Case Study 12.1 — The Sutton Plan: Six on the First Series of Game 2
All teams, players, and statistics in this case study are fictional composites.
Setup
The game: Week 15, Austin Outlaws at Sacramento. In Week 6, at Austin, the Outlaws won 34–27. This is the rematch — the game that later became known on our staff as the halftime-adjustment game. This case study covers only the first defensive series.
The problem: In Game 1, Darius Vance threw at Devonte Sutton, the Outlaws' X receiver, eight times. On six of those throws, Cole Brennan, our second-year boundary corner, was alone on him — in Quarters with our Lock check against trips, or in Cover 1. Sutton caught five of the six for 86 yards, mostly fades and back-shoulder throws along the boundary sideline. Lyle Petrakis, the Outlaws' offensive coordinator, kept building formations that put his three best route-runners to the field against our quarters defenders and left Sutton alone into the boundary against Brennan.
What the scouting said: Owen Kessler's four-game sample (247 snaps) had the Outlaws in 11 personnel on 168 of them, with motion on 134. On third-and-4 to 6 from 3x1 trips they ran a dig or a flood to the trips side 14 times in 22. Vance against five or more rushers: 28 of 36, 9.4 yards per attempt, four touchdowns, no interceptions. Against four rushers with post-snap rotation: 31 of 52, 6.1 yards per attempt, one touchdown, three interceptions. The plan wrote itself in one respect — rush four, disguise, make him hold it — and not at all in another: where do you put the coverage help?
The meeting. Tuesday afternoon, the full defensive staff plus Mike Sorensen.
Tess: Sutton beat Cole five times out of six when Cole was alone. He's 2 of 7 against us in Cover 2 or with a safety over the top across the last two seasons. Small numbers, but they point one direction.
Gabe: Cole can play Cloud. He's better squatting and sinking than he is turning and running with a 6-foot-3 receiver on a fade.
Sorensen: Fine. Now I'm Petrakis. I see Cloud on Sutton and quarters to my trips. I hit the quick out to my slot all day — your apex can't wall inside and beat an out to the sideline.
Russ: On third-and-8 he can have the quick out for five. That's a punt.
Sorensen: Then I'll run my deep over from the trips side into your half safety's grass while he's busy with Sutton.
Tess: Then Malik carries it. Matched routes stay matched until somebody says "Mine."
Sorensen: And if I motion and flip the formation?
Russ: On a hash in plain Six, nothing changes. In the middle, or in Six Weak, Ike re-declares, Tre echoes. No echo, no check. Late motion, nobody moves.
Sorensen nodded and sat back. "Then make him throw it to my third choice."
The game plan's first-down and third-and-medium menus both carried Six. Royce's game-plan declaration for 2x2 in the middle of the field: Cloud on Sutton's side.
What happens
Snap 1 — First-and-10 at the Outlaws' 22, ball in the middle of the field
The Outlaws open in 11 personnel, 2x2, Harlan flexed as #2 to Sutton's side (the offense's left, the left of our diagram), Powers and Gaines to the right. Ball between the hashes, so Six is played by the formation — and in 2x2 with no attached tight end, by Royce's game-plan call. Royce points left: "Cloud!" Holloway points left and echoes. Brennan hears it from Holloway.
Vance takes a three-step drop and throws the quick hitch to Sutton at six yards — the throw that had punished our off-coverage corners all of Game 1. This time Brennan has rerouted Sutton at the line, read Harlan going vertical (not to the flat), and seen Sutton stop. He drives on the hitch from four yards away. Sutton catches it and Brennan tackles him for a gain of 2. The ball is spotted on the left hash.
Owen (on the headset from the booth, to Tess): That hitch was 6.8 a catch in their sample.
Tess: Two today.
Snap 2 — Second-and-8 at the Outlaws' 24, ball on the left hash
Trips to the field: Gaines, Powers, and Harlan attached to the right tackle. Sutton alone in the boundary. Plain Six — the hash makes the call, so there is nothing to say. Brennan and Simmons both align at seven yards; Royce and Holloway at thirteen.
Vance's eyes go straight to Sutton at the snap. Sutton runs a fade. Brennan reroutes him, sees nothing threaten the flat — no #2 on his side, and Ruffin is in protection — and sinks under the fade. Royce is on top. Vance pump-fakes the back-shoulder throw, sees Royce's hips turned toward the sideline and Brennan underneath, and resets. The rush has had three seconds. Rashad Coleman beats the right guard inside, and Vance throws the back-shoulder anyway, late and outside. Royce gets a hand on it. Incomplete.
Snap 3 — Third-and-8 at the Outlaws' 24, ball on the left hash
The Outlaws line up in trips into the boundary: Sutton wide left, Powers in the left slot, Harlan flexed inside him. Gaines is alone to the field. Russ has called Six Weak — Cloud to the side with fewer receivers, which here is Gaines in the field, and quarters to the trips side in the boundary. Royce has declared it ("Cloud!" pointing right) and Holloway has echoed.
With nine seconds on the play clock, Powers motions across the formation, behind the line, and settles in the right slot inside Gaines. Now it's 2x2 with Harlan flexed. Under Six Weak in 2x2 with no attached tight end, the Cloud goes to the boundary. Nine seconds is outside our late-motion window, so the re-declare is live. Royce points left: "Cloud!" Holloway points left and echoes. On the re-declare the safeties swap jobs: Royce becomes the half safety over Sutton, Holloway the quarters safety reading Powers.
SNAP 3, PRE-SNAP (after motion): SIX WEAK RE-DECLARED vs. 2x2
F $
C W M * C
X Y E N T E H Z
O O O O O
H ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~>
Q
R
📊 Diagram (described): The ball is on the left hash. The picture shows the formation after the motion: Sutton (X) wide on the boundary side with Harlan (Y) flexed inside him, Powers (H) now in the right slot after running across the formation behind the line — his motion path is shown by the wavy arrow below the offensive line — and Gaines (Z) wide to the field. The Sentinels are in their nickel two-high shell: Brennan and Simmons about seven yards off, Ames walked out on the boundary side, Bell inside, Vo now apexed over Powers on the field side, and the two safeties about thirteen yards deep. Royce has re-declared the Cloud side to the boundary, and Holloway has echoed.
At the snap, Sutton runs a go, Harlan runs to the flat, Powers runs a quick out at five yards, and Gaines runs a deep over at eighteen yards from the field into the boundary.
SNAP 3, POST-SNAP: CLOUD BOUNDARY, QUARTERS FIELD
[HALF: ON X GO] [TOP #1: Z OVER] [CARRY Z]
F $ C
^ ^ ^
[FLAT: Y] [CURL/HOOK] [HOOK] [WALL #2 -> OUT]
C W M * -->
E N T E <== four-man rush
📊 Diagram (described): After the snap, the boundary is the Cloud half: Royce stays on top of Sutton's go in a deep half, Brennan comes up to take Harlan in the flat, and Ames takes the curl-to-hook. The field is the quarters half: because Powers broke out, Holloway comes off him and gets on top of Gaines's deep over, and Simmons, who matched Gaines from the start, carries him across the field underneath Holloway. Bell is in the middle hook, and Vo walls Powers and then widens toward his quick out. Four linemen rush.
Vance looks left first — Sutton on the go, the throw that had beaten us all of Game 1. Royce is on top of it. He comes to Gaines on the over and finds Simmons trailing him by a yard with Holloway over the top: the over is bracketed. Royce never says "Mine" — he's on Sutton's go and isn't free — so Simmons never lets go. Vance's third read is the quick out to Powers. Vo, who walled Powers inside at the snap, is a step late getting outside, exactly as Sorensen predicted. Powers catches it at the 29 and Vo tackles him there. Gain of 5. Fourth-and-3. The Outlaws punt.
Three plays, seven yards.
Analysis
Why it worked. Every one of the three snaps took Vance's first read away and gave him his third. Snap 1: Brennan's Cloud technique turned the hitch Vance had been completing for nearly seven yards a catch into a two-yard gain, because a flat player was already sitting there. Snap 2: the Cloud doubled Sutton's fade — Brennan sinking underneath, Royce over the top — and the four-man rush had time to arrive. Snap 3: the motion was designed to make us either bust or stay in a split that favored Austin. We re-declared cleanly, the safeties swapped jobs, and the deep over — the concept Sorensen had predicted would attack the seam between the halves — ran into the carry rule and a bracket.
What it cost. The quick out on Snap 3 was open, just as Sorensen said it would be: quarters' apex player has to wall inside first, and a quick out to the sideline can beat him. We accepted that throw because on third-and-8 it wasn't enough. On second-and-4, it would have been a first down — which is why the second-and-short menu that week leaned on Six Strong and Cover 2 instead, putting a squatting corner on the quick-out side.
Why the communication held. The Week 6 bust happened because one safety didn't hear a check. On Snap 3, the re-declare had three protections: it happened with nine seconds on the play clock, outside the late-motion window; it required Holloway's echo before anyone changed; and its default (had the echo failed) was a sound split, so a missed word would have cost us an ideal call, not a coverage. The system — not the players' effort — was what changed since Week 6.
What the offense learned. Petrakis learned within three snaps that we were mixing a field rule and a formation rule. His later adjustments in that game — which are the subject of Chapter 37 — started with that fact.
Discussion questions
- On Snap 1, why did Royce's game-plan declaration (Cloud on Sutton's side) matter more than the hash? What would plain Six have done with the ball in the middle?
- On Snap 3, the safeties swapped jobs on the re-declare. What extra risk does that create compared with a re-declare where each safety keeps his job? How would you practice it?
- Sorensen predicted the quick out to the quarters side. Was accepting it the right call on third-and-8? On second-and-4? On third-and-4?
- If Petrakis had motioned Powers with three seconds on the play clock instead of nine, what would have happened to the split, and would the defense still have been sound?
- The case study credits the system, not the players' effort, for the communication. Do you agree? What does the player still have to do that no system can do for him?
Your turn
Using the Outlaws' tendency data in this case study, write the Six portion of a first-down menu for the rematch: two calls (for example, Six and Six Weak), the formation that triggers each, Royce's game-plan declaration for the ball in the middle, and one sentence for Brennan on what his first thought is at the snap. Keep it to half a page — something you could hand a player on Friday.