Case Study 1 — Fourteen Snaps in October: Making Sacramento Choose

An Outlaws case, told from Lyle Petrakis's side of the field. The Outlaws, Sentinels, and every player, game, and number here are fictional composites.


Setup

The game: Week 6, Sacramento Sentinels at Austin. The Sentinels are the division's best defense, coached by Russ Kimbrough: nickel on about 70 percent of snaps, a two-high shell that rotates after the snap, pressure mostly on third-and-long. They play our Eleven with nickel almost every time.

The problem: Marisol Vega's self-scout of our last four games, the same four games Sacramento's staff would have cut up, showed our Twelve personnel — Ruffin, Harlan, Brandt, Gaines, Sutton — on 49 snaps. Thirty-one were runs. Eleven were play-action. Six were dropbacks. One was a screen. Zero were RPOs. Forty-two of the 49 started with a handoff or a run fake.

What the scouting said about their answer: On the tape we had, Sacramento had never used a big nickel against two tight ends. Against Twelve it played either base — Grant Weller standing up as a Sam linebacker, Tavon Greer on the edge, Kenny Vo on the sideline — or its regular nickel, with Vo on the field. Teo's count from their last four games: roughly a third base, two-thirds nickel against two-tight-end sets. No pattern by down that he trusted.

The staff-room decision: We couldn't fix the zeros in one week. We could do something more useful: make Sacramento's personnel answer visible before the snap, then punish whichever answer it chose.


What We Built

The idea fit on a napkin, and it started on one, at the diner near our facility on Tuesday night:

Twelve, Harlan flexed. Count the man over him. DB → we run. Linebacker → we throw.

Here is why it works. If Harlan lines up in the left slot, somebody on the defense has to cover him. Whoever walks out over Harlan tells us which personnel group we're facing, without our having to read it from the sideline:

Who walks out over Harlan What it means Our answer
Kenny Vo (a nickel) Sacramento is in nickel: six in the box, a 190-pound-class cover player over our 255-pound tight end Zip Harlan back to a wing and run at Vo's side — seven blockers vs. a light box
A linebacker (Weller) Sacramento is in base: a linebacker must cover Harlan in space Y Option or a play-action seam to Harlan

Rome Pettaway, our quarterbacks coach, taught Darius Vance the rule in a single sentence on Wednesday: "Count the man over Eighty-seven. If he wears a corner's body, we hand it off. If he wears a linebacker's body, Eighty-seven is your guy." We installed it as a Kill call — two plays called in the huddle, Vance picks at the line by the look — so the decision was his, not mine.

Gus wasn't thrilled. "You're asking Harlan to block a nickel from a wing after motioning. That's a lot of moving parts for a run play."

"It's one moving part," I said. "And it gets you a seven-on-six."

Gus thought about that. "Seven-on-six I'll take."


What Happened

The opening drive

We opened with Eleven — the inside-slant RPO that worked twice — then a jet-motion out to Powers. On 1st-and-10 at the SAC 32 we brought Twelve on for the first time and ran outside zone: +4. Then, on 2nd-and-6 at the SAC 28, we used the same Twelve look for play-action. Bell and Holloway both came downhill on the fake; Harlan ran the dig behind them for +22 to the SAC 6. We scored two plays later on Vance's zone-read keep. Two Twelve snaps, 26 yards, and Sacramento had seen the run and the play-action from the same look on consecutive snaps.

The Zip run

First quarter, about 7:30 left, 2nd-and-4 at the AUS 46, Outlaws 7–0. This was the first time the napkin rule got its real test.

PRE-SNAP: Twelve, Gun Doubles Right -- Harlan flexed, Vo over him

           F                                        $
   C       *               W        M                         C
                       E   T   N   E
     X              O   O   O   O   O   U
          Y                                                Z
                              Q  R

📊 Diagram (described): Twelve personnel in a two-by-two set: Sutton on the line far left, Harlan standing off the line in the left slot, Brandt attached on the right, Gaines wide right, Vance in the gun with Ruffin beside him. Sacramento shows nickel: Vo, the nickel, has walked out over Harlan; four linemen and two linebackers are in the box; two safeties are deep.

Vance looked left, saw Vo — a nickel, not a linebacker — and gave the run signal. Harlan went in Zip motion, came back toward the ball, and set in a wing spot a yard off the line on the left tackle's hip. Vo followed him.

POST-SNAP: Zip, Inside zone left -- Harlan seals Vo

                           W        M
                           ^        ^
                       E   T   N   E
                       ^   ^   ^   ^
            Y]--> *    O   O   O   O   O   U]
                    <...........R  Q
            aim: left B gap; bounce if the end squeezes

📊 Diagram (described): Harlan has motioned into a wing just outside the left tackle and Vo has followed him to the edge of the box. At the snap the line steps left on inside zone; Harlan blocks Vo, sealing him outside. Ruffin takes the handoff aiming at the left guard's outside leg, with the option to bounce outside if the defensive end squeezes. Seven blockers are working against six box defenders plus the nickel, and the nickel is matched against a tight end.

Ruffin +4, first down at midfield. Not a highlight. A first down on second-and-four, with the defense's smallest player stuck in the run fit. On the next snap we gained 3 more, and on the snap after that — 2nd-and-7 at the SAC 47 — Gaines ran the 41-yard post. The drive ended in a field goal, 10–0.

The Y Option

Second quarter, 2nd-and-7 at the AUS 38, Outlaws 17–7. Same formation, same rule. This time the man who walked out over Harlan was Grant Weller — a linebacker, Sacramento in base. Vance didn't need me. Harlan pushed six yards at Weller, Weller sat inside to protect against the seam, and Harlan broke outside. +9, first down. The drive stalled three plays later and we punted, but the matchup had paid again.

The totals

Week 6, our Twelve vs. … Snaps Runs Rush yards Passes
Nickel 9 7 52 (7.4 per carry) 2
Base 5 3 8 (2.7 per carry) 2
Total 14 10 60 4 for 44 yards

We won 34–27.


Analysis

Why it worked — the mechanism. The plan didn't hide our personnel; Sacramento knew we were in Twelve every time Brandt ran on. What it did was make Sacramento's answer visible and then make that answer wrong. Flexing Harlan forced the defense to show its personnel group by who covered him. A nickel over Harlan meant a light box and a small defender who could be pulled into the run fit by motion. A linebacker over Harlan meant a big player covering a tight end in space. The Kill call gave Vance the authority to choose by the look, so the decision happened at the speed of the snap, not the speed of my headset.

Why the numbers look the way they do. Against nickel we ran 7 times for 52 yards — the defense had brought the wrong size of people for our runs. Against base we ran only 3 times, for 8 yards, because a base front is built to stop the run; the plan sent us to the air against base instead. Read the table as a decision rule working, not as two separate statistics.

What it did not fix. Look again at the self-scout. Our Twelve still had no RPOs and almost no dropbacks. In Week 6 that didn't matter, because Sacramento only had two personnel answers and both had a weakness we could reach. The plan beat the answers Russ had. It didn't change the tendency his staff was about to build a new answer for. That's the subject of Case Study 2.

Caveat. Fourteen snaps is a tiny sample. Marisol would remind you that three base runs for 8 yards could be a bad sequence, not a law. The value of the game isn't the numbers; it's the film, which showed the mechanism working on both sides of the rule.


Discussion Questions

  1. The plan relied on Harlan flexing into the slot so the defense had to declare. Why wouldn't the same plan work with Brandt flexed instead?
  2. Why did we install this as a Kill call for Vance rather than having Lyle choose from the sideline? What would have been lost by calling it from the sideline?
  3. The opening drive ran outside zone and then play-action from the same Twelve look on back-to-back snaps. How did that sequence make the later Twelve snaps more effective?
  4. If you were Russ Kimbrough on Monday after this game, what would your Twelve answer be next time, and what would it have to be good at?
  5. Which part of this plan transfers to high school, where the defense rarely substitutes? Which part doesn't?

Your Turn

Build your own one-sentence "count the man" rule for one of your personnel groups. Pick the hybrid player in that group, put him where the defense must cover him, and write two lines: "If ___ covers him → we . If ___ covers him → we ." Then draw the pre-snap picture for each version and name the play you'd call. Keep it short enough to fit on a napkin, because if it doesn't fit on a napkin, your quarterback won't remember it with seventy thousand people screaming.