for about a second, and Rollins did the rest. Press and four-man rush feed each other.

Why Snap 2 failed. Not because anyone broke a rule — because the rule was incomplete. Our motion rule ("moving receiver = Hands") was right about technique and silent about leverage. Petrakis found the gap between the two. Short motion toward the formation on third-and-short does two things to a press corner: it makes the jam impossible, and it gives the receiver a running start toward the inside, which pulls an inside-leveraged corner the wrong way when the route breaks out.

What the offense was doing. From Petrakis's side, the logic is clean. "They're pressing Gaines on third-and-short. I can't beat Simmons at the line. So I won't let there be a line — I'll move Gaines at the snap. Then I'll attack the leverage their rule gives me." Good offensive coaches don't fight your strength; they move the fight to a place your strength can't reach.

What it says about press as a game plan. A press plan is not a call. It's a series of moves. The first press snap works because it's new. The second works if the receiver hasn't adjusted. By the third, the offense has an answer, and your plan needs the next layer: Hands with outside leverage against zoom motion, Bail on a down when they're expecting press, or a bracket.

Discussion Questions

  1. Owen's sample had 7 slants or quick outs to Gaines on third-and-short. Is 7 enough to build a playoff plan on? What would make you trust it more — or less?
  2. Why did the plan press only Simmons rather than both corners? What would "Press" (both corners) have risked against Sutton?
  3. On Snap 1, which defender other than Simmons made the press call work? Explain the connection between press and the rush clock.
  4. Petrakis answered press with motion. Name two other answers he could have used (see 17.8), and the Sentinels' response to each.
  5. Gabe called Snap 2 "right technique, right leverage, wrong down for it." Do you agree? Rewrite the motion rule so it covers both technique and leverage.

Your Turn

Austin's next third-and-short adjustment is a stack to the field: Gaines on the point, Powers behind him. Write the call you'd use (in Sentinels grammar), who presses and who plays off, the combination call you'd tag, and the one-sentence coaching cue you'd give Simmons. Then predict Petrakis's counter to your answer.