Case Study 1 — The Counter That Got Spilled: Game 2, 2nd-and-5 at the Sacramento 42

An Outlaws case that failed, told from both sidelines. The Outlaws, Sentinels, and everyone in them are fictional.


Setup

Week 15, at Sacramento (Game 2). Third quarter, 2nd-and-5 at the Sacramento 42. The Sentinels won this game 23–20. It was the second of our three meetings that season; we'd won the first, 34–27, in Austin.

By Week 15 our counter had a history. We'd run it all season, and our rule for it was a good rule: Counter goes away from Harlan. When Harlan is attached on the left, it's Counter Right — Kendrick Moss kicks out, Ben Achterberg wraps. When Harlan is attached on the right, it's Counter Left — Pete Lorusso kicks, Darnell Fitch wraps. The back aligns on the tight end's side, takes a counter step toward him, and cuts back the other way behind the pullers.

Personnel and formation: "Eleven, Gun Doubles Right, Counter Left." Harlan attached right with Trey Gaines wide right; Mekhi Powers in the left slot and Devonte Sutton wide left. Jalen Ruffin offset to Darius Vance's right, toward Harlan.

What our scouting said. In Game 1, Sacramento's Will linebacker, Jordan Ames, had read our guards — and our show double team on inside zone had fooled him on the 45-yard run. Our expectation for Game 2 was that Sacramento would have taught Ames to read the back instead. A back-reader is counter's favorite victim. That was the logic of the call.

What we didn't know. We hadn't counted our own tell. Marisol Vega ran the number the Monday after this game: in our first fourteen weeks, Ruffin had aligned toward Harlan in two-by-two on first or second down 19 times, and 14 of them had been counter or counter play-action. Seventy-four percent. Her line for a tell is 70.


What Happens

The Sentinels lined up in nickel with an Over front set to Harlan and two high safeties. (Russ Kimbrough told me in the spring that they called it "Nickel Over Sky." At the time, Teo's word from the booth was "two high, six, nothing hot.")

PRE-SNAP: "Eleven, Gun Doubles Right, Counter Left" vs. Nickel Over
Game 2, Q3, 2nd-and-5 at the Sacramento 42

              F                                   $
  C                                                            C
           *         W           M
                E           N         T     E
  X        H      LT    LG    C    RG    RT    Y              Z
                              Q  R

📊 Diagram (described): The Outlaws are in two-by-two with Harlan attached on the right and Gaines wide right; Powers is in the left slot and Sutton wide left. Ruffin is offset to Vance's right, toward the tight end. The Sentinels are in nickel with an Over front set to the tight end: Rollins, the weak-side end, outside the left tackle; the nose shaded on the center toward the left; Coleman, the 3-technique, on the right guard's outside shoulder; the strong-side end outside the right tackle. Ames, the Will, is over the left B-gap; Bell, the Mike, is over the right A-gap. Vo, the nickel, is over Powers. Two safeties are deep.

At the snap, everything we drew happened. Achterberg and Moss blocked down. Szabo blocked back on Coleman. Harlan hinged. Lorusso and Fitch pulled left, flat and on time. Ruffin jabbed right and cut back.

And the Sentinels did something we hadn't seen them do against counter.

POST-SNAP: Counter Left -- wrong-arm, spill, scrape over the top

    *  force                   F  alley, late
    ^     M <------------------ Bell runs over the top
          |                     from the right A-gap
    E x RG    W x RT     N                T  <- fights across
    (Rollins  (Ames                          Szabo's back block
     spills    spills
     Lorusso)  Fitch)
              LT  LG    C                 Y
              down down back             hinge
                              Q  R
    <-- bounce <----------------/

📊 Diagram (described): The left tackle and left guard block down to their right; the center blocks back on Coleman, who fights across his face. Lorusso and Fitch pull left. Rollins, the end, squeezes down and attacks Lorusso's inside half, wrong-arming the kick-out so it collapses into the hole. Ames, the Will, attacks Fitch in the hole the same way. The designed lane fills with bodies. Ruffin, who has stepped right and cut back left, has nowhere to go but outside. Bell, the Mike, has run laterally behind the line from the right A-gap, over the top of the pile, and Vo, the nickel, is outside him as the force player. The free safety comes down late into the alley.

Rollins didn't take on Lorusso's kick-out with his outside shoulder, the way a "box" end does. He wrong- armed it: low pads, inside shoulder into Lorusso's inside hip, driving underneath him into the hole. Ames did the same thing to Fitch. Two Sentinels "lost" their blocks in the sense that neither made the tackle — and two of our blockers and our whole hole disappeared.

Ruffin did the right thing. He bounced. Bell met him outside the pile, and Vo turned him back in.

Plus one. Third-and-4.

On the headset, I asked Teo what he saw from the booth.

Teo (booth): "Their Will didn't step with Jalen. He ran at Fitch."

Me: "Like he knew."

Teo: "Like he was told."

We ran counter one more time that afternoon. Neither run went for more than five yards.


The Spring: What Russ Told Me

At a long dinner at the league meetings, Russ explained it. After Week 6 his staff had a problem of their own making. They'd fixed Jordan Ames's eyes after our 45-yard run by teaching him to read the back in their Bull front. But as Russ put it, a back-reader is a counter victim. So they built a narrow tag: when our back aligned toward the tight end, Ames keyed the guards and ran with the pullers. Rollins wrong-armed the kick-out; the linebacker in the hole spilled the wrapper; the backside end stayed home for a quarterback keep. On this snap, because Ames was aligned on the play side, he was the man in the hole and Bell was the one over the top — the tag's two linebacker jobs, sorted by where each man started.

I told him, "That's what I saw in Game 2. Your Will stopped stepping with my back. He was watching my linemen. So I didn't get my step."

He said they'd never claimed to solve counter. They'd just stopped giving it a free step.


Analysis

1. The play was sound; the picture was predictable. No Outlaw missed an assignment. Lorusso pulled flat; Fitch wrapped tight; Szabo kept Coleman from chasing. The play failed because the defense knew, from our backfield alignment, which key would tell the truth on this snap. That's the deepest lesson of gap schemes: your blocking rules are visible, and so are the habits that come with them.

2. The defense attacked the kick-out, not the ball carrier. Spill technique trades the edge for time. Instead of one hole, one lead blocker, and one linebacker, the offense gets a back running laterally toward the sideline with no lead blocker, against a linebacker running over the top and a force player. That trade only works if somebody is outside the spill — and Sacramento always had somebody there.

3. The tag was narrow, which is why it worked. Sacramento didn't change Ames's gap. They changed what he looked at, on one backfield alignment, against one opponent. That's cheap to install and hard to see from the other sideline. It's also fragile: change the alignment and the tag is guessing.

4. Our rule became their evidence. "Flip the formation, not the linemen" kept our linemen comfortable. It also tied the back's alignment to the play. A rule that saves practice time can cost you on Sunday if nobody checks what it looks like on film. That's why our self-scout now has a column for backfield alignment by play, and why our spring install has counter from both offsets and Counter Y from the telling one.


Discussion Questions

  1. Sacramento's tag changed what Ames looked at without changing his gap. Why is that kind of adjustment easier to install in a week than a new front?
  2. If Rollins had boxed Lorusso's kick-out (outside shoulder, keep the ball inside) instead of wrong-arming it, where would the hole have been, and who would have had to make the tackle?
  3. Marisol's tell threshold is 70 percent on 10 or more snaps. Was 14 of 19 a tell? What would you want to know before you changed the call sheet?
  4. Name the play from Chapter 11 you would have called from the same alignment on the next snap to punish a Will who is now running with the pullers.
  5. What does it say about the Sentinels that they solved a play before the game rather than during it?

Your Turn

Draw the same pre-snap picture, but call inside zone right — toward Harlan, away from where the pullers would go on counter. Diagram what a Will who keys the guards and "runs with the pullers" sees on that play, and show where the cutback lane appears. Then write the two-sentence note you'd give Vance in the Saturday quarterback meeting explaining why this call belongs on the wristband next to Counter Left.