Case Study 2: Force, Flatten, Chase — How Sacramento Took Away Our Best Run
Austin Outlaws at Sacramento Sentinels, Week 15. Every team, player, and number in this case study is fictional. The defensive side of this case is how Russ Kimbrough explained it to me the following spring; during the season, I didn't know his names for any of it.
Setup
Going into Week 15, our 12-personnel run game was the most reliable thing we had. In the four games the Sentinels studied before our first meeting, we ran on 31 of our 49 snaps in Twelve, and 14 of those runs were outside zone. Our two tight ends, Brooks Harlan and Cody Brandt, made us a gap wider on both sides of the line, and Jalen Ruffin is a one-cut back who loves a stretched front.
The Sentinels had changed one rule because of our first game. In Week 6, our 12-personnel snaps saw their regular nickel nine times and their base defense five times, and we ran well against both. After that game, Russ installed a simple rule: 12 personnel always gets "Big," his big-nickel package. Tre Holloway, the strong safety, moves down to the Star spot over the tight end side. Elijah Pruitt, a third safety, comes on to play deep. Kenny Vo, the regular nickel, comes off.
We'd seen Big on film in the weeks between our games. Our plan for Week 15 was to keep running Wide and duo from Twelve anyway. Big put a safety in the box, which on paper is a lighter player at the point of attack than a linebacker, and I believed our tight ends could handle Holloway.
What happens
The first-quarter snap below is representative. We'd run duo for a yard on first down, so it was 2nd-and-9 at our 32. We called Wide Left from "Twelve, Under Ace Left": Harlan attached left, Brandt attached right, Vance under center, Ruffin deep.
PRE-SNAP (Twelve, Under Ace Left vs. Big nickel, 2nd-and-9 at AUS 32)
$ F
C C
*
M W
E T N E
Y LT LG C RG RT U
Q
X Z
R
📊 Diagram (described): Austin's two-tight-end set with Harlan attached left and Brandt attached right faces the big nickel. The front is set to Harlan: Weller outside Harlan, Coleman as a three-technique outside the left guard, Big V shaded to the center's right, and Rollins outside Brandt. Bell (Mike) is off the ball on the left and Ames (Will) on the right. Holloway is at the Star spot, outside and a little behind Weller. Pruitt and Royce are deep, two high.
POST-SNAP (Wide Left vs. Big: force, flatten, chase)
$ F
<--M (Bell: over the top, unblocked)
* W]
v (Holloway: edge) |
E] T] N] | <--E (Rollins: chase)
\ | \ \ |
Y LT LG C RG RT U
^ Q
+---------R
+4: Bell, with Rollins arriving
📊 Diagram (described): Austin blocks Wide Left by its rules. Harlan reaches Weller and holds him, but Holloway comes down outside-in from the Star spot and owns the edge, so there's no bounce. Coleman doesn't try to penetrate or run wide; he slides flat down the line with his hands on the left guard and center, so the center can't come off the combo to climb. Bell scrapes over the top untouched while the left tackle climbs to where Bell had been. The right guard scoops Big V and the right tackle climbs to Ames. Rollins beats Brandt's cutoff and chases flat down the line, closing the cutback. Ruffin bangs inside Harlan and Bell tackles him after 4 yards, with Rollins arriving.
Four yards on second-and-9 isn't a disaster. It's also not a run that puts the defense in conflict. The pattern held all day. In the second quarter we put together a 12-play drive built mostly on duo and Wide from Twelve. The longest run on it went 7 yards, and one Wide Left that Ruffin bounced too early went for 2. We threw a play-action seam to Harlan from the same look, and Pruitt broke it up. We threw incomplete on third-and-1 and kicked a field goal to tie it 10–10.
Marisol's final count for the game: our 12-personnel runs against Big, 8 carries for 29 yards. The trend was clear long before the final count. On my halftime sheet I wrote three lines. One of them was "Twelve isn't working." Our third halftime change was less 12 personnel. We ran Wide in the fourth quarter from Eleven instead, and it gained 2 (that's the "Whose fault?" drill in §10.9 of this chapter, and it was a technique error, not a scheme problem). We lost 23–20.
The defense's view: what Russ told me
The following spring, at a second-morning breakfast during the league meetings, I asked Russ how he'd taken our Wide away. He drew it on the back of a menu, which I appreciated. He said his staff's plan had three words, and he wrote them in a column: force, flatten, chase.
Force. Holloway was in Big for one reason: to be the force player against our Twelve runs. His rule was outside-in, fast, and never let the ball get outside him. Russ said he didn't care if Harlan reached Weller; he cared that Holloway was outside Weller and coming down. That took away the bounce, which is the run's big-play answer.
Flatten. Russ's interior linemen, Coleman especially, were taught to play our Wide by sliding flat down the line instead of fighting to penetrate or running wide. A defensive lineman who runs wide gets "run" by the blocker, and the back bangs inside him. A lineman who penetrates can be overtaken or cut back against. A lineman who slides flat with his hands on the combo keeps both of our blockers busy for an extra half-second. That half-second was all Bell needed to scrape over the top before our center could climb. It took away the bang, or at least made it a 4-yard bang instead of a 9-yard one.
Chase. Rollins was told to chase every Wide flat from the backside, because, in Russ's words, "You never booted us." He was right. In Week 15 we threw one play-action shot from Twelve and never called a boot. With no boot to fear, Rollins could run as hard as he wanted, and he closed the cutback. That took away the bend.
Then he tapped the column. "Your run has three answers. We took one away with each of three guys. You still got four a carry. We'll take four a carry from you all day."
Analysis
This case is the mirror of Case Study 1, and the lesson lives in the comparison.
Outside zone breaks one of three ways: a reachable edge (the bounce), a front that runs past its gaps (the bang), or a backside that can't chase (the bend). Russ's plan assigned a defender to each, and none of the three had to win a block. Holloway had to be fast, Coleman had to be patient, and Rollins had to run. That's an elegant defense, and it's built from the run's own geometry.
My mistake was a familiar one. I trusted a tendency longer than the defense let it stay true. Our 12-personnel Wide had been our best run all season, so I kept calling it after Big had answered it. The evidence was in by the middle of the second quarter: four a carry, no explosives, the same three defenders making the same three plays. "Never let a tendency outlive its evidence" is in red on my whiteboard now partly because of a different play in a different game. This one deserves a line beside it.
What would have worked? Three things, all of which we did in the divisional game:
- Change the force player. Eleven personnel kept Vo at the Star and Holloway deep. Harlan reaching Vo is a different block from Harlan reaching Weller with Holloway outside him.
- Make the chase pay. One boot in Week 15 would have changed Rollins's rule. With no boot on film, his job was easy. By the divisional game, he'd seen boots on film from other weeks, but none against his own defense in our first two games, and he still chased. That's why the boot in Case Study 1 worked.
- Stop running sideways into a flattening front. When the interior slides flat, downhill schemes with double-teams (duo, inside zone, gap schemes) take the half-second back. We did run duo in Week 15, mostly into the same Big look, and it wasn't much better, which tells you the problem wasn't only the scheme. It was the matchup we kept choosing.
What Russ gave up. Big has a price. Holloway at the Star is a safety covering a tight end; Pruitt is a third safety in coverage on early downs. Our play-action shot behind Holloway never came open that day, but the matchup was there to be hunted, and our Eleven-personnel plan in the divisional round made him pay a different way. Every defensive answer opens something.
Discussion questions
- Russ's plan assigned one defender to each of outside zone's three answers. Which of the three defenders would you attack first, and with what call?
- "Flatten" is a defensive-line technique that beats outside zone's combos. Why would the same technique be weaker against duo or power?
- Lyle says the evidence was in by the middle of the second quarter. What specific numbers or observations should a booth coach report to make that case on the headset, before halftime?
- Russ said, "We'll take four a carry from you all day." Under what game situation would four yards a carry be a win for the offense, and how would that change the call sheet?
- Compare this case with Case Study 1. Name the one decision that most changed the result.
Your turn
You're Teo in the booth for the second quarter of this game. Build a three-row "run report" you could read to Lyle in the 40 seconds between snaps, one row each for force, flatten, and chase. For each, write what you'd watch for on the end-zone camera, what you'd say on the headset in five words or fewer, and the call it suggests.