Case Study 1 — Fourteen Percent: Rebuilding a Defense's Tackling in One Offseason
All people, games, and numbers in this case are fictional unless identified as real history.
Setup
When: The spring after Russ Kimbrough's first season as defensive coordinator of the Sacramento Sentinels — three seasons before the book's season.
The number: Owen Kessler, director of football analytics, has charted every tackle attempt from that season: 149 misses on 1,066 attempts — 14.0 percent. Average yards after a miss: 7.4. Total: roughly 1,100 yards gained after a defender had a realistic chance to end the play.
The staff in the room: Russ; Gabe Lindqvist (defensive backs); Andre "Dre" Whitaker (linebackers); Lou "Big Lou" Fontenot (defensive line); head coach Mike Sorensen; Owen. Tess Navarro is not on staff yet.
The constraint: The NFL's collective bargaining agreement limits padded practices in training camp and during the season. Russ's first-year plan had used a large share of the available padded time on team-period scheme work and a weekly live tackling period early in camp. The trainers' injury report from that camp was not good.
The question: How do you cut a missed-tackle rate by a third without adding contact?
What happens
Step 1: The cutup
Owen didn't bring a spreadsheet to the first meeting. He brought a 22-minute cutup: every miss that cost more than 10 yards. The staff watched it straight through without stopping, which Russ later called the most uncomfortable 22 minutes of his time in Sacramento.
One clip summarized the season. Week 11 that year, at St. Louis. Second quarter, 2nd-and-8 at the Sentinels' 44. The Stallions ran a slow screen to tailback Antoine Day toward the field. The Sentinels were in Cover 3; the field corner, a veteran named Terrance Moody (#23, no longer with the team), was the first defender to the ball.
PRE-SNAP: Stallions 21 personnel vs. Sentinels Base, Cover 3
2nd-and-8 at the Sacramento 44 (field to the right)
F
C C
$ S M W
E T N E
X Y O O O O O Z
Q
B
R
📊 Diagram (described): The Stallions are in an I-formation with a fullback and tailback behind the quarterback, a tight end on the left, a split end to the left, and a flanker wide to the right, toward the field. The center is the middle of the five linemen. The Sentinels are in base personnel: four down linemen, three linebackers (Sam, Mike, Will), two corners over the wide receivers, and a single deep free safety in the middle. The strong safety has rotated down outside the tight end as the eighth man in the box, making eleven defenders in all.
The screen developed to the right. Two Stallions linemen released into the flat. The Will was cut off; the flanker ran the corner off with a vertical release and then turned to block the Sentinels' deep-third defender. Day caught the ball four yards behind the line with two blockers in front of him and Moody coming from outside.
POST-SNAP: field screen; the corner breaks down late and lunges
F
\
\ C (Moody)
v |
M W <-O O v (sprints, no
\ \ @ breakdown,
\ \ / lunges here)
O O O O O R---->-----+
Q - - - - -> ---> 31 yards
📊 Diagram (described): After the snap, the quarterback dumps the ball to the running back, who has slipped into the right flat behind two offensive linemen who released downfield. The linemen engage the Will linebacker and the pursuing Mike. The field corner comes down from his deep third toward the ball at full sprint and, at the spot marked @, lunges at the runner from about three yards away without breaking down. The runner cuts back inside the lunge and runs for 31 yards; the free safety is the only defender still able to pursue.
Moody was in the right place on the right angle. He never slowed his feet. Three yards from Day, at full speed, he dove at Day's thighs. Day stepped inside and went 31 yards to the Sentinels' 13. The Stallions kicked a field goal.
Gabe: "That's not effort. He's sprinting. He's trying to make the play. He just never got into a position where he could make it."
Dre: "Half of mine are the same. Right gap, right time, then they launch from four feet."
Big Lou: "Mine don't lunge, mine reach. My big guys run 15 yards to a screen and try to tackle a 200-pound back with one arm."
Step 2: The categories
Owen had already split the 149 misses by cause, but the staff argued over the definitions for an hour — which turned out to be the most valuable hour of the offseason, because it forced every coach to say what he meant by a good tackle.
| Category | First-season misses | What the staff agreed it meant |
|---|---|---|
| Angle | 41 | The tackler's path took him behind the runner or past his inside hip |
| Lunge / no breakdown | 37 | The tackler left his feet or stopped his feet before the runner committed |
| No wrap | 29 | Contact with the shoulder or body, arms not around the runner |
| High / arm tackle | 22 | Contact above the chest or with one arm only |
| Runner won | 20 | Two coaches agree the tackler did everything right |
Sorensen asked the head coach's question: "How many of those 1,100 yards are coming from our scheme being wrong, and how many from us not being able to finish?"
Owen: "On these 149 plays, the fit was sound on most of them by our grading. These are finishing problems. That doesn't mean the scheme's perfect. It means this cutup isn't about scheme."
Step 3: The design decisions
Over three meetings, the staff made five decisions.
- One tackle model, two words. Hawk (the base near-shoulder tackle, head behind) and Track (the angle tackle on the near hip). Every position coach would use the same words, so a linebacker moving to safety, or a corner moving to nickel, would hear the same cues.
- Head out, shoulder in. Russ had grown up on "head across the bow" in East Texas. He retired the phrase, citing the rugby-influenced model that Pete Carroll's Seattle staff had popularized in the mid-2010s and that many programs had adopted since.
- Separate the phases by tempo. Angles and pursuit at Air and Tag. Strike, wrap, and roll at Bags, using rolling tackle wheels and shields. Breakdown against a live runner at Thud. Live tackling against teammates in short, deliberate periods only.
- A weekly minimum. Every position group would run at least one tackling drill every practice day in-season — eight to twelve minutes — in the individual period, before the team period took the minutes.
- The chart goes public. Owen's weekly sheet — attempts, misses, category, yards after miss — would be shown to the players by position every Tuesday, with the two best tackles alongside the two worst misses.
Sorensen: "You're telling me we're going to tackle less in practice and miss less on Sunday."
Russ: "I'm telling you we're going to tackle better in practice. Fewer collisions, more reps of the part that's actually broken. Moody didn't miss because he hadn't been hit enough in August. He missed because nobody made him break down 200 times."
Step 4: The results
By the end of Russ's second season, Owen's sheet read about 11 percent. Last season, 9.0 percent — 91 misses on 1,012 attempts. The category that moved most was angle (41 → 19). Lunge misses dropped more slowly (37 → 22) and are now the largest category, which is why the Eye-Opener drill moved up the weekly plan in the book's season.
The trainers' report changed too. Russ is careful not to claim a cause-and-effect he can't prove — one team, a few seasons, many other variables — but the camp soft-tissue and contact injury list the second summer was shorter than the first, and nobody on the staff wanted to go back.
Analysis
Why it worked. The staff did three things in the right order. First, they measured with categories, which turned "we can't tackle" — a complaint — into "41 angle misses and 37 lunges" — a practice plan. Second, they matched drills to categories: Track and Team Pursuit for angles, Eye-Opener for lunges, wheel and shield work for the wrap. Third, they protected the minutes: tackling moved into the individual period, where the game plan couldn't eat it.
Why "less contact" wasn't a contradiction. Live tackling reps are expensive: a player can take only so many before fatigue and injury risk rise, and in a live rep the coach can see only the result, not the footwork that caused it. Separating phases let the Sentinels take many more reps of the breakdown and the angle — the two phases responsible for 78 of 149 misses — at almost no contact cost.
What it didn't fix. "Runner won" barely moved (20 → 18). Good backs still break good tackles. And the fit errors in Chapter 5's explosive-run charting were a separate problem with a separate fix. Tackling doesn't replace scheme; it finishes it.
Discussion Questions
- Owen brought a cutup to the first meeting instead of a spreadsheet. What does a cutup do that a table can't, and what does the table do that the cutup can't?
- The staff spent an hour arguing about category definitions. Why was that argument valuable rather than wasted time?
- Russ retired the phrase "head across the bow." What risks come with changing a technique cue that veteran players have used for years, and how would you manage them?
- Big Lou's defensive linemen "reach with one arm" on screens 15 yards downfield. Design one drill, with tempo, for defensive linemen pursuing screens.
- Russ won't claim the drop in the injury list was caused by the new practice structure. Why is that caution appropriate, and what would you need to make a stronger claim?
Your Turn
Take the first-season category table above and assume you have ten minutes a day, four days a week, for an in-season tackling block. Allocate those 40 minutes across drills and tempos to match the five categories in proportion to their size, with no Live tackling. Write it as a one-page weekly plan, and add a single sentence explaining what result on Owen's chart, after four weeks, would tell you the plan is working.