Case Study 1 — Six Throws in Sacramento: The Drive We Were Allowed to Have
An Outlaws case told from both sidelines: the first-half touchdown drive of Week 15 as we called it, and as Russ Kimbrough explained it to me the following spring. All teams, players, and plays are fictional composites.
Setup
Week 15, at Sacramento. Our second meeting with the Sentinels that season; we'd won the first one, 34–27, in Week 6. The division was on the line, and both staffs knew each other's tape down to the hand signals.
Teo's Monday breakdown on Russ Kimbrough's defense said three things about early downs that mattered for the quick game:
- "Two-high shell on most first and second downs. Corners aligned off — seven, eight yards — and they bail at the snap more than they squat."
- "Underneath defenders wall the middle. The apex players widen late."
- "On third-and-short, mostly one-high man with the field corner pressed. Not always."
That's a defense saying we'll give you the short stuff and we'll tackle it. Russ's whole system is built on keeping the ball in front of him and making the offense execute ten or twelve plays in a row to score. Coverage first, pressure on purpose.
So our early-down plan had a quick-game spine. Slants, Hitches, Speed Out, Stick, Snag, and Slant-Flat were all on the Red panel of Darius Vance's wristband, sorted by the corner looks Teo expected. Rome Pettaway's note at the top of the quick-game page in the quarterback meeting was one line long: "Cushion, leverage, help — then let it go."
What happens
The first-half drive, snap by snap
Our touchdown drive started at our own 37 after a Sentinels punt. Ten plays, 63 yards. I'll take you through the throws.
Snap 1 — 1st-and-10, AUS 37: "Eleven, Gun Doubles Right, 60 Left, Slants."
Teo, from the booth, in the quiet window: "Two high. Six. Corners at eight."
Six in the box against eleven personnel is a pass-defense box. Corners at eight with the safeties at twelve is a defense that's paying for depth. Slants to the left — Sutton and Powers — attack the hook area between Vo, the nickel, and Ames, the Will, who had both been walling the middle on Teo's tape.
POST-SNAP: Slants (left side) vs. Quarters, corners off at 8
(Week 15, 1st-and-10 at the AUS 37)
F Royce: reads #2, $ Holloway
sinks when H breaks in ~12
^
C Brennan: bails, outside leverage
^
| <. X slant (inside the bail)
| \
| <. \ W Ames: walls the X slant
| \ . \
| \ . \ * Vo: carried outside
| \ . \ / by the X stem
| \. X
| H <-- slant: ball at ~1.1 s, +8
| O O O O O Y Z
| Q R
📊 Diagram (described): The left side of the field. Brennan, the corner, bails with outside leverage. Sutton (X) and Powers (H) both run slants. Ames, the Will linebacker, walls Sutton's slant inside. Vo, the nickel, widens a step with Sutton's stem and loses inside position on Powers. Royce, the left safety, reads Powers and sinks as he breaks inside. Vance throws Powers's slant at about 1.1 seconds, in front of Royce and behind Vo. Powers gains eight.
Powers caught it at about six and fell forward to the 45. +8.
Snap 2 — 2nd-and-2, AUS 45: "Hitches." Brennan was eight off Sutton again and backpedaling at the snap. Vance picked the left side before the snap, saw Vo stay inside after it, and threw Sutton's hitch as he turned. +7.
On the headset Wade asked me why I threw on second-and-2. "Because they've got six in the box and an eight-yard cushion," I said. "That hitch is a run play that happens to be in the air." Wade didn't answer. He wrote something on his card. Later that night he showed me: 2nd and short — throw if the cushion is bigger than the distance. He was half joking. Only half.
Snap 3 — 1st-and-10, SAC 48: Inside. Ruffin +3. We needed one run in there for the run's sake; Russ's linebackers had started widening early, and the box had to stay honest.
Snap 4 — 2nd-and-7, SAC 45: "Speed Out." The left corner had moved to six yards with inside leverage — Brennan adjusting to the slants and the hitch. Inside leverage gives up the out. Sutton broke out at five, away from Brennan's leverage, while Powers sat inside; Vance threw it on the plant. +6, to third-and-1.
Snap 5 — 3rd-and-1, SAC 39: "Slant-Flat Right." This is the snap in Section 21.3. Teo's page said third-and-short was mostly one-high man with the field corner pressed. This time the Sentinels stayed one- high but played zone: eight in the box, Holloway walked down outside Harlan, Simmons at seven with outside leverage. Our rule is "seven or fewer, run it; eight, take the throw." Eight. Holloway widened with Harlan's flat; Gaines's slant came open behind him. +11.
What I want you to notice about snap 5 is that the play didn't care whether it was man or zone. The read table handles both. If Holloway had run with Harlan in man, Gaines still had Simmons's outside leverage to beat on the slant. That's the value of a concept with a man answer and a zone answer built in.
Snap 6 — 1st-and-10, SAC 28: "Stick," from Trips Right. The Sentinels rotated from two-high to single-high at the snap, and Vo widened with Powers's flat. Harlan sat at six in the window Vo left. +9.
Snaps 7–10. Duo, Ruffin +6. Then Snag to Powers, +6 to the 7 — the snag route sitting at five inside the curl/flat defender, with the corner route holding the corner. Then Inside, Ruffin +4. Then Inside from the 3, and Ruffin walked in.
Six throws, six completions, 47 yards. Four runs, 16 yards. Nothing longer than eleven.
The booth, between series
Teo came on the line after the extra point. "They tackled every one," he said. "Simmons and Brennan made four of the six tackles. They're not missing."
"They're not trying to stop the catch," I said. "They're trying to stop the run after it."
"So what happens when they decide to stop the catch?"
"Then they'll have to come up to do it. And then we'll find out whether we've been running the routes we're going to fake."
The other sideline: Russ's version
In the spring, at a coaches' breakfast at the league meetings, Russ and I talked through that drive. He had his own chart of it: eleven first-half quick completions, and every one of them tackled within a few yards of the catch.
Russ: "I'd have taken that drive every time. Ten plays. You need ten plays on my field, you're going to mess one of them up more often than not. Most of your drives that half, you did."
Me: "We were three of nine on third down."
Russ: "And one of those three was that third-and-1. I wasn't happy about that one. Tre got greedy on the flat."
Me: "He got right on the flat. That's what the play does to him."
Russ: (laughing) "Fine. He got right and lost. My point is this. When you're completing six-yard balls, you're not throwing past my corners. As long as you're not throwing past my corners, I'll give you the six. I just didn't want you so comfortable you'd stop counting. So at the half, I changed the price."
That was the first time I heard all three of his halftime changes in his own words: the corners pressed on about half of our early downs, the safeties rotated out of two-high on about half of them, and the mug corner fire zone was live on third-and-7 or longer.
Me: "You knew the press would give us the double move."
Russ: "I knew it could. I was betting your guy would hold the ball on the slant before it did. Your quick game has a clock, Lyle. My press is a bet that the clock runs out first."
That's the most honest description of press coverage against the quick game I've ever heard from a defensive coach. The quick game is a clock. Press is a bet against the clock. And the double move is a bet that the corner, trying to beat the clock, will commit to the first route.
Analysis
1. The quick game moved the ball because the defense let it — and that wasn't a failure on either side. Russ's first-half plan gave up 74 yards on 13 quick throws and one touchdown. Our plan gained them. Both coordinators were getting what they wanted: we stayed on schedule, and he kept everything in front of him and made us execute. The scoreboard at halftime — Sentinels 13, Outlaws 10 — said his plan was working a little better.
2. Every completion was also a scouting report. Each throw told us something about how the Sentinels were playing the short area: Ames walled and Vo widened on snap 1, Brennan adjusted to inside leverage by snap 4, Holloway chased the flat on snap 5, Vo chased the flat on snap 6. Those notes became our second- half and fourth-quarter calls. The Sluggo that went for 44 yards in the fourth quarter was built from the slants on this drive and the press that followed them.
3. Concepts with man and zone answers survive disguise. The snap that could have stalled the drive — third-and-1, where the scouting said "man" and the defense played zone — didn't, because Slant-Flat's read works against both. If we'd called a pure man-beater, a zone look would have hurt us.
4. Tackling is the defense's quick-game answer before it's the defense's coverage answer. Teo's note that the corners made four of the six tackles is the hidden stat. Against a defense that tackles the catch cleanly, the quick game moves the chains but doesn't break games open. Against a defense that misses, the same throws are explosives. That's a reason to track yards after the catch by defender, not just completions.
Discussion Questions
- Russ said he'd "take that drive every time." Using his logic — the number of plays an offense must execute to score against a coverage-first defense — explain why a ten-play drive is a win for the defense in expectation even when it ends in a touchdown.
- On snap 2, Wade wrote, "2nd and short — throw if the cushion is bigger than the distance." Is that a good rule? Where does it break down?
- Snap 4 came after Brennan changed to inside leverage. What does it tell you that a corner changed his leverage in the middle of a drive, and what would you call on the next snap against him if he stayed there?
- Russ described press as "a bet that the clock runs out first." What's the offense's version of that bet on a double move?
- The Outlaws lost this game 23–20. Does the first-half quick game deserve credit, blame, or neither? Defend your answer with one fact from the drive and one from the second half in Chapter 21.
Your Turn
Take any ten-play drive from an NFL game you can watch on film (or from your own team's season). For each snap, write one line: what the defense showed, what was called, and what the snap told the offense about the defense that it didn't know before. Then circle the one note that you, as the play caller, would have used for a call in the second half — and write that call in your own grammar.