It was 5:40 on the Monday of our first Austin week, and Tess Navarro set a binder on my desk that was thicker than my first playbook.
In This Chapter
- The Hook: Page Twenty-Three
- 24.1 What a Game Plan Is — and What It Isn't
- 24.2 The Scouting Process: Sample, Cutups, and Tags
- 24.3 The Outlaws Tendency Report
- 24.4 Reading a Tendency Honestly
- 24.5 The Outlaws' Favorite Concepts, Drawn
- 24.6 Take Away the Best Weapon
- 24.7 Building the Plan by Situation
- 24.8 Keeping the Plan
- Spaced Review
- Project Checkpoint: Scouting Template + Outlaws Tendency Report
- Chapter Summary
- What's Next
Chapter 24 — Defensive Game Planning: Studying the Offense, Identifying Tendencies, and Building the Weekly Plan
The Hook: Page Twenty-Three
It was 5:40 on the Monday of our first Austin week, and Tess Navarro set a binder on my desk that was thicker than my first playbook.
Thirty-eight pages. She had broken down every snap of the Austin Outlaws' last four games — 247 of them — and tagged each one by down, distance, field position, personnel, formation, motion, and play. There were pie charts. There was a color-coded page for every personnel group. There was a page on Darius Vance's completion percentage by quarter. She had been in the film room since Thursday and it showed in her eyes and in the binder.
I read the first page. It was a table of how often the Outlaws used each personnel group. True, useful, and something I could have guessed. Page two was formation frequency. Page three was run-pass ratio by quarter. I turned pages for a while without saying anything, which I have since learned is a cruel thing to do to a young coach, and I stopped on page twenty-three.
Halfway down the page, in the same 10-point font as everything else, was this line:
3rd-and-4 to 6, 3x1 trips: dig/flood to the trips side — 14 of 22 (64%).
I put my finger on it. "Tess, what's this?"
"Third-and-medium from trips. They run the dig or the flood to the three-receiver side almost two out of three times."
"How many times did we see them in third-and-medium last year?"
She thought. "Two games' worth? Maybe a dozen snaps."
"And how many third-and-mediums will they have against us on Sunday?"
"Five or six, probably."
"So on five or six snaps that decide whether a drive lives or dies, you already know the play two times out of three." I turned the binder around so she could see it. "Why is the most important number in this report on page twenty-three?"
She didn't answer, because there wasn't a good one. It was on page twenty-three because page twenty-three was where the third-down section started, and the third-down section came after the second-down section, which came after the first-down section. The binder was organized the way the data was organized. It was not organized the way a game is decided.
"Everything in here is true," I said. "I'd bet my house on the tagging. But a tendency report isn't a record of what they did. It's an argument about what they're going to do, and what we're going to do about it. This is the evidence. I need the argument."
"How long should the argument be?"
"Two pages. The five things that will decide the game go on the front. Every one of them gets a number, a sample size, and a sentence that tells me what to call. The other thirty-six pages go in the back for Gabe, Dre, and Lou. They'll use every one of them."
"How do I know which five?"
That is the right question, and it is the question this chapter exists to answer. I told her the short version that night: find the thing they do best, find the situations where they're most predictable, and find the things that have hurt teams like ours. Then decide what you're willing to give them instead.
She came back at one in the morning. The binder was still thirty-eight pages, but now it was forty, because she'd written two new ones and put them on top. The page she carried on top of the stack had a single line circled: Darius Vance against five or more rushers. Twenty-eight of thirty-six. Nine-point-four yards per attempt. Four touchdowns. No interceptions.
Page twenty-three was now item two.
I'll tell you in this chapter how we built that plan, what it got right, and the one snap in Week 6 where the report was right and I wasn't.
🏃 Fast Track: If you already break down film and build tendency reports, skim 24.1 and 24.2, read the full Outlaws report in 24.3 (every later chapter and Appendix G cite it), and spend your time on 24.4 (reading tendencies honestly), 24.6 (taking away the best weapon), and 24.7 (organizing the plan by situation).
🔬 Deep Dive: The complete Outlaws scouting packet, with blank versions of every table in this chapter, lives in Appendix G. Blank tagging sheets and tendency forms are in Appendix F. Chapter 25 turns this game plan into a call sheet and turns the same tagging process on your own defense.
📺 Film Watcher: This Sunday, pick one offense and write down the down, distance, personnel, and formation of every third-and-4 to 6 they face. By the fourth quarter you will have a small tendency table. Then ask whether the defense played as if it had the same table.
24.1 What a Game Plan Is — and What It Isn't
Back in Chapter 1 I gave you a hierarchy: philosophy → scheme → system → playbook → game plan → call. Parts I through IV built everything up to the playbook. This chapter is the step down from playbook to game plan, and it is the step most young coordinators get wrong.
A playbook is everything your defense can play. Ours has more than a hundred calls in it if you count every coverage, pressure, front, and tag combination. A game plan is the small subset of that playbook you choose for one opponent, organized by the situations you will face against him. A call is the one thing you say into the radio with twenty-some seconds on the play clock.
The game plan sits between the two because neither one can do the other's job. You can't call the whole playbook — your players would play it slowly, and Lyle Petrakis would find the call you haven't repped since August. And you can't make a good call from scratch in the time between the whistle and the fifteen-second radio cutoff. The game plan is the thinking you did on Tuesday so you don't have to do it on Sunday.
Remember the book's thesis: defense is reactive. The offense knows where the ball is going and you don't. You close that gap three ways — preparation, recognition, and disguise. The game plan is preparation. It is the only one of the three you get to do with no clock running, no crowd, and as much film as you can stand to watch.
The three questions every game plan answers
Strip away the binders and the color-coding, and a defensive game plan answers three questions:
- What do they like? These are the tendencies: what this offense does in a given situation more often than chance would predict.
- What is their best weapon? This is the one player, concept, or condition that produces most of their explosive plays and conversions.
- What will we make them do instead? This is the plan's real decision. Every time you take something away, you give something back. The game plan names what you are willing to give them.
Most bad game plans answer the first question at great length, answer the second one vaguely, and never ask the third. Tess's first binder was all question one. It wasn't wrong. It just stopped before the argument started.
Who does what in a game week
At the NFL level, a game plan is a staff product. Here is how our week runs. The overall calendar is in the Part V introduction; this table shows who owns which piece of the plan.
| Day | Who | Produces |
|---|---|---|
| Sunday night / Monday | Tess (quality control) | Tags every opponent snap from the last 3–4 games; builds the cutups |
| Monday | Owen Kessler (analytics) | Rates and counts checked against the tags; sample sizes; league context |
| Monday | Position coaches (Lou, Dre, Gabe) | Watch their cutups: OL/run game, backs and TEs, receivers and routes |
| Monday night | Russ + Tess | The front page: five items, each with a number and a decision |
| Tuesday morning | Full defensive staff + Sorensen | "How would I attack this?" Sorensen plays Petrakis; the plan gets argued |
| Tuesday | Russ | Game plan v1, organized by situation; the call sheet draft (Chapter 25) |
| Wednesday–Friday | Everyone | Practice cuts what fails; the plan gets smaller every day |
Two things in that table matter more than they look. First, the head coach is in the room on Tuesday, and he's there to attack the plan. Mike Sorensen was an offensive coordinator for eleven years before he was a head coach, and the most useful thing he does for our defense is look at our plan on Tuesday and tell us how he'd beat it. Second, the plan shrinks from Tuesday to Saturday. If your game plan is bigger on Saturday than it was on Tuesday, you're coaching your own anxiety, not your players.
💡 Coach's point: A tendency report describes them. A game plan decides for us. If a page of your report doesn't end in a decision — a call, a check, a coaching point, or "we accept this" — it belongs in the appendix, not on the front.
🔄 Check your understanding: What is the difference between a playbook and a game plan, and why can't a coordinator skip the game plan and call straight from the playbook?
Answer
The playbook is everything your defense can play. The game plan is the small subset you choose for one opponent, organized by situation. You can't call straight from the playbook for two reasons. Your players will play a big menu slowly and with more busts, and you can't do sound situational thinking in the twenty-some seconds before the radio cuts off at 15 seconds on the play clock. The game plan is that thinking done in advance.
24.2 The Scouting Process: Sample, Cutups, and Tags
A tendency report is only as good as the film work under it. This section is the unglamorous part, and it is the part that separates a staff that thinks it knows an opponent from a staff that does.
Choosing the sample
Most NFL staffs study the opponent's last three or four games, which usually comes to somewhere between 150 and 250 offensive snaps. Why not the whole season? Because offenses change. Coordinators install new concepts, players get hurt, a rookie receiver earns more snaps, and a team that was running the ball in September may be throwing it in November. The last four games are the best picture of the offense you'll actually face, and four games is enough snaps for the biggest tendencies to show up.
But "the last four games" is a default, not a rule. Owen and Tess ask five questions before they lock the sample:
| Question | Why it matters | Austin, Week 6 answer |
|---|---|---|
| Has the coordinator or quarterback changed? | Old film may show a different offense | No. Petrakis and Vance in every game. |
| Have key players been hurt or returned? | Tendencies follow personnel | Harlan missed one series in Game 3 of the sample; no effect |
| Was any game a blowout? | Game script distorts run/pass splits | One game had a 21-point fourth-quarter lead; Owen flagged those 11 snaps |
| Did they play anyone who defends like us? | Their plan against a two-high rotation team is gold | One opponent in the sample rotated after the snap often; Tess built a separate cutup |
| Do we have last year's games against them? | Long-term tendencies and our own history with Petrakis | Yes, two games, used as background only, not counted in the 247 |
Austin's last four games came to 247 snaps, after Tess removed kneel-downs and spikes. She kept plays that were wiped out by penalty if the play was run, because a play that's called back still shows you what the offense called. That's a choice, not a law. Write your choice down so everyone on staff reads the numbers the same way.
📈 By the numbers: Why not use a hundred games? Because a bigger sample of the wrong offense is worse than a smaller sample of the right one. Owen's rule of thumb is that four recent games beat ten old ones for play-calling tendencies, and that long samples are better for things that don't change much — like a quarterback's accuracy or how he handles pressure. Even then, he puts the season-long number next to the four-game number and says which one he trusts.
Tagging: one row per snap
Tagging means watching each snap and recording a fixed set of facts about it — one row per snap, the same columns every time. The tags are the raw material for every table you'll build.
Here are the columns Tess uses. Each one is defined so that two people tagging the same snap write the same thing.
| Tag | What it records | Example (snap 131 of 247) |
|---|---|---|
| Game / Qtr / Clock | Where in the game | Sample game 3, Q2, 9:14 |
| Down & distance | Down; distance bucketed (1–3, 4–6, 7–9, 10+) | 3rd-and-5 |
| Field zone | Own 1–10, own 11–39, midfield 40–40, opp 39–21, red zone 20–in | Own 11–39 (own 37) |
| Hash | Left, middle, right | Left hash |
| Score | Leading, tied, or trailing, and by how much | Leading by 3 |
| Personnel | RB count then TE count (11, 12, 21, 10, 13, empty-specific) | 11 |
| Formation family | 2x2, 3x1 (incl. nub), empty, tight/condensed, unbalanced, two-back/other | 3x1 |
| Formation name | Their name if known, ours if not | "Trips Right Flex" |
| Strength | Side of the TE; side of trips | TE flexed right, trips right |
| Motion | None, across (jet/orbit/fly), short/return, TE motion/shift, back out | None |
| Backfield | RB alignment (offset, pistol, gun-strong, gun-weak) | Gun weak (left) |
| Play type | Run, RPO, play-action, dropback/quick, screen | Dropback |
| Concept | Their run scheme or pass concept | Dig (Gaines), out (Powers), seam (Harlan), flat (Ruffin) |
| Protection | Number of blockers; slide direction | 6-man, slide left |
| Target / carrier | Who got the ball | Gaines |
| Result | Yards, first down or not, explosive (run 12+, pass 20+) | +14, first down |
| Defense shown | Shell, coverage, number of rushers | Two-high → Cover 3; 4 rushers |
| Notes | Anything odd | "Vance looked off the safety right; throw on time at 2.5 sec" |
That's eighteen columns. A good quality-control coach can tag a snap in about two minutes once he knows the offense, which puts a four-game breakdown somewhere around eight to ten hours of focused film work — and the first time through a new offense always takes longer.
Writing the definitions down
The most common failure in tagging isn't laziness. It's drift. On Thursday, Tess tags a stick-nod route as a "dig." On Saturday, after she's tired, she tags the same route as a "curl." Now the dig tendency is wrong and nobody knows it.
The fix is a tag dictionary: one page defining every concept name, formation family, and play type. Our dictionary says, for example, that a dig is a route that breaks inside at 10 or more yards and stays flat across the field, and that a flood is a three-level stretch of one side of the field (one deep, one intermediate, one short). Any route that doesn't fit gets tagged "other" with a note, not forced into the nearest name.
Then Owen runs an agreement check. He picks 25 random snaps from the sample and tags them himself without looking at Tess's tags. That Monday, they agreed on the play type for all 25 and on the concept for 23. The two misses were both a dig that Owen called a "deep cross." They talked it out, wrote one more line in the dictionary, and Tess re-checked every dig and deep-cross tag in the sample. Three changed.
That's thirty minutes of work that kept a wrong number off the front page.
⚠️ Common mistake: tagging what you expected. A young analyst watches an offense run outside zone six times in a row and tags the seventh snap "outside zone" before the back has taken his second step. The seventh snap was play-action. Now his play-action count is one low and his run count is one high, and the tendency his staff plans around is a little stronger than the truth. The fix: tag the snap only after you've watched the whole play, end-zone and sideline, and re-tag a random sample cold.
Cutups: the film organized by question
Once every snap is tagged, you can sort the film by any tag. A cutup is a collection of every snap that matches one filter — "all third-and-4 to 6," "all 12 personnel," "all red zone," "every pressure they faced." Cutups are how the staff watches film. Nobody watches a game in order on Tuesday; you watch the situation you're planning for.
Our standard cutup set for a game week:
| Cutup | Who watches first | What we're looking for |
|---|---|---|
| 1st-and-10 | Russ, Dre | Run/pass mix, RPO keys, first-play-of-drive habits |
| 2nd-and-short / medium / long | Russ, Dre | Shot plays on 2nd-and-short; draw and screens on 2nd-and-long |
| 3rd-and-1–3 / 4–6 / 7–9 / 10+ | Russ, Gabe | Concepts by distance; who they target; protection |
| By personnel (11, 12, other) | Lou, Dre | Run schemes by personnel; play-action partners |
| By formation family | Gabe | Route concepts by formation; splits as tells |
| Motion | Gabe, Dre | What motion does to the formation; motion-to-play links |
| Red zone / goal line | Russ, everyone | Compressed-field concepts (Chapter 27) |
| Two-minute / end of half | Russ, Gabe | Tempo calls, sideline routes (Chapter 28) |
| Vs. pressure | Russ, Owen | QB vs. 5+ rushers; hot throws; protection answers |
| Vs. post-snap rotation | Russ, Gabe | How the QB handles a shell that changes |
| Explosives | Everyone | Every run of 12+ and pass of 20+ — how they were made |
| Their game against a defense like ours | Russ | The single most valuable game in the sample |
🎬 Film room: Watch every cutup twice — once from the end zone and once from the sideline. The end-zone view shows you protection, run-blocking schemes, and the quarterback's eyes. The sideline view shows you route depths, the timing of the throw, and how deep the safeties really were. A dig at 12 yards and a dig at 16 yards are different problems for your safeties, and you can't tell them apart from the end zone.
🔄 Check your understanding: Owen and Tess disagreed on 2 of 25 concept tags. Why does a small disagreement on one route name matter enough to re-check the whole sample?
Answer
Because a systematic naming error doesn't stay in one snap — it shifts every count that uses that tag. If digs are sometimes tagged as deep crosses, the dig tendency on third-and-medium looks weaker than it is, and the staff may not plan for the concept it most needs to stop. Re-checking all the dig and deep-cross tags fixed three rows and protected the front-page number.
Who watches what
On our staff, the tags and Owen's numbers tell us where to look, and the position coaches tell us what's happening. Big Lou watches the offensive line on every run cutup. He wants the tackles' feet, because a tackle who sets differently on run and pass is giving away the play before the snap. Dre watches the backs and the tight ends, because their alignment and their first step tell his linebackers what's coming. Gabe watches the receivers' splits and the depth of their breaks, because his corners and safeties play off those.
And I watch the quarterback. On a Monday I'll watch every one of Darius Vance's dropbacks against pressure, and only his eyes and feet. Where does he look first? How fast does he get the ball out when somebody comes free? Does he throw the hot route, or does he hang in and take the shot? The numbers told us Vance was devastating against the blitz. The film told us why: he saw pressure before the snap, set the protection to pick it up, and when somebody came free anyway he didn't flinch. He threw to the vacated spot on time. That's the difference between a number and an understanding, and you need both.
24.3 The Outlaws Tendency Report
This is the report. Every later chapter that game-plans against Austin starts here, and Appendix G reprints it in full. All of it is invented for teaching — the Outlaws are a fictional composite offense, and these are Owen's and Tess's fictional charting numbers — but every table is built the way a real staff builds one, and every number adds up.
The headline table
This is the summary Owen signed off on the Monday night before Week 6. It's the first thing on the first page of the report.
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Snaps in scouting sample | 247 (last 4 games) |
| 11 personnel | 168 of 247 (68%) |
| 12 personnel | 49 of 247 (20%) |
| Other (10, 21, 13, empty-specific) | 30 of 247 (12%) |
| Pre-snap motion | 134 of 247 (54%) |
| RPO-tagged plays | 38 of 247 (15%) |
| Vance vs. 5+ rushers | 28 of 36, 9.4 yards per attempt, 4 TD, 0 INT |
| Vance vs. 4 rushers with post-snap rotation | 31 of 52, 6.1 yards per attempt, 1 TD, 3 INT |
| Third-down conversion rate (offense) | 47% |
| 3rd-and-4 to 6 from 3x1 trips: dig/flood to the trips side | 14 of 22 (64%) |
| Run calls from 12 personnel | 31 of 49 (63%) — mostly outside zone and duo |
A word on the vocabulary in that table. Personnel is written as two digits: the number of running backs, then the number of tight ends, with the rest wide receivers. 11 personnel is one back, one tight end, three receivers. 12 personnel is one back, two tight ends, two receivers. An RPO (run-pass option) is a play where the line blocks a run and the quarterback decides after the snap — by reading one defender — whether to hand off or throw. Play-action is a called pass that begins with a run fake. 3x1 means three receivers to one side and one to the other, which you'll hear called trips. If you need a refresher on any of these, Chapter 7 covers the offense's toolkit from the defense's side.
Behind that headline table are the breakdowns. Tess built every one of them from the same 247 tagged rows, so every column and every row adds back to the totals above.
Personnel × play type
| Personnel | Snaps | Designed run | RPO | Play-action | Dropback / quick | Screen |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 11 | 168 | 38 | 33 | 27 | 59 | 11 |
| 12 | 49 | 31 | 0 | 11 | 6 | 1 |
| Other | 30 | 11 | 5 | 6 | 8 | 0 |
| Total | 247 | 80 | 38 | 44 | 73 | 12 |
The "Other" row breaks down as 10 personnel (11 snaps), 21 personnel (8), 13 personnel (5), and empty-specific groupings (6).
Read the 12-personnel row slowly. Thirty-one runs in 49 snaps. Of the 18 passes, 11 were play-action, and Harlan was the most common target. There were no RPOs at all from 12 personnel. When the second tight end, Cody Brandt (#84), jogs onto the field, this offense is telling you it wants to run, and that if it throws, it'll throw off a run fake. Of the 31 runs, 14 were outside zone, 11 were duo, 4 were inside zone, and 2 were counter.
Now the 11-personnel row. It's balanced in a way that's harder to defend: 38 runs, 33 RPOs, 27 play-action passes, 59 dropbacks, and 11 screens. An offense that splits its plays that evenly from one personnel group is hard to read by personnel alone. You have to go deeper — to formation, to down and distance, to motion.
Down × play type
| Down | Snaps | Designed run | RPO | Play-action | Dropback / quick | Screen |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1st | 108 | 44 | 22 | 21 | 16 | 5 |
| 2nd | 79 | 25 | 15 | 18 | 16 | 5 |
| 3rd | 55 | 9 | 1 | 5 | 38 | 2 |
| 4th | 5 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 |
| Total | 247 | 80 | 38 | 44 | 73 | 12 |
First down is where the Outlaws live in their run game and RPOs: 66 of 108 first-down snaps were a designed run or an RPO. Twenty-one more were play-action off those same looks. Only 16 were straight dropbacks. On first down, Petrakis wants to make your linebackers decide.
One second-down detail went on the front page as a coaching point, not as a call: on 2nd-and-1 to 3, the Outlaws took a downfield play-action shot on 6 of 17 snaps. Seventeen snaps is a small sample, and Owen flagged it. But Gabe watched all 17, and the six shots all came from the same look — 11 personnel, Harlan attached, Ruffin offset — so it went on the sheet as "2nd-and-short: safeties, eyes on your man before your run fit."
Third down by distance
| Distance | Snaps | Runs (incl. 1 RPO, draws) | Called passes | Converted | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3rd-and-1–3 | 14 | 7 | 7 | 10 of 14 (71%) | Six runs and one RPO; quick game on the passes |
| 3rd-and-4–6 | 26 | 1 | 25 | 13 of 26 (50%) | 3x1 on 22 of 26; dig/flood on 14 of those 22 |
| 3rd-and-7–9 | 9 | 0 | 9 | 2 of 9 (22%) | All dropbacks; Gaines the first read on 6 |
| 3rd-and-10+ | 6 | 2 | 4 | 1 of 6 (17%) | Two draws; dagger and a deep crosser off play-action |
| Total | 55 | 10 | 45 | 26 of 55 (47%) |
The 45 called passes on third down produced 41 pass attempts, 2 sacks, and 2 scrambles.
The third-down table is where the plan's weight lives, and it holds two facts that don't look like tendencies until you put them side by side. First, the Outlaws are very good on third-and-short and decent on third-and-medium, and then they fall off a cliff at seven yards and beyond — 3 conversions in 15 tries. Second, they get to third-and-medium a lot: 26 times in four games, nearly half their third downs. That's not an accident. It's what an offense that runs efficiently on first down and throws RPOs on second down produces. Their early-down plan is built to leave them at third-and-medium, where their best call lives.
And on 22 of those 26 third-and-mediums, they lined up in 3x1. Of those 22, they ran the dig/flood family to the trips side 14 times — 9 times as a dig, 5 times as a flood — and converted 8 of the 14. The other 8 trips snaps were 3 isolation throws backside to Sutton, 2 mesh/shallow-cross concepts, 1 option route by Harlan, 1 screen to Powers, and 1 quarterback draw.
Third-down targets
| Target | Third-down targets | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Trey Gaines (Z) | 19 of 41 (46%) | 13 of the 19 came on 3rd-and-6 or longer |
| Brooks Harlan (Y) | 7 | 5 catches; the seam on the dig/flood |
| Mekhi Powers (H) | 7 | Outs, option routes, the shallow on mesh |
| Devonte Sutton (X) | 4 | All backside isolation throws vs. a single defender |
| Jalen Ruffin (RB) | 4 | Checkdowns in the flat |
| Total | 41 |
When the Outlaws need a third down, the ball goes to Gaines nearly half the time, and almost always on the longer third downs. He is their third-down weapon.
Formation families
| Family | Snaps | Designed runs | RPOs | Signature |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2x2 | 104 (42%) | 32 | 20 | Inside zone/slant RPO to Powers; the scissors from reduced splits |
| 3x1 (incl. nub) | 89 (36%) | 25 | 15 | Dig/flood to trips on third-and-medium |
| Empty | 21 (9%) | 1 | 0 | 19 of 21 created by a back motioning out; quick game |
| Tight / condensed (incl. bunch, stack) | 22 (9%) | 13 | 3 | Outside zone with crack blocks; stack releases vs. man |
| Unbalanced | 5 (2%) | 4 | 0 | Too few snaps to plan around; we have a check for it |
| Two-back / other | 6 (2%) | 5 | 0 | Short yardage |
| Total | 247 | 80 | 38 |
Motion
| Motion type | Snaps | What it usually produced |
|---|---|---|
| Across (jet, orbit, fly) | 58 | 21 led to a jet sweep or a flood toward the motion |
| Short / return | 33 | Mostly a run-game or RPO "eye candy" look |
| TE motion / shift | 24 | Re-sets the strength of the formation before runs |
| Back motion out | 19 | Empty — and with it, quick game |
| Total | 134 (54% of snaps) | 47 of the 134 changed the formation family |
Petrakis motions on more than half his snaps, and most of that motion is about information, not about changing the play. Only 47 of the 134 motions changed the formation family. Most of the rest asked our defense a question — will the nickel chase? will the safeties roll? — so Vance could read the answer before the snap. Chapter 14 built our answers to those questions; this table is why it mattered.
Vance vs. the rush
| What the defense did | Comp–Att | Yards / att | TD | INT | Explosive passes (20+) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5+ rushers | 28 of 36 | 9.4 | 4 | 0 | 6 |
| 4 rushers, post-snap rotation | 31 of 52 | 6.1 | 1 | 3 | 3 |
| 4 or fewer rushers, shell held | 24 of 36 | 7.2 | 3 | 1 | 6 |
| Total | 83 of 124 | 7.4 | 8 | 4 | 15 |
Add 7 sacks and 14 scrambles on called passes. Nine of the 14 scrambles came against man coverage and went for 81 yards and 6 first downs; the 5 against zone went for 22.
This is the table that ended up on top of the stack at one in the morning. Read it as a coordinator. Against the blitz, Vance completed nearly four of five passes, averaged more than nine yards an attempt, and never threw an interception. One of every six blitz attempts was an explosive. Against a four-man rush with a shell that changed after the snap, he completed about three in five, averaged six yards, and threw three interceptions. Against a four-man rush with a shell that held — the defense showed one thing and played it — he sat in the middle.
The difference between the second and third rows matters as much as the difference between the first and second. It says that rushing four is not enough on its own. Rushing four and making him read the coverage after the snap is what slows him down. That's the shell-is-not-the-coverage idea from Chapter 6, showing up as a number.
Explosive plays
In the sample, the Outlaws produced 23 explosive plays — 8 runs of 12+ yards and 15 passes of 20+. Five of the 8 explosive runs were outside zone or duo bounced outside, 2 were jet sweeps, and 1 was a zone-read keep by Vance. Of the 15 explosive passes, 5 came on the scissors concept (#1 runs a post, #2 runs a corner) — all 5 from reduced splits — and 6 came against five or more rushers.
Every explosive play gets watched by everyone on the staff. That cutup is short, and it's the one that gets coordinators fired.
🔄 Check your understanding: The Outlaws converted 26 of 55 third downs (47%). Why does the plan care more about where those third downs happened (the distance buckets) than about the 47%?
Answer
Because the overall rate hides two very different offenses. On third-and-1 to 6 they converted 23 of 40; on third-and-7 or longer they converted 3 of 15. The plan has two jobs: stop the third-and-medium concept they lean on (dig/flood from trips), and push more of their third downs into the 7+ range by winning first and second down. The 47% tells you they're good. The buckets tell you where and how.
24.4 Reading a Tendency Honestly
A tendency report can lie to you even when every number in it is true. This section is about the ways it lies and how a staff protects itself.
Counts before percentages
Notice how every tendency in the report is written: 14 of 22, not "64%." That's Owen's rule, and it's non-negotiable on our staff. A percentage without a count hides the sample size. "75%" might be 3 of 4 or 150 of 200, and those are very different pieces of evidence.
Owen uses a rough confidence ladder. It isn't a formal statistical test, and he says so every time he uses it. It's a shared language for how hard to lean.
| Snaps behind the tendency | How we treat it | Language on the report |
|---|---|---|
| Fewer than about 10 | A story. Watch the film; don't build a call around it. | "We've seen…" |
| About 10–25 | A lean. Worth a call on the sheet if the film agrees. | "They lean…" |
| About 25 or more | A plan. Build around it unless context says otherwise. | "They will…" |
The dig/flood number — 14 of 22 — is a lean, not a plan, by that ladder. It earned the front page anyway, for two reasons. The film agreed: Gabe watched all 22 and saw the same three-level stretch, from the same alignment, with the same receivers. And the stakes were high: third-and-medium was where their drives lived.
Compare against the base rate
A tendency only means something compared to what the offense does everywhere else. That's the base rate. If the Outlaws ran the dig/flood family on 64% of all their pass plays, the third-and-medium number would be no tendency at all — just their offense.
So Tess checked. On their other 108 called pass plays in the sample, a dig or flood to one side showed up 22 times — about one in five. On third-and-4 to 6 from trips, it showed up on almost two of three. That gap is the tendency. The concept is in their offense all the time. It moves to the front of the line on third-and-medium.
📈 By the numbers: Owen's honest caveat on the 14-of-22 number: if you flipped a coin that came up "dig/flood" one time in five, getting 14 of 22 by luck would be extremely unlikely, so the tendency is very probably real. But "real" and "will hold on Sunday" are different claims. Offensive coordinators watch their own tendencies too, and a 14-of-22 tendency can become 1-of-5 in a single game if Petrakis decides to break it. The number tells you what to expect. It doesn't tell you what to bet the season on.
Tendencies depend on the defense they faced
This is the one most young analysts miss. Offenses call plays against the defenses they see. If three of the Outlaws' last four opponents played a lot of single-high coverage, then the Outlaws' tendencies are partly tendencies against single-high coverage — and we play two-high on about 62% of our snaps.
That's why Tess built a separate cutup of the one opponent in the sample that rotated its safeties after the snap the way we do. In that game, the Outlaws' third-and-medium calls looked almost the same — still trips, still the dig — but Vance held the ball longer, and two of his three interceptions in the "rotation" row of the table came in that game. That game was 61 snaps of the 247. On a Monday night it was worth more to me than the other 186 combined, because it showed me what Petrakis does against a defense like mine.
Game script and garbage time
One game in the sample had a fourth quarter where the Outlaws led by 21. They ran the ball on 9 of the 11 snaps that quarter, because that's what you do with a 21-point lead. Count those snaps naively and the Outlaws look like a slightly more run-heavy offense than they are. Owen didn't delete them — they're real snaps — but he flagged them and ran the run/pass numbers both ways. With those 11 snaps out, the run share barely moved. Without checking, we wouldn't have known that.
Tells: what you can see before the snap
A tendency tells you what they do in a situation. A tell is a pre-snap clue that tells you what they're doing on this snap: an alignment, a split, a stance, a personnel change. Tells are the bridge from preparation to recognition — from Tuesday's film to the five seconds before the ball is snapped.
The Outlaws' tells in the Week 6 report:
| Tell | What it predicted | Evidence | How we used it |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brandt (#84) on the field (12 personnel) | Run, or play-action off the run | 31 runs, 11 play-action in 49 snaps | Big nickel; safeties "eyes on the tight end before the run fit" |
| Gaines (#1) in a reduced split (within about 3 yards of the slot) | The scissors was possible | All 9 scissors came from reduced splits — but only 9 of the 23 reduced-split snaps were scissors | A "reduced" alert to Royce and the field corner; not an automatic check |
| First play of a drive from 2x2 | Inside zone with the slant tag to Powers | 7 of the 11 inside zone/slant RPOs came on the first play of a drive | Ames "sits" on the first snap of a drive from 2x2 |
| Ruffin motioning out of the backfield | Empty and the quick game | 19 of 21 empty snaps | Bell's Echo rule (Chapter 14) |
Look hard at the second row, because it's the most important lesson in this section. Every scissors came from a reduced split. That does not mean every reduced split was a scissors. It was 9 of 23. If you hear "all of their scissors come from tight splits" and tell your players "tight split means scissors," you'll be wrong 14 times out of 23 and Petrakis will find out in about a quarter and a half. A tell runs in one direction. Check which direction before you coach it.
🔄 Check your understanding: Name two reasons the Outlaws' tendencies in this sample might not hold against the Sentinels, even if every snap was tagged correctly.
Answer
Any two of these: (1) Offenses call plays against the defenses they face, and most of the sample came against defenses that didn't rotate the way the Sentinels do. That's why the one game against a rotating defense got its own cutup. (2) Game script, like a 21-point fourth-quarter lead, can tilt the run/pass numbers. (3) Petrakis self-scouts and may deliberately break a tendency he knows is visible. (4) Small samples (under about 10 snaps) can be noise.
🧩 Productive struggle: Before you read on, rank these three Outlaws tendencies from most to least trustworthy, and say what you would do with each one.
(a) On 2nd-and-1 to 3, they took a play-action shot on 6 of 17 snaps. (b) From 12 personnel, they ran the ball on 31 of 49 snaps. (c) After an RPO gained 4 or more yards, their next first-down play-action rate "roughly doubled" — in a 16-snap sample.
Think about count, base rate, and what a wrong guess would cost.
One staff's answer
Most trustworthy: (b). Forty-nine snaps, a big gap from their overall run rate (80 designed runs in 247 snaps, about a third), and the film shows the same schemes. Build around it: big nickel, run fits first, play-action eyes.
Middle: (a). Seventeen snaps is a lean, but the film showed the same look every time, and a wrong guess (a safety biting on a run fake) costs a touchdown. Treat it as a coaching point — eyes discipline on 2nd-and-short — not as a call.
Least: (c). Sixteen snaps behind a "roughly doubled" rate is thin, and the condition (an RPO gaining 4+) is itself a small slice of the game. It's a story. Tell the safeties, don't build a call.
🔍 Why this works: Why do offenses have tendencies at all, when every coordinator knows he's being scouted? Because an offense is a system of plays built to work together, and every system has a center of gravity. A coordinator calls what his players run best, in the situations where it works best, and he can only practice so much each week. The dig/flood is on third-and-medium because it's the concept Vance and Gaines have repped the most and trust the most against the coverages that show up on third-and-medium. A tendency is not a mistake. It's what being good at something looks like from the outside. The offense pays for it only if the defense knows it and can stop it anyway.
24.5 The Outlaws' Favorite Concepts, Drawn
A number tells you how often. A diagram tells you what you're stopping. The front page of our report carries four concepts drawn the way the players will see them, pre-snap and post-snap. Tess drew them for the Tuesday meeting. Gabe redrew two of them, because Tess drew the routes at the depths the playbook says, and Gabe insisted on the depths the film shows.
Concept 1 — The trips dig on third-and-medium
PRE-SNAP: 3rd-and-5, Outlaws 11 personnel, 3x1 trips right
Sentinels showing the Home look (two-high)
F $
C W M * C
E T N E
X O O O O O Y H Z
Q
R
📊 Diagram (described): The Outlaws line up with three receivers on the right of the picture — Harlan (Y) just off the right tackle, Powers (H) in the slot, and Gaines (Z) wide — and Sutton (X) alone on the left. Vance is in the shotgun with Ruffin offset to the trips side. The Sentinels show their Home look: two safeties deep, Royce (F) on the left and Holloway ($) on the right, corners on each wide receiver, the nickel Vo (*) over the slot, Bell (M) and Ames (W) at linebacker depth, and four defensive linemen.
POST-SNAP: the "dig" version (9 of the 14 dig/flood snaps)
^ Y seam (#3)
|
<-------------------+-----------+
Z dig at about 12 (#1) |
| |
^ X hitch | H----> |
| at 6 | | out |
| | | at 6 |
X O O O O O Y H Z
Q
R ------------------------> flat
📊 Diagram (described): After the snap, Harlan, the inside receiver of the trips, runs straight up the seam. Powers, the middle receiver, runs about six yards and breaks to the sideline. Gaines, the outside receiver, runs about twelve yards and breaks across the field toward the middle. Ruffin releases to the flat on the trips side. On the other side, Sutton runs a six-yard hitch. The result is three levels to the trips side: a deep seam that holds the middle safety, short routes that pull the underneath defenders outward, and a dig coming in behind the linebackers.
The geometry is the whole point. The seam by #3 forces the deep middle defender to honor it. The out and the flat put two receivers on one underneath defender at the sideline. And the dig crosses at the depth where a zone's underneath players can't reach it and its deep players are already committed to something vertical. Against a single-high Cover 3, it's a nightmare: the hook defender can't get under the dig and wall the seam at the same time. The flood version (5 of the 14) swaps the dig for a vertical clear by Gaines and puts Powers on a sail route — an out-breaking route at about 12 yards — so the same side gets three levels along the sideline instead of through the middle.
Concept 2 — The first-play RPO
PRE-SNAP: 1st-and-10, first play of the drive
Outlaws 11 personnel 2x2, Harlan attached on the left
$ F
C M W * C
E N T E
X Y O O O O O H Z
Q R
📊 Diagram (described): The Outlaws have two receivers on each side: Sutton wide and Harlan attached at tight end on the left, Powers in the slot and Gaines wide on the right. Ruffin is beside Vance in the shotgun. The Sentinels show two-high, with Holloway on the tight-end side and Royce on the other. Bell is the linebacker to the tight-end side, Ames to the slot side, and Vo is outside him over Powers.
POST-SNAP: inside zone right, slant tag on Powers
W <-- READ KEY (Ames)
M | Fills the run? Vance THROWS
v Sits in the window? HANDS OFF
^
/ H slant, behind Ames
/
X Y O O O O O H Z
line zone-blocks right --> |
Q | (stalk
R ------> inside zone right v block)
📊 Diagram (described): At the snap the offensive line blocks inside zone to the right and Ruffin takes the handoff path. Powers runs a quick slant inward, aiming at the space Ames, the Will linebacker, is supposed to cover. Vance watches only Ames. If Ames runs downhill to fill his run gap, Vance pulls the ball and throws the slant into the space Ames just left. If Ames stays in the passing window, Vance hands off to Ruffin. Gaines stalk-blocks the corner on the outside.
This is the conflict-defender problem from Chapter 7, with a name and a number on it. Ames has a run gap and a pass window, and the play is built to punish whichever one he chooses. The report's contribution is the "when": 7 of the 11 inside-zone/slant snaps came on the first play of a drive. So the front page said, in one line, "First snap of a drive from 2x2: Ames sits, Holloway fits." Ames triggered anyway on the first snap of Week 6 — the slant went for 17 — and that's a coaching lesson, not a scouting one. The report was right. The rep wasn't there yet.
Concept 3 — 12 personnel: the run, and play-action off it
PRE-SNAP: 2nd-and-6, Outlaws 12 personnel; Brandt (U) on the
wing left, Harlan (Y) attached right; Sentinels in Big
F $ (Pruitt)
C W M * (Holloway) C
E N T E
X U O O O O O Y Z
Q
R
📊 Diagram (described): The Outlaws have two tight ends on the field: Brandt on a wing just outside the left tackle and Harlan attached on the right, with Sutton wide left and Gaines wide right. Ruffin is directly behind Vance. The Sentinels are in big nickel: Holloway has moved down to the nickel spot over the right side, and Elijah Pruitt plays the deep safety spot on that side, with Royce deep on the left. Bell and Ames are the linebackers and four linemen are down.
POST-SNAP: play-action off outside zone right ("the same look")
^ X clear ^ Z post
| |
| <---------------------+ |
| Y dig at about 14 | |
| | |
| W M both | |
| step up on | |
| the fake | |
X <-----+ O O O O O Y Z
U flat | line steps right
U Q
R ------> fake, outside zone right
📊 Diagram (described): The line takes its outside-zone steps to the right and Vance fakes the handoff to Ruffin going right. Both linebackers step forward to play the run. Behind them, Harlan releases from the right side, climbs to about fourteen yards, and breaks across the field to the left: a dig in the space the linebackers just vacated. Brandt slips out to the left flat as an outlet. Sutton runs a vertical clear on the left, and Gaines runs a post on the right to hold the deep safeties.
The run and the play-action pass are one play to the offense. They want your linebackers and your strong safety to see the same first picture on both. The report's answer was not a coverage. It was an eye rule: on 12-personnel play-action, Harlan was the target on most of the throws, and his release was always the tell. If the tight end blocks, play the run. If he releases, sink under him. Dre and Gabe coached it as "First picture is a claim. Second picture is the truth."
🔄 Check your understanding: From the personnel table, why is 12 personnel easier to game-plan against than 11 personnel, even though the Outlaws use 11 personnel more than three times as often?
Answer
Because 12 personnel is lopsided and 11 personnel is balanced. From 12 the Outlaws ran 31 of 49 times, threw play-action on 11 of their 18 passes, and never used an RPO, so personnel alone tells you a lot. From 11 they split 168 snaps fairly evenly across runs (38), RPOs (33), play-action (27), dropbacks (59), and screens (11), so you have to go deeper, to formation, down and distance, and motion, to find a tendency.
Concept 4 — Jet motion and the sweep
PRE-SNAP: 1st-and-10, 11 personnel 2x2; Powers (H) in jet
motion from right to left; Sentinels Home, "Roll" tagged
$ F
C M W * C
E N T E
X Y O O O O O H Z
Q <~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
R
📊 Diagram (described): Powers starts in the right slot and runs in jet motion across the formation, just in front of Vance, toward the left side. The Sentinels are in their Home look, two safeties deep, with a "Roll" tag in the call that tells the safeties to rotate toward the motion.
POST-SNAP: jet sweep left; "Roll" brings $ down as the force
F rotates to the deep middle ----->
$
\ Holloway rolls down: FORCE, turn it inside
v
C <-- corner: keep outside leverage on Sutton, then fold
H <-------- jet sweep, ball handed off at the mesh
X Y O O O O O
Q
📊 Diagram (described): Vance hands the ball to Powers as he crosses in front of him, and Powers races toward the left sideline. Because of the Roll tag, Holloway, the safety on the motion side, comes downhill to be the force player: his job is to meet the runner outside and turn him back inside. Royce rotates from his side to the deep middle so the defense still has a post safety. The corner on the left keeps outside leverage on Sutton and then folds in to help.
Twenty-one of 58 across motions became a jet sweep or a flood to the motion side. That's a lean, not a plan, and the rest of the time the motion was a decoy. So we didn't want anyone chasing Powers. The Roll tag gave the motion side a force player without moving anybody across the formation. When Petrakis motioned and didn't hand the ball off, the rotation also gave Vance a moving picture to read — which, from the table above, is exactly what we wanted him reading.
🔄 Check your understanding: In Concept 2, why is "Ames sits on the first snap of a drive from 2x2" a better game-plan line than "Ames always sits against the RPO"?
Answer
Because a linebacker who always sits gives up the run every time Vance reads him. The RPO is built to punish whichever choice the conflict defender makes. Tying the rule to the situation where the tendency lives — the first play of a drive from 2x2, 7 of the 11 inside zone/slant RPOs — takes away the throw when it's most likely, and leaves Ames free to fit the run the rest of the time. The fit behind him (Holloway) is part of the rule.
24.6 Take Away the Best Weapon
There is a principle every good defensive game planner shares, and it's most often associated with Bill Belichick: identify the one thing the offense does best, take it away, and make them beat you with something else. Belichick's defensive game plan for the Giants in Super Bowl XXV, against the Buffalo Bills' no-huddle passing attack, is held by the Pro Football Hall of Fame. Accounts of that plan describe a defense willing to give up yards on the ground to keep Buffalo's passing game in front of it. Whatever the details of that specific plan, the idea is simple: you can't stop everything, so you choose what you stop.
The principle is easy to say and hard to do, for three reasons. You have to agree on what the best weapon actually is. You have to accept a real cost to take it away. And you have to keep accepting that cost when the offense starts collecting on it in the second quarter.
The Tuesday meeting
Tuesday morning, Week 6. Tess had the front page on the screen, and I asked the question I ask every week: "What's their best weapon?"
Gabe: "Gaines. Nineteen of their forty-one third-down throws. He's the guy."
Dre: "I'd say Ruffin. Eight explosive runs in four games, and five of them bounced outside. If our edges and our alley player are wrong, he's gone."
Big Lou: "Their line is good, not great. I'll take my four against their five on early downs. I'm not scared of the run game if we fit it right."
Owen: "It's not a player. Look at the rush table. Against five or more, Vance averages 9.4 yards an attempt. Against four with rotation, 6.1. That's more than three yards an attempt, on every throw, based on one decision we make. Nothing else in this report moves that much."
Sorensen: "Owen's right, and here's how I'd say it as their coordinator. My best weapon is your aggression. I want you to blitz Vance. I'll motion, I'll show you empty, I'll get you to bring six, and he'll throw it to the spot you just left."
Tess: "Then the best weapon is a condition, not a player. Vance against pressure. And the second weapon is Gaines on third-and-medium, because that's where they put the ball when they need it."
That was the answer. Note how we got there. Each coach named the threat in his own room, which is what position coaches should do. Owen moved the conversation from players to conditions, by asking which of our decisions changed their results the most. And Sorensen did what he does every Tuesday — he took the offense's side and told us what he'd want us to do. When the head coach says "I want you to blitz Vance," the plan writes itself.
The weapon table
The front page of the plan carried this table. It's the core of the argument Tess's first binder was missing.
| Their weapon | Evidence (count, sample) | How we take it away | What it costs us | What they get instead |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Vance vs. pressure | 28 of 36, 9.4 Y/A, 4 TD, 0 INT vs. 5+; 31 of 52, 6.1, 1 TD, 3 INT vs. 4 + rotation | Four-man rush; disguise and rotate post-snap; pressure only when it takes away the hot throw | Fewer sacks; more time for Vance; more checkdowns | Long drives of short completions — they have to be patient for 10+ plays |
| Gaines on third-and-medium (the trips dig/flood) | Dig/flood 14 of 22 from trips on 3rd-and-4 to 6; Gaines 19 of 41 third-down targets | Quarters Lock: the trips-side safety drives on the dig; Royce takes the seam | Brennan alone on Sutton backside | Sutton backside isolation; Ruffin in the flat for 2–4 yards |
| The first-play RPO | 7 of 11 inside zone/slant RPOs on the first play of a drive | Ames sits on the first snap of a drive from 2x2; Holloway fits the run | A cleaner run lane for Ruffin on that snap | Inside zone for 4–6 yards — and second-and-medium |
Every row has a fifth column, and the fifth column is the plan. On our staff we call it "what we'll live with." If you can't fill it in, you haven't made a decision. You've made a wish.
Taking away the dig: Quarters Lock
The answer to the trips dig on third-and-medium was a check from Chapter 14: Lock. Against 3x1, the backside corner plays man on the single receiver, and the backside safety goes to the middle of the field and reads #3. That frees the trips-side safety to play the dig.
PRE-SNAP: "Quarters, Lock" -- the same Home picture as before,
with the check signaled by Royce and echoed by Holloway
F Royce: "Lock!" $ Holloway
(fist into palm) echoes it
C W M * C
E T N E
X O O O O O Y H Z
Q
R
📊 Diagram (described): The picture is exactly the Home look from Concept 1: two safeties deep, corners on the outside receivers, the nickel over the slot, two linebackers, four linemen. The only difference is invisible to the offense: Royce, the safety on the side away from the trips, has signaled "Lock" with a fist into his palm, and Holloway, on the trips side, has echoed it, which makes the check live.
POST-SNAP: Quarters Lock vs. the trips dig
C Brennan: man on F Royce: middle of the field,
| Sutton (alone) ^ reads #3, takes the seam
| | C
| <---------------+----- $ ^
| Z dig Holloway: #2 went |
| out, so he drives |
| on the dig |
| W M * --> Vo jumps |
| (Ames: the (Bell: walls #3, the out |
| back, flat) then hook) Simmons: top of #1
X O O O O O Y H Z
Q
R -------------> flat (Ames rallies)
📊 Diagram (described): At the snap, Brennan stays man-to-man on Sutton on the single-receiver side. Royce comes off his deep half to the middle of the field and picks up Harlan's seam. Bell walls Harlan as he releases and passes him to Royce, then settles into the hook. Vo jumps Powers's out route. Because Powers broke outside, Holloway, the trips-side safety, is free to drive downhill on Gaines's dig. Simmons, the field corner, stays on top of Gaines. Ames runs to the flat to take Ruffin.
| Defender | Lock rule | Against the dig |
|---|---|---|
| Brennan (boundary C) | Man on the single receiver | Sutton's hitch: break on it, tackle |
| Royce (F) | Middle of the field; read #3 | Harlan's seam is his |
| Bell (M) | Wall #3, then hook | Re-route Harlan, pass him to Royce |
| Vo (*) | Wall #2, then curl/flat | Jump Powers's out |
| Holloway ($) | Read #2; if #2 goes out, eyes to #1 | Drive on Gaines's dig |
| Simmons (field C) | #1 vertical; stay on top when he breaks in | Over the top of the dig |
| Ames (W) | The back | Ruffin to the flat |
| Four linemen | Rush; Rollins and Coleman win their matchups | Get Vance off his spot by 2.5 seconds |
Look at the fifth-column cost again: Brennan alone on Sutton. That's not a hidden flaw. It's the price, written on the front page in advance. Petrakis knew that if we took away the dig, the backside isolation would be there. In Week 6, Vance threw at Sutton eight times, six of them with Brennan alone, and completed five of those six for 86 yards. Some of that was Brennan, a second-year corner, losing reps he'll win later. Some of it was the plan working exactly as designed. You don't get to take away a team's best weapon for free.
🗣️ The offense's view: Lyle Petrakis expects you to take his best thing away. That's why his best thing is built with a breaker attached. On the trips dig, the breaker is the backside: if the defense rolls its coverage to the trips, he wants the ball to Sutton one-on-one. From his chair the question isn't "what will they take away?" It's "what will they leave, and is my guy better than their guy there?" A good offensive coordinator reads your game plan from your first three third downs. If your fifth column says "Sutton vs. Brennan," expect to see it by the second quarter, and decide before the game how many times you'll let it beat you before you change the call.
⚠️ Common mistake: the plan that takes away everything. A young coordinator writes a front page with nine "take it away" items: double Gaines, bracket Harlan, spy Vance, cloud Sutton, plus-one the run. Each is reasonable. Together they require fourteen defenders. On Sunday his players get a different coverage on every snap, half of it repped twice, and the busts come in the second quarter. The fix: take away one or two things completely, and write down what you'll live with. A plan that takes away five things takes away none of them.
🔄 Check your understanding: Why did Owen argue that the Outlaws' best weapon was "Vance against pressure" rather than Vance himself or Gaines?
Answer
Because a game plan can only change what the defense controls. You can't remove Vance from the field, but you control how many rushers you send and whether your shell changes after the snap. Owen's rush table showed that one of our decisions moved Vance from 9.4 to 6.1 yards per attempt — a bigger swing than anything else in the report. Defining the weapon as a condition points straight at the decision that takes it away: rush four and rotate.
24.7 Building the Plan by Situation
The tendency report is organized by what the offense did. The game plan is organized by what the defense will face: situations. Every coordinator organizes it a little differently, but every good one organizes it the way the game arrives — by down and distance, then by field zone, then by special situations.
The structure of the plan
| Section | What it covers | Where this book teaches it |
|---|---|---|
| Front page | The best weapon, the "live with" list, the five items that decide the game | This chapter |
| Early downs | 1st-and-10; 2nd-and-short (1–3), 2nd-and-medium (4–6), 2nd-and-long (7+) | This chapter and Chapter 25 |
| Third down | 3rd-and-short (1–3), medium (4–6), long (7–9), very long (10+) | Chapter 26 |
| Red zone and goal line | Inside the 20; inside the 5 | Chapter 27 |
| Two-minute and end of half | Clock situations | Chapter 28 |
| Backed up | Offense inside its own 10 | This chapter, briefly |
| Short yardage / fourth down | 3rd- and 4th-and-1 or 2 anywhere | Chapters 20 and 26 |
| Tempo | No-huddle, no substitution | Chapter 29 |
| Alerts | Screens, trick plays, formations we haven't seen | This chapter |
| The "never" list | Calls we won't make against this opponent, and why | This chapter |
The early-down section is where most game plans are too thin. It's where the Outlaws do most of their damage quietly: 4- and 5-yard gains on first down that leave them at second-and-medium and then third-and-medium, which is where their best call lives. If you lose first down to this offense, you'll be playing their favorite situation all day. So the early-down plan isn't just about stopping runs. It's about where you leave them.
The Week 6 plan, by situation (excerpt)
Here is the core of the plan we carried to Austin. The call names follow our call grammar from Chapter 8: personnel, front, modifier, pressure, coverage, tag.
| Situation | Their tendency (count) | First call | Second call | Coaching point |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1st-and-10, 11 personnel, 2x2 | 66 of 108 first downs were runs or RPOs | Home (Nickel Over Quarters) | Nickel Over Spin 3 | First snap of a drive: Ames sits, Holloway fits |
| 1st/2nd down, 12 personnel | 31 of 49 runs; 11 of 18 passes play-action | Big Over Quarters | Big Over Spin 3 | Eyes on the tight end before the run fit |
| 2nd-and-1–3 | Play-action shot on 6 of 17 | Home | Nickel Over Spin 1 | Safeties: eyes on your man first |
| 2nd-and-7+ | Draws and screens creep up | Nickel Over Spin 3 | Home | "Screen!" alert; linemen retrace |
| 3rd-and-1–3 | 7 runs, 7 passes; quick game to Gaines | Nickel Over Spin 1, Field Press | Big Over Quarters vs. 12 | Win the first step; tackle short |
| 3rd-and-4–6, 3x1 | Trips on 22 of 26; dig/flood on 14 of 22 | Nickel Over Quarters Lock | Nickel Over Six (Cloud on Sutton) | Holloway drives the dig; Brennan, we trust you |
| 3rd-and-7–9 | Gaines first read on 6 of 9 | Nickel Over Spin 3 | Nickel Over Robber | Make him throw short of the sticks; tackle |
| 3rd-and-10+ | Dagger and the deep crosser off play-action | Dime Over Two Man | Dime Over Spin 3 | Rush lanes: Vance scrambles against man |
| Ruffin motions out (empty) | 19 of 21 empty snaps | Echo (kill pressure → Buzz 3) | — | Bell's call; no exceptions |
Two things about that table. First, the second call in the third-and-medium row is there because of the fifth column. If Petrakis started living on Sutton against Lock, Six — Cover 2 to the boundary, quarters to the field — gave Brennan a safety over the top on the single receiver, at the cost of a little help on the trips side. That's how you plan the counter to your own plan before the game.
Second, look at what's not in the table. There's almost no pressure. The plan had one fire zone on it, built so that a dropping lineman landed in Vance's hot window, with a limit on how many times a half I could call it. And it had a "never" list:
- No Cover 0. Not on third down, not to "change the game." The one exception: no zero pressure unless they're in 12 personnel inside our 10.
- No man on Harlan with Bell. If the call puts Bell on Harlan in man, check to Robber with Holloway on Harlan.
- Nobody chases jet motion across the formation. Roll or Bump.
🔄 Check your understanding: Why does the third-and-medium row have a second call, and what event in the game should trigger it?
Answer
Because the first call, Quarters Lock, has a known cost: Brennan alone on Sutton. The second call, Six with the Cover 2 half to the boundary, puts a safety over Sutton. The trigger is the offense collecting on the "live with" play often enough that it's no longer something you can live with, for example Sutton beating Brennan twice. You decide the trigger before the game so you aren't deciding it angry in the third quarter.
The front page
Here's the finished front page — page one of the forty — the way Tess rebuilt it at one in the morning.
| # | Item | Number (count) | Decision |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Don't blitz Vance. Four-man rush, rotate after the snap. | 28 of 36, 9.4 Y/A vs. 5+; 31 of 52, 6.1 Y/A, 3 INT vs. 4 + rotation | Pressure only with a lineman dropping into the hot window. Never Cover 0. |
| 2 | Third-and-medium from trips is the dig/flood. | 14 of 22 | Quarters Lock; Six if they live on Sutton |
| 3 | 12 personnel is the run game. | 31 of 49 runs; 11 of 18 passes are play-action | Big; tight end's release is the play-action tell |
| 4 | First snap of a drive from 2x2 is the RPO slant. | 7 of 11 | Ames sits, Holloway fits |
| 5 | We will live with: Sutton vs. Brennan, Ruffin in the flat, long drives. | Sutton hitch: 6.8 yards per catch in the sample | Tackle the catch. Make them go 12 plays. |
That page is about 120 words. Everything else in the binder supports it.
🎙️ On the headset: This is the voice the front page puts in my head on Sunday. 3rd-and-5, trips right, Gaines outside, Harlan as #3. Front page, item two. They want the dig. Quarters Lock. Royce will signal it, Holloway will echo it, and Brennan is on an island with Sutton. I know that. I chose that. If Sutton beats him, it's a hitch for six and it's fourth down. If Gaines catches the dig, it's a first down and they're in our territory. I'll take the hitch.
🏫 Any level: At the high school level, the process is the same and the scale is smaller. You might have two or three games of film from an exchange service, and the tagging gets done by you, an assistant, and maybe a manager on a Sunday afternoon — so cut the tag list to the eight or ten columns that matter (down, distance, hash, personnel, formation, motion, play, result). Two things get bigger at lower levels. The hash: high school hash marks divide the field into thirds, so offenses run to the wide side far more predictably than NFL offenses do, and "formation into the boundary" is often a tendency by itself. The tendencies themselves: a high school offense with a strong runner and one good receiver usually has a much simpler call pattern than Petrakis. A 12-of-15 tendency in high school is common; build around it, and expect fewer breakers. College sits in between, with wider hashes than the NFL and more film than high school.
📋 Try it — Make the call: Week 6, second quarter, the Outlaws face 3rd-and-5 from their own 44, left hash. They come out in 11 personnel, 3x1 with the trips to the field — Gaines wide, Powers in the slot, Harlan flexed as #3 — and Sutton alone into the boundary. Ruffin is offset to the trips side. Score tied. You have the front page above. Make the call, say who has the dig, and name what you're giving up.
Worked answer
Call: Nickel Over Quarters, with the Lock check — Royce signals "Lock," Holloway echoes.
Why: Front-page item two: third-and-4 to 6 from trips is the dig/flood, 14 of 22. Lock puts Royce in the middle reading #3, so Harlan's seam is covered without Holloway. That frees Holloway, the trips-side safety, to read #2 (Powers). If Powers breaks out, Holloway drives on Gaines's dig with Simmons on top. Vo jumps the out. Ames takes Ruffin to the flat. The four-man rush follows item one.
What you're giving up: Brennan is one-on-one with Sutton in the boundary. That's the "live with" line. If it's a hitch, Brennan breaks on it and tackles short of the sticks — 6.8 yards per catch in the sample means it's a coin flip at 5. If Sutton beats Brennan twice, the second call on the sheet is Six, putting a safety over Sutton.
What you didn't call, and why: Cover 0 or any five-man pressure. Item one. Vance at 9.4 yards per attempt against the blitz is the most expensive number in the report.
24.8 Keeping the Plan
You can build a perfect game plan on Tuesday and lose it on Sunday. Not because the plan was wrong — because you didn't keep it.
Week 6: the report was right
For three and a half quarters at Austin, the plan held. It didn't hold perfectly. Ames triggered on the first-play RPO, a Lock/Quarters split bust gave up a 41-yard post in the first quarter, and Ruffin went 45 yards in the second when two defenders on the same side ended up in the wrong gaps. Those were execution failures, and Chapters 5, 8, and 14 own them. But the plan — rush four, rotate, Lock on third-and-medium, live with Sutton — was doing what it was built to do. Vance was completing balls underneath and having to earn every yard.
Then came the fourth quarter. Tied 27–27, 4:12 left, Outlaws' 3rd-and-8. Every number on the front page said four-man rush and rotation. Owen said it in my ear. Gabe said it to my face. I called Cover 0 with six rushers. Vance stood in, Ruffin picked up the sixth rusher, and Gaines beat Brennan on a deep over: 52-yard touchdown, final score 34–27.
Chapter 16 tells that story in full, and I own it there. Here is the game-planning lesson. The front page had a line that said never Cover 0. I had written it myself. And with the game tied in the fourth quarter, every nerve in my body told me to do something, and "something" felt like pressure. The tendency report didn't fail. Item one was the most important line in it, and I was the only person in the building who didn't follow it.
That's why the "never" list exists, and why it goes on the call sheet in red, not just in the binder. A game plan has to survive the coordinator. Chapter 25 builds the call sheet to make that possible.
💡 Coach's point: The hardest part of game planning is not finding the answer. It's keeping it when the game is tied in the fourth quarter and every instinct you have tells you to do something else. Write your "never" list on Tuesday, when you're calm, and treat it as an order from a smarter version of yourself.
Week 15: rebuilding the report
Nine weeks later, Tess rebuilt the report for the rematch. The process was the same — four games, every snap tagged — but the sample was different: our Week 6 game plus the Outlaws' three most recent games. That's a choice worth noticing. Our own game against them was the most valuable film in the building, because it showed what Petrakis does against us. But it was also one game, and one game is a story, not a plan. Tess kept it in the sample and built a separate cutup of it, the same way she'd isolated the rotating opponent in Week 6.
The most useful page in the Week 15 report wasn't a tendency at all. It was a comparison: what moved between the two reports, and what held. Some of the Outlaws' tendencies had shifted — Petrakis self-scouts like everybody else, and after a win he'll still break what he knows we know. But the core held. Vance was still lethal against pressure. The trips dig was still the third-and-medium answer. Gaines was still the third-down weapon.
So the front page barely changed, and that's the point. One line changed a lot: item one's exception. In Week 6, the plan allowed "pressure only with a lineman dropping into the hot window" and I never called it. In Week 15, that exception became a real call, designed from the cutup of Vance's hot throws: when he saw A-gap pressure, his eyes went to the field-side slot window, quickly and almost every time. So we built a pressure that put a 300-pound defensive tackle in that exact window.
Third quarter, Game 2, 3rd-and-7: "Mug Cat Fire." Bell and Ames mugged in the A-gaps. Five rushers — Bell, Ames, Simmons off the edge, Rollins, Big V. Coleman, our 3-technique, dropped into the field-side hot window under the slot. Vance saw the A-gap pressure, looked hot to Powers, found Rashad Coleman standing in the throw, hesitated, and Bell came free. Sack, 9-yard loss, punt. Chapter 13 draws it in full.
That call didn't break the plan. It was the plan — the exception clause, built from the same tendency report that said "don't blitz." Don't blitz Vance the way he wants to be blitzed. If you're going to pressure him, take away the answer he's practiced. The Sentinels won that game 23–20.
🔄 Check your understanding: For Week 15, Tess built the sample from the Week 6 game plus the Outlaws' three most recent games, and she cut the Week 6 game separately. Why include it, and why isolate it?
Answer
Include it because it's the only film of Petrakis and Vance against our defense, which makes it the most relevant game anywhere. Isolate it because it's one game, and one game is a story, not a plan. Cutting it separately lets the staff watch it closely without letting its snaps dominate the tendency tables.
🪞 Learning check-in: Stop and take stock before the review.
- Can you explain, without looking, the difference between a tendency and a tell — and give one Outlaws example of each?
- Look back at the five items on the front page. For each one, could you defend it to Mike Sorensen in the Tuesday meeting: the count, the sample size, and the decision? Which one would you have the most trouble defending? That's the one to reread.
- When you read a number like "64%," do you now automatically ask "of how many?" and "compared to what?" If not, go back to 24.4 and redo the productive struggle.
- Think about your own "page twenty-three." In the work you do — coaching, film breakdown, analysis — is your most important finding where the reader will see it first? Or is it where the data happened to put it?
- Rate your confidence (1–5) that you could build a tendency report for an opponent from three games of film. If it's below 3, the Project Checkpoint below is your next step, not Chapter 25.
📋 Try it — Whose fault? Wednesday practice, Week 6 week. The scout team runs an Outlaws card: 11 personnel 2x2, Gaines (played by the scout receiver) in a reduced split, 2nd-and-6. Simmons, the field corner, sees the reduced split, opens his hips to the sideline at the snap, and bails to the corner route he expects from the scissors. The scout-team slot runs a 5-yard whip route back outside instead. Gaines's stand-in, from the reduced split, runs a hitch. The ball goes to the hitch for 7 and a first down, with Simmons 9 yards deep. Gabe asks the room: whose fault?
Worked answer
The defender: Simmons broke his technique. In quarters, the corner plays #1's vertical with eyes through him to #2, and he doesn't open to the sideline until #1 or #2 tells him to. He guessed instead of reading.
The real fault: the coaching point that told him to guess. Simmons had heard "their scissors all come from reduced splits" and turned it into "reduced split means scissors." The report said 9 of 9 scissors came from reduced splits, but only 9 of the 23 reduced-split snaps were scissors. The tell runs in one direction. Coached backwards, it's wrong more often than it's right, and it turned a good corner into a predictable one.
The fix: the coaching point on the front page was rewritten as a reminder, not a rule — "Reduced split: the scissors is possible; play your read." Gabe re-ran the rep twice, once with the scissors and once with the whip, so Simmons could feel that the alignment alone doesn't tell him which one is coming.
📋 Try it — Diagram it: Draw the post-snap picture of Quarters Lock against the flood version of the Outlaws' trips concept: Gaines (#1) runs a vertical clear, Powers (#2) runs a sail (out-breaking route at about 12 yards), Harlan (#3) runs to the flat at about 2 yards, and Ruffin stays in to block. Who has Powers's sail?
Worked answer
```text POST-SNAP: Quarters Lock vs. the trips flood
C Brennan: man on X F Royce: reads #3; #3 went | to the flat, so he looks | for work: the deep middle | ^ C Simmons: | $ ------> | carries #1 | Holloway: #2 is | (Gaines) | vertical-out, he | vertical | takes the sail | | W M * | | (Bell: #3 Vo: sinks under | | to the flat) the sail, then | | rallies | X O O O O O Y H Z ```
📊 Diagram (described): Simmons carries Gaines's vertical clear down the sideline. Because Powers, the #2 receiver, pushes vertically before breaking out at about 12 yards, Holloway reads him and takes the sail route. Vo sinks under the sail to squeeze the throwing window, then rallies to anything short. Harlan, the #3 receiver, goes to the flat, and Bell, who was walling him, follows him there. Royce, whose Lock read was #3, sees him go short and settles into the deep middle. Brennan stays man-to-man on Sutton on the other side.
Holloway has the sail, and Vo squeezes it from underneath. In quarters, the safety's #2 read is what makes this work: #2 went vertical, so #2 is the safety's.
Spaced Review
Answer each question before you open the answer.
1. (Chapter 23) The Sentinels cut their missed-tackle rate from 14% in Russ's first season to 9% last season. Look at the fifth column of the weapon table in 24.6. Why does the "live with" list against Austin depend on that number?
Answer
Everything the plan agrees to give up is a short completion: Sutton's hitch, Ruffin in the flat, Vance's checkdowns. A plan built on "make them go 12 plays" only works if a 5-yard catch stays a 5-yard catch. Every missed tackle turns a "live with" play into an explosive, and the plan stops working. The tackling curriculum is part of the game plan.
2. (Chapter 22) In Concept 4, the Roll tag brings Holloway down against the jet sweep. What's his run-support job, and in a Cloud call to that side, who would have it instead?
Answer
Holloway is the force player: he meets the runner outside and turns him back inside to the pursuit. In a Cloud call the corner squats and becomes the force player, and the safety plays over the top. A handy way to remember it: Sky means the safety forces, Cloud means the corner forces.
3. (Chapter 6 — deep callback) Vance completed 31 of 52 with 3 interceptions against a four-man rush with post-snap rotation, and 24 of 36 with 1 interception against a four-man rush with the shell held. Both are four-man rushes. What idea from Chapter 6 explains the difference?
Answer
The shell is not the coverage. What the quarterback sees before the snap is a claim, not a fact. When the shell held, Vance's pre-snap read was correct, and he could throw on rhythm. When it rotated, he had to re-read after the snap, which cost him time and occasionally led him to throw into a coverage that wasn't there anymore. Royce's interception in the playoff rematch came from exactly that kind of re-read: Vance read two-high, threw to the deep middle, and found Royce there. The report put a number on a Chapter 6 idea.
Project Checkpoint: Scouting Template + Outlaws Tendency Report
In Chapter 23 you built your Tackling Curriculum & Tracking Sheet: how you teach and measure the most basic skill your defense has. Now you turn outward. This checkpoint has two parts. The first is a tool you'll use every week; the second is the first time you use it on the opponent you'll plan against in the capstone.
Part 1 — Your Scouting Template. Produce three things:
- A tag list — the columns you'll record for every opponent snap, with a one-line definition of each. Pros and serious analysts can use all eighteen from 24.2. High school coaches should pick eight to ten (at minimum: down, distance, hash, field zone, personnel, formation, motion, play type, concept, result).
- A tag dictionary — one page defining your concept names and formation families so two people tag the same snap the same way. Include your explosive-play definition (this book uses runs of 12+ and passes of 20+).
- A cutup list — the cutups you'll build every week and who on your staff watches each one first.
Part 2 — The Outlaws Tendency Report. Using the tables in 24.3 (and the full packet in Appendix G), build a two-page report:
- Page 1, the front page: five items, each with a count (never a bare percentage), a sample size, and a decision. One of the five must be a "live with" item.
- Page 2, the weapon table: at least two weapons, each with all five columns filled in — weapon, evidence, how you take it away, what it costs, what they get instead.
- The back: your choice of supporting tables, plus a "never" list of no more than three lines.
A worked example of one front-page item:
| # | Item | Number (count) | Decision |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | 12 personnel is the run game | 31 of 49 runs (63%); outside zone 14, duo 11; 11 of 18 passes play-action | Big nickel vs. 12, always. Front strength to the attached TE. Play-action rule: "TE blocks, play run; TE releases, sink under him." |
Level options: high school coaches can do Part 2 on a real upcoming opponent instead of the Outlaws, using two or three games of film. Film-room analysts can build Part 2 for an NFL team from public play-by-play data, but should note which columns public data can't provide (coverage, rushers, and route concepts usually require charting by hand).
Check yourself: hand your front page to someone who hasn't seen the tables. Can they tell you, in one sentence each, what you're going to do and why? If they can't, you've written a summary, not an argument.
Next: In Chapter 25 you'll build Call Sheet v1 + Self-Scout Checklist — your front page turned into a sheet you can call from in twenty seconds, and the same tagging process turned on your own defense.
Chapter Summary
The process:
| Step | What you do | The trap |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Choose the sample | 3–4 recent games, ~150–250 snaps; check coordinator, QB, injuries, blowouts, opponents like you | More film of the wrong offense |
| 2. Tag every snap | Fixed columns, a written dictionary, an agreement check | Drift; tagging what you expected |
| 3. Build cutups | Sort the film by situation; watch each twice (end zone and sideline) | Watching games in order |
| 4. Build the tables | Personnel, down, distance, formation, motion, QB vs. rush, targets, explosives | Percentages without counts |
| 5. Read honestly | Counts, base rates, the defenses they faced, game script, one-way tells | Coaching a tell backwards |
| 6. Find the best weapon | Ask which of your decisions moves their results most | Naming a player when the weapon is a condition |
| 7. Decide what you'll live with | Fill in the fifth column for every weapon | A plan that takes away everything |
| 8. Organize by situation | Early downs, third down, red zone, two-minute, backed up, short yardage, tempo, alerts, "never" | A plan organized like the data |
| 9. Keep it | "Never" list on the call sheet; shrink the plan as the week goes on | The fourth-quarter itch |
The Outlaws in one paragraph: They live in 11 personnel (168 of 247), motion on more than half their snaps (134), and run their best call on third-and-medium from trips (dig/flood, 14 of 22). They run when the second tight end comes in (31 of 49). Vance destroys the blitz (28 of 36, 9.4 Y/A, 4 TD, 0 INT) and struggles against a four-man rush that rotates after the snap (31 of 52, 6.1 Y/A, 3 INT). The plan: rush four, rotate, Lock the trips on third-and-medium, sit Ames on the first-play RPO, live with Sutton against Brennan and Ruffin in the flat — and never Cover 0.
The decision framework, in one line per question:
- What do they like? → tendency tables with counts and base rates.
- What's their best weapon? → the condition your decisions change the most.
- What will we make them do instead? → the fifth column, written down before the game.
- Where does each answer live? → the situation sections of the plan.
- What will we never do? → three lines, in red, on the call sheet.
What's Next
A game plan tells you what you intend to call. Chapter 25 is about what you actually call, with forty seconds on the clock and the radio cutting off at fifteen — the call sheet, the check system, and the uncomfortable discovery that your own tendencies are the opponent's scouting report. Lyle Petrakis has an analyst too, and somewhere in Austin she has a binder about us.