Case Study 26.1 — The Dig Problem: Building the Medium Panel for Game 2
A Sentinels case (fictional composite). It follows one panel of the third-down page, the 3rd-and-4 to 6 panel against trips, from Owen's report on Monday through three snaps on Sunday. Two of the snaps went our way and one didn't.
Setup
The game: Week 15, Austin Outlaws at Sacramento. Austin had won the Week 6 meeting 34–27, and the Sentinels would win this one 23–20.
What the scouting said. Owen Kessler's four-game sample (247 snaps) had one third-down line highlighted in yellow:
| Outlaws, 3rd-and-4 to 6 from 3x1 trips | Snaps | Converted |
|---|---|---|
| Dig or flood to the trips side | 14 | 8 |
| Everything else (backside throws, mesh, option route, screen, QB draw) | 8 | 5 |
| Total | 22 | 13 |
Two more numbers framed the week. The first was the Sentinels' own record last season: opponents converted 26 of 54 third-and-mediums (48%), and 11 of the 20 completions that moved the chains had been caught short of the sticks. The second was Vance's split: 28 of 36 for 9.4 yards per attempt against five or more rushers, and 31 of 52 for 6.1 yards per attempt with 3 interceptions against four rushers with a post-snap rotation.
Personnel and formation expected. 11 personnel, 3x1 trips to the field. Brooks Harlan flexed as #3, Mekhi Powers as #2, Trey Gaines as #1, Devonte Sutton alone backside, and Jalen Ruffin in the gun. The Sentinels would be in nickel on 3rd-and-4 and 5, and in dime (Andre Lucas in for Jordan Ames) on 3rd-and-6.
What Week 6 had shown Austin. The Sentinels played Home on most of their trips third-and-mediums in Week 6, and it checked automatically to Quarters Lock. Two of those snaps were digs caught at seven or eight yards, with Marcus Bell a step late under the route and Isaiah Royce arriving with the ball.
What happens
Wednesday: the staff room
Russ put the trips picture on the whiteboard and drew Lock in blue. Mike Sorensen did what he does in every game-plan meeting and sat down on the offense's side of the table.
Sorensen: "I'm Petrakis. I've got your Week 6 tape. You played this on every one of these. I'm running the dig until you prove you can stop it."
Dre Whitaker: "Marcus can get to the dig. But he's got to put a hand on Harlan first. That's the rule, and it's a good rule, because if he doesn't wall Harlan, Harlan runs straight up the middle at Royce."
Gabe Lindqvist: "And Ike is reading three. By the time three tells him 'flat,' the ball's out. Two jobs each, and the route breaks right between them."
Tess Navarro: "Can I put up the other number? It's not the dig I'm worried about. Owen's eleven of twenty. When we do get there, we're not finishing. Half the conversions we gave up last year were caught short."
Russ: "Then the answer has two parts. One call that puts somebody on the dig first. And one sentence on every underneath player's card about what he does when the ball's thrown short."
The first part became Robber at 8 to 10 yards. Robber is Cover 1, so it gets Holloway to the dig with nothing else to do, and it starts from the same two-high look as Lock. The second part became two lines on the cards. Every underneath defender got "Sticks plus one, eyes on the quarterback, drive on anything in front." Bell got one more line of his own: "#3 to the flat — you're the cutback."
Sorensen: "Fine. Now I'm Petrakis again. Robber's man underneath. I put Harlan on Marcus up the seam."
Russ: "Then you'll get some. That's the price. I'd rather pay it on Harlan's seam than on Gaines's dig fourteen times out of twenty-two."
Thursday: the Money Period
Tess scripted six third-and-medium snaps. Four were the tendency, three digs and a flood. Two were the counters: Harlan's seam against Robber, and a backside slant to Sutton against Lock. The defense won five of the six. The one loss was the Harlan seam: the scout tight end beat Bell by a step and caught it for 18 yards. Tess's Money Sheet showed something else that mattered. On all four tendency snaps, the first contact came short of the cone line marking the sticks.
Sunday, snap 1: first quarter, 3rd-and-5 at the Austin 40
Trips right. Russ called Robber. Vance saw two high safeties, the same picture he'd seen on Week 6 film, and came to Gaines on the dig. Holloway drove from the robber spot and broke it up. Punt.
Sunday, snap 2: third quarter, 3rd-and-6 at our 45
Petrakis had a counter ready. The Sentinels were in a Cover 1 call with Bell matched on Harlan, and Harlan ran the seam. Bell was a step behind, and Vance threw it over him for 19 yards. It was the Thursday rep, right down to the yardage, and the Sentinels had known it was coming. Russ said afterward that it was the right price. Austin had to find its second-best answer to move the chains, and it found it once.
Sunday, snap 3: early fourth quarter, 3rd-and-4 at the Austin 33
Trips right again. This time Russ played Quarters Lock, the base call he hadn't shown on a trips third-and-medium all game. Austin ran the flood. Gaines cleared vertically, Powers ran an out at about six yards, and Harlan went to the flat. Vo sank under the out, which took away the conversion route. Vance threw the flat to Harlan at two yards.
POST-SNAP, FIELD SIDE ONLY (Quarters Lock vs. the flood, 3rd-and-4)
$ C
^ ^ (Z clears)
[CARRY] [CARRY #1]
* <---------------+ H (out, 6)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - STICKS (4 YDS) - - - - - - - - -
M ===> Y (caught at 2)
(cutback)
O O O O O
📊 Diagram (described): This partial diagram shows only the field side of the play. Holloway and Simmons carry the vertical routes deep. Gaines runs straight up the field, and Simmons goes with him. Powers runs an out at about six yards, two yards past the sticks, which are drawn at four yards. Vo has sunk underneath the out and is sitting in its path. Harlan has run to the flat and catches the ball about two yards past the line of scrimmage. Bell, who walled Harlan at the snap, comes back to the flat from the inside and closes on him. Vo drives down from the out. Harlan's only path is toward the sideline, and the two defenders meet him before the sticks. The rest of the defense isn't shown.
Bell did what his new card line said. He came back to the flat from the inside, and Harlan had no cutback. Vo arrived from above, and Harlan went down after three yards. It was 4th-and-1 at the Austin 36. Petrakis was aggressive, but this was outside the zone where he'd been going for it, and Austin punted.
Analysis
Why the panel worked. The panel didn't win because Robber is a better coverage than Lock. It won because the two coverages started from the same look and gave different answers to the same route, so Austin's tendency became a liability. In Week 6 the dig had beaten a defender's second job. In Week 15, the first time Austin threw it, it ran into a defender's first job. And once Robber had taken the dig away, Lock was a surprise again by the fourth quarter.
Why the sticks rule mattered more than the call. Look at snap 3. Vance completed the pass. On most of last season's third-and-mediums, a completion caught short of the sticks became a conversion (11 of 20). This one didn't, because two defenders had a plan for the moment after the catch. Bell's card line came from the "Whose fault?" film of Week 6, and it turned a two-yard completion into a fourth down. The scheme decided where the ball went, and the rally decided whether the drive went on.
Why giving up snap 2 was acceptable. Every coverage concedes something. Robber concedes the man-to-man matchup that the robber isn't helping. The staff chose that cost on Wednesday. They named the counter, practiced it on Thursday, and accepted it on Sunday. A 19-yard seam to a tight end is a real cost, and Russ doesn't pretend otherwise. But the alternative was to keep playing a coverage that Austin's best receiver had beaten on its best route. A defense that never gives up anything is not on offer. The choice you actually get is which thing you give up, and you want it to be what the offense likes least.
What the data could and couldn't say. The 14-of-22 tendency was a small sample. Owen's margin note said as much, and the film made it believable. Three Sunday snaps prove nothing statistically. What the staff could fairly claim was narrower: the plan matched the tendency, the players carried out the rules they had practiced, and the one conversion came on the counter they had predicted.
Discussion questions
- Sorensen played Petrakis in the staff room. What did his "I'm running the dig until you prove you can stop it" tell the staff about how an offensive coordinator uses a tendency, and why didn't Russ answer with a pressure?
- Robber and Quarters Lock start from the same two-high look. List two specific things a quarterback might still read after the snap to tell them apart, and say how quickly he could read each.
- Bell's new card line was "#3 to the flat — you're the cutback." Why does that rule belong on the Mike's card and not on Vo's?
- Snap 3 ended at 4th-and-1 on the Austin 36, and Austin punted. If the same snap had ended at 4th-and-1 on the Sentinels' 45, would the third-down call have been as good? Explain using four-down territory.
- Russ called snap 2 "the right price." Make the case against him: what could the Sentinels have done on 3rd-and-6 to keep Robber's dig coverage without leaving Bell alone on Harlan?
Your turn
Pick a team you can watch on film, or use the Outlaws data above. Build one third-and-medium box from the chapter's Project Checkpoint for that team's most common third-and-medium formation. It needs:
- the opponent's top tendency in that box, as a count with a sample size;
- a base call and a changeup that start from the same pre-snap look;
- what each call concedes, measured against a 5-yard distance;
- one card line for the underneath defender who has to finish the play when the ball is caught short of the sticks.
Then write the counter you expect the offensive coordinator to use once he has seen your changeup, and the price you are willing to pay for it.