Appendix J — Answers to Selected Exercises
How to use this appendix. For every chapter you'll find worked answers to two Part A items, two Part B items, one Part D item, and one Part M item, plus notes on Part C. Most Part C items already carry a short answer in a collapsible block in the chapter's exercises file; here those get a brief extension (the next question a coordinator would ask) or the reasoning standard a grader should hold you to, so don't treat this page as a second copy of the short answers. Item numbers match the exercises files exactly (A3, C2, M1). Part D and some Part C and M items are judgment calls with no single right answer. For those you get a model answer and a list headed What a strong answer includes, and that list, not the specific call, is the grading standard. Write your own answer before you read ours. An answer you only recognize is not an answer you can produce on a Tuesday night with the game plan due. The Austin Outlaws, Sacramento Sentinels, and the other league teams and players are fictional.
Chapter 1 — Offensive Philosophy
Exercises: Chapter 1
A1. The offense knows where the ball is going and the defense doesn't. Eleven players start the snap with the answer key, and eleven start it with a guess. The three multipliers from section 1.1 are these:
- Conflict: make one defender responsible for two things, then attack whichever one he gives up.
- Sequence: every play makes another play better, so you call the next play's reason to work.
- Illusion: plays look identical until it's too late to tell them apart.
The fourth thing is not a multiplier: eleven people executing on the same count.
A10. The zero bin is the three or four wristband plays Teo builds each week to be called only against Cover 0: two quick hot throws, then the max-protect deep over. The deep over sat third because Austin didn't expect Russ to call zero in that spot. The Week 6 report showed Cover 0 on 1 of 26 Sentinels third-and-7+ snaps. The hot throws are the cheap answer when zero is likely. The deep over spends extra protectors, so it is the answer you keep for the rare call. Russ called zero at 4:12 anyway, and the third play on the list won the game, 34–27.
B2. Snaps 1 and 2 rely on sequence: they teach Holloway that the ball is coming downhill. Snap 3 relies on illusion: the play-action copies inside zone's first steps, and Holloway is the conflict defender who has run fit and deep quarter in the same half-second. Snap 4 is sequence again, punishing his correction. Holloway hesitates ("one step then stop"), which tells you he no longer trusts what he sees. A safety who hesitates is late to both of his jobs, so the alley opens and Ruffin scores from the 4 (27–27).
B4. (a) The pre-snap shell was two-high (MOFO) and the post-snap coverage was single-high Cover 3 (MOFC), a rotation. (b) The post is aimed at the seam between two safeties. When one safety spins to the deep middle, the post runs straight into him. (c) Game 3, 3rd-and-9 at the Austin 38, 2:41 left, down 20–17. Austin called Mills, Vance threw the post at about 2.4 seconds, and Royce intercepted at the Sacramento 40.
Part C (short answers in the chapter). Grade every C item on whether you can state the reason in one sentence Vance could repeat.
- C2 extension: this snap needs the safety's alley fill to be repeated, and that repetition is the later "two receipts" rule.
- C4: the standard is separating the decision from the outcome. Wade kicked here, and Lyle would have gone.
- C6: a strong answer names a specific box on the sheet for each change ("second-and-medium"), not a general wish.
- C7: you have to name why the bounce is open: the squeezing end and the far safety.
D3. Model answer. For calling it: 29 straight snaps is real evidence, the play destroys the coverage, and the biggest third down is exactly when you cash your best read. Against it: Russ knew Teo was counting, and a streak that long may be bait that the defense is choosing to spend. A post-snap check costs little if the tendency holds and saves the game if it breaks. The middle-read tag removes the dilemma. You keep the pre-snap call, and the quarterback confirms the middle after the snap. Open means throw the post. Closed means never the post: throw the dig, then the flat or the back.
What a strong answer includes: both columns argued honestly; the idea that a tendency is evidence with a shelf life ("Never let a tendency outlive its evidence"); the point that the fix lives in the call, not in the quarterback's courage; and recognition that the tag is cheap when the tendency holds.
M1. The failure started at the call-sheet/game-plan level. A "3rd LONG vs. 2x2" box held Mills with no branch, so a tendency was treated as a certainty. Its root sits one rung higher, in the system, which had no built-in way to check the middle after the snap. The middle-read tag is applied at the system level: it is printed on every Blue-panel third-and-7+ call with a deep-middle throw. That is the lowest level that can solve the problem. A call-sheet fix would protect only one week, and because the hole was in how every third-and-long call is built, the fix has to live where calls are built.
Chapter 2 — The Evolution of Offense
Exercises: Chapter 2
A1. Section 2.1 asks three questions of every era:
- What was the defensive problem?
- What was the offensive answer, and which multiplier did it use?
- How did the defense counter?
Applied to the T with man-in-motion:
- By the late 1930s, defenses had caught up to power football. They overshifted to the single wing's visible strength and stacked the gaps.
- Shaughnessy's T put the quarterback under center, with quick hand-offs and counters that hit before the defense could react. The man in motion forced the defense to answer in public, which uses illusion and the motion's information.
- Defenses took men off the line to play linebacker, moving toward four- and five-man fronts and the 4-3. They also learned to rotate the secondary to the motion instead of chasing it with one man.
A8. As a base offense, the read option asked the quarterback to be a runner on every snap. Defenses learned the scrape exchange and assignment football, and they hit the quarterback on every keep. Griffin's playoff knee injury became the cautionary story. As a tag, it keeps the arithmetic (the quarterback as the plus-one, a read instead of a block) while the coordinator controls how often the quarterback is exposed. That is why section 2.11 says it became "part of an offense rather than its foundation."
B2. This is the West Coast curl-flat, the hi-lo of a single underneath defender. The conflict defender is the strong safety standing between the curl and the flat. If he widens to the back in the flat, throw the curl at 12. If he hangs under the curl, throw the flat and let the back run after the catch, which is "the short pass as a run."
B3. This is the counter trey, Joe Gibbs's Washington teams. The left guard and left tackle pull from the back side, and the H-back stands just off the line. The illusion is the back's first step left plus the front side blocking left: the linebackers read flow one way, and the ball comes back behind two pullers. The same idea lives in Austin's Counter (Chapter 11), which always goes away from Harlan.
Part C.
- C3 (full answer). Use the Chapter 1 / section 2.11 Inside Slant picture: 11 personnel, Gun Doubles Right, Harlan attached right, Ruffin offset left. The read defender is Ames, the Will, shown as
(W). Vance's two answers are the hand-off on inside zone right (Ames sits) and the slant to Powers into the window Ames vacates (Ames triggers). Possible labels: - shotgun/spread for the backfield
- 11 personnel 2x2, the modern spread
- zone blocking and the back reading the first defender past the center, from Lombardi's "run to daylight" and the Shanahan/Alex Gibbs zone tree
- read a defender instead of blocking him, from the option tradition
- the slant on rhythm, from West Coast timing
- the run-pass attachment itself, from the RPO era and the 2017 Eagles
- C5 (full answer). A fast quarterback, a 210-pound line, and an eight-man 4-4 front call for the option tradition and the spread. Option: a veer or zone read that leaves the play-side end unblocked and reads him. "If he can tackle the back, he can't tackle you" makes the quarterback the plus-one against eight. Spread: widen the formation so the 4-4's outside linebackers must declare (cover the slot or stay in the box), then throw the quick game to whichever one leaves. The section 2.9 Ohio veer story is the model: a 165-pound quarterback beat the league's best defense by reading the end the line couldn't block. Hold yourself to a carry budget (player safety).
- C2 / C7 standard: your call has to name the defensive behavior it beats. "Man-press" leads to crossers or option routes, and "simulated pressure" leads to a route behind the droppers.
D1. Model answer. Motion asks the defense a question and waits for the answer. Tempo denies the defense time to ask itself anything. Every second spent watching a defender travel with the Z is a second tempo doesn't have, so a team can't fully do both on one snap. Lyle still goes fast after a big play, when the defense is tired and its substitutions are jammed. The K-Gun rule applies: if the offense doesn't substitute, the defense gets no time to match. What he gives up is the information and the full call. The defense lines up in a simpler look, but so does he.
What a strong answer includes: the mechanism (question vs. denial), the K-Gun substitution rule, a specific trigger (a big play, a tired or mismatched defense), and an honest cost (no motion read, a smaller menu).
M5. The sequence borrows most from Lombardi (the same run until the defender's reaction tells you where the play is, with a small, deep menu) and Shanahan / Alex Gibbs (play-action that copies the run exactly). The West Coast idea of "every play is a question" connects them.
- Snap 1, inside zone: sequence, teaching Holloway to fill.
- Snap 2, inside zone: sequence, confirming the fill and earning the second receipt.
- Snap 3, Inside PA post: illusion, cashing Holloway's conflict between alley and deep quarter.
- Snap 4, inside zone: sequence plus conflict, punishing his hesitation.
Chapter 3 — Formations
Exercises: Chapter 3
A2. At least seven players must be on the line at the snap (section 3.2). Of those, only the two on the ends are eligible. Everyone between them is an interior lineman, and every back is eligible. The quarterback's own eligibility depends on alignment and code, so check the rule.
A4. In 11 personnel, Gun Trips Right puts Gaines (#1), Powers (#2), and Harlan (#3, detached) on the right, with Sutton alone on the left. #3 to the right is Harlan. #1 to the left is Sutton. Renumbering is the point: if a Quarters safety is told "read #2," moving Powers changes whom he reads.
B3. The defense is using a passing-strength rule: its 3-technique and linebackers set to the three receivers. The strong safety walking down outside Sutton confirms it. Harlan's side, the right, is declared light. The section 3.4 table spells out the attack: put your extra receivers away from your tight end, then run (or throw to Harlan) into the side the defense just emptied.
B8. The formation is Under Load Right, with Brandt the end of the line on the left and Achterberg covered up on the right. Blockers: seven (five linemen plus Brandt and Harlan). Box: eight. The total says the run is short. The defense has aligned two linemen to each side of the center as if the line were balanced, so it is a gap short on the heavy side. Count by side: the run to the overload is favorable. This is the Week 12 picture: "Twelve, Under Load Right, Wide," Ruffin +9.
Part C (short answers in the chapter).
- C1: the standard is naming the defense's rule (front to the field), not just the hash.
- C3 extension: the next question is the counter-adjustment. Once St. Louis learns to count, C7's boot to Brandt (+14 in Q3) is the follow-up, so draw both and say which one you'd call first.
- C4: the answer must name the tell. In the four-game chart, all 9 scissors came from a reduced split.
- C6: cite in-out switching as the specific behavior that kills a bunch flat.
D3. Model answer. Lean no on going empty here. Empty means five blockers. A left tackle who has allowed three pressures in two games is the weakest of those five, and your best pass protector, the back, has just been taken off the field. Against six rushers someone is free, and Vance becomes part of the protection with a hot throw. What you gain is information: empty makes the defense declare its coverage. On third-and-7, you can get much of that by keeping the back in and chipping, or by motioning him out late (Peel) only when the front shows four. If the defense has shown four-man rushes and soft coverage on third-and-long all day, empty is defensible. You must have a built-in hot and a quick concept that breaks at the sticks.
What a strong answer includes: the rushers-vs.-blockers arithmetic (five vs. a possible six); the specific weak link (the left tackle) and the specific asset you'd lose (the back); what empty buys (a declared coverage); a condition that flips the answer; and a hot plan if you do go empty.
M1.
- "Motion for information": Doubles, the "balance as a question" formation. A motion out of it shows whether a defender travels.
- "The run for credibility": Load or Trey. Each adds a gap or puts the tight end at #3, forcing a strength call and creating an extra run gap (effects 1 and 5 in section 3.8).
- "The pass for the kill": Trips or Nub. Each isolates a receiver (effect 4), such as Sutton on the backside corner when the safety rotates to trips.
Note that each formation must still carry more than one play. That is section 3.9's warning that your formation is a tell.
Chapter 4 — Personnel Groupings
Exercises: Chapter 4
A2. Personnel is named by job, not by roster label. In Heavy, Fale lines up as a third tight end, so the group is 13. The ambiguity helps because the defense's personnel caller gets two or three seconds to decide what Fale is. If he reads "fullback," he may bring a run-only group. If he reads "tight end," he must cover one more receiver. Either way, the offense has made the defense guess before the snap. That is the substitution game of section 4.3.
A8. Sixty-three percent is a lean the defense can live with: 37 percent is enough to keep it honest. The zero is different. Twelve had zero RPOs and only six dropbacks, and 42 of 49 Twelve snaps started with a handoff or a fake. That told a defensive staff exactly what group to build: something sized for the run that can still cover Harlan, which is big nickel. Marisol's rule: "kill the zeros." For every personnel group used more than a handful of times, every major play family (run, RPO, play-action, dropback, screen) must appear at least a few times in any four-game window. They don't need to appear equally, just not never.
B3. Number 84 coming on for the slot makes the offense 12 personnel (Brandt plus Harlan). The defense goes from nickel to big nickel: a third safety replaces the corner-type nickel, and a safety walks down over the flexed tight end. The offense wanted a linebacker (base) or a small slot corner (nickel) on its tight end. Now a safety built to tackle and cover is on Harlan. In Sacramento's version, Holloway moved to Star, Pruitt played deep, and Vo went to the sideline.
B8.
- (a) Big nickel. The
*is a safety-type player in the nickel spot. - (b) The box is four linemen, two linebackers, and the
*outside the right tight end, which makes seven. Blockers are five linemen plus two tight ends, also seven. The count is even. - (c) A regular nickel is a slot corner who loses the alley fit to a 255-pound tight end. This defender is the defense's best run-fitting defensive back, a "real seventh run defender," and he can still run with Harlan. That is why the Week 15 Twelve runs averaged 3.6 a carry.
- (d) Make him choose. Duo with Harlan popping behind him (Duo Pop) or an inside run with a glance tag: if he fits the run, the throw is behind him, and if he stays on Harlan, the box is light.
Part C (short answers in the chapter). The standard throughout is section 4.6's lesson: match their intentions, not their bodies.
- C3 extension: if you stay in Twelve, your call must change the why (an RPO or Pop off Holloway). If you leave, name the group you're going to and the defensive answer you expect.
- C6: you must predict St. Louis's personnel before choosing your play.
D1. Model answer.
Gus: Twelve ran 7.4 a carry against nickel in Week 6, and running the ball is what that group is for, so don't trade efficiency for a pretty chart.
Marisol: in Week 6, Twelve beat both of Sacramento's answers (base got thrown on, nickel got run over). Because of the zeros, Russ could build a third answer. In Week 15 big nickel held Twelve runs to 3.6 a carry, and the 12-play drive was points earned in spite of the personnel.
Recommendation: keep Twelve's run identity, but kill the zeros. Install a Twelve RPO and a real dropback from Twelve, and use them often enough to be charted. The goal isn't a 50–50 split. It's that no defensive group can be built around something you never do.
What a strong answer includes: both Week 6 tables (7.4 vs. 2.7 by defensive group) and the Week 15 result; the distinction between a lean and a zero; a specific play or family to add; and the recognition that "a tendency with good branding" isn't a philosophy.
M5.
- (a) Twelve, Pistol Ace asks: "Base or big nickel, and how many in the box?" It hopes for nickel so it can run.
- (b) Twelve, Gun Doubles with Harlan flexed asks: "Who covers the tight end?" A linebacker means throw (Y Option). A defensive back means Zip him in and run. That is the Week 6 "napkin rule" Kill call: count the man over Harlan.
- (c) Eleven, Peel to empty asks: "Does anyone run with the back?" Someone running means man, so attack the linebacker in space (Ruffin +11 vs. Birmingham). Nobody running means zone, so throw where the back's defender should have been.
Chapter 5 — The Offensive Line
Exercises: Chapter 5
A2. A lineman is covered when a defensive lineman is aligned on him or in his play-side gap. He is uncovered when nobody is there and the nearest defender in his area is a linebacker off the ball (section 5.3). The definition uses the play-side gap because zone blocks an area moving in the play's direction. A shade into your play-side gap will be in your path on the first step, so he is yours even though he isn't nose-to-nose with you. A shade on your backside shoulder belongs to the man behind you.
A10. An air block is a blocker who sets, punches, and then has nobody. The Game 2 sack had two. Ruffin moved to the edge for Weller, who dropped to the boundary curl/flat. Lorusso took Coleman, who stepped in and then dropped into the field hot window. Six blockers became four on rushers, Bell came free through the A-gap, and the hot window was occupied. In the whiteboard version: "6 blockers + 1 ball = 7. Russ made it 4 + 0."
B3. This is counter (GT counter) to the right: the guard kicks out the end man on the line and the tackle wraps up through the hole, while the back's jab step left sells the false flow. In Austin's language that's Counter Right, with Moss kicking and Achterberg wrapping, the version drawn and repped most. Counter always goes away from Harlan.
B7. The error is the overset: kicking too deep and wide after repeated speed rushes. The counter is the inside spin. Teo's charting over five games showed 21 Achterberg oversets in 151 protection snaps, and 16 of the 21 came after he had already seen two or more speed rushes in the same series. That is how Rollins got inside on the Game 1 third-and-11, where Vance escaped through the door.
Part C (short answers in the chapter).
- C1 standard: check each lineman's own spot and play-side gap, not the man in front of him.
- C3: grade on counting rushers, counting blockers, and naming the hot. "70" is the weakest choice for a reason you should be able to state.
- C6 extension: C6 is the Game 3 rule. Add the receiver half (Gaines's sight-adjust hitch) and the hot location, since after Week 15 the rule became "two hots, two sides."
D5. Model answer. Stop sliding to the crowd against the mug. Take the mugged linebackers directly: center on the Mike, back on the other A-gap backer. Leave the slide only for linemen down in a stance at the snap, and widen the right tackle to the field corner when he's within about seven yards. That is the Game 3 rule. A late walkout can no longer drag the back away from the rusher who matters. The new weakness: a walked-out end who actually rushes is now unblocked by design. Your answer is the ball, so the hot must sit on his side, outside the window a dropping 3-technique occupies.
What a strong answer includes: the specific flaw (a manufactured crowd moves the back); a rule that keys on threats, not bodies; the honestly named new weakness; and a hot plan tied to that weakness, so the protection is "an answer for one more rusher than it blocks."
M6. "Five on five" means the line had a blocker for every box defender who could make the play. On Anchor A, Harlan arc-released to the alley safety, and Weller was a 5-technique. When Ames sat in the slant window, he removed himself from the box. That left the four linemen and Bell for Austin's five linemen. Covered linemen blocked their men, and the uncovered linemen's combos had only one linebacker (Bell) to climb to. Ames, the backside A/B gap player, was handled by the read instead of a block. A read removes a defender without a blocker, so every combo knows exactly whom to climb to. Snap 1 (Ames triggered and gave up the +17 slant) is why Ames sat on snap 2, and his sitting handed the line a clean count. That is "every play is the reason the next one works."
Chapter 6 — The Skill Positions
Exercises: Chapter 6
A1. The four phases (section 6.2), with one way each can fail:
- Release: a lazy first step against press, or one release for every corner.
- Stem: drifting, or telegraphing the break with the eyes or hips.
- Break: a yard too deep or too shallow, or rounding a sink-and-drive cut.
- Finish: turning to run before the catch.
A10. The tie-breaker: in doubt, sit and face the quarterback. A receiver who is standing still is easier to find than one going the wrong way. Most option-route interceptions come from the receiver and quarterback disagreeing, and "sit" removes the disagreement.
B4. The alignment is a wing, one yard off and one yard outside the tackle. The section 6.7 table credits the wing with "wham and kick-out across the formation." Running flat down the line to block the far-side end is that across-the-formation block. Austin calls the split-zone version Slice (Chapter 9). It leaves the backside end for a blocker coming from an angle he isn't watching.
B5. The technique is the back's scan: inside-out, A gap, then B gap, then edge. The A-gap rusher is the fastest path to the quarterback. Finding nobody, he check-releases, waiting a count and then slipping out as the checkdown.
Part C.
- C3 (full answer). Use the Week 12 snap: "Twelve, Under Ace Right, Toss Right, Z Crack" against an eight-man box and Cover 3.
- Gaines (Z) starts wide and cracks the strong safety, the walked-down force player. He blocks in front and high, with his head out of the contact.
- The right tackle pulls to replace, kicking out the corner that Gaines left.
- Harlan reaches the end.
- Brandt is on the left wing, so Sutton and Harlan are the eligible ends.
- Ruffin aims outside the end, inside the right tackle's kick-out. The force defender is gone and the corner is sealed out. The play gained 14.
Safety standard: if Gaines can't see the safety's numbers, he doesn't throw the crack. He climbs to the next defender. - C5 (full answer). Use the Game 3 version: Gaines runs a 6-yard hitch, and Powers stems past 9 as if on a seam, then breaks out at 12. Vance pumps at the hitch. - Picture 1: Simmons's eyes jump to the pump, and he drives on #1. Read: "Corner bites on the hitch, throw the bender behind him." This is the +14. - Picture 2: the corner keeps his eyes on #2 and sinks. Read: "Corner stays on Powers, the hitch is open now."
In both pictures the safety must be shown carrying the vertical stem high. - C1, C2, C4, C6 standard: name the defender and his leverage before naming the route. For C6, add that Sutton's back-shoulder scored Game 3's first Austin touchdown vs. Cover 2 man.
D3. Model answer. Keep him on the field, but stop asking him to win the protection alone. A substitution on third down shouts "pass." It also tells the defense your best runner leaves on passing downs, which turns every snap he plays into a run tell. Instead, put him on the side of the line where the scan is simplest. Give him a chip-and-release instead of an A-gap stonewall. Make the slot the hot when two come from one side. Lean on quick-game and RPO calls where the ball beats the blitz. If the opponent has shown it will bring a specific A-gap pressure, then a one-snap substitution of a better protector is defensible, but disguise it by also using that player on runs.
What a strong answer includes: what each choice tells the defense (personnel as a tell); a protection or route adjustment that hides the weakness instead of exposing it; the hot plan; and acceptance that some risk remains either way.
M4. The 2 (slant) and its named variation Sluggo ("two-nine") make a good pair. In Game 2, Austin threw the quick game repeatedly: six quick-game completions on the first touchdown drive, including Gaines's slant +11 on 3rd-and-1. By the fourth quarter, Brennan had seen the slant enough to jump it. "Eleven, Gun Trips Right, 60 Right, Z Sluggo, H Seam, Y Drag" sold the slant for three steps, shoulders turned to Vance, then ran the go for 44 yards to the SAC 15. A Sluggo before the slant is real just gets carried. The earlier slants were the reason the kill worked.
Chapter 7 — Understanding Defensive Structure
Exercises: Chapter 7
A2. Count it. Eleven personnel puts five eligible receivers on the field: three receivers, a tight end, and a back. Two deep safeties plus seven in the box is nine defenders, which leaves two for the remaining receivers. The two corners take the outside receivers, so a slot or the tight end has no one assigned to him unless a box defender leaves the box. You can show two-high or seven in the box against 11 personnel, and paying for both leaves a receiver uncovered. That is why a two-high shell usually means a six-man box (section 7.3: "the run is 'right'").
A10. A tendency describes what the defense has done. A read is what the defense is doing on this snap, confirmed after it can no longer disguise. A tendency should shape the plan, but it should never replace the post-snap read. Twenty-nine identical snaps can be a pattern or bait.
B2. The defense has rotated from two-high to single-high Cover 3, the Game 3 picture: the left safety down to the curl, the right safety to the deep middle, the corners in deep thirds. (a) the post from the right is most dangerous. It runs straight to the spinning safety's landing spot, which is exactly how Royce intercepted Mills. The dig is thrown under a deep-middle player and breaks away from the rotated-down safety, which is reasonable. The left go route runs into a bailing corner, so it's low-percentage, but it isn't an interception magnet.
B5. The box is seven: four down linemen, two linebackers, and the strong safety at six yards over the right tackle. The nickel is over the slot, outside the box. The blockers are six (five linemen plus the tight end). The defense is plus-one, so on a plain inside-zone handoff one defender is unblocked and the run is "wrong." Read the extra man (zone read or RPO), or throw. A single-high shell with seven down usually means a receiver has no help.
Part C (short answers in the chapter). Every item here grades one habit: name the defender who tells you, then name what he told you.
- C3: the flaw has to be stated in terms of the back's two jobs ("the back was the guy who was supposed to be on the Mike").
- C6 extension: add the timing beats from section 7.8, eyes to the middle on step 1 and open/closed declared by step 3. Note that the throw doesn't come out later. The read happens later, "after the defense has finished lying."
D1. Model answer. The reporter has it backward. In the four-game sample, Vance was 28 of 36 for 9.4 yards per attempt, 4 TD, and 0 INT against five or more rushers. Against four-man rushes with post-snap rotation he was 31 of 52, 6.1 yards per attempt, 1 TD, and 3 INT. The numbers suggest he punishes the blitz and can be baited by disguise. Pressure isn't his problem. A coverage that changes after he has decided is. Caveats:
- 36 and 52 attempts are small samples.
- The splits are selected by the defense: teams blitz in certain situations, so down, distance, and opponent quality are tangled in.
- "Rotation" is charted by people and can be mislabeled.
What a strong answer includes: both splits with sample sizes; the correct reading (the weakness is disguise, not pressure); at least one caveat about selection (who chose to blitz, and when); and the implication for the offense, that a post-snap middle read is the fix, not more hot throws.
M3. The Mike point is the protection's reference: the linebacker the protection treats as the Mike, which tells every lineman and the back who belongs to whom. Vance or Szabo makes the call ("Fifty-four's the Mike!"). Against a double-A mug, both linebackers are in the A gaps, so the "Mike" is whichever one the count needs as the reference, not the green-dot jersey. The count starts from the box: who is in it, who is mugged, and where pressure can come from. Under the Game 3 rule, the center took the Mike (Bell), the back took the other A-gap backer (Ames), and the right tackle widened to the corner. Assume one of them drops. The ID is a structural decision, which is why "the center's point is a recommendation; the QB owns the final ID."
Chapter 8 — The Language of Play-Calling
Exercises: Chapter 8
A2. The order is Personnel → Formation → Motion/Shift → Protection → Play/Concept → Tags. The radio cuts off at 15 on the play clock whether or not you've finished. Missing any of the first five slots costs between a broken play and a dead one, but missing a tag costs only a wrinkle. The grammar "puts the most dispensable words last," so a cut-off eats the tags and the play survives.
A7. From most to least authority:
- Check: pick from a short weekly menu at the line, using code words.
- Kill: choose between two plays called in the huddle, switched with a spoken word ("Kill, kill!") and covered every snap by a dummy word.
- Alert: take one named shot if the look is there, otherwise run the called play.
The Alert needs no communication at the line, because the alert route is already in the call and only the quarterback's decision changes. Austin's spectrum also includes the zero bin, which needs no permission, and no full audibles.
B2. A corner who travels with the Zip and stays in press is almost certainly in man on the Z, and the coverage is probably man across the board. Vance now expects press-man rather than a zone corner squatting in the flat. Leverage beats zone voids, so routes that win against man (breaking away from leverage, crossers, the back against a linebacker) go up his list. He also checks his hot, since man coverage often travels with pressure. In the Outlaws' rule, if somebody runs with the motion, go to the man-beater.
B4. Section 8.8 answers both details through Wade's defensive view. A hand still on the helmet's earhole near 16–17 seconds means a long call, which usually means pass. A glance at the wrist means a band call, usually a situation call. That is why the Outlaws use the ten-word rule, scramble band numbers weekly, and put a small band on every eligible receiver. The defense times your radio and watches your eyes.
Part C (short answers in the chapter). The standard throughout section 8.6 is to count the seconds, decide what you're willing to lose, and keep tags last.
- C3: "Blue 52" plus a working second channel (the live signaler) is the whole answer.
- C7 extension: write the rule as Vance would say it, "If I didn't hear the tag, there is no tag." Then add the coordinator's half: decide before the ball is spotted, with two calls ready. Deciding late is the St. Louis mistake.
D1. Model answer.
Week 1: give the rookie Alert (no talk, one shot, easy to forget if the look isn't there) and the zero bin (Cover 0 is the look where hesitation gets him hit, and the hot throws are drilled). Allow Kill only on run-or-quick-throw pairs with a one-sentence rule, like the napkin rule: count the box, or count the man over the tight end.
By Week 10: add Kill on early downs in 11 personnel and Check on third-and-short, once his Friday stills test shows he identifies the looks reliably.
Never: a full audible. He can be baited by disguise, and authority should match his reads.
What a strong answer includes: the authority spectrum in order; the matching of each tool to a specific risk (a wrong Kill changes eleven jobs, a wrong Alert costs one throw); a measurable gate for adding authority; and a line about what stays off the table.
M5. The tempting look is two safeties at 13 yards, square and wide, with a quiet front. The middle looks open, and the Alert Post looks free. The punishing rotation is one safety driving down to the curl while the other spins to the deep middle, which is the Game 3 picture. Alert rule: "The alert post is live only if the middle is still empty at the top of your drop. If a safety arrives, forget the alert and play the concept."
Chapter 9 — Inside Zone
Exercises: Chapter 9
A1. A lineman is covered if a defender is aligned on him or in his play-side gap. He is uncovered if nobody is. The shade rule (section 9.2) says a defender on a lineman's inside or outside shoulder belongs to the lineman he's shading. You check your own nose and the gap you're stepping toward. Who is closest doesn't matter, and neither does who is the best player.
A8. Each tag answers one question: who handles the backside end (or the extra defender)?
- Arc: the front-side tight end releases past the end to the first defender outside the box, and the tackle owns the end alone.
- Slice: the tight end or H-back crosses behind the line and kicks out the backside end. It is Austin's split zone, named "Slice" because "Split" is already a backfield word.
- Bluff: the same path, but the blocker fakes the kick-out and climbs to the backside linebacker while Vance reads the end.
- Wham: the extra tight end blocks an interior down lineman so the lineman in front of him can climb at once. It is the bear-front answer.
- Insert: a fullback (Fale) leads through the play-side gap to the linebacker the line can't reach.
B1. (a) Under. The 3-technique is away from Harlan. (b) Covered: the center (the nose shades his right shoulder), the left guard (the 3-technique), and the right tackle (the end on his outside shoulder). Uncovered: the right guard and the left tackle. Harlan is uncovered, so he arcs by rule. (c) The center and right guard combo the nose, and the right guard climbs to the Mike, who is front side. The left guard and left tackle combo the 3-technique, and the tackle climbs to the Will. The backside end is left to the fake. Chapter 9's C7 shows what happens when that left tackle skips the combo.
B5. Eight in the box: four linemen, three linebackers, and the walked-down safety. Six blockers leaves two unblocked, usually the backside end chasing from behind and the safety filling the alley at the point of attack. This is the picture from the first snap of Week 2 at St. Louis, where Ruffin gained 1, and the reason for the rule written that Monday: Seven or fewer, run it; eight, take the throw.
Part C (short answers in the chapter). Grade the C items on the order of your reasoning: count the box, then find who handles the backside end, then make the call.
- C3 extension: the Kill version only works if Vance's trigger is stated in numbers ("nine in the box, throw").
- C5: a strong answer also explains why a sack or an incompletion costs more than a two-yard run at 8:20 with a lead.
- C8: call the RPO first because it is the cheapest way to learn how Oklahoma City coaches its apex nickel. That is information you use for the rest of the game.
D1. Model answer. Break the rule (1) in four-minute offense with a lead, such as Week 12's 8:20 drive. There an incomplete pass stops the clock, a stopped run doesn't, and you're betting that a two-yard loss costs less than a clock stoppage. Break it (2) when you are deliberately buying a "receipt" for play-action from the same picture. You hand off into eight because you want the safety to keep filling, and you're betting on the pass two snaps later. You'd never break it on third-and-medium, where the run has to gain the yards on this snap.
What a strong answer includes: the arithmetic stated plainly (six blockers, two free tacklers); a bet named for each break; recognition that the rule exists because Lyle broke it on judgment in Week 2; and the caveat that safeties creep late (Week 12 Kill, Ruffin −2), so the count is only as good as the moment you take it.
M4. The first two runs (+5, +7) taught Holloway that this formation, with this first step, means inside zone, and he filled harder each time. The third play copied the picture exactly: the same personnel, formation, Harlan blocking Weller, and Ruffin's track. Holloway took the fake and left his deep quarter, and Gaines caught the post for 35. Run the first two from a different formation and the illusion breaks. Holloway would have learned "fill against that look," and a new look on snap 3 would have told him to play pass. Same picture or no sequence.
Chapter 10 — Outside Zone
Exercises: Chapter 10
A3. The back presses his landmark, the outside leg of the play-side tight end or tackle, and then cuts once on what the play-side defenders do:
- Bang (up inside the play-side blocker): the play-side defender runs wide and his blocker runs him.
- Bend (back across the center): the front flows hard to the play side and the backside is cut off.
- Bounce (outside the edge): the edge defender gets reached or squeezes inside and the edge is empty.
A4. In Marisol's chart, 72 of Ruffin's 96 Wide carries, three out of four, cut inside the tight end: bang 41, bend 31, bounce 24. That corrects the myth that outside zone is "a run to the outside," a sweep. It threatens the edge so it can run everywhere else. The bounce produced the most explosives (6) but the lowest success rate (38%).
B4 (extension; the short answer is in the chapter). Look at when the safety arrives, not just where. A late walk-down from 9 to 6 means he is guessing on the snap count. That makes him a candidate for Wide PA Boot behind him, and for a hard count, which can show his walk-down early and turn a loaded box back into a Kill-call throw. Three gains of 2 to 4 yards are the defense winning politely. Don't call a fourth.
B6 (extension). The fifth snap is Naked, and it was earned by four snaps of evidence, not one. A strong answer adds that the end's single tackle from behind is the reason he'll keep chasing: he has been rewarded for it. If he had stayed home, Vance throws the flat immediately or throws it away. Naked has no blocker to make that end wrong.
Part C (short answers in the chapter). The standard for every C item is naming which defender the call is aimed at. Outside zone is a horizontal stretch, and the call either runs at the force player or away from him.
- C2 extension: write down the three things you are learning (the safety's fit, the backside end, the linebackers' flow) on the call sheet next to the call, so the booth knows what to watch.
- C4: a strong answer counts the chases (three) and explains why you would rather have five. Russ's ends stopped looking for the pulling guard after seeing Wide the same way five times on one drive.
- C7: the grader wants Marsh named, and the point that in Cover 1 the crosser must win his man with the fake's head start.
D4. Model answer. Call Naked in a playoff game only when this game's film says the end chases. That means several snaps of flat pursuit, Teo saying it from the booth, and Vance throwing well on the move. Against Rollins in the divisional game, Austin chose Boot (Lorusso pulling, Brandt to the flat) even with the evidence in hand. Rollins is a premier rusher, and Wade's condition was "somebody blocks ninety-four on the plays where Vance keeps it." Insist on Boot when the edge player is the defense's best rusher, when the score makes a sack expensive, or when the evidence is thin.
What a strong answer includes: the difference between the two calls (the boot-side guard pulls on Boot, nobody pulls on Naked); a stated evidence threshold; the quarterback's health as a constraint, not a tiebreaker; and the field-position condition that a boot is best when the crosser is a scoring throw.
M3. In the Tuesday staff meeting of divisional week, Austin used personnel to pick the force player. Twelve drew the Sentinels' big nickel, which put Holloway, their best force player, at the Star spot and in the alley before Ruffin reached the line. Eleven kept Vo at the Star and Holloway deep at 10 to 11 yards. So Austin ran Wide from Eleven and kept Twelve for the boot, with Brandt on Rollins's side for the flat, and for killing the clock. The play didn't change; the defender did. That is Chapter 4's lesson applied to one run.
Chapter 11 — Gap Schemes: Power, Counter, Trap
Exercises: Chapter 11
A7. "We flip the formation, not the linemen." Counter always goes away from Harlan. Counter Right (Harlan attached left) pulls Moss, who kicks, and Achterberg, who wraps. Counter Left pulls Lorusso and Fitch. Advantage: no lineman ever plays from the unfamiliar side, so Gus never has Achterberg pass-blocking from the right on the next snap. Tell: if counter goes away from the tight end and the back aligns toward the tight end to run it, the back's offset predicts the play. Marisol's Monday-after-Game-2 count was 14 of 19, 74 percent, over her 70-percent tell line.
A10. When the quarterback carries, the back stops being a spectator and becomes a blocker. On QB Power he crosses the quarterback's face and kicks out the end man, so you add a blocker without adding a player. The cost is linebacker-level contact on your quarterback on an inside run where he can't slide before the hit. Austin's rule is QB Power only inside the opponent's 10 and on third- or fourth-and-short, with practice reps at walk-through or thud tempo only.
B5. Counter Right off the Power look, the "one lie" from the hook. It is built to fool a near-back (fullback) key: the linebacker who reads the fullback sees Fale's first step go left exactly as on Power and leaves with him. Meanwhile the jab step and the two left-side pullers take the ball back right. In Week 12 that linebacker was Hollis Mabry. "Fifty-five's leaving with Fale. Every snap," Teo said, and Odom went for 14.
B9. The Will reads the guards. On gap runs he follows the puller, and on zone he steps toward the guard who fires out. He is most vulnerable to plays where the guard's movement lies:
- Power PA: the guard pulls and the ball goes over him.
- Dart: the guard stays home and the tackle pulls, so the key reads "zone."
- Inside zone's "show" double, which shows him a seam to jump.
He is least vulnerable to plain GT counter and Power, where the pulling guard tells the truth about the hole. A guard-reader beats the wrap there, as Talbert did at Portland.
Part C (short answers in the chapter). Every C answer should start with the same sentence: what is the conflict defender reading right now? Gap schemes win by angles and by arithmetic the defense can't see before the snap, and both depend on that key.
- C3 extension: the cleanest answers keep the Power picture and change only the man who meets the shooting Mike.
- C5: a strong answer admits that Austin ran counter from the telling alignment and got +1. The fix belongs in the spring install (both offsets), not in a single call.
- C7: say aloud that bear removes the double team and the center's back block, the two parts Power and counter need.
D5. Model answer.
- Cheapest, but shortest-lived: run more inside zone from the telling alignment. It costs almost no practice time, but a smart staff recalculates within weeks, and the fix is only as good as your discipline about the mix.
- Mid-cost, long-lived: counter from both offsets. It means new reps for the back's path and the mesh, but it removes the tell at its root. This is what Austin installed in the spring.
- Mid-cost, mid-lived: Counter Y. It shows a guard-reader one puller instead of two, so it adds a key-breaker rather than removing the tell, and it asks Harlan to wrap from the backside.
Use 2 as the base and 3 as the changeup.
What a strong answer includes: separate rankings for cost and for shelf life; the recognition that a fix creating a new tell isn't a fix; and Lyle's corollary: "never let a rule of yours become their evidence."
M3. On the inside-zone show double, the covered guard and the uncovered center combo the 3-technique (Chapter 9's rules). A guard-reading linebacker sees a guard firing forward and a seam behind the double, and if he jumps it, the back bounces outside him. On counter, the guard leaves the line and pulls. A back-reader steps with the jab and is wrong, and a guard-reader runs with the pullers and is right, which is why the third play, play-action, has to follow. The Game 1 45-yard run was play 1 of the test whether or not it was planned: the Will filled the wrong gap off the double, Ruffin bounced, and the Sentinels responded by teaching Ames to read the back. That made counter the natural next question.
Chapter 12 — The Option Game
Exercises: Chapter 12
A3. Rome's rule: "If he can tackle Jalen, he can't tackle you." It is phrased around the back because ends lie with their feet. A good end shuffles a step inside with his shoulders square and his eyes on the quarterback. His feet moved, but he can still take the quarterback. The question is not "did he move inside?" but "can he, from where he is right now, tackle the back?" Shoulders tell the truth; feet don't.
A10. The budget is about three designed quarterback carries a game in the regular season, and up to five in a playoff game with Wade's sign-off. Zone-read keeps, draws, and quarterback powers count against it. Scrambles don't, because they are Vance's own decisions on pass plays and Rome's four scramble rules govern them. The point is the season-long count of hits, not any single carry.
B1. The play is the zone read (Inside Read) and the defensive answer is the scrape exchange, the Sentinels' "Swap." The end crashes to take the dive and the Will scrapes outside to take the quarterback. The likely result is a keep into the scraper for little or nothing. In Week 15, 2nd-and-4 at the SAC 38, Vance kept for 1. Vance's read was correct, since the end could tackle Jalen. The defense simply had a second man for the quarterback.
B6. The defense is alternating its answers by series: crash/scrape (Swap), then slow-play (Sit), then Swap again. This is Russ's Week 15 pattern, which Teo's page caught ("exchange on 5 of 9, end on the QB on 4 of 9, alternated"). It tells you that a counter built for one answer, such as Arc for Swap, is a bet on the pattern holding. The defense knows you're charting it and may break the alternation on purpose. Prefer a call that's sound against both (Inside Read Bubble is the chapter's hedge), or call the counter only when the score and down make being wrong cheap.
Part C (short answers in the chapter). The reasoning standard for every C item is the same two-part check. Which defensive answer do I expect (Swap, Sit, the mesh charge, squeeze-and-scrape)? Which counter beats only that answer? A counter only beats the answer it was built for.
- C3 and C6: the grade turns on putting the quarterback's hits ahead of the yardage. Both short answers start from the budget, not from the defense.
- C8 extension: state the carry count before the call. Two carries left means the two-point speed option is in budget, and the pitch key will hit the quarterback whether he pitches or not.
D1. Model answer.
- For Lyle's decision: Teo's page said Russ alternated by series and never showed the same answer twice in a row. Arc against Sit is Harlan blocking air and a zone run one blocker short on the front side.
- Against it: a pattern the defense knows you're charting can be broken, so the "safe" plain Inside Read was also a guess, and it got Ruffin only 2 against Sit.
- What would have made Arc right: a booth read of the Will's first two steps on the previous zone read, made reliably before the call; or a page row showing Swap in this down-and-distance regardless of series.
Russ's spring line settles the debate: "You had Arc. I saw it at Portland. That's why you got Sit."
What a strong answer includes: both sides argued; the principle that a counter beats only its answer; a specific piece of information (a booth tell or a situational row), not "more film"; and recognition that the defense was charting Austin's counters too.
M7. "Same track, same speed" matters most because the back is the only part of the fake the read end can see clearly at the mesh. If Ruffin slows at the mesh on gives, the end learns that the ball is going to the back. If he doesn't slow on keeps, the end learns to read the back's speed instead of the quarterback's hands, and the read is gone. Within a couple of series the end can sit on the quarterback whenever Ruffin slows, so every keep runs into a waiting end and every give is pre-announced.
Chapter 13 — RPOs
Exercises: Chapter 13
A1. Every RPO has three parts (section 13.1):
- run blocking up front, a real run, with the linemen firing out;
- a real mesh in the backfield, the ball in the back's stomach while the quarterback decides;
- a pass option that punishes the conflict defender.
The difference from play-action is part 1 combined with the decision. On play-action the line protects and the ball is always thrown, because the fake is a lie. On an RPO the line is truly run-blocking, and the quarterback reads one defender at the mesh to decide whether the run or the throw happens. That is why the ineligible-downfield rule shapes the RPO and not the fake.
A6. A packaged play combines a pre-snap question and a post-snap question in one call. For "Inside Slant, Z Now" the answers are checked in this order:
- Pre-snap: is Simmons off 8+ yards with nobody else outside Harlan? Throw the Z Now to Gaines.
- At the mesh: does Ames fill? Pull and throw the slant to Powers.
- Neither: hand off, inside zone right.
The fastest and safest answer comes first, and the run is the default. Austin carries one packaged play a week, and Vance can veto it on Saturday.
B1. (a) Inside Slant, the Anchor A picture. (b) The Will, who has the backside A/B gap and the slant window. (c) His hips go forward, so he is filling. Vance pulls and throws the slant into the weak hook window Ames vacated, 5 to 7 yards deep, inside the nickel (aligned with outside leverage) and behind the Will. That is Snap 1 of Game 1: Powers +17.
B3. (a) The defense has cancelled the conflict with a rotation. A safety takes the slant window, so the Will can play the run cleanly. This is Russ's "real answer" from Game 2, which Austin later learned was called Pinch Sky. (b) Under "key plus window," the key committed but the window is full, so Vance doesn't throw and hands off. That was the right answer on the first snap of Game 2 (+1). (c) The defense has given up a deep safety. Two-high has become one-high, which opens the post and the deep middle, so Inside PA with the Z post, or Inside Glance on the rotator, becomes the next call.
Part C (short answers in the chapter). The reasoning standard is to name where the decision lives. Against man or press, move it pre-snap (a Kill call). Against a two-high zone with a true conflict, keep it at the mesh.
- C5 extension: "rotator side" on the booth chart is the payoff, and Teo proposed exactly that the Monday after Game 2.
- C6: check that your screen and your read are on opposite sides, so one defender can't erase both answers.
- C7: you should be able to explain why outside-leveraged press makes the slant a leverage throw, not a read.
D4. Model answer. Both are right, about different things. Marisol is right that four calls for about thirteen yards is one game and too small a sample to retire a play that averaged a little over six yards a call. Lyle is right that the cause wasn't random: the first-snap tendency (seven of eleven in the sample) gave Russ the question in advance, and he answered with a rotation. The decision is the one Austin made. Keep the play, stop calling it as a first snap, and pair every call with a counter from the same look (Glance, play-action, or the slant fake) for the snap after a rotation shows.
What a strong answer includes: the sample size stated alongside the number; a mechanism for the decline, not just the decline; the conclusion that a solved play is still worth calling if its answer opens something else (Theme 1); and a concrete change in when the play is called, not only whether.
M1. The two plays punish each other's answers. Inside Read Bubble reads the backside end and then the nickel. Inside Slant reads a linebacker. If a defense beats the zone read with a scrape exchange, sending the Will outside to the quarterback, the Will has left the hook window, and Inside Slant throws into it. If a defense beats Inside Slant by having the Will sit, he is no longer scraping to the quarterback and the box is honest for the zone read's give. If the nickel helps on the quarterback, the bubble is open. A defense can't solve both with the same linebacker.
Chapter 14 — Short Yardage and Goal Line
Exercises: Chapter 14
A1. Section 14.1 names three changes:
- The vertical field disappears. At the 3 there are 13 yards of grass behind the line, so every defender can play within about five yards of the ball and play the run.
- The defense changes technique to a gap charge. Linemen fire low into assigned gaps and linebackers fill over the top, so the goal is a pile a yard short, not a tackle for loss.
- The defense matches your bodies. Heavy personnel draws a 6-2, a 5-3, or a bear, and spread personnel draws nickel Cover 0, so you lose the numbers advantage your personnel was meant to buy.
A4. The four fixes, each with an example:
- Angles: Power Left from Jumbo, where down blocks let the gap-charger's own momentum carry him past the hole.
- Gaps: Jumbo with Kalu reporting, which adds an attached blocker to create and then out-block a gap.
- The plus-one: the QB sneak, where the man who would hand off becomes the runner.
- The hold: "Power Pass, Y Leak," a pass threat that freezes a linebacker.
B1. A bear front: the center and both guards are covered, and the 3-techniques sit outside the guards. The A gaps are empty of linemen, and only the Mike, four yards deep, can fill them. That invites the QB sneak: "count the A gaps," and ask whether Vance can cover one yard before Bell covers four. This is the Game 2 third-quarter 3rd-and-1, "Heavy, Under Wing Right, Check," where Vance gave the sneak word.
B3. A QB wedge, beaten by a reading linebacker who waits and fills over the top. That is the wedge's one listed weakness, since it closes gaps but has nobody assigned to the man who stays home. Next time, call a play that puts a body on him or goes where he isn't: iso (Fale leads to the first linebacker to show) or Power (the wrap is aimed at him). If he keeps sitting at two yards, the leak goes behind him.
Part C (short answers in the chapter). The reasoning standard is the first question of goal-line football: which defenders are we choosing not to block, and can they reach the ball in time? An answer that never names the unblocked men isn't finished.
- C3 and C8: the grade is on separating the fourth-down chart's league-average assumption from the day's evidence. Both short answers note that Wade's decision went the other way from the chart.
- C5 extension: "Power Pass, Y Leak" sits directly under Power Left on the Green panel so Vance reads the two as one idea. Write it on your card that way.
D2. Model answer. Saving is correct only when the saved call is genuinely more valuable later and you have other calls you trust now. In Game 1, Wade saved Jumbo Power Left on 4th-and-goal at the 3 and kicked (10–0). The defensible part is that the card was untouched by film. The cost is that Austin had just run three plays from three families, a duo, a back-shoulder, and a bunch in-out, for three yards, and the chart said "go, close." The card was used nine weeks later and scored from the 2 in Week 15. Lyle's lesson: a package with one trusted play is "a prayer with a wristband number." Build six calls in pairs so nothing is too valuable to spend.
What a strong answer includes: one situation where saving is right (a self-scout showing you've never shown the look, with a reliable alternative in hand) and one where it costs points (Game 1); the recognition that saving is a symptom of a thin package; and Lyle's line "If every call is good, there's nothing to save."
M3. Heavy personnel adds blockers, but the defense adds bodies to match, so the count usually stays even or favors the defense, which can never be fully blocked on a handoff. An option from Eleven spreads the defense back into nickel and adds the quarterback as a runner. The read end is blocked by the decision, and the bubble makes the nickel choose. In Game 1 at the SAC 4, Vance read Rollins and then Vo, and kept for the touchdown when Ames fit inside on the dive. That is the plus-one from Chapter 12 applied to Chapter 14's arithmetic: one more ball carrier than the defense can account for, against a defense that isn't in its goal-line package.
Chapter 15 — Route Concepts
Exercises: Chapter 15
A1. A route concept is two or more routes run together on purpose, so that their combined spacing creates a problem for the coverage. Five receivers each running a route are five unrelated decisions. A concept is a set of routes chosen together, placed in specific relationships (in front of, outside, under), and aimed at one rule a defender must follow. In Walt Dupree's terms, it is a question asked of one defender.
A4. The same route can stress a different man depending on the coverage, so the read has to survive a coverage change. On curl-flat, the flat defender is the nickel against Cover 3, the corner against Cover 2, and in some fire zones a defensive end who dropped. "Read the flat defender" still works when the shell changes. "Read the nickel" doesn't. The quarterback identifies who holds the role before the snap and confirms it after.
B3. Snag from Gun Trey Right against Cover 3. The key is the nickel, the curl/flat defender. Against Cover 3 the corner route is never the throw, because the corner bails and takes it. Its job is to clear him and keep the nickel from sinking. The nickel widened with Harlan's flat, so the snag at six, settling between the nickel and the hook safety, is the throw. That is the Week 12 Snag to Gaines (+7, first down at the Stallions' 38).
B7. Reading the receiver, the first failure in section 15.9 and the opposite of the threshold concept. He stared at the stick and threw when the receiver turned around, not when the key chose. The curl/flat defender stayed inside, which made the flat the throw. The fix is the painter's-tape drill: grade the key, not the receiver.
Part C (short answers in the chapter). The reasoning standard is that every answer names the role being read, and that the role survives a rotation.
- C5: a strong answer reads the robber as a second key and either attacks him with a hi-lo of his own or works away from him.
- C6 extension: the grade turns on the landmark, "no wider than the top of the numbers" for the curl and "the bottom of the numbers at two to three" for the flat. That is a coaching fix that needs no new play.
- C8: one concept, one key, half-field, many formations is the correct shape for a sophomore. Grade down any answer that adds a second concept.
D3. Model answer. Keep smash on the sheet, but out of the base third-down box. Against a 75-percent Cover 3 team, smash's corner route runs into a bailing corner and leaves you a hitch, which isn't a third-and-6 route (Curtis Bale's mistake). Call it only when the shell and the tendency say Cover 2 together: a two-high shell in a down-and-distance where Teo's page shows this team's Cover 2. Carry Snag beside it, because the triangle has a Cover 3 answer built in, the snag or the flat. A "Both" call, with a Cover 2 beater to one side and a Cover 3 or man beater to the other, also lets you keep smash alive without betting on it.
What a strong answer includes: the mechanism (a bailing Cover 3 corner takes the corner route); a specific calling condition tied to evidence; a partner concept named; and refusal to drop a good concept just because this week's opponent isn't its ideal target.
M8. Model questions, each addressed to the key defender:
- Curl-flat (to the flat defender): "Man in front of you, man behind you. Which do you want?"
- Smash (to the Cover 2 corner): "Squat on the hitch or sink under the corner. You can't do both."
- Drive vs. Tampa 2 (to the hook defender): "Come up on the drag or sink to the dig?"
The non-negotiable this chapter puts into practice is "read defenders, not receivers."
Chapter 16 — Smash, Flood, and Levels
Exercises: Chapter 16
A2. (a) Smash attacks the flat defender, who is easiest to put in conflict in Cover 2 (the corner), and also in Tampa 2 and the half side of Cover 6. (b) Flood attacks the curl/flat defender, easiest in Cover 3 and in rotations to single-high (an outside linebacker, nickel, or rotated safety). (c) Levels attacks the hook defender, the inside linebacker or nickel, and works against Cover 3, Quarters, and Tampa 2 as long as a vertical carries the Mike. Three concepts, three different defenders, which is why they're taught as a set.
A4. Six, not eight, because a hitch at eight gives the corner time to sink under the corner route and still drive back down on the hitch. At six, the corner who sinks can't recover to it, so his choice stays a real choice. Lyle learned this when his own split end ran the hitch at eight yards and the corner sank, saw it, and drove back on it.
B1. Cover 2, with the corner sinking: he has turned his hips and is running under the corner route, taking #2. The throw is the hitch to #1, right now, on rhythm. This is the second smash at Portland, after Marchetti told Kiel to sink when #2 released vertical: Sutton +8. The corner must choose, and both choices lose.
B3. Tampa 2, and the throw is the #1 dig at 12. The Mike ran the middle with the #3 seam and the Will drove forward on the five-yard in. That empties the window behind the Will and in front of the safeties, where the dig crosses. This is the Week 10 fourth-quarter Trips Levels (Gaines's 23-yard TD, 24–13). The seam is what made it work, because it gave Talbert somewhere else to be.
Part C (short answers in the chapter). The reasoning standard for every C item is to name the defender in conflict and the rule he's using today, since a defense that has adjusted (Kiel's sink rule) needs a variant that removes the trigger.
- C2: China is the cleanest example. It never shows the vertical #2 that tells Kiel to sink.
- C8 extension: in drawing 2, put Talbert at about fourteen yards above the dig window. That one spot is the whole lesson of "no levels without a vertical."
- C9: the strong answer refuses the inbounds throw, because with no timeouts the sideline matters more than the yardage.
D1. Model answer. It was a design error, not a reasonable decision that lost, and Lyle is right to own it. Keeping Harlan in had a sensible input: Teo's chart said Marchetti's one regular third-and-medium pressure came from the tight-end side. But the design removed the one route that levels is defined by. Against Tampa 2, a middle linebacker with no vertical to carry runs to about fourteen yards and sits above the dig. Vance read it correctly (Odegaard jumped the low in, so throw the dig), and Talbert broke on it from above. The fix was available in the same game: Trips, Harlan on the seam, 60 instead of 70. The result (a 41-yard FG instead of a touchdown) isn't what makes it an error. The design would have failed against Tampa 2 every time.
What a strong answer includes: the decision separated from the result; a good input (the pressure tendency) separated from a bad structure (no vertical); the definition "two in-breakers under a vertical"; and a better protection-versus-concept trade (protect with the back, keep the Y vertical).
M6.
- Smash: the flat defender (the Cover 2 corner) squats, so throw the corner route, or sinks, so throw the hitch.
- Flood: the curl/flat defender jumps the flat, so throw the sail, or widens and sinks, so throw the flat. Throw the clear only if the corner squats.
- Levels: the hook defender jumps the low in, so throw the dig behind him, or sinks under the dig, so throw the low in in front of him.
Chapter 17 — Mesh, Shallow, and Man-Beaters
Exercises: Chapter 17
A2. Section 17.1 names three sources of separation: traffic, leverage, and speed.
- Traffic puts bodies between a man defender and his receiver, so he has to go around them. That is Mesh, where Barrera had to go over the top of Harlan's path on the Week 8 third-and-4.
- Leverage means breaking away from the side the defender chose. That is the option route: the slot breaks away from a defender's head start.
- Speed means running across the field away from a chaser who started on the other side. That is the crossers (Shallow, Y Cross, the zero-bin deep over).
The R Angle combines leverage and speed. The back makes the linebacker's correct first step the wrong one.
A9. Harlan's shallow was a hold route. On the Game 1 deep over, the Sentinels had one defender who was neither rushing nor deep. Harlan's job, after protecting first, was to run the shallow at about 6 yards through the hole that defender was sitting in. A lurker who sees a crosser coming has to stay on it, so he can't sink under Gaines's deep over. The shallow was never the throw. It was there to keep the throw open.
B1. This is Cover 1 robber. The second safety is the spare defender: he sits at about 10 yards in the middle and reads the quarterback, looking to jump digs and crossers at the sticks. The section 17.4 answer is shallow under, dig over, with the rule "eyes start on the shallow." The quarterback's first look pulls the robber down or shows he is staying high. Either way, one of the two routes is open.
B5. A defender who travels across the formation with the motion man is almost certainly playing man. Lyle's standing rule (section 17.2, from Chapter 15) is this: "If nobody runs with the motion, I go to my 'both' call; if somebody runs, I go to my man-beater." Once man is confirmed, go to step two of the man plan, the matchup, and then to traffic.
Part C (short answers in the chapter). Grade each item on whether you identified the spare defender before you chose the route.
- C2 extension: what changes if Banks bails at the snap? He becomes a rat. Powers then has to keep running past him, and Gaines's sit becomes the throw.
- C3: the standard is naming which defender has to play outside from inside leverage.
- C4: a strong answer names the rat as the reason plain Mesh is a bad bet.
- C7: the count of possible rushers must come before the play name.
- C8: say why the Lace re-confirms man before the snap.
D2. Model answer. "Every route in our rub concepts runs to a landmark: a depth and a spot on the field that doesn't move when the defense moves. We pick those landmarks because they're where the routes have to cross, and crossing routes are legal football. Our receivers are taught Lou Ventresca's three questions: run to a spot, not a man; hands and shoulders stay in the route; keep running. Any contact is incidental, while both players are running their paths. If our tight end's path bends toward your defender, flag it. That's a block, and we coach against it on film every week." The thing you would not coach even if it were legal: the words "pick him" or "get a piece of him." Those phrases make the defender the receiver's job, and that teaches the illegal version.
What a strong answer includes: the one-yard downfield blocking rule stated accurately; the spacing-versus-blocking distinction; Ventresca's three questions applied, not just listed; an admission that how the rule is judged changes from season to season; and a "won't coach" line tied to the language, not the route.
M1. An RPO works because one defender, the Will on Inside Slant, owns both a run fit and the slant window. Against man coverage the slant has its own defender. Barrera, the Forge nickel with inside leverage on Powers, covered the slant whatever the Will did, which is how he broke it up in Week 8, Q1. The read key no longer controls the throw, so there is nothing to read. The answer with the same Eleven, Gun Doubles Right is Mesh. Inside leverage on Powers doesn't help against a crosser, because Barrera still has to get through Harlan's over route. That is exactly the 11:08, 3rd-and-4 snap: Powers +11. You can also keep the RPO family but switch the slot to a Lace or option route once motion shows someone traveling.
Chapter 18 — Four Verticals and Deep Passing
Exercises: Chapter 18
A3. Against Cover 3, the two corners take the outside thirds and the free safety takes the middle third. Both seams run into that one middle third, so four receivers are working against three deep defenders, and the free safety is in conflict. He can't cover two seams 15 yards apart, and whichever one he doesn't go to is open.
A9. The five triggers in the "when we call it" rule (section 18.8):
- The free down: 2nd-and-1 to 3.
- Sudden change: the first snap after a takeaway or an explosive.
- The shot zone: our 40 to their 35. Inside our 15, only play-action shots from max protection. Inside their 35, no shot that risks a sack.
- The look: a safety has shown the habit you're attacking at least twice.
- The never list: never on 3rd-and-medium without an underneath answer that converts, never without a protection repped that week, and never when your tackle is losing and unhelped.
B4. That movement is a rotation, two-high to single-high (Cover 3). Russ later told Lyle the Sentinels call it Spin 3. The dig gets the ball. Against a rotation, Mills is a dig play: the post runs straight at the safety who just arrived in the middle. If he's over the post, throw the dig under him. Throw the post only if he jumps the dig. That's the Game 3 third-and-9 read Vance didn't get to make.
B5. Throw the back-shoulder: early, low, and to the outside (back) shoulder at about 15–18 yards. The corner is on top and running with his back to the quarterback, and no safety can help. A running corner can't stop. A receiver who knows the throw is coming can. The fade is for a corner who is even or beaten. This is Sutton's isolation picture, and it is legal only because the "safety over the top" row of the isolation table is empty.
Part C (short answers in the chapter). Hold every answer to the Part D box's standard: name a defender, not just a concept.
- C2: state that Tampa 2's Mike takes the strong seam, so the read moves to the weak side.
- C3: a strong answer explains why (b) is the wrong look, not the wrong concept. The reduced-split scissors tell was already known to the Sentinels.
- C5 extension: what makes Vance throw the stick instead of the fade? The safety drifting toward Sutton's side. Say that before the snap so he isn't deciding during it.
- C7: the grade turns on whether your concept reads the middle after the snap. The 4-of-9 rotation note rules out a two-high-only call.
D1. Model answer. "Coach, the shots box went 46 calls, 19 completions, 14 explosives, and 4 interference flags drawn. The median shot fails, but the average shot pays, because the hits are huge and the flags count as yards. The cost was 3 sacks and 2 interceptions, and that's the reason we call shots only on a free down, in the shot zone, with a protection we repped, after the look has shown up twice. I wouldn't call one on 3rd-and-6 at their 33. A sack there can push Dorsey out of his roughly 52-yard range and turn three points into a punt."
What a strong answer includes: the numbers used honestly in both directions (Marisol's "high-variance play, so call it when you can afford a miss"); at least one trigger from the "when we call it" rule; a specific no-shot situation tied to its cost (a sack outside field-goal range, or a backed-up safety); and no claim that a good result proves the decision was good.
M2. Both snaps came against the same rotation, two-high to Cover 3. All Go at 7:14 reads the middle after the snap. It is "built for a number," not a coverage. Vance's eyes went to the middle on his first step, he saw Royce arrive and turn toward Powers by his third step, and he threw Harlan's seam behind Holloway's drop: +19. Mills on 3rd-and-9 decided the middle before the snap. It was called as a two-high splitter, so when Royce spun to the middle, the post ran straight at him. That is Chapter 7's "the shell is not the coverage" in two snaps. The concept that asked its question after the rotation beat it, and the concept that asked before lost to it.
Chapter 19 — Play-Action Passing
Exercises: Chapter 19
A7. On Boot, the boot-side guard pulls flat to log the first defender outside the tackle. On Naked, nobody pulls, and the quarterback is betting that the end chased the fake. The backside end decides between them: if he stays home, you need the guard (Boot); if he chases flat, Naked is faster and gives him no guard to read. The quarterback's rule when that defender is free and in his face: throw the flat now, or throw it away. Never take the sack on a boot. He is already several yards deep and moving away from his help, so a sack is a big loss.
A8. The defender you're lying to must show the reaction you'll exploit twice, from the same picture, in this game before you call the play-action. "One receipt is a coincidence. Two is a habit. Three is a risk." Evidence has a shelf life. By the third identical look, a smart defender starts asking why you keep showing it to him, so the moment to cash the play-action is when his confidence has peaked and before his suspicion starts. In Anchor D, Holloway was "never going to be more sure than he is right now."
B1. This is Inside PA, Gaines Post. The lied-to defender is the right (field) safety filling the alley. The flanker's three stalk steps are aimed at the corner, who sees a run-support block, plays the run, and lets the post get past him. It is the receivers' rule from section 19.4: run the route that looks like the run.
B2. The right guard set like a pass blocker, which is the hook's "Your helmet came up, Pete." The linebackers read the guards, saw pass, and dropped, and the safety read the linebackers and stopped. Lorusso (an aggressive short-setter whose body "knew it was a pass") gave the play away. Gus's correction: identical first step and identical pad level as inside zone, helmet forward, fire out low, then stay at the line (the one-yard ineligible rule) instead of setting. "Sell it with your feet, not your zip code."
Part C (short answers in the chapter). The grading question for every C item is whether you named the lied-to defender and the receipts for this down.
- C1 and C6: read them as a pair. Receipts must show the reaction you'll exploit (a fill, not a backpedal), and they must be collected in the situation you'll cash them (first down, not third-and-9).
- C2: the standard is recognizing a rule-fit defense, where the picture is enough even with a 2.1-yard run game.
- C7 extension: this is the Week 15 lesson that sent pocket play-action to Eleven and the boot to Twelve.
D6. Model answer. It is good news for the play-action and bad news for the run. A cheating alley safety makes the run harder, because he is closer to the hole. The cheat also deepens his commitment to his run job before the snap, so he is now an easier man to lie to: the post behind him has more grass and the fake needs fewer receipts. The cost to the defense is a softer deep quarter on the run side. To find out which you're facing, have the booth chart his first step after the snap, the way Teo charted Holloway's "down" column. If he cheats and triggers, cash the play-action off the same picture. If he cheats and then backpedals, the cheat is disguise, and the run's light box or the RPO is the answer.
What a strong answer includes: both sides of the trade for the defense; recognition that the tell is kept on purpose because every run from that look carries a read, an RPO, and a play-action; a booth measurement (first step, not alignment); and the two-receipts rule applied to the cheating safety rather than assumed.
M3. In Anchor A (Inside Slant) the conflict defender is the Will, Ames, with the backside run fit against the slant window. Vance reads him at the mesh, during the play, so the offense is right whatever Ames does. In Anchor D the conflict defender is Holloway, with the alley against the deep quarter. Inside PA bets before the snap that he'll fill, a bet backed by two receipts. The protection keeps seven in and the quarterback fakes fully, so there is no hand-off option if the read changes. Prefer the RPO when the defender is unpredictable, or when you want a guaranteed positive play. Prefer the play-action when the receipts are in, the field position makes a deep completion worth a touchdown, and you want the explosive. Duo Pop is the hybrid built for the moment a safety has learned to trigger: it reads him after the snap, at the cost of a shorter throw.
Chapter 20 — The Screen Game
Exercises: Chapter 20
A3. Section 20.1 gives the three jobs:
- Constraint: slow down the pass rush. A defensive end who has been run past a screen rushes the next pass a half-step more carefully.
- Blitz-defeat: punish pressure, because five or six rushers leave fewer defenders behind them.
- Rhythm: a changeup. It's an easy completion to a playmaker, it gives a rattled quarterback a throw with no read, and it changes the game's pace.
A screen that gains two yards still did its job if it was called for constraint and Rollins rushes the next three snaps a half-step slower. Ask "which job did I call it for?" before you ask "did it gain yards?"
A9. The free-lunch rule is the Sentinels' sentence on Rollins's rush card after Week 6: "Tackle lets you go → screen → turn and run." A rusher who is suddenly let go free stops, finds the back, and retreats on an inside-out angle (the retrace). DeShawn Rollins learned it between Week 6 and Week 15. In Game 2 he turned on Achterberg's release and tackled Ruffin from behind for −1.
B1. This is the slip (Slip Left). The linemen sell for a count, release flat at the end of "one-thousand-two," and the back blocks, then slips to a spot 2–3 yards behind the line. Expect the throw at about 2.0–2.5 seconds, "at about two seconds or a little later" on the section 20.2 timeline, once the quarterback has drifted his three extra steps.
B5. This is Tampa 2: the Mike runs to the deep middle on a pass read. The Middle screen attacks the hole he leaves, with the catch about two yards behind the center and the guards and center leading. That was the Week 10 snap at Portland: 4:58, 3rd-and-12 at the POR 28, "Eleven, Gun Trips Right, Middle," Ruffin +9, and then Dorsey's 36-yard field goal.
Part C (short answers in the chapter). Grade every C item against two checks. Did you name the defender whose alignment or rule makes the screen work or fail (the bailing corner, the hug linebacker, the squatting Kiel, the running Mike)? And did you say which of the three jobs the call serves?
- C3: the strongest answers spot that the hug defender covers the slip by design.
- C6: "surrender" is a judgment about the down, not about the screen. Show the arithmetic of fourth-and-four, the clock, and the timeout.
D2. Model answer. The fix was cheap for Russ: no new call and no new practice period, just one sentence on Rollins's rush card and one name in every call's screen line. It was expensive for Austin because the screens stopped buying anything. By Game 2 they went four calls for nine yards, and a screen that gains two and teaches the end nothing is no longer worth a down. Austin lost a constraint play against its most dangerous rusher. The one way it cost Russ: a retracing rusher rushes every pass with one eye on his blocker, which takes a half-step off his rush, and the named screen player can't help on anything else. Russ traded a little of Rollins's rush for the end of Austin's screen game. That is a good trade for a coverage-first defense.
What a strong answer includes: the distinction between making screens fail and making them expensive; Russ's own question, "which of the three did Petrakis want?"; the specific costs from the section 20.7 table; and the recognition that Austin's counter (Bubble Go, the Double, changing sides) has to make the retrace cost more.
M1. A pre-snap screen RPO ("Wide Now") is decided before the snap, and the pass is caught behind the line. A forward pass that doesn't cross the line never triggers the ineligible-downfield rule, so linemen run-blocking two or five yards downfield are legal in every code. A post-snap slant or glance RPO throws a pass that crosses the line while the line is run-blocking. The legal limit then decides whether the play is clean: one yard in the NFL, with college and high school historically allowing more (check your current code). That is why the post-snap RPO's design changes level by level: Walt Dupree's 40-clip test found only 11 of 40 college RPOs survived the NFL one-yard rule. Gus's "Hit, don't travel" also exists because of it.
Chapter 21 — The Quick Game
Exercises: Chapter 21
A2. Section 21.1 gives four jobs:
- Stay on schedule: 1st-and-10 or 2nd-and-7 against a two-high shell with soft corners.
- Beat pressure: third down against one more rusher than you block (the hot throws and the zero bin).
- Win short yardage: 3rd-and-2, 4th-and-short, two-point plays.
- Make the corner commit: any snap. Every hitch he gives up makes him play tighter, which feeds the double move later.
The fourth job is the one people skip.
A7. Every quick concept has a counter that starts the same way and finishes somewhere else. The counter works only after the defense has seen the original enough to jump it. "You can't call the counter first."
- Hitch: Stop-go ("zero-nine").
- Slant: Sluggo ("two-nine") or Glance.
- Stick: Stick Nod.
Counters take two and a half to three seconds, so call them with the protection the counter needs, not the protection the original concept used.
B4. Stacked defenders over a stack suggest in-out (banjo): the pressing defender takes whichever receiver breaks out, and the off defender takes whichever breaks in. The worst call is a pair with one out-breaker and one in-breaker, such as the Week 15 stack quick out and slant, because it hands each defender the man he is already leaning toward. The best call sends both receivers the same direction at different depths (one defender then has two men), or sends one receiver vertical so the out defender can't tell a stem from a go.
B6. This is press-bail. It gives you the hitch, "a gift if you see it," because the corner's weight is going backward when the receiver stops at six. It has to be read after the snap because press-bail looks exactly like press until the corner opens his hips. The quarterback can't commit before the snap, and the hitch is the answer once he sees the bail.
Part C (short answers in the chapter). The standard for every C item is the chain in Rome's chant. Count the box (run or throw), read the corner's cushion and leverage (which route), then read the help (whether to throw it), in that order.
- C3: the sticks rule must show up as a depth change: stick at seven on third-and-6.
- C6: a strong answer names the counter's trigger (the slant completed twice against this corner) and its protection.
- C8: the best answers say out loud which throw they're refusing and why: the boundary fade with a safety on the hash.
D1. Model answer. Signs that a defense is letting you have it: completions that are all short, with the corners still off and tackling at six ("Eleven of thirteen, seventy-four, nothing over eleven"); no change in their third-and-long calls; and no pressure or disguise spent against concepts that keep working. A defense that is failing to stop something adjusts during the half. A defense that is investing in your tendency keeps its cheapest look on. At halftime, assume the price will change. Prepare the counters with their protections (Sluggo with Ruffin chipping), decide in advance how Vance will handle press on half of the early downs and rotation on half, and don't build the second half on the assumption that the first half's quick game will be there. Lyle's first halftime line was "They're giving us the quick game, and they'll take it away."
What a strong answer includes: evidence you could see on the sideline (depth of completions, unchanged alignments), not a feeling; Russ's logic of investment and price; counters keyed to specific likely changes (press, rotation); and the point that the counters need dropback protection.
M1. Inside Slant (Chapter 13) reads the Will at the mesh. Ames is the conflict defender, with the run fit against the slant window, and the line run-blocks. If Ames sits, the ball is handed off, so against an eight-man box the run is never "wasted": the read decides whether the box count matters. Slant-Flat reads the curl/flat defender, with the slant against the flat, from pass protection (or quick-game protection), and it is a pure pass. Against eight in the box it is the "eight, take the throw" answer, but it has no run attached. The RPO adds no risk to the run because the run is still the default, and the throw happens only when the key takes himself out of the slant window. The cost is that the RPO linemen must obey the ineligible-downfield limit when the slant is thrown.
Chapter 22 — Pass Protection
Exercises: Chapter 22
A7. Every man you keep in is a receiver the defense doesn't have to cover. 80 Max sends only two or three routes, so a defense that rushes three or four and drops seven or eight collects the bill: "your perfect protection becomes a perfect view of nobody open." That's why Austin uses max only when it's sure, in the zero bin against six or more with nobody deep, and why the simulated pressure that shows six and rushes four is the call that makes max most expensive.
A9. First, he sees the whole field: the safety walking down, the nickel creeping, the late walk after the radio cuts at 15. The center sees only the front from three feet away. Second, the protection's aim decides his hot, because the slide decides who is free and the hot is the area the free man leaves. The man who has to throw the extra-blocker ball must own the count that creates it. Week 8 showed what happens otherwise: Szabo's point was wrong, nobody fixed it, and the result was sack, −7, punt.
B1. This is a six-man half-slide, 60 Right. The center, right guard, and right tackle slide right, the left guard and left tackle block man, and the back is on the man side, scanning A → B → edge, so he steps into the left A-gap first.
B7. Lorusso (right guard) and Ruffin blocked nobody. Ruffin had been moved out to Weller when Weller walked at about ten seconds, and Weller dropped. Lorusso's 3-technique, Coleman, also dropped. "I blocked air, Coach." Rashad Coleman dropped into the hot window under Powers. Bell ran free through the right A-gap, Vance found Coleman sitting on his hot at about 0.8 seconds, and he was sacked at 1.9.
Part C (short answers in the chapter). The standard throughout is the threshold concept: count rushers, count blockers, name the free man, and then name the throw that blocks him.
- C3 and C4: grade the reasoning, not the choice. The best answers price the protection by what the defense can drop, not only by what it shows.
- C6 extension: if Bell and Ames both drop and Weller rushes from his walk, you now have a blocker looking for work and a rusher from the boundary. That is why rule 5 points the throw to the side he walked from.
- C7: the strongest answers find both failures (the slot's missed conversion and the throw to a spot) and propose a drill that grades both.
D5. Model answer. The case against Vance: he had the Mike ID and the authority to re-declare it. He moved Ruffin to the late walk, which emptied the A-gap. And once he saw Coleman in the hot window, he could have thrown the ball away instead of taking a 9-yard sack on third down. Why the chapter disagrees: every rule on the card fired exactly as written, and Russ had read the card. The nose's kick sent the slide to the boundary, the walk at ten seconds moved the back after the radio died, and the 3-technique dropped into the one window all 8 of 8 A-gap hots had gone to. "6 blockers + 1 ball = 7. Russ made it 4 + 0." Lyle: "Not the call. The rules. The rules are mine." To the quarterback, make the second argument, plus one coaching point: when the hot is covered and the clock says 1.9, the ball goes away. To the staff, make the second argument only. The fix is the card (center on the Mike, back on the other A-gap backer, corner as the hot, "two hots, two sides"), not the player.
What a strong answer includes: an honest version of the case against the player; the specific rules the defense exploited; the timing (everything happened after 15); and a fix that lives in the rules, not in effort.
M2. The protection version: "The front is not the rush." A pre-snap picture of six or seven possible rushers tells you who can come, not who will. Rule 2 of the playoff page, "Mug: assume one drops," applies that to the double-A mug. Instead of assigning blockers to every man who shows, block the two A-gap threats with the two blockers who can't be dragged away (the center and the back) and build the hot for the man who drops, by making the corner your hot. As with a shell that rotates after the snap, you plan for the picture changing at the snap rather than for the picture you were shown.
Chapter 23 — The Scouting Report
Exercises: Chapter 23
A1. Walt Dupree's three questions, plus Lyle's fourth line (section 23.1):
- What do they do? This is the count: personnel, fronts, coverages, and pressures, sorted by situation.
- What can't they do? It adds the holes every structure leaves, which is Chapter 7's "the defense tells you where to go" applied to one defense.
- What do they do when we do X? It adds the trigger. Defenses play rules, and a trigger you've found is one you can pull on purpose.
- What will they leave, and is my guy better than theirs there? This is where description turns into a plan.
A5. The denominator is the "out of how many": the number of chances the defense had to do the thing. Marisol's version of the sentence: "On third-and-1 to 3 they sent five or more on 8 of 10 snaps in the last four games." Write the count with its denominator ("9 of 14," never "64 percent"), and keep the context, meaning which games and which situations produced it.
B1. The shell before the snap was 2H. After the snap it was 2H→1H (a rotation). The 12-yard safety spun to the middle, the 10-yard safety came down to about 6 outside the tight end, and the corners bailed. The coverage family is Cover 3, rotated toward the strength (the down safety's side). Keep both shell columns. A single "coverage" column would hide the very fact that beat Austin in Game 3.
B5. In Austin's in-season words, this is the double-A mug. Row 6 of the Week 6 page covers it: mug on 3rd-and-7+, ten snaps on tape. The two outcomes it counted: both backers came on 6 of 10, and one dropped on 4. Those four exceptions were the part of the row that mattered most, because "assume one drops" is what Chapter 22 later had to learn.
Part C (short answers in the chapter). Grade every C item on whether the call can be traced to a specific row and count on the page. "They blitz a lot" doesn't meet the standard.
- C3 extension: 9 of 17 is a lean, not a tell. The answer earns full credit only if it says the walk-down at :10 is the live indicator that turns the lean into a call.
- C5: a strong answer notices that Austin's own 42-of-49 tendency in Twelve is what created the base-defense matchup, and that throwing on it now is what changed Row 2 by the divisional round.
D6. Model answer. The post-season row: "3rd-and-7+ vs. 2x2: two-high, 22 of 22 since their bye (Week __ on). No exceptions?" The start date goes in the "since" column, and the streak with zero exceptions gets a question mark instead of bold type. The safeguard in the call is the middle-read tag. Keep the two-high-beating concept, but on step 1 Vance's eyes go to the empty middle, and on step 3 he declares it open or closed. Open means throw the concept's read. Closed means never the post: the dig, then the flat or the back. You keep the tendency's value if it holds and lose only a check if it breaks.
What a strong answer includes: the "since" column; the question mark on a no-exception streak against an opponent who knows you're charting him; Russ's point that a streak can be an investment ("you don't need to fool an offense on every snap, only on the one it can't afford to lose"); and a post-snap answer built into the call rather than left to the quarterback's nerve.
M3. Chapter 22's arithmetic: six blockers plus the hot throw make seven answers. "Back on the Mike" assigns the back to an A-gap linebacker. When an end walks out late, the quarterback moves the back to the walker's side, so the Mike, the closest rusher with a 1.9-second path, is now the free man by design. The hot has to beat him, and if a lineman drops into the hot window, the protection has two blockers on air and no seventh answer. That is the Game 2 sack: Ruffin moved to Weller, Bell free, Coleman in Powers's window. The scouting fact that should have warned Austin was Row 6's own exceptions: one backer dropped on 4 of 10. The exceptions were the report. The rows that counted who dropped, and what the end did when he walked, would have shown that the mug could reassign Austin's back after the radio cut.
Chapter 24 — Building the Game Plan
Exercises: Chapter 24
A5. Section 24.6 gives the four jobs of an opening script:
- Information: every call asks the defense a question.
- Rhythm: easy early completions and trusted carries.
- Rehearsal: every scripted call was repped all week against the expected look.
- Booth work: the script tells Teo what to watch.
Walt's saying puts information first. Answers are cheaper to learn at 0–0 in the first quarter than on third-and-nine in the fourth, and a script built to win, your fifteen favorite plays, "learns nothing," which leaves you calling plays in the second quarter against a defense you haven't diagnosed.
A9. The four steps for settling a staff disagreement (section 24.2):
- The tape test: show me the snaps.
- The one-sentence test: can Vance say why we're calling it?
- The rep test: can we practice it enough by the last full practice?
- The coordinator decides, and writes the dissent in the margin.
Step 4's margin note is the step most staffs skip. It protects the losing argument, which stays on paper so halftime can revisit it as "the next idea." The cost of skipping it shows in Rome's Game 3 note, "Post vs. two-high is pre-snap. Want a post-snap check?", answered with "Rule four covers."
B3. (a) The bender: Powers stems past 9 and breaks out at 12, and Gaines runs a hitch at 6. (b) The corner, Simmons. Holloway is held deep by the stem, but Simmons is the read. (c) The hitch to Gaines. Simmons's eyes stayed on Powers, so he can't also cover the hitch in front of him. (d) This is Game 3, Q3, 3rd-and-6 at the SAC 44. Russ's staff had seen the second-quarter bender (+14 on 2nd-and-7 at the AUS 36) and reminded Simmons where his eyes belonged. The card said hitch, Vance threw the bender anyway, Simmons broke it up, and Austin punted. The quarterback's read failed. The plan had done its part: the bender was repped Thursday against both versions of Simmons in equal numbers.
B7. (a) Big nickel, every time against Twelve after Week 6. (b) The man over Harlan is a defensive back (the third safety), so the run half of the napkin-rule Kill call is live. (c) The Game 3 plan made Twelve a boot package: outside-zone action with Wide PA Boot off it. Big nickel is built to fit the run and still cover Harlan, so the boot attacks the edge and the flow instead, putting the third safety in conflict between the run fit and the boot flood. Running into a group built to stop it is what produced 8 for 29.
Part C (short answers in the chapter). The reasoning standard throughout is the plan's spine: every C answer must name what the defense leaves, what it takes away, and what it does when we do X, and every call needs a sponsor and a sentence.
- C1: grade the question each script slot asks, not the play.
- C4: the first line of the box (the range line) must come before any call.
- C7: the short answer's own rule holds. A row with no rep plan gets half credit.
D5. Model answer. Add the second answer, but only as a rule the quarterback already knows how to execute, not a new play. With no practice time, a new concept is "an answer in name only." The Mills interception shows what one-answer boxes cost. The box had one answer and a blank contingency row, and Rome's note was answered by a rule that fires only on doubt. The cheap fix is to attach the post-snap check to the call that's already in the box: eyes to the middle on step 1, and if it closes, the dig, then the flat or the back, never the post. Then say it out loud in Saturday's QB meeting and walk it through once. Leaving the box alone would trust that the tendency holds on the snap the defense is most likely to break it.
What a strong answer includes: the distinction between a new play (needs reps) and a branch on an existing play (needs a sentence and a walkthrough); the "rule that fires on doubt can't protect you from confidence" logic; respect for the rep test; and the dissent treated as information, not as a challenge.
M5. The deepest cause lived at the game plan (and the call sheet built from it). The third-long box had one answer, a blank contingency row, and Thursday reps that showed only two-high, so the plan "made him sure." Following Chapter 1's ladder upward, the plan could leave a branch out because the system had no standard post-snap middle check. The fix, the middle-read tag, was built at the system rung: printed on every Blue-panel third-and-7+ call with a deep-middle throw. So the rungs are not the same. The failure showed up in one plan, but its cause would recur in every plan until the system changed. The fix sits one rung higher, which is still the lowest level that can solve the problem for good.
Chapter 25 — Play Calling
Exercises: Chapter 25
A3. Teo says three things in the quiet window, in this order: shell, box, one thing ("Two high, six, Will at five"). The shell is what the safeties showed on the last snap, and the box is how many defenders stood within about five yards of the ball. Both are counts, and a trained eye gets them right almost every time. The one thing is a choice. Teo has to pick, from everything he saw, the single fact that should change the next call, and he has to say it in two or three words before 34. Picking it means predicting what Lyle needs, which is why section 25.2 calls it the hardest job in the booth.
A9. Lyle uses three letters. C means the call was wrong for the look, and three Cs in a half say his model of the defense is wrong, which gets fixed at halftime. R means a rule failed (protection, hot, or sight adjust), and two Rs mean the rule changes now, not next week. X means execution: the call was right and the team didn't do it. Xs go to the position coaches. The letter is made in about four seconds inside the quiet window, and the fix is applied wherever the letter points.
B4. It's a hot throw. The nickel rushes, and the ball goes to the space he left, out at about 1.0 second, which is in the Outlaws' hot-throw range of roughly 1.0–1.3 seconds. A sight adjustment changes the receiver's route in response to his defender, as when Gaines turned his post into a six-yard hitch when Simmons blitzed. Here the slant was already the route. The quarterback simply threw it on time because a blitzer left the window empty, the same answer as Game 1's Q3 3rd-and-6 slant to Powers against a nickel fire zone (+16).
B5. (a) The investment calls are the inside zones for +5 and +7, and you could argue the +2 as well. (b) The receipts are the safety's alley fills on those runs: the same defender showing the same reaction, in the same picture, in this game. (c) The play-action post on the fourth snap is the payoff. Under the "two receipts" rule (section 25.7), the third run was optional. Two fills had already paid for the play-action.
Part C. C1–C4 and C6 have short answers in the chapter. Hold yourself to the chapter's standard: write the call out of ten against at least two defenses, and say how the fourth-down owner's rule changes what counts as a partial success. A C1 or C4 answer that never mentions Wade's fourth-down line has missed half the question.
C5 (worked answer). Here is a model script for a 3rd-and-8.
- 40–34: Teo reads: "Two high, six, nickel's staying on."
- 34–28: Lyle takes the "didn't gain enough" call he had ready: "Eleven, Gun Doubles Left, Y Off, 60 Right, Mills." It is nine words, so it goes in as words. Add one tag and it runs past ten, and then he calls the band number instead ("Blue 14," for example).
- 28–20: The call goes into Vance's helmet.
- 20–15: Vance says the call once with the snap count. Only Szabo may ask for a repeat. The huddle breaks at about 15, when the radio cuts.
- 15–5: Vance or Szabo points: "Fifty-four's the Mike!" If the linebackers mug and the corner walks up, the rule is center on the Mike, back on the other A-gap backer, and the right tackle widens to the corner. Gaines sight-adjusts to the six-yard hitch.
- Snap: at :06–:03.
What a strong answer includes: both of the caller's windows (34–28 is his, 15–0 belongs to the rules); a word count against the ten-word rule; and a named rule, not a hope, for the late walk-up.
D2. Model answer. "Coach, I'm not grading the field goal they kicked; I'm grading what we knew at the decision. The chart said go on fourth-and-1 at our 36, and a punt there gives up more than the chart thinks a failed sneak does. Can we write down, before Sunday, which fourth-and-1s you'll go on, so I can build the third-down call around your answer?"
What a strong answer includes: no reference to the opponent's field goal as proof, because that is resulting; respect for ownership, since Wade owns fourth down and Lyle says his piece once on the headset and twice in the office; a forward-looking ask in the spirit of "the fourth-down answer belongs in the third-down call"; and honesty that a single punt is one draw, not a verdict.
M4. A play-action fake is an investment that pays off only if the target defender believes the run. Cash it after one receipt and you're betting on a single reaction that may have been noise. If he didn't really fill, the fake sells nothing, and you've thrown a seven-man-protection pass into intact coverage. Wait for a third receipt and the price goes up. The extra run costs a down and may not gain much. It also gives the defender time to correct on his own or the defensive coordinator time to make a call. Anchor D's Holloway was never going to be more committed than after his second fill. Two receipts is the point where the evidence is good enough and the cost of waiting has started to rise.
Chapter 26 — Situational Football
Exercises: Chapter 26
A3. The range line is the yard line where the kicker becomes a real threat. For Austin it is about the opponent's 35, the edge of Evan Dorsey's range of roughly 52 yards. Field-goal distance is the line of scrimmage plus 17 (10 for the end zone, 7 for the hold):
| Line of scrimmage | Field goal | In Dorsey's range? |
|---|---|---|
| Opponent's 35 | 52 yards | At the edge |
| Opponent's 31 | 48 yards | Comfortably |
| Opponent's 38 | 55 yards | No, past the line |
A9. Since the spring, Teo prints a small box at the bottom of every third-down row: "4th: P / K / G." Before each third down, Lyle says one letter to Wade, and Wade confirms it or changes it. It takes two seconds. The answer changes the third-down call itself. If the answer is "G," a three-yard gain is worth having, and the call should have a high floor. If it is "P," only the conversion counts. Wade owns the decision, and the coordinator owns having asked before the snap.
B3. The flaw is the flat route's landmark. It was set for first and second down, when a catch at two yards is a fine gain. On third-and-6 the underneath defender is coached to close to the sticks, and a ball caught at two gives him four yards to rally. The fix is the sticks plus one rule from section 26.3: the flat bends up and finishes at seven, and Cal's cones on the line to gain make a short break a rep that doesn't count, completion or not.
B7. Both errors come from Week 2 at St. Louis. The first is communication: a fourteen-word call broke "More than ten words, call the band," the radio cut off at 15, and Vance spent a timeout at 3:02 that the drive would have wanted later. The second is situational: on third-and-2 at the 37, a two-yard gain had a double payoff, the first down plus crossing the range line, so even a failed fourth down would have become a field-goal try. That snap deserved the call Austin trusted most for two yards. Instead, Ruffin gained nothing, and the 4th-and-2 from the 37 was a 54-yarder, two yards past the line. Two yards short of the range line is the worst place on the field to stall.
Part C. Every C item has a short answer in the chapter. The standard is to name, before you name a play, what result counts as success at this distance and on this clock. C7 is the model: six yards to reach the 35 is a good result even without a first down. Extension for C4: redo the clock count for an opponent with only two timeouts. You should find that one first down plus the two-minute warning may be enough, which shows why the series plan starts with their timeouts and not with your plays.
D1. Model answer. "Converts most often" is the right rule only when failure costs the same no matter how you fail, and it rarely does. On long-long, section 26.2 ranks the jobs: don't lose the ball, don't lose the yards, improve the next decision, and take the first down only if they give it to you. Austin converted 5 of 27 third-and-11+ snaps. The long-long box against Sacramento held a draw, a slip screen, and one dagger, because a sack or an interception costs far more than a punt. In four-minute, Week 12's 3rd-and-5 at the STL 43 shows the same thing. A pass probably converted more often, but an incompletion would have stopped the clock and handed St. Louis about forty seconds. Wade said "Run it," and Power Left gained six. The run's failure was cheaper.
What a strong answer includes: two concrete examples, at least one of them a clock situation; the idea that a call is chosen by its whole range of outcomes, not its conversion rate alone; and the cost of failure named in yards, time, or possession.
M4. A model rule: "Two-minute calls live on the Blue panel. Inside two minutes of either half, anything over ten words goes in as a band number. Fast mode sends the number only." The Week 2 call ran fourteen words and was cut off at :15, costing a timeout. Under the rule it would have gone in as a band number ("Blue 23," say) by about 25, with time to spare. The cost is that Vance must read it off his wrist and hand-signal or call it in the huddle, so the Blue panel has to be rehearsed in Friday's two-minute period. The gain is that no two-minute call can be longer than the radio window.
Chapter 27 — Motion and Shifts
Exercises: Chapter 27
A5. Motion runs on one of two clocks, and choosing the clock is half of choosing the motion.
- Early, to learn. Motion that asks a question has to finish early enough for Vance to hear the answer and act on it: kill to the second play, change the protection, or move the back. It starts around 12 on the play clock and is set by about 7. Example: the H Zoom before a "Kill, Both" call.
- Late, to win. Motion meant to win leverage or speed has to be moving at the snap, so the defense has no time to adjust. Examples: Jet, Fly, Orbit, and any Zip or Zoom tagged "Live," like the Game 3 "Zoom Live" by Gaines on 3rd-and-2.
A8. In man coverage a defense can answer motion with an exchange. The defender over the motion man hands him off to a teammate on the other side, so nobody crosses the formation, and the picture looks exactly like a zone slide. A slide therefore fits both coverages. After Week 15 the Outlaws' rule became "slid = no information; the snap decides." Vance's first post-snap look goes to the defender on the zone side. If that defender turns and runs with a receiver, it's man.
B2. The picture is consistent with zone (Cover 3, or Quarters re-centering) and with man played by exchange: the nickel's step inside could be the start of a hand-off. Under the post-Week 15 rule, the motion didn't answer the question, so Vance's first post-snap look is at the zone-side defender (on the base Both, the curl-to-flat player over Sutton's curl). If that defender sits or widens, it's zone and he throws the zone side. If he turns and runs with Sutton, Vance's eyes go to the man side before he has taken his hitch step.
B5. The risk is a tell. This is the Powers problem from section 27.8: about two-tenths of a second slower on 9 of his last 12 Flys, enough for a defensive back to feel a stride. The defense learns that a slower jet means it's not a sweep, and it stops respecting the constraint. The fix is Cal's sentence: "Every jet is a sweep until the ball is snapped." To measure it, put a stopwatch on end-zone film from the motion man's first step to the near tackle's outside leg, sorted by jet versus Fly. Then keep timing jets in Wednesday practice, every week.
Part C. Every C item has a short answer in the chapter. Grade each one by asking which clock the motion is on and which of the three jobs it does. An answer that names a motion without a job breaks the "motion has a job" non-negotiable. Extension for C5: list what makes the pair legal. After the Y Flip, everyone sets for a full second, then only one man moves. Then say what you'd do if the defense froze on the flip, which gives you the fourth answer from the table: overload the side they left.
D1. Model answer. The case that it was a bad call: 3rd-and-8 is a "long" down. A "Both" call is, by its own rule, "okay against everything and never great against anything," and the man side's quick out broke at five yards on a down that needed eight, a violation of the sticks-plus-one rule. A third-down call should be built to convert against the likeliest coverage, not to survive every coverage.
The answer: the Kill structure had already handled the likely case. If anyone traveled, Mesh was live against man. The Both call was the branch for "no answer," and the motion produced exactly that answer. The failure was the read order Lyle had coached ("slid = zone side first"). The man side was open, and Vance looked at it second. That is a rule failure (an R) more than a call failure, and the rule changed after Week 15. The critique about the out's depth still stands, though, so a fair grade gives the critic half the point.
What a strong answer includes: a steelman that uses the chapter's own rules (sticks plus one, "never great against anything"); a defense that separates the call from the rule; and the honest admission that part of the critique is right.
M2. The call is "Eleven, Gun Doubles Right, Fly, 60 Left, Flood, X Fade." Under the Chapter 8 motion-word owners, Fly belongs to the H, so no letter is needed. Flood is a one-side concept, and with motion it goes to the motion man's side. That makes ten words, which is not more than ten, so it can go into Vance's helmet as words between 28 and 20. One more tag would push it past ten, and then it goes in as a band number. Check the grammar order: personnel, formation, motion, protection, concept, tag.
Chapter 28 — Offensive Analytics
Exercises: Chapter 28
A5. The selection trap: a number describes the plays you chose in the situations you chose them. Austin's play-action averaged about 8.6 yards per dropback against 6.2 for straight dropbacks, which looks like two and a half yards of free value. But about four of every five play-action calls came on first or second down, while barely half of the dropbacks did. The rest came on third down, where everyone's average drops. Comparing first and second down only, the gap shrank to about 8.6 against 7.0. Play-action was still better, but most of the original gap measured Lyle's call sheet, not the play.
A8. A fourth-down model assumes five things:
- You have a league-average play for this distance.
- You have a league-average kicker and punter.
- You face a league-average defense in this situation.
- Your players are healthy and fresh.
- Nothing has happened in this game that changes the odds.
B1.
| Snap | Needed for success | Result | Explosive? |
|---|---|---|---|
| (a) 1st-and-10, +4 | 4 (40%) | Successful | No |
| (b) 2nd-and-9, +5 | 5.4 (60%) | Unsuccessful | No |
| (c) 3rd-and-6, +14 | 6 (100%) | Successful | No (a pass needs 20) |
| (d) 1st-and-10, +23 | 4 | Successful | Yes |
| (e) 2nd-and-2, +1 | 1.2 | Unsuccessful | No |
| (f) 1st-and-goal at the 6, +2 | 2.4 | Unsuccessful | No |
B4. "Graded alone, plain Inside was a little under half successful and about zero EPA per play (26 of 58). But Inside Slant, Glance, and play-action from the identical look (31 calls at +0.19 and 22 at +0.41) only work because the handoff looks exactly like them, and the family as a whole was solidly positive (+0.12 on 111 calls)." The caveat goes in the same note. The ledger shows the family is good. It does not prove that the runs made the passes better. The defender-level evidence is Teo's Holloway card (15 of 21 triggers), and that is twenty-five snaps of one safety.
Part C. C1, C2, C4, C7, and C8 have short answers in the chapter. The standard for each: write the break-even or the score logic first, then the call that makes the decision true. Every GO box names its play.
C3 (worked answer). Use the Week 12 snap: "Heavy, Under Wing Right, Check" against the Stallions' bear, with a nose head-up on Szabo and 3-techniques on both guards' outside shoulders.
- Pre-snap: the bear has all three interior blockers covered, eight in the box, and one high safety (Carrow).
- Post-snap: Szabo drives the nose straight back. Moss and Lorusso each fit their 3-technique inside-out, inside shoulder first, so neither tackle can slant into an A gap. The tackles and tight ends block the man on them or inside them, and nobody climbs. Vance follows Szabo's right hip into the right A gap, and Mabry fills from three yards a half-count late, for +1½ and a first down.
The described line must say who blocks the nose, how the guards fit, and which A gap. Add the player-safety note: low and forward, two hands on the ball, never leap the pile.
C5 (worked answer). Down 14, the touchdown makes it down 8 before the try, the "Go — and debated" row of the 28.8 chart.
- Case for going: convert and you're down 6, so your next touchdown plus the kick wins. Fail and you're down 8, and your next touchdown plus a two-point try still ties, the same as if you'd kicked both times. You also learn now, with 6:10 left, whether you'll need two later.
- Case for kicking: down 7 keeps the game one score. If your two-point play is really a coin flip or worse, you've added risk without adding value, and you can try for two after the next touchdown anyway.
- Choice: go. A 5-of-8 practice rate is far too thin to trust as a number (Marisol would write "5 of 8," not "63 percent"), but it gives no reason to think you're below the league's rough coin flip, and the information has value with two possessions likely left.
What a strong answer includes: both branches traced to the end of the game, the count kept as a count, and an honest statement that the row is debated.
C6 (worked answer). A kicker reliable inside 25 yards means a field goal only from about the opponent's 8 or closer (25 − 17). A 31-yard punt buys little field position. Two differences from the NFL chart stand out:
- The no-man's-land zone grows enormously, from roughly midfield all the way to the opponent's 9. Almost every box there turns GO or LG for distances up to about 4.
- The own-territory boxes shift toward going, because a short punt makes failure cheaper by comparison. Keep "own 1–20" at TU or K beyond fourth-and-2, since a failure there still hands over a short field.
Add the high-school note: the two-point try is snapped from the 3, which nudges conversion odds down.
C9 (worked answer).
- Fourth-and-short, failure cheap (for example, goal to go, or late and trailing):
- "Heavy, Under Wing Right, Power Pass, Y Leak." Likely failure: incompletion.
- "Eleven, Gun Trips Right, Sprint Right, Snag." Likely failure: incompletion, with a sack possible.
- Fourth-and-short, failure expensive (your own territory, or protecting a lead):
- "Heavy, Under Wing Right, Check" (sneak against a bear, otherwise duo). Likely failure: no gain.
- "Jumbo, Under I Wing Left, Power Left." Likely failure: no gain or a loss of one.
The point of the two rows is that cheap failure lets you buy a higher conversion chance with variance, while expensive failure buys a floor.
D1. Model answer. "Coach, I believe you, so let's name it. 'We're playing good defense' isn't specific yet. 'Their offense has two first downs in six drives and their left tackle is out' is. If we price that, it makes their next drive worth less, so the punt gets a bit better. On fourth-and-1 at midfield the break-even is low enough that it usually changes the play we call, not the decision. Tell me which drives you'd count, and I'll have Marisol put the price on the card before Sunday."
As stated, the objection fails the "name it" test, because the model already assumes a defense. Restated with observable facts, it passes, and then it has to be priced.
What a strong answer includes: respect for Wade's ownership; a conversion of the feeling into something observable; the arithmetic step ("price it"); and the recognition that most named objections flip the call rather than the decision.
M1.
- Decision: right. Up 17–10 late in Q3, 4th-and-1 at the Portland 18, the chart said go because a touchdown is worth far more than a near-automatic 35-yard field goal, and a failure leaves Portland on its own 18.
- Call: reasonable. The check to duo against their short-yardage front is a play the menu offered for that picture.
- Execution: lost the rep. Dion Pratt slanted into the A gap across the right guard's face, for no gain.
Graded as a bet on a distribution, a play that converts seven times in ten fails three, and this was one of the three. The result doesn't reopen the decision.
Chapter 29 — The Shanahan System
Exercises: Chapter 29
A3. On Boot, the boot-side guard pulls flat to block the first defender outside the tackle. On Naked, nobody pulls and the edge is unblocked by design, because the quarterback is betting the end chased. In "Wide PA Boot Left," the run fake goes right (Wide Right action), and the quarterback goes left, because the word after "Boot" is always the quarterback's direction. The left guard pulls, and in Austin's line that is Moss.
A10. The borrow list rejects backside cut blocks and running into eight-man boxes as an identity. The first is a technique that tightened rules have restricted at every level, so Gus teaches cutoff with the feet and hands instead. The second conflicts with Austin's rule since Week 2, "Seven or fewer, run it; eight, take the throw," and Austin runs Wide into eight only to buy the boot. Neither rejects the central idea, that every play starts as the same run. Both reject a practice that doesn't fit Austin's rules or evidence: "keep the reasons, adjust the tools."
B2. The backside end on Wide PA Boot Left is the left end.
- Successful: he chases flat down the line after the fake going right, and the Will flows hard to the play side to beat the reach. Vance comes out on the left with the end behind him, the flat route holds the curl-flat defender, and the crosser comes back across behind the Will's flow.
- Unsuccessful: the end squeezes down the line but looks for the guard. He sees Moss pull, stops chasing, and turns to the quarterback, so the boot becomes a contained rollout. If the Will reads the pull and doesn't flow, he sits in the crosser's lane.
That is Russ's "force, flatten, chase," with the rule that kept the chase honest.
B7. It is a tite front, 4i–0–4i: both tackles on the inside shoulders of the offensive tackles, and the nose head-up on the center (a 0). The 4i is already inside the offensive tackle and squeezes, so the reach is impossible. The 0 nose demands two blockers, so the center needs the guard's help, and the combination that should free a climber never releases anyone. The linebacker scrapes over the top untouched. Nobody missed an assignment. The front's whole purpose is to make the reach impossible and the climb late. The answers in section 29.9 are other runs: the early-down Wide-to-Duo check and Counter away from Harlan.
Part C. Every C item has a short answer in the chapter. The standard is evidence before the call: the chase count (two chases on the drive) for a boot, a committed safety for Yankee, and a box of seven or fewer for another Wide. Extension for C1: say what you'd call if the booth had said "End squeezed and looked." The answer is Naked or another Wide, because the cutback just got bigger.
D1. Model answer. "The boot's average is not a property of the boot. It's the price of the runs before it. Every Wide that makes the backside end chase is a deposit, and every boot is a withdrawal. Marisol's table shows the difference: 10.2 yards a call after two or more chases, 4.5 after one, and 1.8 when the end never chased. Make the boot the base pass and you call it before the deposits are made. The end stops chasing, squeezes, and looks for the guard. You'll have more calls in the bottom row and fewer in the top. Then the run gets worse too, because a defense that isn't chasing stops being moved by Wide."
What a strong answer includes: the selection logic (the average describes calls made after the evidence); the named defender, the backside end, and his key changing from the ball to the guard; the 24-call sample caveat; and a rule, the chase count, in place of a frequency target.
M5. After the rotation the middle of the field is closed (single-high), and the strong safety has been pulled toward the jet. That makes the jet fake with Wide away possible ("Eleven, Under Doubles Right, H Jet, Wide Left"). The run goes to the side the rotation thinned out, with the nickel gone with the motion. The rotation takes away running toward the jet, the sweep or a Wide to that side, because that side just gained a defender. It also takes away any post meant to split two safeties. The chapter's rule from section 29.7 is to make the defense run before the snap, then go where it ran from.
Chapter 30 — The Air Raid
Exercises: Chapter 30
A4. A conversion rule tells a receiver what his route becomes against man and against zone, decided after the snap, so the receiver reads the coverage along with the quarterback.
- Mesh: the crossers keep running against man, away from their defenders, and settle in the window between linebackers against zone.
- Stick: the #3 receiver pushes to 5 or 6 yards and sits facing the quarterback against zone, or breaks away from his defender against man. On third down the stick sits at the sticks, so on third-and-6 it sits at 7.
A9. A poach is Quarters' answer to Trips Y Cross. The backside safety ignores the lone receiver on his side, reads #3, and drives down into the lane where the cross is supposed to land. The backside receiver's corner pays for it. Sutton's post (or an X Fade tag) becomes one-on-one with no safety in the middle. If the backside receiver can beat that corner, the poach is a gift. If he can't, it's a wall.
B1. Two defenders within a yard of the mesh point, both moving laterally with the crossers, means man coverage. That is the film-room count from section 30.3: two means man, one or zero means zone. The over crosser's decision to sit at 6 was wrong. Against man, the crossers keep running away from their defenders, and a crosser who sits lets his trailing defender catch up to the throw.
B2. It is Stick against Cover 3. The nickel is the curl/flat defender, and he has widened with Powers's flat, so the ball goes to the #3 receiver's stick at 6, inside him. The strong safety at hook depth was the one defender who could have helped, and he has stepped outside. Section 30.5 notes that the strong safety "has to keep from sliding outside." Once he does, the stick has a clean window between the nickel and the linebackers.
Part C. Every C item has a short answer in the chapter. The standard is that the call follows the defense's answer, not the concept's reputation. In C5 the poach creates the backside matchup. In C7 the wrong personnel creates the tempo snap. Extension for C1: say what changes if Teo's one thing is "Corners pressed." The answer is that "Kill, kill" to Mesh becomes likely before the snap.
D3. Model answer. A lean (13 of 18 Y Cross calls against single-high, five explosives) belongs on the call sheet as a placement, not a rule. Put Y Cross in the third-and-long box with a note that it's the first call against one-high, and pair it in a Kill with the two-high answer, so the defense's shell picks the play. Don't print it as "always vs. single-high," and don't let it crowd out the man-beater. What would make it a rule: more calls (dozens, not eighteen) across several opponents, with the result holding when you sort by down, distance, and protection, plus defender-level evidence that the single-high safety can't get to the landing spot. Even then it carries a "since" date, because the defense reads its own film too.
What a strong answer includes: the count written as a count; the difference between a lean and a rule stated in terms of sample size and selection; a concrete place on the sheet; and a re-check condition.
M2. In the Air Raid, the receiver carries the man-or-zone decision: the shallow keeps running against man and settles against zone. Austin moved that decision into the call. Shallow is the man-first version, where the shallow never settles. Drive is the zone-first version, where the dig reads the hook defender. Both are "shallow plus dig, sides set by the call." The conversion rule still exists, but the play caller and the quarterback make it before the snap by choosing the word, often in a Kill pair or after motion has answered the question. Receivers run one version cleanly instead of carrying two. The cost is that a wrong pre-snap diagnosis puts the right route on the wrong coverage. That is why the post-snap check still matters.
Chapter 31 — The Quarterback Revolution
Exercises: Chapter 31
A3. The three taxes from section 31.1:
| Tax | What the defense does | What it gives up | What you attack |
|---|---|---|---|
| Box tax | Adds a defender to the run fit (a safety down or a nickel in the box) | A coverage player, often leaving a single-high shell | Play-action and RPO throws behind the extra man |
| Rush tax | Rushes in lanes: contain-first, no inside counters | Sacks and wins, because rushers can't use their best moves | Time to throw: deep concepts and double moves |
| Spy tax | Assigns a defender to mirror the quarterback | A coverage defender or a rusher | Crossers through the spy's area, and the matchup he left |
Good defenses choose which tax to pay by down and distance.
A7. Vance's three finish rules: get down before the second defender arrives; never lower your head into a safety; and outside the 10, the first down is enough. They govern scrambles, which don't count against the budget, so Rome still charts how every scramble ends (slide, sideline, or hit).
B2. The linebacker is spying. He is square at six yards, mirroring Vance's slide, neither dropping nor rushing. With the back staying in to block, the most likely version is a green-dog spy: a man defender on the running back whose rule is "Back blocks, you spy." To confirm it, release the back on the next third-and-long. If the same linebacker runs with Ruffin, he's a green dog, and the release has taken the spy away (he must cover). If he still mirrors the quarterback and someone else picks up the back, he's a dedicated spy, and the defense paid with a coverage player.
B6. Rollins won his rep, because his inside spin beat Achterberg's deep, wide kick. But the spin opened a door on the left, and Vance stepped through it for 12 on 3rd-and-11, so the defense lost the down. The rule that would have prevented it is the Lanes rule Sacramento used in Game 2: edges turn at the quarterback's depth, and inside counters come only after the quarterback has set his feet. A contain-first rusher gives up the win so the quarterback never gets a door.
Part C. Every C item has a worked short answer in the chapter. The standard is to count before you call. Box defenders against blockers, with and without the read (C1). Which defender the counter beats and which it loses to (C8). Whether a carry is worth the budget it spends (C6). Extension for C1: name the RPO that attacks the eighth defender without spending a carry, for example Inside Slant against a Will who triggers, and say what the read defender is.
D2. Model answer. "Coach, his yards per designed carry are higher partly because we ration them. We call them against the best looks: light boxes, a crashing end, the red zone, and a defense that hasn't seen one in a while. Double the calls and we'd be calling them against worse looks, so the average will fall (it's the selection trap from Chapter 28). The number also leaves out the bill. Rome's card has a Hits column, and a quarterback hit while throwing counts too. Before I'd agree, I want three things. How many hits per game he's taking now, running and throwing. What our designed runs average when the defense expects one. And who plays quarterback in January if the extra carries cost us a game of his. I'd rather keep three as the regular-season budget and spend up to five in the playoffs with your sign-off, which is the deal we have."
What a strong answer includes: the selection problem behind yards per carry; the hit count as the real constraint; the season-long view (January, not Sunday); and a specific counter-proposal instead of a flat no.
M1. Chapter 12's idea is that a read "blocks" a defender by making him wrong whichever way he goes. The quarterback leaves the end unblocked and lets the end's choice decide where the ball goes. A spy is the defense's version. Instead of blocking or covering a player, it assigns a defender to the quarterback's decision: if he runs, the spy is there. The costs are not symmetrical. The read costs the offense nothing, because the blocker it frees goes to another defender, and the unblocked end is beaten by a choice. The dedicated spy costs the defense a whole coverage player (often the short-middle defender who robs crossers), and that is why crossers through the spy's area punish it. The exception is the green-dog spy, which is nearly free when the back stays in. That is why releasing the back is the answer.
Chapter 32 — Tempo and the Clock
Exercises: Chapter 32
A4. The four taxes from section 32.3:
| Tax | What tempo takes from the defense | What limits it |
|---|---|---|
| Personnel | The ability to match your personnel and rest its rotation | A no-substitution base package that can play anything, usually nickel |
| The call | The size of the menu; complex pressures and disguises need time | A short tempo list of one-word calls |
| The legs | Rest between snaps, especially for linemen | Rotation plans built around windows, plus conditioning |
| The disguise | Time to show one look and play another | Starting every tempo call from one shell, so the shell tells you nothing |
A5. Tempo costs the offense its own substitutions, its time to call (no real quiet window), its own legs (the line runs 30 yards after every big gain too), its motion and pre-snap information, a short menu that can be scouted, and its own defense's rest. The last one lands on another unit. A fast three-and-out sends the defense back out in under a minute of game clock. The head coach owns the whole team's snap budget, so that cost is his call, not the coordinator's. That is why "our own defense just played a long drive" is one of the Fast vetoes.
B3. (a) The linemen are waiting because the offense didn't substitute, so the defense has no guaranteed window to substitute. Coming on now risks twelve men on the field, or getting caught mid-change. (b) The offense has refused to substitute, which freezes the personnel tax. (c) If every fast call starts from the same two-high shell, the shell tells the quarterback nothing about the coverage. The answer is a play that decides by itself after the snap, a post-snap read like the packaged Inside Slant on Fast row #1. That is fast-test question 3.
B5. Snapping at :12, :11, :09, and :10 against a target of :03 left 9 + 8 + 6 + 7 = 30 seconds unspent over four snaps, close to a full extra snap's worth of game clock handed back to the opponent. The chart says the team is in a hurry it doesn't need. Four-minute card rule 5 is "use the whole play clock," and the Outlaws' "Slow" word (snap at :03 to :02) exists because of exactly this habit, the fast reflex from section 32.8.
Part C. C1–C4, C6, and C7 have short answers in the chapter. The standard: name the trigger or the veto before you name the play, and do clock arithmetic in actual seconds (the 40-second play clock against the game clock and the two-minute warning). C2's lesson is the one players resist most: no Fast with a fourth-quarter lead, even against a gassed dime.
C5 (worked answer). One model: "Gun Doubles Right, 60 Left, Hitches" on the Fast row.
- Pre-snap against two-high: hitches at 6 by both #1 receivers, with the slots on seams or flats.
- Post-snap, coverage 1 (Quarters stays two-high): the corners are off at 8. Throw the hitch to the side with the bigger cushion, in front of the corner.
- Post-snap, coverage 2 (rotation to Cover 3): the strong safety drops into the right curl area and the corners bail. Throw the hitch away from the rotated-down defender, to the left.
The fast test:
- Two signs and one word: a formation sign and a play sign to the receivers, plus "Sixty" to the line.
- A picture we've shown: only if Doubles Right is already on the series.
- Decides by itself: the cushion rule pre-snap and the side away from the rotation post-snap both belong to Vance.
- One more rusher: the ball is out in about a second, so it's its own hot.
- No sub: any Eleven grouping can run it.
The weakness to admit is press-man. The corners squat on the hitch and nobody is behind them, so Slants on row 5 stays the better pressure call.
D1. Model answer.
- For the timeout: it keeps time on the clock in case the punt pins Sacramento and its offense goes three-and-out, so Austin gets one more possession with a chance at points.
- For letting the play clock run nearly out: Sacramento had its own timeouts and the half's clock to drive, and in the actual game it kicked a field goal to go up 13–10. Taking the timeout gave Sacramento's offense the same seconds it bought for Austin.
- The card process: before the third-down snap, decide what happens on fourth. That is Chapter 26's "4th: P / K / G" rule. Then decide whether the punt runs the clock or saves it, using four inputs: your punter's net (a long punt makes the timeout safer), your defense's two-minute record, their kicker's range from where the punt lands, and your own offense's end-of-half success.
- My lean: with a tied score, a road game, and a defense facing a quarterback comfortable in two-minute, run the clock and punt. Save the timeout for the defense to use after a first-down completion.
What a strong answer includes: both cases priced in seconds; the recognition that a timeout helps whichever team has the ball next; the decision moved before the third-down snap; and no grading of the choice by Sacramento's field goal alone.
M5. On 3rd-and-5 at the STL 43, about 2:43 left, St. Louis was out of timeouts.
- Power Left: convert, and the game is effectively over (the clock runs to the warning, then three kneels). Fail, and you punt with the clock still running, so St. Louis gets the ball back with about two minutes, no timeouts, and needing a touchdown.
- Quick pass: convert, same result. Fail, and an incompletion stops the clock and saves St. Louis about forty seconds, while a sack also costs field position.
Even if the pass converts slightly more often, its failure branch is much more expensive. A call is a bet on a distribution, and here the run's worst outcome was cheaper than the pass's typical failure. Wade's "Run it" bought a cheap failure, and Power Left gained six.
Chapter 33 — Trick Plays and Gadgets
Exercises: Chapter 33
A2. The parent play is the normal play a gadget impersonates. The reverse is only as good as your jet sweep, and the flea flicker is only as good as your inside zone. A reverse with no jet in the offense fools nobody, because the defense has never been taught anything to unlearn. Nobody has chased a jet they've never seen. A reverse off a jet you run every week punishes a habit the jet itself created. The chase works so often on the parent play that the backside end stops believing the reverse is real.
A4. These are the three conditions from section 33.2:
- The habit is on film, above the line. That means about 70% on ten or more snaps, from the last four games, in the situation you'll call it. Without it you're building on a lean, and the defender simply doesn't do the thing the play punishes.
- The situation pays for the risk. Call it on first down or second-and-short between the 35s, or where the conventional play's odds are poor anyway. Without it, a loss turns a likely first down into a punt from your own end zone.
- You can afford to fail, and you've practiced enough that you won't. Without it, the exchange hits the ground, and a failed gadget hands the other coordinator a story to tell at the next timeout.
B1. (a) The left end chases flat down the line toward the jet. Kittredge's version was 19 of 23. (b) The corner bails to his deep third, and the Will scrapes with the jet, so nobody on that side stays home. Kittredge's evidence on the gadget card listed the corner bailing 21 of 23 and the Will scraping 20 of 23. (c) The Z Reverse. Don't call it if any of these is true:
- The in-game trigger hasn't appeared, meaning he hasn't chased your first two jets today.
- The end is pinched tight to the tackle, which is the kill.
- It's third down, you're backed up inside your 20, it's raining, or the opponent just took a timeout. All four are on the card's "Never" row.
B8. He is now following the oldest trick rule there is, "Squeeze, then look for the reverse before you chase." That's Kittredge after Week 13: two steps down the line, then a look back. A change like that usually means someone ran a reverse at him, or his staff installed the rule for a team that has one. Either way, recent opponents have taught him. For you the conclusion is the same: the reverse is probably dead against him, and the parent play is alive. An end who stands still can't run the jet down, which is how Austin's next jet gained eleven.
Part C (short answers in the chapter). Grade every C item on whether you named the victim, the habit, the count, and the window, which are the gadget card's middle rows. A gadget answer with no named defender fails, however clever the drawing.
- C1 extension: what to watch on the second jet. The tackle doesn't matter. In Week 13, Kittredge caught the second jet after three yards, and that still counted as the trigger, because he chased.
- C3 extension: list the Philly Special's eligibility check and the "twelve clean in a row" rule before the fourth-down argument.
- C6: the standard is treating a contradicted habit as unconfirmed rather than calling the gadget on the strength of last month's film.
D6. Model answer. The reverse's job was not to gain 31 yards. Its job was to make the jet sweep work against anyone who had watched that film. Kittredge had made tackles from behind on the jet, and after the reverse he stopped and looked back, so the next plain jet gained eleven. A gadget's value includes the habit it breaks and the parent play it frees. You can measure it partly. Teo already charts the victim's behavior (chases per jet), so Marisol can compare the chase rate and the parent play's yards per call before and after the gadget, with sample sizes stated. With five gadgets in a season, the results are stories, not proof. The behavioral change is the cleaner signal, because it's charted on every parent snap, not just the five gadget snaps.
What a strong answer includes:
- The idea that the gadget's real payoff arrives on later snaps.
- A process measure, such as the victim's charted habit, rather than only the gadget's own yards.
- Honest caveats about tiny samples.
- Awareness that a defender can stop chasing for other reasons, such as a new trick rule from his own staff.
M1. The "two receipts" rule (Chapter 19) says call play-action only after the defense has "paid" for two same-look runs. A gadget card's in-game trigger is the same logic. The Week 13 reverse needed Kittredge to chase Austin's first two jets in that game, on top of 19 of 23 on film. A gadget can reasonably demand more receipts than play-action for three reasons:
- It pays more when right and costs more when wrong, because of exchange risk, losses of five or more yards, and the gift of confidence a failed gadget hands the other side.
- Its window is narrower, since it is banned on third down and when backed up.
- Once called, it's gone for weeks. The card retires it for four weeks.
Play-action can be called again next series. A gadget is a one-time purchase, so you confirm the price before you pay.
Chapter 34 — Installing the Offense
Exercises: Chapter 34
A1. These are the definitions from section 34.1:
- Installation is teaching new material until every player can say back what he does and why.
- Practice is repetition at speed until nobody has to think about the parts he shouldn't be thinking about.
- Rehearsal is practicing the exact test you will be given: this opponent, this week's calls, this tempo.
- Walkthrough is a no-speed rehearsal to check alignment, assignment, and communication without spending legs.
Mills was installed, practiced, and walked through. What was missing was rehearsal of the real test. Card T-9 showed two safeties staying high, and Keon Ashby asked "you want me to spin?" and was told no. Austin rehearsed a test with one answer and then took a test with two.
A8. From least to most contact, the rungs are walk, on air, thud, control ("tag"), and live. Quarterbacks stay above all of it. They wear red no-contact jerseys every day of the year, in camp, in goal-line, and in blitz pickup. When a scout rusher comes free, he runs past, and the coach blows the play dead and calls it a sack. The quarterback's health is worth more than any rep's realism.
B2. It breaks the first scout-card rule: one arrow per defender. Give a scout player two options and he picks the easier one, so the rep rehearses a coin flip nobody plays. Split it into two cards:
- T-31a: "NICKEL DROPS TO HOOK; 4-MAN RUSH." Show this on the share of reps the film supports (frequency matches the film).
- T-31b: "NICKEL BLITZES OFF THE EDGE; HE IS THE HOT." Grade the back's scan and the quarterback's hot throw on this card.
Name the nickel by number on both cards, and give depths in numbers ("1H @ 12").
B5. The offense rehearses inside zone against the safety's habit. The card has the safety wearing 31 trigger downhill at the mesh, the way Holloway did on 15 of 21 Week 6 triggers. That teaches the line and Ruffin where the extra run defender comes from, and it teaches Vance and Gaines what the play-action picture looks like when the safety bites. In the fourth quarter of Game 1, that habit produced Anchor D: two Inside runs as Holloway filled, then "Inside PA, Gaines Post" for 35 behind him.
Part C (short answers in the chapter). Hold every C item to reps per call. An answer that adds a call without naming where its reps come from fails.
- C1 extension: any call that ends the week with neither a rep nor a walked rep comes off the sheet. That's "rep it or cut it."
- C2: the standard is that the question-mark card matches the regular card's pre-snap picture exactly. A different pre-snap picture rehearses recognition of the wrong thing.
- C3: the answer must honor "no new protections after Friday" and still give Vance a recognition rep.
D3. Model answer. Both are right about different levels, and the variable that decides it is reps per call (section 34.9). At the NFL level, about one and a half full-speed reps per call per week is just enough, because veterans carry years of reps of the same concepts. Volume is affordable, and some breadth keeps a defense from taking away the one thing you do. At the high-school level, a junior carries one or two seasons, so he needs many more reps per call. Fifteen plays from three formations executed perfectly will beat sixty half-known plays almost every Friday. The line coach's sentence is the high-school rule, and a sound NFL rule as well whenever the line is young.
What a strong answer includes:
- The reps-per-call ratio rather than a raw play count.
- The point that volume belongs on the surface (formations, tags) while the blocking rules underneath stay few.
- Recognition that the right answer changes with level and with the experience of the five linemen.
- Gus's test, "What do my five do differently?", as the way to price an addition.
M4. The week could have tested "Rule four covers" with a single rep in which the scout safety spun to the middle at the snap. That rep would show whether Vance, seeing the middle close, actually threw the ball he knew. Instead the week confirmed Lyle's answer by never asking the question. Card T-9 kept the safeties high, Ashby was told "stay high," and Mills went six-for-six on Thursday with four would-be touchdowns. A rehearsal that never shows the break can only agree with you. Austin made two changes afterward. Every streak now gets a question-mark card, and Vance's spring rule, "Show me the spin on Thursday, or don't call it on Sunday," means one third-and-long rep in three rotates.
Chapter 35 — Managing the Quarterback
Exercises: Chapter 35
A2. These are the grants on the authority map (section 35.1), with the one thing the quarterback may not do under each:
| Grant | What he may not do |
|---|---|
| Alert | Take the shot because he likes it |
| Kill | Invent a Play C |
| Check | Call a play that isn't on the week's three-play menu |
| Zero bin | Use it against anything but Cover 0 |
| Protection ID | Change the play to fix the protection |
| Timeouts | Spend one to argue (Wade owns them; Darius may call one only to save a delay or a busted call) |
Above all of it sits "no full audibles."
A8. Rule four, "the free square," fires only when the quarterback is in doubt about the middle. On the Mills snap, the scouting page, the scout team, the Friday stills, and the plan had all told Vance the two-high shell would hold. He wasn't in doubt. He was sure ("No. I was sure."). A safety net that depends on feeling uncertain can't catch a mistake the plan made him certain about. That's why the fix went into the call.
B1. (a) Two-high rotated to single-high: the strong safety came down, and the far safety spun to the middle. That's Cover 3. (b) The dig is open, underneath the new middle safety. The post now runs straight into him. (c) By his third step. The middle-read tag puts his eyes on the deep middle at step 1, and by step 3 he knows open or closed.
B2. It's the double-A mug with a corner fire. The second end walking outside the left tackle is the Game 2 picture. The post-Week 15 answer is center on the Mike (Bell), Ruffin on the other A-gap backer (Ames), right tackle widens to the corner (Simmons), with "assume one drops." The hot is the ball. The receiver whose corner fired, Gaines in Game 3, converts to a sight-adjust 6-yard hitch into the space the corner left. Both statements are true: the RT widens, and the corner is your hot.
Part C.
- C1, C2, C4, C7, C8 (short answers in the chapter): the standard is the ownership ledger and the authority map. Every sideline sentence must be specific and true, and every line-of-scrimmage decision must sit inside a written grant.
C3 (worked). Against Cover 1, the Y Cross design from Chapter 30 is: Harlan crosses climbing toward about 16, Sutton runs the backside post, Gaines runs the go, and Powers runs the flat. When Vance escapes right at 3.2 seconds, the routes apply Rome's rules:
- Rule 1, deep goes short: Gaines stops his go and comes back toward Vance.
- Rule 1, short goes deep: Powers turns his flat up the sideline.
- Rule 2, work to the QB's side: Harlan stops crossing away and works back toward the right.
- Rule 3, find grass, show hands: everyone settles in open space facing Vance.
- Rule 4, the throw-away: if the middle is in doubt and nobody is clean, label the throw-away out of bounds. It's legal only if Vance is outside the tackle box and the ball reaches the line of scrimmage.
C5 (worked). A model eight-line page:
- Two-high on early downs is Quarters; the dig and the out are our money throws.
- Third-and-long: eyes to the middle on step 1. Middle open by step 3, throw the post. Middle closed, never the post: throw the dig, then the flat or the back. (This is the post-snap branch.)
- Double-A mug on 3rd-and-7+: center on the Mike, back on the other A-gap backer, RT widens. Assume one drops.
- Corner fires: the sight-adjust hitch is the hot.
- Quiet front, two-high on third-and-long: assume a third of them rotate.
- Zero is the bin, top-left on Blue.
- In doubt anywhere: rule four.
- Their rat sits at five, so climb with your eyes up.
C6 (worked). (a) Two-high holds. At step 1 his eyes go to the deep middle, which is empty. At step 3 it's still open, so he throws the post between the safeties. (b) Rotation. At step 1 his eyes are on the middle and the spinning safety is arriving. At step 3 it's closed, so it's never the post. He throws the dig underneath that safety, then the flat or the back.
C9 (worked). The scout edges take wide arcs past the launch point (about 7 yards). A scout linebacker either sits at about 5 as the rat or rushes late through an A gap. Vance climbs into the front door. If the rat sat and then dropped, he throws on the climb. If the rat came, he tucks and slides. The first-rep coaching point: "Climb with your eyes up and a reason!"
D4. Model answer. The colleague confuses two audiences. In public, protect the quarterback without lying: "I put him in that spot, and we'll be better at it." The ledger forbids taking all the blame in the room, because "Never take his half away" exists for a reason. Absolving him removes the lesson and teaches him that owning a mistake gets him rescued instead of coached. In the room, Lyle says his half first and makes it specific ("The box had no branch. That's mine"). He never gives Vance that half, and he doesn't take Vance's half away either.
What a strong answer includes:
- The difference between the media sentence and the room sentence.
- The ledger's principles named.
- The ledger's purpose: keep the quarterback's "sensor" working, since he is the only one who sees the defense from where the ball is.
- The rule that the same ledger applies in wins (the Game 2 sack: "Me. Not the call. The rules.").
M1. On the Game 2 sack, Vance executed the old mug rule perfectly ("I did it right, Coach"). Six-man, back on the Mike, and a 3-technique dropped into the hot window: "6 blockers + 1 ball = 7. Russ made it 4 + 0." In Game 3's Anchor C, the same quarterback executed the new rule perfectly: center on Bell, Ruffin on Ames, RT wide, and Gaines's sight-adjust. The result was zero free rushers and +10. The rules changed, not the quarterback. Because the quarterback is part of the protection arithmetic, a perfect quarterback inside a bad rule still gets sacked.
Chapter 36 — Halftime Adjustments
Exercises: Chapter 36
A3. These are the five kinds of problem from section 36.3, each with the fix that usually answers it:
| Kind of problem | Usual fix |
|---|---|
| A defender | A tag or help rule (chip, slide, double), or a call that uses his aggressiveness |
| A structure | A formation or personnel change that alters what the structure must cover |
| A price (they're letting it work) | A double move or shot built off what they're conceding |
| A tendency they caught | Break it: same look with a different play, or a new look for the same play |
| Execution | Coaching, not scheme: one sentence to one player |
A5. The triage filter asks five questions:
- Is it a pattern or a play?
- Who has to change?
- Can we say it in words we already have?
- What does it cost?
- What will they do to it?
Question 5 was missing in Sacramento. Lyle filled in that column only in the spring. Because nobody asked it, the third-and-long protection rules (a tendency the Sentinels had a season of film on and hadn't tested yet) went untouched. Russ's third change, the mug corner fire on 3rd-and-7+, met nothing on Austin's side and produced the sack at 6:51 of the third quarter.
B3. It's a double-A mug that fires both linebackers and drops the 3-technique into the field slot's hot window, with two safeties still deep: a simulated pressure. It attacks the habit of throwing hot to the slot off an A-gap blitz, and the protection habit of sending the back to the Mike. It's both a game-plan call and a halftime adjustment. The call existed on Tuesday. Holding it until the first third-and-long of the second half is the halftime decision, Russ's "I fix what you're going to keep doing."
B6. It's a targeted halftime change. The defense leaves the early downs alone, where nothing was hurting it badly, and spends its one new idea where the offense has a habit worth attacking. Keeping everything else the same hides the change until the snap that counts. It also denies the offense any early-down evidence to adjust to, so the first sign of the change is the first third-and-8 of the half. That's the Week 15 pattern exactly.
Part C.
- C1–C7 (short answers in the chapter): grade on the triage filter. Every change needs an owner, existing words, a written cost, and a guess at the reply.
- C6 extension: subtracting the move-the-back rule doesn't make the protection perfect. It moves the free man to a place the quarterback can see.
C8 (worked). A model first call: "Eleven, Gun Doubles Right, 60 Left, Hitches, X Fade", the same 2x2 picture used all first half.
- Off coverage: the Z and H hitches at 6 beat a corner sitting at seven or eight yards.
- Press: Sutton's fade, with a back-shoulder throw, is the route that beats a pressed corner. That was the one first-half explosive in Week 15.
- Quarterback's rule: read the X-side corner before the snap. Pressed, throw the fade or back-shoulder. Off, throw the hitch.
📊 The flanker and slot run hitches at six yards, the split end releases outside on a fade, and the quarterback's pre-snap look at the corner's depth picks the side. The call confirms the prediction (are they pressing?) and has an answer either way.
D1. Model answer. Yes, vary it, but rarely. Sixteen rushes, two pressures, and no sacks says the chip did its job. Still, a help side the defense can predict is a tendency, and the triage filter wrote the cost down in advance: Ruffin is late into his routes, and "our help has a side." A sensible split is to chip Rollins on most long downs and flip the back away on one or two, with the slide set toward Rollins so Achterberg still gets help inside. Varying costs something. On the flipped snaps, Achterberg is alone against a rusher who already had five pressures on 17. And any change gives Russ a fresh look to answer. What it buys is that the chip stays a question for the defense rather than a fact.
What a strong answer includes:
- The chip's numbers read as success, not as proof of safety.
- Recognition that a predictable help side is information the other coordinator can use.
- A specific, limited variation with its cost named.
- A note that the Sluggo TD in Q4 came with Ruffin on Rollins's side. The chip side was also where the play was built.
M2. The quick game wins because Vance knows before the snap where the ball goes and gets it out at about 1.0–1.3 seconds. Russ's two changes didn't stop it. They made it slower to read, with press and rotation each on about half of early downs. A change on every snap is a fact. The quarterback learns it and adjusts his pre-snap answer. A change on half the snaps is a question, and he has to confirm the cushion and the rotation after the snap. That confirmation eats the clock Russ was betting would run out first. The quick out went for +4 instead of a free six.
Chapter 37 — The Coaching Career
Exercises: Chapter 37
A3. The rule from section 37.2: a move across ladders is almost always a trade of title for learning, or learning for title.
- (a) Lyle's move from college OC to NFL QC traded title for learning: his biggest title for the steepest curve he'd been on.
- (b) Teo's move from NFL QC to FCS passing-game coordinator trades learning for title: the NFL's learning curve for a title and a room of his own.
- (c) An NFL quarterbacks coach becoming a college OC trades learning for title: a bigger title and the chance to call plays sooner.
- (d) A high-school head coach becoming a college GA trades title for learning: down to the bottom rung, paid mostly in access.
A10. These are the four job questions:
- What will I learn there that I can't learn here?
- Who will I learn it from, and how secure is he?
- Who else does this move?
- Can I come back?
The rule on top of all four: never take a job to get away from one. Take it to get toward something.
B1. (a) Four down, Mike, Sam, and the strong safety over the tight end make seven. The apex Will counts as a half, so it's seven and a half. Wade called it eight because the Will will play the run like he's eight. (b) The Will. (c) His run fit and the slant window behind him. That's why the answer is Inside Slant: if he fits the run, the slant is behind him; if he sits, it's five blockers on five.
B2. Not the same one. The Will is out of conflict, because the inside-leverage nickel owns the slant window. But the nickel has taken himself out of the run fit, so the box is lighter and the space outside him is soft. Lyle's interview answer: run the ball into the seven-man box with a back you trust, or tag the bubble outside the nickel. The defense moved a different defender into or out of the conflict, so you change the read before you change the play.
Part C (answers in the chapter). Hold every C item to the standard Wade graded on the whiteboard and Lyle used with Teo: run all four questions out loud, name the one fact you'd want before signing, and volunteer the weakness of your own choice.
- C2 extension: "make your work visible" this year means sending the college staff your cut-ups now, so you're someone they've already seen next spring.
- C7: the decisive detail is that B flagged his own false tell. That's the trait a QC exists for.
D2. Model answer. Mostly a career failure that showed up as a scheme failure. Year one worked because the novelty was real. Then defenses played deep, and he had no next play. He abandoned the run, and his pocket quarterback took sacks. That was a scheme problem, but a solvable one. The career failure was refusing feedback. After the firing, he wanted to talk about officiating, injuries, and his quarterback, and only at the long dinner did he look at his own film the way he looked at everyone else's. "The firing is not the end of a career. The refusal to learn from it usually is." After year one, I'd have told him this: "They'll study this film all spring. Write down the three answers they'll bring, and build the next play for each before camp."
What a strong answer includes:
- The scheme evidence: defenses played deep, the run was abandoned, the sacks piled up.
- Chapter 1's point that novelty expires and volatility is not a philosophy.
- The distinction between losing a job and failing to learn from it.
- Advice that is a process ("build the next play"), not a pep talk.
M1. Chapter 23's Week 6 page found two tells: Vo creeping in means he's coming (9 of 12), and Royce on the boundary hash spins to the middle (17 of 22). Both were gone by Week 10. A tell is evidence with a shelf life, and the defense is studying the same film. The "since" date tells the reader how old the evidence is and whether the defense has had time to see it, which became the rule after the divisional loss: every row gets a "since" date. A candidate who leaves it off is treating a tendency as a permanent fact. That is exactly how Austin got to 29 straight, and the fix is "Never let a tendency outlive its evidence."
Chapter 38 — The Complete Offense
Exercises: Chapter 38
A1. These are the three terms from section 38.1:
- A base play is cheap, sound against most of what the defense does, and something your players can run in their sleep.
- A defensive answer is what a good defense does once the base play works. Usually that means giving one defender a second job or adding one more defender where the play hurts.
- A constraint play looks like the base play as long as possible, then goes to the place the answer emptied.
One family: Inside (base), Holloway filling the alley (answer), and "Inside PA, Gaines Post" (constraint) on the Anchor D drive.
A5. These are the four beats, with what each replaces:
- Name both throws in the huddle ("Open, post. Closed, dig."). This replaces picking the throw from the pre-snap shell.
- Eyes to the grass on the first step: the empty space between where the safeties stood. This replaces reading the shell and then going to a receiver.
- Declare open or closed on the third step. This replaces a pre-snap "two-high" nobody re-checks.
- Throw on rhythm. Open means the concept's normal read. Closed means never the post: the closed throw, then rule four. This replaces rule four as the only safety net.
B1. (a) Inside zone right from the one picture. (b) The field safety triggering downhill at the handoff, Holloway's answer. (c) Play-action off identical inside-zone action with the post behind him, "Inside PA, Gaines Post." (d) Inside zone again. After being burned, the safety will hesitate, and a hesitating safety is late to the alley. That's snap 4 of Anchor D, Ruffin's 4-yard TD. "Every play is the answer to the defense's answer."
B4. A chase on four straight snaps is a habit, not a law, and the defense can turn it into bait. Two ways it happens:
- He found a key. In the Outlaws' boot convention, the boot-side guard pulls. An end coached to chase unless the guard pulls toward him will chase every true run and stay home on every boot. That's a key that lies, the defensive version of Lyle's line. Teo's "chases twice" count only measures the chase. It can't see the end's key.
- The odds caught up. Marisol's boot table is an average: about 10.2 yards a call after two chases, 4.5 after one, 1.8 after none. Those numbers describe a distribution. Even a well-earned boot loses some of the time.
The fix is to check what the end looks at, not only how often he chases.
Part C (answers in the chapter). Grade every C item with the System Map test: "every arrow needs a play at both ends." An answer must name the defensive answer, the defender, and the play that punishes him, plus what you'll call if he does the other thing.
- C2 extension: against single-high, the Glance's shorter window is usually the better first price than the post, which runs toward the middle safety.
- C4: the standard is that the tagged call must stay right even if the tendency holds. That's "one drop, two answers."
D1. Model answer.
- "Coach, plain Inside from Gun Doubles is about zero expected points over 58 calls. But the RPOs from the same picture are about +0.19 and the play-action about +0.41, and the family as a whole is about +0.12."
- "Those children only work because the plain run makes Holloway fill. Teo has him on film triggering 15 of 21, and if we cut the parent, the children lose the thing they imitate."
- "Let's grade the Inside family as one ledger, the way we've done since midseason, and watch the defender's feet."
What would change my mind: if the charted defender stops reacting to the plain run (no trigger, so no receipt), or if the children stay positive while plain-run volume drops. Either would mean the parent isn't paying for them. "If you can't show that defender's feet, the average wins."
What a strong answer includes:
- Grading the family, not the play.
- Naming the specific defender whose behavior links the plays.
- Real numbers with their sample size (58 calls).
- A falsifiable condition for changing course.
M1. As a map row it reads: defensive answer, load the box (eight); what it gives up, the space the eighth man left; punishing play, Inside Slant / Inside Glance. Seven or fewer, the arrow points to the handoff. Eight, it points to the throw. A defense that becomes eight only after the snap breaks the pre-snap count: Vance counts seven, hands off, and the eighth arrives from depth. The map needs a new arrow whose play reads the post-snap trigger. That means play-action from the same picture behind the triggering safety (Anchor D's Holloway from 10–11 yards), or an RPO that reads that safety at the mesh (Duo Pop reads Holloway). If those plays are missing, the arrow is empty.
Chapter 39 — Capstone: Your Offensive System
Exercises: Chapter 39
A2. These are the three tests from section 39.1:
- Napkin test (philosophy): every play in the core answers to the philosophy, and a play that doesn't serve the thesis needs a written reason to stay.
- Parent test (system): every play shares a parent picture with at least one other play and has a partner it sets up or is set up by. A play with neither is an orphan, and orphans become tells.
- Receipt test (the week): every game-plan box traces back to a row on the scouting report or self-scout. Otherwise it's a favorite, not a plan.
A5. A zero is a personnel group that never runs a whole family of plays (Marisol's "kill the zeros"). The defense can rule that family out the moment the group runs on. An accepted zero has one written line on the back of the matrix. Twenty-one's reads: "A run group by design; we accept that the defense knows it, and we win with Power and Power PA." An accepted zero is a tell you've decided to live with. An unwritten one is a tell you don't know you have, like Twelve's season with zero RPOs.
B3. The missing row is the last one in the Game 3 contingency table, which was left blank: "Rotate out of two-high on 3rd-and-7+ from a quiet front." In the "instead of" column it should read "staying two-high." In the plan column: "Middle-read tag on every deep-middle call. Closed means never the post: the dig, then the flat or the back." A third-long box that covers "quiet front" and "mug" but not "quiet front that spins" has an empty arrow exactly where a 29-snap streak tempts the defense to spend it.
B5. A prepared defense rules out RPOs and quick/dropback the moment Twelve runs on. It plays the run and the play-action and stops covering the rest, which is how Twelve ended up seeing big nickel. Two fixes: fill the cells, as Austin's spring install did with Duo Pop, Y Screen, and Gun Empty from Twelve, plus Y Option and Hitches from 70; or accept the zero in writing with a reason, and win with what remains.
Part C.
- C1–C3 and C5–C7 (answers in the chapter): the standard is the receipt test. Every call named in your answer should point to a row: the 6-of-17 shot tendency, Teo's "Two high, on the goal line. Man under," or the range line about the SAC 35.
- C3 extension: your answer must name the end line. It is what removes the safety's help over the back-shoulder.
C4 (worked). A model card from the base picture, "Eleven, Gun Doubles Right," Harlan attached right, Ruffin offset left:
| Step | Call | Defender it reads | Trigger to move on |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Inside Right | The field safety (alley) and the Will (backside) | The safety fills twice |
| 2 | Inside PA, Z Post | The safety. Post behind him if he bites, Powers sitting at 6 if he doesn't | The safety hesitates |
| 3 | Inside Right again | The safety's first step: a hesitating safety is late to the alley | Teo reports him filling again, and the card restarts |
When the card goes live: the card sits on the sheet until step 1's trigger is seen in this game, and no step is called before the defense has paid for it (two receipts). Spending step 2 early is the Curtis Bale error, a shot with no setup.
D1. Model answer.
- Retire it (Lyle): Russ will expect it, a year off denies him the film, and a quarterback who threw the playoff interception shouldn't see that word on his wrist.
- Keep it with the tag (Teo): of the 29 two-high snaps, most would have had the post open at step three. Mills with the tag is right against two-high and against the rotation, and retiring it hands Russ the deep middle on third-and-long for a year. Darius threw the dig on every spring rotation rep.
Choose to keep it. Lyle's own test exposed his sentence, "I don't want Darius to see that word on his wrist," as a feeling about one snap, not a reason. For a rookie the answer can change. The tag depends on step-one eyes built over a spring of reps, so a rookie without those reps might get Drive or Y Cross in that spot until the rep test is passed.
What a strong answer includes:
- Both cases in their strongest form, settled by the four-step rule (tape, one sentence, reps, then decide and write the dissent).
- Lyle's margin note ("The evidence says keep").
- "Never let a tendency outlive its evidence" applied to the coach's own fear.
M3. In the mug row, the ball is the extra blocker. Six men block six. If a seventh comes, the sight-adjust hitch beats him, and that's why the Game 2 math, "6 blockers + 1 ball = 7," failed when Russ made it "4 + 0." In the rotation row, nobody extra rushes, so the threat isn't a rusher but a defender arriving in the deep middle. There, the decision is the extra blocker. The middle-read tag's step-three declaration "blocks" the spinning safety by taking the post off the menu. The arithmetic is the same: one more answer than the defense has threats.
Chapter 40 — Watching Football Like a Coordinator
Exercises: Chapter 40
A1. These are the four questions of the viewing loop (section 40.1):
- Before the snap, what did they line up in?
- At the snap, what happened?
- Why this call, now?
- How good was it? The process grade first, then the result.
"Did it work?" comes last and sits inside question 4 because the result is the least informative thing about a call. Asked first, it colors every other answer. That's resulting. The process is the part that repeats next time.
A5. The four freeze-frames, with the question asked at each:
| Freeze at | Question |
|---|---|
| 1. The snap | What did they show? |
| 2. The quarterback's back foot (or the mesh) | What did it turn into? |
| 3. The ball leaving | What did he decide, and on the right defender? |
| 4. First contact or the catch | Who won the matchup the play depended on? |
Frame 2 is the one almost nobody uses. On the Game 3 interception, the snap showed two high at thirteen. At Vance's back foot, Holloway was already coming down and Royce already turning to the middle. The whole story sits between two frames about a second apart.
B3. It's Cover 0: nobody deep, both safeties walked down, the corners pressed, and the nickel over the slot. That's more potential rushers than six blockers. The Outlaws' ready answer is the zero bin: two hot throws, then the max-protect deep over. The Week 8 version on 3rd-and-6 was "Blue five!" (zero-bin Slants), Powers +14. Vance may go to the bin without asking, but only against zero, and he IDs the Mike first ("Fifty's the Mike!").
B5. It's single-high, a MOFC family that has rotated into something like Cover 3. The throw it hurts most is the post between the safeties, which now runs into the free safety arriving in the middle. The dig at twelve crosses underneath him and is still alive. The checkdown is untouched. That's why the middle-read tag's closed answer is the dig first and then the back.
Part C (short answers in the chapter). Hold every C item to the 34-second fence. Before you look at the result, write the purpose, the likely looks, and the call's answer to each.
- C3 extension: that fence note would have graded the untagged Mills a B− before the replay, which is the whole point of writing it then.
- C5: the standard is splitting C / R / X by piece, not assigning one culprit.
D1. Model answer. "Management" means managing the call's shelf life. Inside Slant was an A call because Ames, a young Will, had triggered on 14 of 18 zone flows and couldn't be right either way. But a conflict has a half-life, and the better the defender, the shorter it is. The play averaged a little over 6 yards a call before Game 2. In Game 2 it was four calls for about 13 yards. By Game 3, Ames had stopped triggering on the first flow, and Lyle kept the call in the openers longer than its evidence supported. Retire a still-positive call when the behavior that made it work has changed, even before the yards collapse. The yards lag the evidence. Watch the key's first step and ask whether he's still giving you the answer you built the call on.
What a strong answer includes:
- The distinction between the call's process grade and its management over time.
- The Game 2 numbers with their tiny sample acknowledged.
- The defender's behavior, not the average gain, as the retirement trigger.
- "Never let a tendency outlive its evidence" applied to your own tendencies as well as theirs.
M4. Placing the three Sacramento third downs on the process/result grid:
| Snap | Box on the grid | Fix |
|---|---|---|
| Week 15 sack, 3rd-and-7, −9 | Deserved. The call was fine, but the protection rules had been readable after four games of film | The protection card |
| Divisional Anchor C, Mills with the mug protection, Gaines hitch +10 | Earned. Right box, right information, executed | Keep it, and expect Russ to answer it |
| Divisional Mills at 2:41, intercepted | Deserved. The call was defensible, but the plan had one answer and a blank contingency row | The plan, then the post-snap read |
The two Mills calls landed in opposite corners because the distribution under the routes changed, not the routes. At 11:30 of Q3, Russ picked the branch Austin had practiced. At 2:41, he picked the one Austin hadn't, the 30th third-and-long after 29 straight two-high shells. That is why the grid grades the bet against what was knowable, not the concept.