Case Study 2 — The Offense With No Brakes: Curtis Bale's Second Season
Curtis Bale, his team, his opponents, and every game and number here are fictional composites. His team is left unnamed on purpose; this is a lesson about an approach, not a person. Case Study 1 was a screen game that worked until the defense learned. This one is about an offense whose defenses never had to learn anything, because it had no screen game at all.
Setup
Who. Curtis Bale and Lyle Petrakis were young assistants together on Walt Dupree's staff. They were the two who stayed latest and drew the most plays. Bale is the most gifted play designer Lyle has ever worked with. In his first season as an offensive coordinator, for a team in the other conference, his offense led its conference in explosive plays. In his second season, it fell apart, and he was fired before the next one.
The earlier chapters of this book tell that collapse through three lenses: a philosophy that fit Bale's ego instead of his roster (Chapter 1), borrowed plays that didn't know about each other (Chapter 2), and sixty-one formations that turned into a tell (Chapter 3). This case adds a fourth lens, a smaller one that's easier to fix: Bale had nothing to slow down a pass rush.
What Lyle studied. The spring after Bale was fired, Lyle pulled four games from the middle of Bale's second season and charted every passing down. He wasn't looking for screens. He was looking for why a quarterback who'd been hard to sack the year before was getting sacked. Here's what his chart said.
| Item (four games, Bale's second season) | Count |
|---|---|
| Opponents rushing four on 2nd-and-7+ and 3rd-and-7+ | 61 of 70 snaps |
| Opponents in a two-high shell on those snaps | 55 of 70 |
| Defensive ends aligned in a wide technique (well outside the tackle, built for speed rushing) | 48 of 70 |
| Bale's calls on those snaps that targeted a receiver 15+ yards downfield | 51 of 70 |
| Sacks on those snaps | 10 |
| Screens of any kind on those snaps | 0 |
| Screens of any kind in the four games | 3, all bubbles, all on first down |
📈 By the numbers (fictional): Seventy long-yardage passing downs, and the defense rushed four on 61 of them and played two-high on 55. That's the defense saying "we'll give you the underneath, and our ends will come as fast as they like." Bale threw deep on 51 of those snaps, and he called zero screens. It's a four-game sample from one season, so treat it as a description of what those defenses did, not as a law.
A wide alignment (many coaches call the widest version a "wide 9") puts a defensive end several yards outside the offensive tackle, aimed at the quarterback's launch point. A wide end is a great speed rusher and a poor run defender. He's exactly the rusher a slip screen is built for.
What happens
One series, third quarter
Lyle's chart had one series he circled twice. Bale's team trailed by ten in the third quarter. Second-and-fourteen at its own 22.
PRE-SNAP: four wide vs. two-high, wide ends (Bale's 2nd season)
F $
C * W M * C
E (wide) T T (wide) E
X H O O O O O H Z
Q R
📊 Diagram (described): Bale's offense is in a four-receiver set: two receivers on each side, with a running back beside the quarterback. The defense shows two deep safeties, two nickel defenders over the slots, two linebackers, two defensive tackles, and two defensive ends aligned well outside the offensive tackles in wide speed-rush alignments.
Bale called four verticals. The defense rushed four and dropped seven deep. The quarterback took a seven-step drop and waited for a seam to come open between two safeties who weren't going to let it. The left end, from his wide alignment, ran a straight speed rush at the launch point. The left tackle kicked to meet him and was a step late. Sack, minus eight.
Third-and-twenty-two at the 14. Bale called a deep dig. The quarterback threw it early under pressure, and it fell incomplete. Punt from the end zone. The opponent started its next drive near midfield and kicked a field goal.
What the defense was doing
🛡️ The defense's view: Picture the defensive coordinator on the other sideline. His plan for Bale was three sentences, and it held for the whole season. Play two-high, because the deep ball is what beats you. Rush four, because you don't need more. And let the ends go, as wide and as fast as they like, because nothing behind them will make them pay. The last sentence is the one that matters for this chapter. A coordinator can only tell his ends to rush that way if the offense has no slip screen, no draw, and no quick game to the area the ends just left.
The play that wasn't called
Here's the same snap, second-and-fourteen, with the call Lyle drew on the back of his chart.
POST-SNAP (the call not made): Slip Left vs. the same look
C (runs with X) F (deep: 12+ yds away) $
* (carried off by H's stem, then stalked)
W (drops to hook, deep)
X ^ H ^ [LT]--> kick [LG]--> lead [C] wall
R <== caught 2-3 yds behind the line: open grass
T ==> T ==>
E (wide) =========> speed rush at the launch point
Q drifts 3 extra steps
📊 Diagram (described): The same defense, with a slip screen to the left. The wide left end runs his speed rush straight at the quarterback's launch point, and the left tackle lets him go. The left tackle, left guard, and center release to the left. The running back catches the ball two to three yards behind the line. The two receivers on the left run vertical stems that carry the corner and the nickel away, then block. The linebackers have dropped deep, and the nearest safety is more than twelve yards away. The grass in front of the back is open.
Seven defenders dropping deep, four rushing, two ends sprinting at the launch point: that's the picture the slip screen was invented for. It wouldn't necessarily have converted second-and-fourteen. But it would have done two things the deep shot couldn't. It would have stayed out of a sack. And it would have made that left end, on the next passing down, rush with one eye on the back.
The dinner
Lyle and Bale talked about his second season at a long dinner, years later. Bale was honest about most of it, which Lyle has always respected. On screens, he was honest too.
BALE: I never liked them. A screen on second-and-fourteen is a punt with extra steps.
LYLE: It's not for second-and-fourteen. It's for third-and-eight two series later, when that end is a half-step slower.
BALE: You can't put a half-step on a stat sheet.
LYLE: No. You put it on the sack column. Yours went up.
BALE: (a long pause) They just kept coming.
LYLE: Because you never gave them a reason not to.
Analysis
What failed wasn't the deep shots. It was the absence of a tax. Every aggressive defensive behavior has a cost the offense can charge: a run against a light box, play-action against a fast safety, a slip screen against a rusher who wants to win. An offense that never charges lets the defense do the aggressive thing for free. Bale's opponents put their ends in wide speed-rush alignments on 48 of 70 long-yardage downs because nothing in his offense made that alignment expensive.
Why a small play matters this much. The screen's main value isn't the yards on the screen. It's the change in the rusher's behavior on every pass after it. Remove the screen and the rusher's best strategy is simple: rush as hard and as wide as possible, every time. That strategy beats average offensive tackles. Bale's line was average.
The contrast with Case Study 1. Austin's screens to Rollins stopped working in Game 2 because the Sentinels changed Rollins's rules: the free-lunch rule and a named screen player. But those changes cost the Sentinels something. Rollins rushed every pass with one eye on his blocker. Bale's opponents never had to change anything. In a screen game, even the failures do some work. Bale's offense never got that far.
Why it isn't about Bale's ego, exactly. Calling no screens is a common blind spot among brilliant designers, because a screen is the least interesting play to draw. It has no clever route and no read; it's five linemen counting to two and a back standing still. That's the reason it's easy to leave out, and the reason defenses notice when it's missing. Chapter 1's warning was "the thesis must fit your quarterback and your line, not your ego." A line that is average in pass protection needs a way to slow the rush down more than it needs another shot play.
The fix, in one sentence. Two screens a game, called on purpose against the rushers who want to win, with a "call it when" line on the call sheet. That wouldn't have saved Bale's season by itself. But it would have changed what the opponents' defensive ends were allowed to do.
Discussion Questions
- The defensive coordinator in this case told his ends to rush "as wide and as fast as they like." List three offensive plays that make that instruction expensive, and say which one is cheapest to install.
- Bale said a screen on second-and-fourteen is "a punt with extra steps." Using the chapter's "right / surrender" table, when is he right?
- Lyle's chart counted zero screens on 70 long-yardage downs. How would a defensive coordinator find that number, and how long would it take him to act on it?
- Compare the two case studies. Austin's screens failed in Game 2, and Bale had no screens to fail. Which situation is better for the offense, and why?
- Bale's first season led his conference in explosive plays without a screen game. Why might the absence of screens not hurt in year one but hurt badly in year two?
Your Turn
You've been hired as Bale's replacement. Same quarterback, same average line, same defenses playing two-high with wide ends. Write a two-screen starter package for your first four games: one slow screen and one fast screen. For each, give the call, the "call it when" trigger (as a defensive behavior you can see on film), the "don't call it when" look, and the next play it's meant to make better. Then write the one sentence you'd say to your offensive line in the first meeting about why a play where they let their man go is the most important pass-protection play in the book.