Case Study 1: Five Wides and a Boot — The Tying Drive in Sacramento
Austin Outlaws at Sacramento Sentinels, divisional playoff. Every team, player, and number in this case study is fictional.
Setup
The divisional-round game in Sacramento was the third time we'd played the Sentinels that season. We'd won the first at home, 34–27, and lost the second in Sacramento, 23–20. By the last two minutes of the third quarter of the third game, we were behind again: Sentinels 17, Outlaws 10. Our previous drive had died on a third-and-6 at their 44, when Malik Simmons broke up the bender to Mekhi Powers. Our defense forced a punt, and we took over at our own 42 with 1:55 left in the third quarter.
Three things were on my mind.
The personnel problem. In Week 15, our 12-personnel runs against the Sentinels' big nickel had produced 8 carries for 29 yards. The big nickel is what Russ Kimbrough plays against two tight ends: Tre Holloway moves from strong safety to the Star spot, the slot-and-edge position, and a third safety, Elijah Pruitt, comes in to play deep. Holloway is Sacramento's best force player. Our staff had decided that week (see §10.9 of this chapter) to run Wide mostly from Eleven, where the Sentinels keep Kenny Vo at the Star and Holloway deep, and to save Twelve for the clock and for the boot.
The chase. DeShawn Rollins, number 94, is the Sentinels' weak-side edge. Against our Wide runs to Harlan's side, he's the backside end. In Week 15 he'd been in on two of our Wide tackles from behind. He doesn't fight blockers on those plays. He runs flat down the line and catches cutbacks.
The look. On every snap of this drive, Brooks Harlan was attached on the left. With the Sentinels setting their front's strength to the attached tight end, that put Rollins on our right, the backside of every Wide Left. And it meant that if Vance ever booted right, he'd be rolling toward Rollins's side, with Rollins hopefully chasing a fake in the other direction.
Our call sheet had one box I'd circled before kickoff: "Twelve, Under Ace Left, Wide PA Boot Right — when 94 chases twice and we're inside the 15."
What happens
| # | Clock | Down, distance, spot | Call | Result |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Q3 1:55 | 1-10 AUS 42 | Eleven, Gun Doubles Left, Wide Left | Ruffin bangs inside Harlan, +6 |
| 2 | Q3 1:16 | 2-4 AUS 48 | Same | Ruffin bends back; Rollins tackles from behind, +1 |
| 3 | Q3 0:34 | 3-3 AUS 49 | Eleven, Gun Doubles Left, Powers option | Powers sits in the hole vs. zone, +8, first down |
| 4 | Q4 15:00 | 1-10 SAC 43 | Eleven, Gun Doubles Left, Wide Left | Vo reached; Ruffin bounces, +12 |
| 5 | Q4 14:20 | 1-10 SAC 31 | Twelve, Under Ace Left, Wide Left | Big nickel; Ruffin bangs, +9 |
| 6 | Q4 13:38 | 2-1 SAC 22 | Same | Ruffin bangs again, +13; Rollins arrives late |
| 7 | Q4 12:56 | 1-G SAC 9 | Twelve, Under Ace Left, Wide PA Boot Right | Harlan, 9-yard TD at 12:48. 17–17. |
Seven plays, 58 yards, 4:07 of game clock. Five Wides, one option route, one boot.
Snaps 1 and 2: learning the chase
The first snap was a clean bang. Grant Weller, the Sentinels' strong-side end lined up outside Harlan, widened at the snap. Harlan ran him, said "Run him!" loud enough that I heard about it on Monday, and Ruffin cut up inside for 6.
The second snap told me more. Ruffin pressed the landmark, saw Bell and Ames flow hard over the top, and bent it back, the right read. But Rollins had not stopped running from the moment Ruffin took his first step. He came flat down the line from the backside, past Darnell Fitch's cutoff, and tackled Ruffin from behind for a yard.
Teo, from the booth: "Ninety-four's chasing. Flat. Didn't look at the quarterback."
One chase. I wanted two.
Snap 3: staying on schedule
Third-and-3 is a down where the Sentinels' tape said they'd play zone underneath with two safeties deep. We called a Powers option route from the slot: in doubt, sit and face the quarterback. He sat between the linebackers and caught it for 8. The quarter ended.
Snaps 4 through 6: buying the boot
Between quarters, Rome Pettaway, our quarterbacks coach, walked Vance through the boot one more time on the sideline: "If ninety-four chases, you're outside him before he knows. If he doesn't, you throw the flat and you live."
Snap 4 was the run we'd built the whole plan around. Eleven personnel kept Holloway deep and put Vo at the Star. Harlan reached Vo, which is a mismatch in our favor, and the edge opened. Ruffin's read 1 said the defender was reached and the edge was soft, so he bounced for 12. That's the only time a bounce is right: when the defense gives it to you.
Then we switched to Twelve. Pruitt came on, Holloway moved to the Star, and Vo left the field. That's the big nickel we'd struggled against in Week 15. Twice we ran Wide Left into it anyway, and twice Ruffin banged for big gains, 9 and then 13 on a second-and-1 where the Sentinels' tape said we'd throw play-action.
Why did Wide work against Big this time when it hadn't in Week 15? Two reasons. First, the five Wides on this drive came against a defense that had spent three quarters adjusting to our Eleven-personnel runs. Its linebackers were flowing faster than they had in Week 15, which is good for the bang. Second, and more important, Rollins kept chasing. On snap 6, he came flat down the line again and was a step late. Teo said it on the headset, and I quoted it earlier in this chapter: "Ninety-four's chasing every one. Flat down the line. Hasn't looked back once."
Teo had his chart in front of him. Of the five Wides on the drive, Rollins had chased flat on all five. He'd looked for a pulling guard on none of them, because there hadn't been one.
Snap 7: the boot
First-and-goal at the Sentinels' 9. Twelve personnel, same formation as snaps 5 and 6. I said it into Vance's helmet with about 30 seconds on the play clock: "Twelve, Under Ace Left, Wide PA Boot Right."
PRE-SNAP (Twelve, Under Ace Left vs. Big nickel, 1st-and-goal at 9)
===================== GOAL LINE ========================
$ F
C C
*
M W
E T N E
Y LT LG C RG RT U
Q
X Z
R
📊 Diagram (described): Austin has two tight ends, Harlan (Y) attached on the left and Brandt (U) attached on the right, with Vance under center, Ruffin deep, and both wide receivers off the line. The Sentinels are in their big nickel with the front set to Harlan: Weller outside Harlan, Coleman as a three-technique outside the left guard, Big V shaded to the center's right, and Rollins outside Brandt on the right. Bell and Ames are the linebackers; Holloway is at the Star spot outside Weller; Pruitt and Royce are deep near the goal line, with the corners on Sutton and Gaines. It is the same picture as the two Wide Left runs before it.
POST-SNAP (Wide PA Boot Right: fake Wide Left, Vance boots right)
===================== GOAL LINE ========================
/ X: post Z: fade (clears) ^
<--* <--M <--W
Y-----------------------------> Harlan, caught at the 1
<--E (chases the fake) U--> flat
(Y) LT LG C RG RT (U) <-- line steps left
RG====>[ (pulls to the edge)
X (fake)<===R<....Q=========> boot Z
📊 Diagram (described): The whole line takes its Wide Left steps and Vance fakes to Ruffin going left. Holloway, Bell, and Ames all flow left with the fake, and Rollins chases flat down the line from the right toward Ruffin. Vance keeps the ball and rolls right. Lorusso, the right guard, pulls flat to the right edge to block the first defender who shows outside the right tackle; nobody does. Brandt releases late into the right flat; Harlan, who stepped left as though reaching Weller, crosses the field from left to right just short of the goal line; Gaines runs a fade to clear the right corner and Sutton runs a post from the left. Vance throws to Harlan, who catches it at the 1 and walks in.
Rollins chased. He took three steps flat down the line toward Ruffin before he looked up, and by then Vance was outside him. Lorusso pulled to the edge and found nobody there to block, so he turned upfield and looked for a linebacker. Ames, who'd have had Harlan's crossing route in a perfect world, had taken two hard steps left with the fake. Harlan was behind him. Royce, the deep safety on that side, had to respect Gaines's fade into the corner of the end zone.
Vance threw it on the run, softly, a little in front of Harlan. Touchdown. 17–17, 12:48 left.
Analysis
This was not a trick play. It was the sixth snap of a conversation.
The run had to be real. Five Wides on the drive gained 41 yards. If they'd gained 8, Rollins would have had no reason to keep chasing and the Sentinels' linebackers would have had no reason to fly. The boot cost us nothing to call because the runs had already made the Sentinels play the run with their whole bodies. That's Theme 6 of this book: threaten what you don't want to do. More precisely, make the run credible enough that the defense can't afford to doubt it.
The illusion had to be exact. Harlan's first step on the boot was the same reach step he'd taken on the five Wides. Lorusso's pull was the only difference in the whole line, and it was one man on the backside, moving away from the flow. The Sentinels' ends had a rule to look for a pulling guard, as Russ told me in the spring. But after five Wides without one, Rollins had stopped looking.
The chase had to be confirmed, not assumed. I'd circled "when 94 chases twice" before the game. Teo's booth count gave me five out of five. If Rollins had stayed home even once on the drive, I'd have called Wide again or a different play-action. The boot is only as good as the evidence that the backside end is chasing.
Personnel chose the defender. We ran Eleven early in the drive to keep Holloway deep and get a mismatch on the edge (the 12-yard bounce). We switched to Twelve inside the 35 because Twelve was our boot personnel. It put Brandt on Rollins's side to release into the flat, and it brought on the big nickel, whose linebackers and Star had been flowing hard for two snaps.
Where it could have failed: if Rollins had stayed home, Lorusso would have had to block a premier edge rusher in space, and Vance's answer was the flat to Brandt or a throwaway. That's the floor of the play: a short gain or an incompletion on first-and-goal, not a sack.
Discussion questions
- The staff decided before the game to run Wide mostly from Eleven. Why did switching to Twelve inside the 35 help the boot, even though Twelve brought Holloway, the Sentinels' best force player, onto the edge?
- On snap 6, a 2nd-and-1, the Sentinels' tendency data said Austin would throw play-action. Lyle ran Wide instead. What did that run add to snap 7?
- What single observation would have made Lyle switch from the circled boot to a different call on first-and-goal? What would you have called instead?
- The Sentinels' ends had a "look for the guard" rule. Why does a rule like that weaken over the course of a drive, and what does that tell you about self-scouting your own sequences?
- If you were Russ Kimbrough watching this film on Monday, what would you change about Rollins's rule for the next game?
Your turn
Write the call-sheet box for a boot off your own outside-zone run, in the same form as ours: the call, the personnel, and a one-line trigger built from two observable facts (one about the backside end, one about field position or down and distance). Then write the "if not" line: the call you make if the trigger isn't met by the time you reach the field position you wanted.