Case Study 2 — Curtis Bale's Borrowed Air Raid

An NFL case that failed. Curtis Bale, his team, and every number here are fictional. The lesson is real.


Setup

Curtis Bale and I were young offensive assistants together on Walt Dupree's staff. He was the most talented play designer I've ever worked beside. He could draw three plays on a napkin before you finished your sentence, and all three would work on the board. When he got his first coordinator job, with a team in the other conference that I'll never name, he built an offense out of everything he loved.

Year one looked like this:

  • A four-wide base on early downs, often with the back motioned out to empty.
  • Run-and-shoot choice routes for the slot receivers.
  • Air Raid mesh and four verticals as staples, with mesh on third down against everything.
  • A steady diet of gadgets.

It worked. His offense led its conference in explosive plays. It was the most-talked-about offense in the league that year, and Curtis was on every list of future head coaches.

Year two, he was fired before the following season.

This case study is about why. Chapter 2 tells the history and Chapter 20 tells the screen side. This one is about the Air Raid, and it's narrower: Curtis borrowed the Air Raid's plays and left behind its arithmetic.


What Happened

What the defenses did in year two

The spring after Curtis was fired, I charted four of his mid-season games from year two. The defensive pattern was the same in all four:

  1. Two high safeties, rotated late. Defenses showed two-high and spun one safety down or to the middle at the snap. His quarterback's pre-snap picture of where the space would be was wrong after the snap.
  2. Four-man rushes with simulated pressure. Defenses rushed four almost every time, but not always the four Curtis expected. A nickel or linebacker rushed, and a defensive end dropped into the window where the hot throw was supposed to go.
  3. A spare linebacker parked over the ball on third down, sitting on the first crosser on mesh.
  4. Light boxes on early downs, daring him to run.

He ran the ball on about a quarter of early downs. His pocket quarterback, who was not a scrambler, took sacks. The signature play of the season came on a third-and-6 near midfield in a close game: empty, the left slot on a choice route, the route bending into a middle that had been rotated after the snap. The free safety intercepted it.

The protection picture

Here's the one picture I saw again and again on those four tapes.

POST-SNAP: empty, five-man protection vs. a simulated pressure

     C                         F                           C
                  ^ (E drops into the slot's hot window)
       *          |                 W        M          *
        \         |
         \==>     E      T     T            E
                  O      O     O      O     O
 X    H                     Q         (empty: no back)  Y    Z

📊 Diagram (described): Five receivers spread across the field, no back, and five linemen in protection. The defense shows two high safeties and four rushers, but not the four the line expects. The left defensive end, who looked like a rusher, drops straight back into the window where the left slot's quick throw is supposed to go. The left-side nickel blitzes off the edge in his place. The two tackles and the right end rush as usual, and both linebackers stay home. The line has slid toward the end who dropped, so nobody is assigned to the nickel, and he has a free path to the quarterback. The hot throw to the left slot is now aimed at the defensive end standing in that window.

Count it the way we teach protection. Five blockers. Four rushers, so on paper the line wins by one. But the line slid toward the end who dropped, and nobody was assigned to the nickel coming off the edge. With five-man protection, the answer to the extra rusher has to be the ball: a hot throw, out in about a second, to the area the rusher came from. Curtis's empty package had one hot rule, to one side. The defenses brought the extra man from the other side, or dropped a lineman into his hot window.

The practice picture

The tape told me what the defenses did. A long dinner with Curtis told me why the offense couldn't answer.

Lyle: How often did you run routes on air?

Curtis: Once a week, maybe. We had too much to install.

Lyle: How much?

Curtis: By midseason we were carrying more than forty pass concepts in a game plan. Every week the defense took something away, so every week I gave them something new.

Lyle: How many reps did mesh get on a Wednesday?

Curtis: (laughing) You sound like Walt. Not enough. I had sixty-one formations, Lyle. Thirty-eight of them only had one play in them. I thought that was creativity.

He was quiet for a while. Then he said the thing I've repeated to every young coach I've hired since.

Curtis: I had the Air Raid's plays. I didn't have its patience.


Analysis

What Curtis borrowed

The concepts: mesh, four verticals, choice-route spacing, empty formations. These are good plays. They are in our playbook and in nearly every NFL playbook. Nothing about the failure was the plays.

What he didn't borrow, and what each omission cost

Air Raid principle What Curtis did instead What it cost
Few concepts, many reps 40+ pass concepts by midseason; formations carrying a single play (38 of 61) No concept was automatic. Defenses read the formation and knew the play. Receivers' conversions were slow against rotation.
Conversion rules taught on air and in skelly Choice routes taught mostly in team periods The choice route bent into a rotated middle because the receiver read the pre-snap shell, not the post-snap safety
Ball out fast with a hot on each side (the NFL version) Five-man empty with one hot side Simulated pressures from the other side, and a dropped end in the hot window. Sacks.
Tempo / simplicity simplifying the defense Gadgets and new looks every week The defense had the simpler plan. Two-high, rotate, rally, and wait for a mistake.
(The NFL addition) A credible run game Runs on about a quarter of early downs Light boxes cost the defense nothing. Two safeties stayed deep.

The mechanism

The Air Raid is a bargain: a small menu, in exchange for executing it better than anyone can defend it. Curtis took the menu's contents and threw out the bargain. Year one, defenses didn't know the menu, so the contents were enough. Year two, they did. Once a defense knows what you have, the only thing that beats it is executing better than it can answer. That's built by reps, and Curtis had spent his reps on new plays.

There's a second mechanism, and it's the one I worry about in my own building. Every new concept is a bet that the defense hasn't seen it. Every repped concept is a bet that the defense can't stop it even though it has. In the NFL, where every defensive staff watches every snap you've run, the second bet wins over a season. The first one wins for a few weeks.

What I did with it

I put two things on the Outlaws' practice schedule because of that dinner. The first is the "Air" period: twelve minutes, and only the week's core concepts. The second is a rule in our weekly install meeting: nothing new goes into the plan unless something comes out. If Cal wants a new route for Gaines, he tells me which one Gaines stops running that week.


Discussion Questions

  1. Curtis's year-one offense led its conference in explosive plays. Using this case, explain why year-one success with a borrowed system is weak evidence that the system will work in year two.
  2. In the protection diagram, the defense rushed only four against five blockers and still had a free rusher. Explain how. What would an Outlaws "50" protection rule require before you could call it against that look?
  3. "I had the Air Raid's plays. I didn't have its patience." What does patience mean in practice terms? Name two specific practice-schedule decisions.
  4. Which single change from the analysis table would have helped Curtis most in year two? Defend your choice.
  5. Is "nothing new goes in unless something comes out" too rigid for an NFL staff? When would you break it?

Your Turn

You've just been hired as a coordinator, and your quarterback ran an Air Raid in college. Write a one-page "What we won't do" memo for your first staff meeting. Name three things from the Air Raid you'll adopt (with the practice period that reps each), two you'll reject (with the reason), and one rule that keeps you from turning into Curtis Bale by midseason.