Case Study 2 — The Overload That Taught the Offense to Count: Vic Maddox's "Avalanche"
A fictional case from early in Russ Kimbrough's career. All teams, people, and numbers are composites. Told by Russ — this time from the other sideline.
Setup
Early in my career, Vic Maddox and I were on the same NFL staff: he coached linebackers, I coached defensive backs. You've met Vic in this book already. He's the coordinator who blitzes everything, calls Cover 0 on big third downs, and has been brilliant some seasons and fired in others. He isn't a villain. He's one of the most creative pressure designers I've ever been around, and his first season as a coordinator — on a different team, after we'd gone separate ways — was a sensation: he blitzed on roughly 44% of dropbacks, his defense led its conference in sacks, and his name came up in head-coaching interviews.
The next season, I was coaching the secondary for a team in Vic's division. So I got to watch Vic's pressure package from the side of the room that has to block it, in the meeting room of our offensive coordinator, a quiet, meticulous man I'll call Dennis Okerlund. This case is about one pressure and two games.
The pressure. Vic's signature third-down call was a six-man field overload he called Avalanche. From a nickel look, the strong safety and the nickel walked down on the field side late in the play clock. At the snap, six rushed — four linemen, the nickel off the edge, the strong safety through the B-gap — with the field-side linebacker taking the running back man-to-man and Cover 0 behind it: corners on the outside receivers, the free safety on the tight end, the other linebacker on the slot. Nobody deep.
What Vic had seen. Most offenses in his division protected with a half-slide pointed away from the back's alignment. Against that rule, Avalanche put four rushers on a side with three blockers. The free man came off the field edge.
Game 1: the arithmetic works
In the first meeting, Avalanche was exactly as good as it looked. Our protection was a half-slide toward the boundary with the back checking the boundary linebacker — sound, ordinary, and pointed the wrong way. Vic called Avalanche five times on third down. Our ledger, as Okerlund drew it on Monday:
| Line | Avalanche vs. our half-slide away from the field |
|---|---|
| Rushers | 6 (four on the field side of the center) |
| Blockers | 6 |
| Wasted | 1 (our back, checking a boundary linebacker who didn't come — he had our back in man) |
| Effective | 5 |
| Free | 1 — the nickel, off the field edge |
| Hot | Our slot on a quick slant into the space the nickel left — but Vic's other linebacker was sitting on the slot man-to-man with inside leverage |
Two sacks, one hurried incompletion, one 6-yard completion short of the sticks, and one conversion when our quarterback climbed and found the tight end. Vic won the game by ten.
The Monday meeting — Okerlund draws Vic's side
Okerlund didn't panic. He did something I've copied every week since: he charted every Avalanche Vic had called that season, from every game on film. There were 31. On 27 of them, the pre-snap picture was identical — nickel and strong safety walking down on the field side with under eight seconds on the play clock. On the other four, Vic had walked them down to the boundary, and he'd brought the overload from the boundary every time.
"He's not hiding it," Okerlund said. "The walk-down is the call. So we'll count it."
He installed one protection adjustment, a single word the quarterback could call at the line: when two defensive backs walked down on one side late, the protection turned — center and that side slid toward the walk-down, and the back set to that side to take the outermost rusher. The man left over — the Mike, who had the back in man coverage — became the quarterback's hot. And he put one route on the wristband to go with it: the tight end, aligned on the side away from the walk-down, on a quick seam straight up the field, because the man covering him would be the free safety — in Cover 0, a free safety with no help.
Game 2: the arithmetic doesn't
Week 14, at our place. Second quarter, 3rd-and-6 at our own 42. We're in 11 personnel, 2x2, the tight end attached to the boundary side, the back on the quarterback's left. With seven seconds on the play clock, Vic's nickel and strong safety walk down to the field.
Our quarterback calls the word. The center points right. The back shuffles behind the quarterback to his right.
POST-SNAP (Avalanche vs. the "turned" protection: 6 v 6)
[ NOBODY DEEP ]
^ Y (quick seam)
|
F (man on Y, trailing)
C=X W=H C=Z
M (man on R: R blocks, M stays)
E N $ T E *
vv vv vv vv vv vv
O O O O O
blocks: E N $ T E R -> *
Q R
📊 Diagram (described): Vic's six rush: the boundary end wide on the left, the nose through the boundary A-gap, the strong safety through the field A-gap, the 3-technique through the field B-gap, the field end through the field C-gap, and the nickel off the field edge. The offense's turned protection points everything at the field: the center slides to the strong safety, the right guard takes the 3-technique, the right tackle the field end, and the back — moved to the quarterback's right — takes the nickel off the edge. On the boundary side the left guard blocks the nose and the left tackle the boundary end. Six rushers, six blockers, nobody free. The tight end doesn't block: he releases from the boundary side straight up the seam, with the free safety trailing him in man coverage. The corners have the two wide receivers, the Will has the slot, and the Mike has the back — who is blocking, so the Mike stays home and watches. Nobody is deep. Eleven defenders.
Count it the way Okerlund did. Six rushers. Six blockers — five linemen and the back, with four of them pointed at the four field-side rushers. Nobody free. Vic's Mike had the back in man coverage; when the back blocked, the Mike had no Hug rule — Vic's man-pressure players were taught to "stay home on the back," a rule built for screens — so the Mike stood at five yards and watched.
The quarterback had time. The tight end released from the boundary side up the seam. Vic's free safety, playing him from eight yards with inside leverage, had to turn and run with a tight end who'd been running free since the snap. The throw came at 2.2 seconds, over the safety's outside shoulder at about 20 yards. Nobody deep. 58-yard touchdown.
Vic called Avalanche twice more that afternoon. Both times we turned the protection; once we threw the seam for 19, once the quarterback hit the slot on a quick option route for 11. We won by eight.
Analysis
The pressure wasn't wrong. The look was a confession. Avalanche was well designed: against the most common protection in the division, it produced a free rusher every time. Its flaw wasn't in the rushers. It was that 27 of 31 times, the walk-down said exactly where the overload was coming from. An overload that can be identified before the snap is just a six-man pressure with a label on it, and a six-man pressure against six blockers is even.
The offense's answer was arithmetic too. Okerlund didn't block Avalanche with better players. He moved his six blockers to the side with six rushers, accepted an unblocked Mike as his hot, and attacked the one weakness Cover 0 can't hide: nobody deep. The ledger went from "1 free" to "0 free," and Line 6 — what happens to the ball — went from "hot into a man defender" to "seam against a safety with no help."
What Vic could have done. Every counter in Chapter 18 was available. Move the count late: walk down to the field and bring the overload from the boundary, or walk the strong safety back out after the quarterback turned the protection. Conflict the back: put two threats on whichever side the back set to. Add a Hug: let the Mike rush when the back blocked, which would have made it seven against six. Or show Avalanche's look and play a sim behind it — which would have put seven droppers against the seam and the hot and taught Okerlund's quarterback that the walk-down meant nothing. Any of those keeps the look honest.
What I took from it. I learned more about pressure from watching Okerlund beat Vic than from any pressure I'd ever drawn. Two habits came out of that season and are in the Sentinels' building today: (1) every pressure look must carry at least two calls, and (2) Owen charts our own pre-snap looks against our actual rush counts every week — self-scouting the walk-down before someone like Okerlund does.
Vic was fired after his third season. It wasn't because he blitzed too much. It was because, by year three, every offensive coordinator in the division had a turned protection and a seam route waiting for the same picture.
Discussion Questions
- Run the ledger for Avalanche against Game 1's protection and against Game 2's turned protection. Which line changed, and what caused the change?
- Vic's Mike had a "stay home on the back" rule rather than a Hug. Why might a coordinator choose that rule, and what did it cost him in Game 2?
- Okerlund's quarterback treated the Mike as his hot. What would have happened if Vic had given the Mike a Hug rule — and what would Vic have had to give up in coverage to do it?
- Compare Avalanche to the Sentinels' Mac Star Fire Thin (18.4). Both are six-man field overloads. Name two design differences and explain which one protects better against the turned protection.
- Russ says "the look was a confession." What's the self-scout number you'd want to know about your own defense before you called a pressure like Avalanche for the 28th time?
Your Turn
You're Vic, the week after Game 2. Keep the Avalanche walk-down picture exactly as it is — you want offenses to keep turning their protection toward it. Design two calls from that picture: one that brings the pressure from the other side after the protection turns, and one simulated pressure that rushes four and drops seven. For each, draw the post-snap picture against Okerlund's turned protection, count to eleven, and run all six lines of the ledger. Then write the one-sentence game-plan rule for when you'd call real Avalanche again.