Case Study 2 — Forty-Four Snaps Without Blocking the End: A High-School Veer Week

A case from Lyle Petrakis's high-school coaching years in northeast Ohio, one that worked. The school, the players, and the games are fictional, and so is the rest of this book's world. The rules and the football are real.


Setup

The season: my fifth and last as a high-school offensive coordinator, at the same small school outside Youngstown where I'd started. Our quarterback, Nate Mercer, was a senior and the best passer I'd coached at that level. In Week 2 he broke his collarbone on a scramble. He was going to miss most of the regular season.

The replacement: Eddie Sokol, a junior. He weighed 165 pounds with his shoes on, ran the 100 meters in the spring, and was the fastest kid in the school. He could throw a slant and a hitch. He couldn't throw a comeback, and he couldn't read a coverage, because nobody had ever asked him to.

The line: five kids who averaged about 215 pounds. Smart, tough, and small. They could down-block and reach. They could not drive a 250-pound defensive tackle off the ball.

The opponent: in Week 6, the league's best defense, a 4-4 front (four linemen, four linebackers) that had allowed 31 points in five games. Their ends were good athletes who crashed hard on anything that looked like a run inside.

The decision. Monday night after Eddie's first start, which we lost by a field goal running the offense we'd built for Nate, I sat in my parents' diner after close with a stack of placemats. Ray Kessler, my head coach, sat across from me. I drew a split-back veer.

"You're going to leave their best players unblocked," Kessler said. He'd coached defense for thirty years. "On purpose."

"Two of them," I said. "Every snap. Eddie's going to block them with his eyes."


What happens

The install (four days)

We cut the playbook to four plays. Inside veer both ways: the dive back hits the B gap, Eddie reads the first defensive lineman outside the B gap (the dive key), then attacks the next man (the pitch key) with the other back in pitch relationship. Speed option both ways. Play-action off the veer to the tight end. A slant to our split end for third-and-long.

Every day we ran one drill above all the others: a manager holding a pad as the dive key, another as the pitch key, each moving on my signal. Eddie had to give, pull, keep, or pitch on the defender's action, never on a guess. On Wednesday he fumbled four times in the mesh drill. On Thursday he fumbled once. On Friday he didn't.

The game

We ran an option play on forty-four of our snaps. The pattern held all night. Their ends crashed hard. That's their best habit, and against the veer it's a handoff-to-keep switch every time. Their outside linebackers had to choose between Eddie and the pitch.

We led 13–7 at halftime on two long drives.

Their defensive coordinator was good, and he did what good defensive coordinators do at halftime: he took away the answer we'd been getting. In the third quarter their ends stopped crashing. They sat: square, patient, eyes on Eddie, the way the Sentinels' ends would sit on Darius Vance years later. On the veer that's a give read, so Eddie gave, and our dive back ran into linebackers who had been told to fill the B gap and nothing else. Three straight dives gained a total of four yards, and we punted twice.

So we stopped asking the end. On the sideline I told Eddie we'd run speed option both ways for a series. Speed option has no dive and no dive key. It goes straight to the pitch phase, so an end who sits and waits for the quarterback is just a pitch key standing still. Eddie attacked his inside shoulder, and the end, taught to sit, couldn't decide whether to take Eddie or chase the pitch. We got nine yards and then twelve. On the next series the ends started crashing again to stop the speed option, and the veer was back.

That's the same conversation this chapter describes at the NFL level, just slower and on a smaller field. Their answer was the slow-play. Our counter was to take the dive key out of the play.

They tied it 13–13 early in the fourth quarter. Then, on 2nd-and-7 at their 34, with the ball on the left hash, we ran inside veer to the wide side of the field:

POST-SNAP — Inside veer to the field, 4th quarter, 13-13,
2nd-and-7 at the opponent's 34 (high school, left hash)

                          $  (alley, 12 yds deep)
         C          ]
                    Y  arcs to the alley safety
                  (S)<== OLB attacks Eddie: PITCH key takes QB
        T    T    (E)<== end crashes the dive: dive key
   O    O    O    O    O  \
                 Q ==>     \  Eddie pulls from the dive...
                 :  \       \...attacks the OLB, pitches
            HB   R  ==> dive (no ball)
              \......................> pitch: Corey Hamm, 34-yd TD

📊 Diagram (described): A high-school inside veer run to the wide side of the field. At the snap, the dive back hits the B gap and the defensive end, the dive key, crashes down to take him. Eddie pulls the ball and attacks the outside linebacker, the pitch key, who comes up hard to tackle him. Eddie pitches to the halfback, Corey Hamm, who has stayed in relationship outside him. The tight end has arced outside to block the safety in the alley. Hamm runs down the sideline into the end zone.

The end crashed, so Eddie pulled. The outside linebacker came up to take him, so Eddie pitched. The tight end had arced to the safety. Corey Hamm, our halfback, caught the pitch in stride and ran down the wide side for a 34-yard touchdown. 20–13. Our defense held on the last two series. We won by a touchdown.

Eddie carried the ball 19 times that night and pitched it 11 more. He was sore for four days.


Analysis

Why it worked: the arithmetic. A 4-4 puts eight defenders near the box. Our line had five blockers plus a tight end, six bodies for eight defenders. On a normal handoff, that's two unblocked defenders and a loss. The veer read two of them, the dive key and the pitch key, so our six blockers only had to handle the other six. Every defender in the box had a blocker, a decision, or a pitch route aimed at him. The best two players on their front spent the night guessing.

Why it worked: the field. On a high-school field the hash marks are 53 feet 4 inches from each sideline. From the left hash, the wide side had nearly forty yards of grass. Their pitch key and alley safety had to cover that much ground. The same call from an NFL hash, near the middle of the field, would have given them half that space.

Why it worked: practice time. A Friday-night opponent gets one week, and a scout team that can't imitate a 100-meter sprinter running the veer. Their defense had seen the option on film. Their players hadn't seen it at Eddie's speed.

What it cost. Nineteen carries and eleven pitches on a 165-pound junior. "Make him tackle you" was our pitch rule, the classic one, because it maximizes the read. Eddie got tackled after a lot of those pitches. In the NFL I would never ask that of a quarterback, and by the end of that season I wasn't sure I should have asked it of a high-school junior. When Nate came back for the playoffs, we went back to his offense and kept the veer as a package. Eddie played safety the next fall. He was good at it.

The threshold, seen from Ohio. The night I drew that veer on a placemat was the first time I understood that you could block a man with a decision. Kessler's line, "You're going to leave their best players unblocked," was meant as a warning. It turned out to be the reason the plan worked.


Discussion questions

  1. Count the box for a high-school 4-4 against a one-tight-end, split-back offense. How many defenders does the veer read, and how many does the line have to block?
  2. Their ends' best habit, crashing hard, was a weakness against the veer. What would you have told those ends at halftime if you were their defensive coordinator? (Think about the Sentinels' Sit.)
  3. Lyle chose "make him tackle you" as the pitch rule. Given a 165-pound junior, argue for "pitch it early" instead. What does each rule gain and cost?
  4. How does the high-school hash change the pitch phase compared with college and the NFL?
  5. Lyle cut the playbook to four plays for the week. What does that tell you about installing an option package with limited practice time?

Your turn

You're a high-school offensive coordinator whose starting quarterback just got hurt. The backup is the fastest player on your team and a weak passer. Your line averages about 210 pounds. Write a one-week, four-play option install: name each play, its read key or keys, the one drill you'll run every day, and your quarterback-carry budget for Friday, with the reason for that number.