Case Study 39.1 — The Other Side of the Page: Petrakis Reads Our Game Plan
Every name, game, and number in this case is fictional. The conversation is reconstructed by Russ; Lyle Petrakis's lines are paraphrased as Russ remembers them.
Setup
A game plan is a bet about what the other staff knows. You never see their side of the bet. Once, I did.
At the league meetings the spring after our season (the same meetings where Lyle Petrakis and I had talked about his "both" calls and his zero bin), he found me at breakfast on the second morning and slid a folded sheet of paper across the table. It was a copy of one page from his quality-control staff's report for the divisional playoff, the third time his Austin Outlaws played my Sacramento Sentinels that season. His staff titled the page "Kimbrough by situation."
"I figure you've earned a look," he said. "You'll notice we were right about almost everything."
Here's what the page said, as close as I can reproduce it.
| Austin QC report: Sentinels by situation (divisional week) | Their finding |
|---|---|
| 1st-and-10 vs. 11 personnel | Home look most snaps; rotates a safety from it "about half the time"; no pattern by previous-play result |
| 12 personnel | Big nickel every time; two-high look; rotation "unpredictable" |
| 3rd-and-1–3 | Man coverage from two-high (Spin 1), field corner pressed; zero only on 1–2 |
| 3rd-and-4–6 vs. 3x1 | Lock "on most"; Robber "sometimes, same look" |
| 3rd-and-7+ vs. 2x2 | Two-high look: stayed two-high, every snap since their bye |
| Mug look on third down | "Was always pressure through Week 6. Not since. Can't call it." |
| Pressure rate on 3rd-and-7+ | "Low and flat. No quarter or score pattern since Week 6." |
| Tells | "None found on safety depth or width since Week 10." |
Owen read it twice and said, "That's a good report." It was. It was also the report we'd built for them.
The relevant pieces of our plan (Chapter 39, 39.6) were: Home with automatic Lock and Robber as the self-scout counter in the medium box; the mug look with three outcomes on the second line of the long box; Nickel Over Six starred in the long box; a mix line capping pressure on third-and-7-plus at one call in five; and a HOLD line, written in Week 15, that said "Spin 3 from 13-yard two-high, cash once, Q4 only." Tess had counted 29 straight two-high looks on third-and-7-plus since the bye that stayed two-high.
What happens
Petrakis's plan, in his words
"We had three rules for Darius on third down," Lyle told me. "One: against two-high on third-and-long, the post is there if the middle opens. Your two-high had been honest all year. If the safeties stayed on the hashes, the post-dig was our best throw in the book, and our report told him your safeties always stayed. Two: against the mug, the back stays in and the center goes to the Mike. Six-man protection, our rule since your Week 15 sack. Three: against Lock, we look backside to Sutton first, because your corner is alone over there."
"You had the right rules," I said.
"We had your rules," he said. "That's what bothers me."
He was right about the mug. He didn't tell me how many mug looks his staff charted in the playoff, and I didn't ask, but he said the six-man protection "felt like blocking a ghost." His center kept sliding to Bell, and Bell kept leaving. "We protected for five every time and you never told us whether we'd been right."
The snaps he brought up
He walked through three Game 3 snaps, and every one matches what we know from our own film.
First quarter, 3rd-and-3 at our 38. Austin in 2x2. Their report said Spin 1 with the field corner pressed on short yardage, and that's what we called. "We expected it," Lyle said. "We had the slant to Trey against press. Your corner beat him to the spot, and your edge beat our tackle." Simmons won the slant; Rollins got the sack, 7 yards; Austin punted.
Third quarter, 3rd-and-2 at our 29. This one he was proud of, and he should have been. He used zoom motion to bring Gaines toward the ball before the snap, which flipped Simmons's leverage; the quick out went for 5 and a first down. The drive ended in an Outlaws field goal. (That snap is why we added a zoom-motion rule for our corners after the season.)
Fourth quarter, 3rd-and-9 at their own 38, 2:41 left, we led 20–17. Austin in 11 personnel, 2x2: Sutton wide left with Harlan attached beside him, Powers in the right slot, Gaines wide right, Ruffin offset. Our look: two-high, both safeties at 13 yards on the hashes.
PRE-SNAP (Game 3, 3rd-and-9: the look Austin's report expected)
$ F
C W M * C
E T N E
X Y O O O O O H Z
Q R
📊 Diagram (described): Austin is in 11 personnel, 2x2: Sutton (X) wide left with Harlan (Y) attached on the left of the line, Powers (H) in the right slot, Gaines (Z) wide right, Vance (Q) in the shotgun with Ruffin (R) offset to his right. The Sentinels are in nickel with a four-man rush: Weller outside Harlan, Coleman inside him, Tuipulotu on the center, and Rollins on the right edge. Ames (W) and Bell (M) are the linebackers, Vo (*) is over Powers, and Brennan and Simmons are the corners. Holloway ($) on the tight-end side and Royce (F) on the other side are both at 13 yards on the hashes: a two-high look. Eleven defenders, eleven offensive players.
"Our report said two-high on third-and-long stays two-high," Lyle said. "So Darius looked for the middle. He wasn't hunting a first down. He was hunting the play that put our kicker in range with time to spare. He had the post-dig, Trey on the post. The middle was supposed to be open."
POST-SNAP (what Vance expected: two deep halves, middle open)
[DEEP HALF] $ F [DEEP HALF]
Z <-- post into
the open middle
H <-- dig at 12
C [FLAT] W [HOOK] M [HOOK] * [CURL] C
E T N E
vv vv vv vv
X Y O O O O O
Q R
📊 Diagram (described): The picture Vance expected after the snap, not the one he got. Holloway and Royce each stay on a deep half, leaving the deep middle between them open. Gaines runs a post into that open middle, and Powers runs a dig at about 12 yards underneath it. The corners squat in the flats, Ames and Bell drop to the hooks, Vo drops to the curl, and four linemen rush. Sutton and Harlan are at their starting spots; Ruffin stays in. Eleven defenders, eleven offensive players.
It wasn't open. At the snap Holloway rotated down to the curl/flat and Royce spun to the deep middle: Spin 3, single-high Cover 3. Vance threw the post where the hole was supposed to be, and Royce was standing in it. Interception at our 40. Our offense ran out the clock. (Chapter 6 tells the snap from our side.)
"Twenty-nine for twenty-nine," Lyle said. "My guys had it right. You'd never once spun out of that look on a long third down after your bye. I told Darius it was the one look he could trust."
"That's why it was there," I said.
Analysis
The report was accurate, and that was the problem. Austin's quality-control staff did its job. Every line on that page was true, and most of them were true because we wanted them to be. The two-high look on long third downs stayed two-high because the HOLD line kept Spin 3 off the field for six weeks. The pressure rate on third-and-7-plus was "low and flat" because the mix line and Owen's pressure slots made it that way. The "no tells since Week 10" line came from Chapter 30's twins rule and Tess's width checks. A self-scout doesn't hide your tendencies. It chooses them, and the opponent's report then becomes a copy of your choices.
One true finding did us real damage. "Lock on most" was also true, and Petrakis built his medium-box answer on it: the backside throw to Sutton. That's why Robber was in the box and Six Weak was on the pre-loaded halftime menu. You can't build a tendency you want without also leaving tendencies you'd rather not have. The question is whether each one has an answer waiting behind it.
The mug finding is the look-to-outcome table working. "Can't call it" is the best line a defensive coordinator can read on the other team's report. Petrakis did the right thing, protecting for the worst case, and the right thing cost him a receiver on every long third down when he saw the mug, while the defense told him nothing about whether he'd guessed right.
Petrakis also won snaps. The zoom-motion quick out on 3rd-and-2 was a counter to a rule of ours he'd identified on film. A game plan isn't a guarantee. Austin scored 17 points against this one. It's a way of choosing which fights you take and which you concede, and of making sure the fights you take are ones you've already rehearsed.
The deepest lesson is about time. The interception was decided by a line written six weeks earlier and protected every week since. The Week 6 touchdown was decided by a call made in about ten seconds against the written plan. Same quarterback, same situation type, same coordinator. The difference was where the decision was made.
Discussion questions
- Petrakis says his staff "had your rules." In your own words, what's the difference between scouting a defense's tendencies and scouting the tendencies it chose to show you? How could an offensive staff tell the difference?
- "Lock on most" was a true finding that Austin used against the Sentinels. What does that say about the limits of self-scouting? Could the Sentinels have hidden it too, and at what cost?
- Petrakis protected for five on every mug look and called it "blocking a ghost." Was his protection rule wrong? What would you have done in his chair?
- The chapter calls the HOLD line "a tendency you are building on purpose." What did it cost the Sentinels to carry it for six weeks, and how would you decide whether a HOLD is worth that cost against a different opponent?
- Compare the decision process behind the Week 6 Cover 0 call and the Game 3 Spin 3 call. Which parts of the game-plan structure (call sheet, NO line, HOLD line, Card veto, mix line) were involved in each?
Your turn
Write the "by situation" page an opponent's quality-control staff would write about your defense (or, if you're a film-room reader, about an NFL defense you've charted for at least three games). Use the eight rows in the table above. Then mark each finding with one of three labels from Chapter 25: Break (a tendency you must change this week), Bait (a tendency you'll keep on purpose and attack), or Accept (a tendency you'll live with because changing it costs too much). For every "Bait" line, write the HOLD call that cashes it and the situation where you'd use it.