Case Study 2 — A List That Looked Like an Offense: Curtis Bale's Second Season
Curtis Bale, his team, and every number in this case are fictional composites used to teach. The team is never named, on purpose. Curtis is not a villain in this book. He's the coach most of us are one bad October away from becoming.
Setup
Curtis Bale and I worked two seasons together on Walt Dupree's staff. He was the best pure play designer in the building. He could draw a concept on a whiteboard that beat three coverages, and he could draw it fast. When he got his first coordinator job, with a team in the other conference, his offense became the one everyone talked about: four-wide sets, choice routes, Mesh, four verticals, empty, and a gadget or two a game. His conference's leader in explosive plays that year.
The next season, defenses had a year of his film. They played deep. They rotated their safeties after the snap. They put a spare linebacker over the ball and dared his quarterback, a pocket passer, to throw into the coverage they'd built. He was fired before the season after that.
The spring after he was fired, I charted four of his mid-season year-two games. Not to grade him. To learn what an offense looks like when it has every good play and no map. We talked about it over a long dinner. He was more honest about it than I would have been.
What year two looked like, by the numbers I charted and the ones he told me:
| Item | Year two |
|---|---|
| Formations carried | 61, and 38 of them carried exactly one play |
| Pass concepts in a game plan by midseason | More than 40 |
| Early-down runs | About a quarter of early downs |
| Screens on long-yardage downs | 0 on 70 |
| Empty-protection hot rules | One, to one side |
| Third-down defense he saw most | A robber in the middle (one opponent: on 9 of 13 third downs) |
What Happens
The defense's answers
Every defense he faced in year two gave him some version of the same four answers:
- Two-high, deep, rotate after the snap. Take away the explosive plays that made him famous.
- A light box, six or fewer, because the run had stopped being a threat worth honoring.
- A spare defender over the ball, a linebacker who could spy, rob, or rush.
- Rush upfield on long downs, because there was nothing behind the rushers to punish them.
Each of those answers gives something up. Two-high and deep gives up the box. A light box gives up the run. A spare linebacker over the ball is one fewer rusher or one fewer deep defender. An upfield rush leaves grass behind it for screens and draws.
His answers to their answers
Curtis answered every one of them with a pass concept. A new one. When two-high took away his shots, he installed a new shot. When the robber sat on his crossers, he added a new crosser that went somewhere else. He wasn't lazy; he was working harder than anyone on his staff. By midseason the game plan had more than forty pass concepts, and his quarterback was getting a new third-down page every week.
Here's the map I drew from his four games. Read the right column.
CURTIS BALE, YEAR TWO -- the map from four charted games
THE DEFENSE'S ANSWER HIS PRICE ARROW
--------------------------- ------------------------- -------
two-high, deep, rotate --> a new shot concept EMPTY
light box (six) --------> runs on ~1 in 4 early WEAK
spare LB over the ball --> a new crosser EMPTY
rush upfield, long downs -> 0 screens in 70 EMPTY
robber on third down ---> choice route (into him) WRONG
pressure vs. empty -----> one hot, one side HALF
======================================================================
No base play at the left edge. No arrow that returns to one.
📊 Diagram (described): A three-column map of Curtis Bale's second-season offense. The left column lists the defenses' answers: two-high and deep with rotation, a light six-man box, a spare linebacker over the ball, an upfield rush on long downs, a robber on third down, and pressure against empty. The middle column lists what he called against each: a new shot concept, runs on only about one early down in four, a new crossing route, zero screens in seventy long-yardage downs, a choice route thrown into the robber, and a single hot rule to one side. The right column grades each arrow: empty, weak, empty, empty, wrong, and half. A note at the bottom says the map has no base play and no arrow that leads back to one.
The snap
The game that ended it, as much as one game ever ends a coordinator: down 20–7, 3rd-and-6 at his own 48, against a defense that had played a robber on 9 of its 13 third downs in that game. The call was a choice route by his best slot receiver, a route that reads leverage and breaks away from the defender over him. Against man it's one of the best third-down routes in football.
3rd-and-6, own 48, down 20-7 -- choice route into the robber
F (deep middle)
R (robber at 10-12) <-- reads the QB, jumps it
^
| . . . . . . . . . . ball
C N breaks in, away from the nickel's outside leverage
\ /
H
X O O O O O Z
Q
📊 Diagram (described): The slot receiver runs a choice route and, reading the nickel's outside leverage, breaks inside. That is exactly where the robber, sitting ten to twelve yards deep in the middle with his eyes on the quarterback, is waiting. The quarterback throws on rhythm to the inside break, and the robber jumps it for an interception near midfield. A free safety stays deep behind the play.
The slot broke inside, which was right by the route's rules: the nickel had outside leverage. The robber was sitting exactly where the right break went. Interception. Nobody on that field made a mistake by his own rules, which is precisely the problem. The route was a man-beater with no answer for the zone defender the man coverage was built around.
Analysis
Mechanism 1: he answered coverages, not defenders. Every new concept beat a coverage on paper. But the defenses weren't beating him with coverages; they were beating him with specific defenders doing two jobs: the spare linebacker, the robber, the rotating safety. A system attacks the defender who's doing two jobs. A list attacks the coverage chart.
Mechanism 2: no base play, so no constraints. You can't constrain a defense that has no reason to defend anything in particular. When the run became about one early down in four, defenses stopped paying for it. When they stopped paying for it, the box went light, which should have made the run better. He never cashed it. Every arrow in his map started at the defense's answer and ended at a new pass. None ended at a run, a screen, or a draw that would have sent the defense back to honest.
Mechanism 3: the long-yardage downs were free for the defense. Zero screens in 70 long-yardage downs means seventy snaps on which the rushers could pin their ears back without a second thought. My line to him at dinner about a give-up screen, "a punt with extra steps," was a joke about the bad version. The good version is the reason four-man rushes have to hesitate. His didn't.
Mechanism 4: volume ate the reps. More than forty concepts by midseason meant none of them got enough Thursday reps against the robber look, and his quarterback was learning new third-down pages weekly instead of perfecting one. "Rep it or cut it" wasn't a rule on his staff. Everything got installed, so nothing got repped.
What Curtis told me, and gave me permission to repeat: "I had the Air Raid's plays. I didn't have its patience." And later that night: "I thought that was creativity."
The fair half of the story. His year-one offense was real, and it was brilliant. The league answered it, as the league answers everything. Every offense in this book has been answered. The Outlaws were answered three different ways by the Sentinels, and the one we hadn't priced ended our season. The difference isn't that some coordinators get answered and others don't. It's whether your offense has a place for the answer to go.
| Curtis Bale, year two | The Outlaws' map | |
|---|---|---|
| What a new play responds to | A coverage | A defender doing two jobs |
| Where arrows end | Another pass concept | A run, a pass, a screen, or a protection, whichever lives where the answer emptied |
| Long-yardage constraints | None | Draw, Slip, Middle, the zero bin |
| Install volume | More every week | "Nothing new goes in unless something comes out" |
| Empty arrows | Most of the map | One, until the divisional round showed it to us |
Discussion Questions
- Curtis's quarterback was a pocket passer. Which arrows on his map could a pocket quarterback still have filled, and which would have needed a different player?
- A light box is supposed to be a gift to the offense. Why didn't it help Curtis, and what would it have taken for the run to start "costing" defenses again?
- The choice route was the right route by its own rules. Rewrite the 3rd-and-6 call so that the same route has an answer for the robber built in.
- Is "more concepts" ever the right answer to a defense that has adjusted? Describe a case where it is.
- Compare Curtis's empty arrows to the Outlaws' one empty arrow. Which is the more dangerous kind of hole, many obvious ones or one hidden one? Defend your answer.
Your Turn
Pick any three defensive answers from Curtis's map. For each, write the cheapest price you could install in one week of practice: the play, the defender it reads, and the base play it sends the defense back to defending. Then cut one existing concept from his game plan for each play you add, and say why it was the one to cut.