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Youngstown, Ohio, the second week of July. Six in the morning, the back booth of my parents' diner,

Chapter 18 — Four Verticals, Post-Safety, and Deep Passing: Attacking the Safeties and Scoring from Anywhere

The Hook: Two Posts on One Placemat

Youngstown, Ohio, the second week of July. Six in the morning, the back booth of my parents' diner, the one by the kitchen door where I did my homework for twelve years. My father has already refilled my coffee twice without asking. I have a paper placemat turned over to its blank side and two pens: one blue, one red.

In blue I draw the first snap. Game 1, Week 6, at home against the Sacramento Sentinels. First quarter, a little over six minutes left, Outlaws 7, Sentinels 0. Second-and-7 at the Sacramento 47. Two-by-two, Trey Gaines wide right. Mekhi Powers comes across in motion and settles inside Gaines, and now we have three receivers to the right. At the snap Gaines runs a post, a route that climbs straight up the field and then breaks at a slant toward the goalposts. He runs it into the middle of the field. Nobody is there. Forty-one yards. Ike Royce, their free safety, runs him down from behind at the 6.

In red I draw the second. Game 3, the divisional playoff, at Sacramento. Sentinels 20, Outlaws 17, 2:41 left. Third-and-9 at our 38. Two-by-two again, Brooks Harlan attached on the left. Gaines runs a post from the right. Powers runs a dig underneath it. Before the snap there are two safeties at 13 yards and the middle of the field is open. At the snap one safety drops down and the other one spins to the middle. Darius Vance throws the post at about 2.4 seconds. Royce catches it.

I set the pens down and look at what I've drawn. The blue line and the red line are almost the same line. Same receiver. Same break at about twelve yards. Same landing spot in the middle of the field, give or take a few yards. Same safety's name next to both of them: Royce chased the first one and caught the second.

My father comes back with the pot and looks over my shoulder. In forty years he has never once asked me about a defense. He taps the blue line, then the red.

"Same play?"

"Same route," I say. "Different answer."

He taps the red one. "This one cost more."

He's right, and that's the chapter. The post is a question you ask the middle of the field, and the answer arrives after the snap. In the blue picture, the Sentinels made a check against our motion, and one of their safeties never heard it, so ten men played one coverage and one man played another. The middle was empty because of a mistake. In the red picture, the middle was empty before the snap and full a half second after it, on purpose. Russ Kimbrough, their defensive coordinator, had let us ask that question twenty-nine times on third-and-long and had answered "two high" every time. On the thirtieth he answered "one high," and we threw the ball before we heard him say it.

Deep passing is the most valuable thing an offense does and the most dangerous thing it does. A completed post is a touchdown drive in one snap. An intercepted post is the other team's field position, the other team's momentum, and on that night the other team's season-ending kneel-downs. This chapter is about how to throw the ball deep on purpose: how four vertical routes stress three or four deep defenders, how post-safety concepts make the middle safety choose, how the quarterback's eyes move a safety, how many men you keep in to block, and when a coordinator should put a shot on the call sheet at all.

I folded the placemat and put it in my bag. It's taped inside the cover of my notebook now. Blue on the left, red on the right.

🏃 Fast Track: If you've coached four verticals and post concepts, skim 18.1–18.2 and read 18.3 (four verticals against Quarters, which is where most All Go installs break down), 18.5 (the read tables for Mills, Dagger, Yankee, post-wheel, and scissors), and 18.8 (the shot play as a call-sheet category). Then build the Project Checkpoint.

🔬 Deep Dive: Coverage structures from the offense's side are in Appendix E; every deep concept here, with its full read against each coverage, is in Appendix C. Protection math for shots is built out in Chapter 22.

📺 Film Watcher: This Sunday, on any pass longer than 20 yards in the air, rewind and watch the deepest safety for the first two seconds after the snap. Where did he start, which way did he open his hips, and did the quarterback's eyes go there first? You'll start to see the throw before it happens.


18.1 Every Deep Ball Is a Question About the Safeties

Start with a count. Before you think about routes, count the defenders who can cover the deep part of the field, and figure out where each one of them has to be.

A defense has eleven players. In a typical passing-down look, four rush and seven cover. Of the seven, some play underneath, the short and intermediate zones out to roughly 10–15 yards, and some play deep. The number of deep defenders is the first fact about any deep shot, because a deep pass is only open where a deep defender isn't.

The shortcut coaches use for this count is the middle of the field. MOFC (middle of the field closed) means one deep safety sits in the middle, as in Cover 3 and Cover 1. MOFO (middle of the field open) means two safeties split the field into halves or quarters and nobody starts in the middle, as in Cover 2, Cover 4 (Quarters), and Cover 6. Cover 0 means no deep safety at all: everybody is in man coverage or rushing.

Here is the most important sentence about the shell, and you've seen it before in Chapter 7: the shell is not the coverage. What you see before the snap is the defense's opening statement. What matters for a deep throw is what's there two seconds after the snap, when the ball comes out. Two safeties at 13 yards can become one safety in the middle in the time it takes your quarterback to take his drop. The red line on my placemat is that sentence in ink.

The deep-defender table

Coverage Shell before the snap Deep defenders Underneath defenders (4-man rush) Where the deep void lives
Cover 3 MOFC 3 (two corners, free safety), each with a third of the field 4 The seams: the strips between the hash and the numbers, where the middle safety and an outside corner both have a claim and neither is close
Cover 1 MOFC 1 free safety, plus man coverage 5 in man (one may be a "robber" in the middle) Wherever a receiver beats his man and the free safety can't get there: the outside one-on-ones, especially away from the safety
Cover 2 MOFO 2 safeties, each with a deep half 5 (the corners squat in the flats) The middle between the safeties, and the sideline "hole" between a squatting corner and his half-field safety at about 18–22 yards
Tampa 2 MOFO 3 (two safeties plus the middle linebacker running the deep middle) 4 Down the seam away from the running Mike, and the deep sideline hole
Quarters (Cover 4) MOFO 4 (both corners, both safeties) 3 Very little deep. The space is underneath and outside: the flats, the checkdown, and the out cut
Cover 0 No deep safety 0 Everyone is in man or rushing Everywhere deep, if your protection holds long enough to get there

Read the right-hand column and you have the whole chapter in outline. Against one deep safety, you attack the seams and the post-safety's eyes. Against two, you split them or stretch one of them across his half. Against four, you mostly don't throw deep at all. You throw under them, or you make one of them choose between two routes. Against zero, you need one more blocker than they have rushers and one receiver who can win.

Why the deep ball is worth it

An explosive play, in this book and in its companion, is a run of 12 or more yards or a pass of 20 or more. Explosives are where touchdowns come from. Drives that get one are far more likely to score than drives that don't, because a single explosive skips three or four sets of downs, three or four chances for the defense to win a third down or force a penalty or a sack. Public charting has found the same pattern for years, with the obvious caveat that good offenses produce both explosives and long drives, so the relationship isn't all cause and effect.

Our fictional Outlaws had 71 explosive plays over 17 games last season. When Marisol Vega, our director of analytics, sorted our scoring drives in the spring, she showed me that most of them had at least one explosive in them and only a handful scored by grinding ten or twelve plays without one. I already knew it. Seeing it on one slide made me sit down.

Why the deep ball is dangerous

Every deep pass costs three things.

  1. Time. A post at 12 yards that's thrown on rhythm comes out at about 2.4–2.7 seconds. A go route thrown 40 yards in the air needs more like 2.8–3.2 seconds, depending on the drop. Vance gets rid of the ball in about 2.9 seconds against a four-man rush on a normal dropback. A shot asks your line to block longer than your offense usually does, which is how shots turn into sacks.
  2. Probability. Most deep throws are incomplete. The median shot is an incompletion. You're trading a likely 4–6 yards for an unlikely 35, and that trade only pays if you make it at the right time.
  3. Interceptions. A ball thrown 20 or more yards in the air hangs long enough for a safety to break on it. Deep middle throws are the worst, because the middle safety is facing the quarterback the whole way. Vance's four-game split, which Russ's staff charted before Game 1 and reprinted in their book, says it plainly: against five or more rushers, 28 of 36 for 9.4 yards per attempt with no interceptions. Against four rushers with post-snap rotation, safeties moving after the snap, he went 31 of 52 for 6.1 yards per attempt with 3 interceptions. The deep middle against a moving safety was his weakness. Russ knew it. So did we.

💡 Coach's point: A deep pass isn't a play you call. It's a question you ask a safety. If you can't name the safety and say what you're asking him, don't throw deep. Walt Dupree, my first NFL boss, used to say, "Every play is a question. Know what you're asking." He said it about every play. I think about it most on the deep ones.

🔄 Check your understanding: A defense shows two safeties at 13 yards. Name three coverages it could be playing after the snap, and say how many deep defenders each one has.

Answer

It could stay two-high: Cover 2 (two deep), Tampa 2 (three deep, with the Mike running the middle), or Quarters (four deep). Or it could rotate after the snap into a one-high coverage: Cover 3 (three deep) or Cover 1 (one deep, man underneath). That's the whole point of "the shell is not the coverage." Two high before the snap tells you where the safeties started, not where they'll be when the ball comes out.


18.2 Four Verticals Against Cover 3: Four on Three

Four verticals sends four receivers straight up the field. Many systems have their own name for it. Ours is "All Go." It's the oldest deep concept in modern football. Sid Gillman is widely credited with teaching offenses to stretch the whole field, vertically and horizontally. The run-and-shoot built its passing game on vertical choices. Hal Mumme and Mike Leach's Air Raid made four verticals one of the handful of concepts they repped every single day. Every one of those traditions came to the same arithmetic.

Against Cover 3, four verticals is four receivers on three deep defenders. The two corners take the outside thirds. The free safety takes the middle third. The two inside verticals, the seams, both run into the free safety's third. He can't cover two men who are 15 yards apart. Whichever one he doesn't go to is open.

That's the core. Here is how we teach it.

The All Go rules

Player Route Landmark and rule
#1 receivers (X and Z) Go The fade lane: 4–6 yards from the sideline, never closer than 4. Win the release, get even, then stack (get directly on top of the corner). Vs. press, win the first step or you've lost the play.
#2 receivers (H and Y in Doubles) Seam Release vertically to the outside edge of the hash, give or take a yard. Vs. one high, stay on your landmark and bend away from the middle safety if he widens toward you. Vs. two high, stay vertical and make the safety on your side cover you and the go at the same time. Vs. Quarters, the rule changes (18.3).
Back Protect, then check down In 60 protection the back checks his man first. If nobody comes, he releases to the middle at 5–6 yards and turns to face the quarterback. He's the throw when every safety stays deep.
Quarterback Read the middle safety Vs. one high: eyes start on the free safety. He moves, you throw away from him. Vs. two high: pick the side before the snap (18.3). Three-step or five-step drop from the gun, ball out on the hitch step.
Line 60 Left (our base six-man half-slide) Six blockers. Vs. a four-man rush, one free blocker. Vs. a fifth rusher, the back has him. Vs. a sixth, the ball has to come out hot.

A quick note on the hash. The NFL's hash marks are 70 feet 9 inches from each sideline and only 18 feet 6 inches apart, about six yards. So in the NFL the "outside edge of the hash" puts the two seams roughly 12–14 yards apart, depending on where the ball is, and each seam is roughly 15–20 yards from its own go route. Those are the four lanes. College and high school hashes are much wider, and that changes the geometry a great deal. We'll get there in the 🏫 note and in Case Study 2.

PRE-SNAP: "Eleven, Gun Doubles Right, 60 Left, All Go" vs. Cover 3

                               F (14)
  C (7)                                                   C (7)
             *           W          M          $ (8)
                     E   T    N    E
  X          H       O   O    O    O   O   Y              Z
 #18        #3                Q  R        #87            #11

📊 Diagram (described): Austin is in two-by-two. Sutton (X) is wide left with Powers (H) in the left slot. Harlan (Y) is attached on the right with Gaines (Z) wide right. Vance is in the shotgun with Ruffin beside him. The defense shows one deep safety in the middle at about 14 yards, corners at about 7 yards off on both outside receivers, a nickel over Powers, two linebackers in the box, and a strong safety at about 8 yards on the tight-end side. That's a single-high, middle-closed picture.

POST-SNAP: All Go vs. Cover 3 -- four verticals on three deep

  [DEEP 1/3]           [DEEP 1/3]                 [DEEP 1/3]
  ^                 ^       F                ^             ^
  | X go            |   <--'  F opens to H   |   Y seam   |  Z go
  C                 | H seam                 |   OPEN     C
  |                 |                        |   ...>     |
  |                 |                        |  /         |
  *-->[CURL/FLAT]   W [HOOK]       M [HOOK]  $-->[CURL/FLAT]
          E   T   N   E
          O   O   O   O   O
                  Q ......' throw away from F's hips
                  R (check, then middle at 5-6)

📊 Diagram (described): All four receivers go vertical. Both corners bail to the deep outside thirds over Sutton and Gaines. The four underneath defenders drop to their curl/flat and hook zones, which are too shallow to matter against routes that are 18 yards deep. The free safety in the middle has two seams in his third: Powers on the left and Harlan on the right. He opens his hips toward Powers. Vance, whose eyes started on the safety, throws Harlan's seam on the other side. Ruffin checks for a blitzer, then settles in the middle at 5 or 6 yards as the checkdown.

🔍 Why this works: It isn't speed. It's the fact that a safety's hips can only open one way. Once a deep middle safety turns to run with one seam, he's facing one sideline. Getting back to the other seam means flipping his hips, and that costs him about half a second, which is roughly 4–5 yards of a receiver's separation. The quarterback isn't reading receivers. He's reading which way one man's belt buckle turned. That's also why the throw has to come on time: if Vance holds it, the safety settles in the middle between the seams and both windows close.

When the defense says no: match Cover 3

That's the textbook version. The modern version is harder. Many defenses now play Cover 3 as a match coverage: the underneath defenders don't just drop to a spot, they read the receivers and "carry" anyone who goes vertical. The curl/flat or hook defender over the #2 receiver runs with him up the seam for 10–12 yards, until the safety can take over. A match Cover 3 turns "four on three" into "four on five" for the first 12 yards.

We learned that in the first quarter of our Week 2 game at St. Louis.

📋 Try it — Whose fault? Week 2 at the St. Louis Stallions (a fictional opponent), first quarter, scoreless. 3rd-and-10 at our 25. Two inside-zone runs had gained nothing. I called "Eleven, Gun Doubles Right, 60 Left, All Go." The Stallions' defensive coordinator, Frank Ostrowski, plays single-high almost every snap. Pre-snap: one deep safety, Wes Carrow (#28), at 14 yards. At the snap the corners bailed and Carrow stayed in the middle, a classic Cover 3 picture. But the Stallions' Mike linebacker, Hollis Mabry (#55), didn't drop to his hook spot. He turned and ran with Harlan's seam. Their nickel did the same with Powers on the other side. Vance read Carrow, saw him open toward Powers, and threw Harlan's seam on time. Mabry was in Harlan's hip pocket. Carrow, who had only opened toward Powers, came back over the top. The ball was broken up at the Stallions' 45. Ruffin had checked down into the middle at six yards, wide open, with nobody within eight yards of him. Whose fault? What's the rule, and what's the fix?

Answer

Mostly mine, partly the read. The call asked Vance to throw a seam against a defense whose underneath players carry seams. I had seen Mabry carry the seam on film twice and had written it off as a linebacker freelancing. Against match Cover 3, plain four verticals is four on five for the first twelve yards, and the safety only has to cover what's left.

The quarterback piece: our rule for the seam throw is "safety and carrier." The safety tells you which side, and the underneath defender over that seam tells you whether it's open now. Vance read the safety perfectly and never looked at Mabry. On a seam with a carrier on it, the throw goes over the carrier's outside shoulder and away from the safety, or it doesn't go. If both seams are carried, the ball goes to the checkdown or the go route with the corner bailing. On 3rd-and-10, a six-yard checkdown doesn't convert, so the honest answer is that this was the wrong call on third down against this defense.

The fix we installed the next week: against a team that carries seams, the seams become conversion routes. If the underneath defender carries you and the safety stays deep, break off at 12–14 and sit in the window between them, facing the quarterback. Your carrier is now behind you or trailing, and the safety is 8 yards over the top. And on third-and-long against Ostrowski, we stopped calling plain All Go. We punted on fourth down. Nobody remembers that punt but me.

The other answer: read the rotation after the snap

The reason four verticals survives in every playbook, even against match coverage, is that it reads the middle after the snap. Most deep concepts are built for a coverage. All Go is built for a number. The quarterback doesn't care what the safeties looked like before the snap. He cares where the deep middle defender is when he hits his last step. If there's one, throw away from him. If there are two, there's room between them. If there are four, check it down.

That's why the best All Go we threw all season came against the exact rotation that beat us later the same night.

Game 3, the divisional playoff at Sacramento. Fourth quarter, 7:14 left, Sentinels 20, Outlaws 17. 1st-and-10 at our 25 after their field goal. "Eleven, Gun Doubles Left, 60 Right, All Go." Harlan was attached on the left with Sutton outside him. Powers and Gaines were on the right. The Sentinels showed two high, both safeties at about 12 yards. Teo's voice from the booth gave me what he always gives me between the whistle and the call, in order: "Two high, six, Holloway at twelve." Shell, box, one thing.

At the snap they did what Russ told me in the spring is called Spin 3. Tre Holloway, the strong safety on Harlan's side, rotated down toward the curl. Royce spun from the right hash to the deep middle. Two-high became Cover 3.

POST-SNAP: Game 3, Q4, 1st-and-10 at the AUS 25 -- All Go vs. the spin

   ^ X go        ^ Y seam: OPEN       F Royce spins to        ^ Z go
   |  C          |   (THROW)         /  the middle, opens  C  |
   |             |                  /   toward H's seam       |
   |    $ Holloway rotates         ^ H seam                   |
   |      down to the curl         |                          |
   |      v                        |                          |
   X       Y                       H                          Z
             O   O   O   O   O
                     Q  R

📊 Diagram (described): Austin is in two-by-two with Harlan attached left and Sutton wide left; Powers is in the right slot and Gaines wide right. At the snap the strong safety on the left, Tre Holloway, drops down toward the curl zone, and the free safety, Ike Royce, spins from the right side to the deep middle, where he opens his hips toward Powers's seam on the right. Harlan's seam on the left now has nobody over it except Royce, who's facing the other way. Vance throws Harlan's seam.

Vance's eyes went to the middle on his first step. That's what Rome Pettaway, our quarterbacks coach, teaches as "two looks with one pair of eyes": the first look is before the snap, and the second one, the one that counts, comes on the drop. By his third step he saw Royce arrive in the middle and turn toward Powers. He threw Harlan's seam behind Holloway's drop and away from Royce. Harlan, +19, to our 44. Three snaps later we punted, and I didn't think about that seam again until the next morning.

Here's why it haunts me. Seven minutes of game clock later, on third-and-9, the same rotation came, and we beat ourselves with a concept that had decided the middle before the snap. All Go asks the question after the snap. The call we made on third-and-9 asked it before. We'll come back to that in 18.5, because it's the most expensive lesson in this book.

⚠️ Common mistake: Throwing the seam the safety is already on. The quarterback picks a seam before the snap ("I like Harlan on the linebacker") and throws it no matter what the middle safety does. Result: the safety breaks on a ball he was already running toward, and you get a pass breakup at best and an interception at worst. Fix: in practice, the quarterback isn't allowed to say a receiver's name in the All Go read, only a defender's. "Free safety went left, ball right." If he can't name the defender, he hasn't made the read.

🔄 Check your understanding: Against Cover 3, why are the two seams the throws and not the two go routes?

Answer

Each go route has a corner on it whose only job is his deep outside third, and he's already running with it. The two seams both land in one defender's third, the free safety's. One man can't take two vertical routes 12 or more yards apart, so one seam is open as long as the throw goes away from the safety and on time. The go routes matter because they hold the corners outside. Without them, the corners could squeeze the seams.


18.3 Four Verticals Against Two High: Cover 2, Tampa 2, and the Quarters Problem

Against two deep safeties, the arithmetic changes.

Against Cover 2: one safety, two routes

In Cover 2 the corners play the flats and jam the outside receivers. The two safeties each own a deep half. That means each safety has two vertical routes in his half: the go outside him and the seam inside him. Four verticals against Cover 2 isn't four on three. It's two on one, twice.

The read is horizontal. The safety on each side has to choose, and the quarterback picks a side before the snap, usually the side with the safety who's lined up wider or shallower, or the side with the better matchup. Then he reads that safety. If the safety widens toward the go, he throws the seam inside him. If the safety stays on the seam, he throws the go in the hole: over the squatting corner and in front of the safety, along the sideline at about 18–22 yards. If the corner sinks under the go instead of squatting, the flat is free, and that's your checkdown side.

PRE-SNAP: All Go vs. a two-high shell (Cover 2, Tampa 2, or Quarters)

          $ (12)                                  F (12)
  C (5)                                                    C (5)
             *           W          M
                     E   T    N    E
  X          H       O   O    O    O   O   Y              Z
                              Q  R

📊 Diagram (described): The same Austin two-by-two with Harlan attached right. The defense shows two safeties at about 12 yards, one over each hash, corners pressed or tight at about 5 yards, a nickel over Powers, and two linebackers. The middle of the field is open. Before the snap, this picture could be Cover 2, Tampa 2, or Quarters, and Vance can't know which until the safeties move.

Against Tampa 2: the Mike runs

Tampa 2 takes the middle away by sending the middle linebacker straight down the middle of the field at the snap. He carries the first vertical route that threatens the deep middle, which is usually a seam. That makes it three deep against four verticals again, and the job of the quarterback is to know which seam the Mike will carry. Usually it's the one to the passing strength or the one that releases cleanest, and teams vary. The other seam is back to two on one against that half-field safety.

The Portland Pioneers, whom we played in Week 10, ran the most disciplined Tampa 2 we saw all season. Their Mike, Owen Talbert (#52), carried the seam to our strength on almost every snap Teo charted. So our rule for All Go against Portland was simple: work the weak side. Throw the seam away from Talbert, or the go if the weak safety widened to the seam.

POST-SNAP: All Go vs. Tampa 2 -- the Mike carries one seam

     ^ X go          ^ H seam                ^ Y seam       ^ Z go
     |   [DEEP 1/2]  |   OPEN?   [MIDDLE]    |   [DEEP 1/2] |
     |    $          |            M runs     |    F         |
     |    reads H    |           with Y -->  |   widens     |
   C sits            |                       |   to Z go    C sits
   [FLAT]    *[CURL]                  W[CURL]               [FLAT]
                     E   T    N    E
                     O   O    O    O   O
                              Q  -> eyes left: $ vs. H and X

📊 Diagram (described): At the snap both corners squat in the flats. The middle linebacker turns and runs down the middle of the field with Harlan's seam on the right. The free safety on the right widens toward Gaines's go route. On the left, the strong safety has Powers's seam and Sutton's go in his half by himself. Vance looks left and reads that safety: if he stays on Powers's seam, the go to Sutton is open in the hole over the squatting corner. If he widens, Powers's seam is open inside him.

🎬 Film room: To find which seam a Tampa 2 Mike carries, don't watch the Mike. Watch the quarterback he's facing on the opponent's tape. A Mike who carries the seam has to turn his back to the quarterback at about 7–8 yards. Freeze every opponent snap where the offense ran two seams and mark which one the Mike turned to. Teo did it for Portland and found the same side on almost every snap. A rule that reliable is a gift. Don't waste it on the side the defense has already covered.

Against Quarters: four on four

Now the hard one. Quarters, also called Cover 4, puts four defenders deep: the two corners and the two safeties. The safeties read the #2 receivers. If #2 goes vertical, the safety on that side carries him. The corner carries #1. Four verticals against Quarters is four receivers running into four men who are already waiting for exactly that.

This was the Sacramento Sentinels' foundation. Their base call, which Russ told me later is called "Home," was nickel, an Over front, Quarters, and a four-man rush. Against Home, plain All Go isn't a shot. It's a coverage sack waiting to happen, because all seven defenders in coverage are standing on the routes.

So against Quarters, we don't run plain All Go. We run it with the seams as conversion routes:

What #2 sees What #2 does Why
The safety over him is high and drifting to the middle (Cover 2 or rotation) Stay vertical on the seam The safety is leaving. Run into the space.
The safety is flat-footed at 10–12 yards, eyes on #2 (Quarters) Stem to 12, then break out: H runs the bender, Y sits at 12–14 facing the QB The Quarters safety is coached to carry vertical; a break away from him at 12 leaves him driving on air. The corner's eyes are on #1's go.
A linebacker or nickel carries him up the seam (match) Sit at 12–14 between the carrier and the safety The carrier is trailing you; the safety is over the top. The window is in front of the safety.

The bender is Powers's version: a vertical stem past 9 yards that breaks out at 12, "nine-to-five" as we teach it. It's the concept the Sentinels' own staff named, and the one we adopted their word for after the spring. In Quarters, the out cut is free. The corner has gone with #1, the safety has been told by his rules to stay deep over #2, and nobody is responsible for the space at 12 yards on the sideline.

POST-SNAP: All Go with the convert vs. Quarters ("Home")

     ^ X go                                                ^ Z go
     |  C carries #1                                       |  C
     |                                                     |
     |      $ sits on H's stem       F sits on Y's stem    |
     |      at 12, eyes in                                 |
     |   <--.                                .-->          |
     |       \ H bender at 12          Y sits/            |
     |        |                         12-14 |            |
              *              W     M
                     E   T    N    E
                     O   O    O    O   O
                              Q  R --> checkdown under 3

📊 Diagram (described): Against Quarters, the corners carry Sutton and Gaines deep. The two safeties sit at about 10–12 yards, flat-footed, reading Powers and Harlan. Powers stems vertically past 9 yards and breaks out at 12, the bender, toward the sideline the left corner has vacated. Harlan pushes up to 12–14 and sits facing Vance in front of his safety. Underneath, only three defenders cover the whole width of the field, so Ruffin's checkdown is open behind them if both converts are taken.

We hit this exact idea in the playoff. Game 3, second quarter, 2nd-and-7 at our 36, against Home. Gaines ran a 6-yard hitch. Powers stemmed past 9 and broke out at 12. Vance pumped on the hitch to draw the field corner, Malik Simmons, and Simmons's eyes left Powers. Bender, +14, first down. That drive ended with Sutton's back-shoulder touchdown at the Sacramento 9. In the third quarter we came back to it on 3rd-and-6 at their 44, and Simmons's eyes stayed on #2 this time. Broken up. Punt. Same play, different eyes on the corner. That's the conversation.

🛡️ The defense's view: Russ explained it to me in the spring with the kind of honesty I've come to expect from him. Quarters is built to make four verticals pointless, so the offense's only real deep answer is to make a Quarters safety think #2 is vertical when he isn't, or the other way around. "Your bender was the right answer," he said, "so we stopped letting the corner look at the quarterback." He taught Simmons to keep his eyes on #2 on any snap where #1 ran short. The answer to my answer cost the corner his look at the hitch, which is a different play's problem. Every fix leaves something open. That's why the game is a conversation.

📈 By the numbers: Marisol charted every All Go we called last season (fictional data, small samples, read the caveats). 29 calls. Against single-high (Cover 3 or Cover 1): 14 calls, 9 completions, 5 explosives, 1 interception, 1 sack. Against Cover 2 or Tampa 2: 6 calls, 4 completions, 2 explosives. Against Quarters: 9 calls, 3 completions, all short, 0 explosives, 2 sacks, and 6 of those 9 came before the bye week, when we added the Quarters conversions (the bender and the sit). Her caveat, word for word: "Twenty-nine is a season, not a law. And we chose when to call it, so the good numbers against Cover 3 are partly just you picking good moments." She's right. Here's what it means for the call: All Go is a single-high beater that survives against two-high only with conversions, and against Quarters it's an underneath play pretending to be a deep one.

🔄 Check your understanding: Why does All Go become "two on one, twice" against Cover 2, and what happens to that arithmetic in Tampa 2?

Answer

In Cover 2 the corners squat in the flats, so each half-field safety is alone deep against two verticals in his half: the go outside him and the seam inside him. That's two on one on each side. In Tampa 2 the Mike runs the middle and carries one seam, so on that side the safety only has the go. It's back to two on one on the other side only, so the quarterback has to know which seam the Mike takes and throw the other side.


18.4 The Post: The Most Dangerous Route in Football, for Both Sides

The post is a vertical stem to about 12 yards, then a break at roughly 45 degrees toward the goalposts, into the deep middle of the field. In our route tree it's the 8. It's Trey Gaines's best route and the route on both halves of my placemat.

The post is dangerous for the defense because it attacks the one place every deep coverage has to decide about: the middle. Against two high, the post goes between the safeties, into the seam of the coverage itself. Against one high, it runs at the middle safety, and the question is whether he's deep enough and centered enough to take it.

It's dangerous for the offense for the same reason. The deep middle is where the safety is facing the quarterback. A post thrown into a middle that closed after the snap is thrown to the one defender on the field who saw it coming the whole way.

That makes every post concept a post-safety concept: a concept whose read is the safety who is, or might become, the deep middle defender. Your quarterback isn't reading Gaines. He's reading whoever can get to the middle.

🧩 Productive struggle: Before you read the next part, work this out. It's Game 1, first quarter, 2nd-and-7 at the Sacramento 47. We're in Gun Doubles Right: Sutton and Powers on the left, Harlan attached and Gaines wide on the right. The Sentinels show their Quarters look, one safety over each hash. That week Royce, the free safety, was on the right over Gaines, and Holloway was on the left over Sutton and Powers. We motion Powers across the formation to settle inside Gaines, so now it's three receivers to the right and Sutton alone on the left. Question 1: A Quarters defense can't leave its backside safety standing over one receiver while three receivers go to the other side. What does it have to do? Question 2: If it does that, where is the post open, and where is the throw if the post isn't open? Write your answer before you keep reading.

Game 1, the 41-yard post

Here's the answer the Sentinels gave, and the answer they meant to give.

Against trips, their Quarters carries an automatic check. Russ told me in the spring it's called "Lock": the backside corner, Cole Brennan, locks on Sutton man-to-man, and the backside safety, Holloway, leaves Sutton and works to the deep middle to help against the three-receiver side. That's the answer to Question 1. The defense rebalances by sending the backside safety to the middle.

During the season we didn't have their word. We had Teo's description from the tape: "Quarters, corner locked, back safety comes to the middle." And we had built a call to ask that exact question. The full call was "Eleven, Gun Doubles Right, H Zoom, 60 Left, Z Post, H Seam, Y Drag." That's fourteen words, and our rule is "more than ten words, call the band," so it went into Vance's helmet as a wristband number off the Red panel, the openers and early downs.

The design was a "both" call in disguise. If Holloway came to the middle, Sutton was alone on the left against Brennan with no help over the top, and Vance's eyes would go backside to Sutton's go. If Holloway didn't come, the middle was open and the post was there. Either way, one read: the middle.

PRE-SNAP: Game 1, Q1, 2nd-and-7 at the SAC 47, AUS 7-0 -- "H Zoom"

        Holloway $ (12)                           F Royce (12)
  C Brennan                                              C Simmons
             * Vo        W          M
                     E   T    N    E
  X          H       O   O    O    O   O   Y              Z
 #18         ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~> H     #11
  (ball on the left hash)     Q  R

📊 Diagram (described): Austin starts in two-by-two: Sutton wide left, Powers in the left slot, Harlan attached right, Gaines wide right. The Sentinels show two safeties at about 12 yards: Holloway on the left hash, Royce on the right hash over Gaines. Brennan is on Sutton and Simmons is on Gaines. Before the snap Powers motions across the formation and settles between Harlan and Gaines, making three receivers to the right with Sutton alone on the left.

POST-SNAP: ten men play the check, one man plays the old call

                       ^ Z post: EMPTY middle, +41
                        \
  ^ X go                 \                 ^ H seam
  |                       \___             |  (F Royce
  |  C Brennan                \___         |   carries it)
  |  locks on                     \___     |
  |  Sutton      $ Holloway           \___ |
  |              sits deep over           \|___
  |              Sutton (old call)         |   \__  C Simmons
  |                                        |      |  outside
  X                 M W <---- Y drag       H      Z
                     E   T    N    E
                     O   O    O    O   O
                              Q

📊 Diagram (described): At the snap Brennan plays Sutton man-to-man, Royce carries Powers up the seam, and Simmons plays outside leverage on Gaines because the check gave the post to a middle safety. The linebackers squeeze Harlan's drag underneath. But Holloway never heard the check. Playing the original call, he sits deep over Sutton on the far side. Nobody is in the middle of the field. Gaines breaks his post into the empty middle and Vance throws it on rhythm. Royce, chasing from the seam, runs him down 41 yards later at the Sacramento 6.

Vance's read took one look. By his third step he saw two safeties going away from each other and nothing between them. He didn't need to know that ten men had heard "Lock" and one hadn't. He only needed to see the middle, and the middle told him.

I'd love to tell you I designed the bust. I didn't. I designed the question; they answered it wrong. Russ told me in the spring that one snap changed how his defense communicates: from then on, a check that isn't echoed doesn't exist. That's the other side of this play. A great defense learns from a 41-yard post the same way a great offense learns from an interception.

And then the drive stalled inside the 6, and we kicked a field goal. A 41-yard post that ends in three points is a reminder that explosives get you close and execution in the red zone gets you seven. But that's a different chapter.

🔄 Check your understanding: On the 41-yard post, what was Vance reading, and what would he have done if Holloway had come to the middle as the check required?

Answer

He was reading the middle of the field, the space where the backside safety had to arrive if the Sentinels made their trips check. If Holloway had come to the middle, the post would have been covered, and Sutton would have been alone against Brennan on the backside with no safety help. Vance's eyes would have gone to Sutton's go or back-shoulder. The motion forced the defense to choose, and the one read covered both choices.


18.5 Post-Safety Concepts: Mills, Dagger, Yankee, Post-Wheel, Scissors

Each concept in this section pairs a deep route with a second route that puts a safety in conflict. Names vary from system to system. These are the names many systems use and the ones we use.

Mills: the post over the dig

Mills puts a post and a dig (a square in-breaking route at about 12 yards) on the same side. Many systems use the name, and it's widely associated with Steve Spurrier's offenses. Ours: #1 runs the post, #2 runs the dig, the backside #1 runs a go, the tight end releases to the flat, and the back stays in. It's a Quarters beater. The Quarters safety reads #2. When #2 breaks inside on the dig at 12, the safety's rules pull him down and inside to rob it, and the post goes behind him, one-on-one against a corner who's playing outside leverage. Against Cover 2, the post splits the safeties and the dig sits under them.

Coverage after the snap Who's in conflict The read Throw
Quarters The safety over #2 Drives on the dig → post. Stays deep → dig. Usually the post
Cover 2 Both safeties (the post splits them) Middle opens → post. A safety pinches → dig under him. Post or dig
Cover 3 / rotation to one high The middle safety He's over the post → dig under him. He jumps the dig → post. Usually the dig
Cover 1 The free safety and the slot defender Free safety deep middle → dig vs. the man under. Dig, or go backside

Look at the third row. Against one high, Mills is still a good concept, but the throw is the dig, not the post. The post runs straight at the safety. Mills against a rotation is a dig play with a post that holds the safety. That only works if the quarterback reads the middle after the snap.

PRE-SNAP: Game 3, Q4, 3rd-and-9 at the AUS 38, SAC 20-17, 2:41 -- Mills

           $ Holloway (13)                    F Royce (13)
  C                W         M          *                     C
                       E   T   N    E
                   Y   O   O   O    O   O                     Z
  X                            Q  R                 H
 #18              #87                               #3       #11

📊 Diagram (described): Austin in two-by-two with Harlan attached on the left beside the left tackle, Sutton wide left a step off the ball (so Harlan stays eligible), Powers in the right slot off the ball, and Gaines wide right on the line. Ruffin is beside Vance. Both Sentinels safeties are at about 13 yards: Holloway on the left over the tight end, Royce on the right. It's the same two-high third-and-long picture Teo's page said they had shown twenty-nine straight times since their bye.

POST-SNAP: Mills as drawn vs. two-high (left) and as played vs. the spin

  AS DRAWN vs. QUARTERS (right side)    AS PLAYED: SPIN TO ONE HIGH
                                                 F Royce spins to
        F reads #2,       ^ Z post            ___/ the middle: INT
        drives on dig    /  OPEN             /        ^ Z post
           v            /                   |        /
   <------ H dig  (12) /           <------- H dig   /  (open under F)
                 C outside         ($ Holloway rotated down far left)

📊 Diagram (described): Two half-pictures of the right side. On the left, Mills as designed against Quarters: the safety over Powers reads the dig and drives down on it, and Gaines's post is open behind him against a corner playing outside. On the right, what actually happened: Holloway rotated down on the far side, and Royce spun from the right hash into the deep middle, directly in the path of Gaines's post. Powers's dig at 12 yards was underneath Royce and open. Vance, reading the pre-snap two-high picture, threw the post at about 2.4 seconds, and Royce intercepted at the Sacramento 40.

We called Mills there because the shell had been two high on twenty-nine straight third-and-longs, and against two high, Mills is the right call. The call wasn't crazy. It was incomplete. It asked Vance to be right about the middle without building in a way to check. On the sideline, before I said a word, Vance said, "Rule four, Coach." Rome's rule four, the free square, says that when the middle of the field is in doubt, throw the ball you know. On that snap the ball he knew was Powers's dig, which would have converted.

So here's what's on my desk this summer, the middle-read tag: a post-snap middle-of-the-field read built into every third-and-long call. It isn't a new route. It's a rule about the quarterback's eyes on the third step. Middle open, throw the post. Middle closed, the ball goes under the safety or it goes to rule four. It's what All Go already did for us on the 1st-and-10 seven minutes earlier. All Go asks the question after the snap. That night, Mills asked it before.

⚠️ Common mistake: Reading the shell instead of the safety. The quarterback decides "two high" before the snap and throws the two-high answer on rhythm. Result: an interception the moment the defense rotates. Fix: on any post concept, the quarterback's eyes go to the deep middle on the first step, and he has to see it on the third step. Coach it with tape: freeze at the third step and make him say "open" or "closed" before you hit play.

🔄 Check your understanding: Mills is called a Quarters beater. Why is the dig, not the post, usually the throw when the defense rotates to one high?

Answer

In Quarters the safety over #2 reads the dig and drives on it, which leaves the post behind him. In a rotation to one high, a safety arrives in the deep middle, right where the post is going. Now the post runs into him, and the dig at 12 yards sits underneath him in the space he can't cover while he's sitting deep over the post. The concept is the same; the defender who's in conflict changed, so the throw changes.

Dagger: clear the seam, throw the dig behind it

Dagger sends #2 up the seam to clear the hook defender and occupy the middle safety, and #1 runs a deep dig behind the space the seam emptied. Our dagger dig breaks at 15–16 yards, deeper than the 12-yard dig in our tree, because it has to cross behind the linebackers the seam pulled. The concept overrides the default.

Dagger is a zone beater, especially against Cover 3 and Cover 2. Against Cover 3, the seam forces the hook defender to carry or the free safety to step up, and either one leaves a window at 15 yards between the hook and the middle. Against Cover 2, the seam is a shot by itself between the safeties, and the dig sits under them.

POST-SNAP: Dagger left vs. Cover 3 (pre-snap: the 18.2 picture)

                    F stays over the seam
                   /
             ^    v
             | H seam (clears the middle)
  C (deep)   |
   .---------|----------------> X dig at 15-16 (THROW)
   |         |
   |         |  W carries H for 10-12 yards
   |         |
   X         H     *[CURL/FLAT]       M[HOOK]
                 E   T    N    E
                 O   O    O    O   O     Y check-release
                          Q

📊 Diagram (described): From the same two-by-two shown in 18.2, Powers runs the seam up the left hash to clear out the middle. The Will linebacker carries him for 10–12 yards and the free safety stays on him over the top. Sutton runs his dig behind them at 15–16 yards, breaking across the field into the space the seam emptied, under the free safety and over the linebackers. The left corner stays deep in his third. Vance reads the seam first, then throws the dig.

Now the failure, because dagger has one. Game 2, first quarter, 6:48 left, scoreless. 3rd-and-11 at our 44, after a holding penalty. We called dagger. The Sentinels played what Russ later told me was Dime Over Two Man: man coverage underneath with two deep safeties over the top. Against two-man, dagger is the wrong question. The seam is covered by a man and a safety. The dig is a crossing route against a defender trailing it, with a safety sitting right over the landing spot. Everything was covered. Grant Weller, their strong-side edge, over-rushed, and Vance escaped right and ran for 7. We punted. Dagger beats zones that drop to spots. Against man under two deep safeties, you want the concepts in Chapter 17.

Yankee: the deep over off play-action

Yankee is a two-man deep concept off play-action: one receiver runs a post from one side, the other runs a deep over, a crossing route that climbs to about 18–22 yards, from the other. Many coaches associate it with the Shanahan-tree offenses. Everyone else stays in to block. It's a single-high beater. The post holds the middle safety. The over comes in behind the linebackers who bit on the run fake and in front of the corner. The read is the middle safety: he stays on the post → throw the over. He jumps the over → throw the post.

Week 10 at the Portland Pioneers (fictional), fourth quarter, about 5:50 left, Outlaws 24–13. 2nd-and-2 at our 47. We'd been running from Twelve to drain the clock, and Portland, down eleven, had gone to a single-high, eight-man box.

PRE-SNAP: Week 10, Q4, 2nd-and-2 at the AUS 47 -- "Twelve, Under Ace
Right, Inside PA, Yankee"

                                F Price (15)
  C Kiel (8)                                          C Okoro (8)
                  S        W       M        $ Moffitt (6)
                       E    T     T     E
               U   O   O   O   O   O   Y
              #84          Q            #87
   X                                                 Z
  #18                      R                         #11

📊 Diagram (described): Austin is under center in Ace: Brandt (U) attached left, Harlan (Y) attached right, Sutton off the line wide left, Gaines off the line wide right, and Ruffin deep behind Vance. Portland shows one deep safety, Darnell Price, at about 15 yards; corners Josh Kiel (left) and Rasheed Okoro (right) at about 8 yards; and eight defenders near the line, including the strong safety, Tyrell Moffitt, rolled down at 6 yards outside Harlan.

POST-SNAP: Yankee vs. single-high -- Price takes the post, over open

                 ^ X post      F Price holds
                  \           / on the post
                   \_________/
     C Kiel  <================================== Z deep over
     sits deep           (18-22, THROW HERE)                   \
                  S,W,M bite on the run fake                    |
                       E    T     T     E                       Z
                   U-]  O   O   O   O   O  [-Y
                           Q ..fake..> R (stays in)

📊 Diagram (described): Vance fakes the inside-zone handoff to Ruffin, who stays in to block. Brandt and Harlan both block, so eight men protect. The linebackers step up to the run fake. Sutton runs a post from the left, and Price, the only deep safety, stays over it. Gaines runs a deep over from the right, crossing the field at about 18–22 yards behind the linebackers and in front of Kiel, who is sitting deep in his outside third. Vance throws the over.

Wade Harmon, our head coach, was on my headset before the call went in.

Wade: Up eleven, five-fifty. Tell me why we're throwing it.

Lyle: Second-and-two. They've got eight in the box, and they're guessing run. If it's incomplete, it's third-and-two and we run it. If it hits, the game's over.

Marisol: (on the analytics channel) Clock cost of an incompletion is about five seconds, not forty. The play's fine. Protect it.

Wade: Eight-man protection?

Lyle: Eight.

Wade: Go.

Price held on the post. The linebackers bit. Gaines caught the over at the Portland 33, and Kiel pushed him out at the 26. Plus 27. Three snaps later, after a middle screen on third-and-12 got us back to the 19, Evan Dorsey kicked the 36-yard field goal at 4:18 that made it 27–13.

What that exchange reveals is the real job of a shot. Wade's question wasn't "will it work." It was "what does it cost if it doesn't," and I had the answer before he asked. A shot on 2nd-and-short costs a down you didn't need. A shot on 3rd-and-6 costs the drive.

🔄 Check your understanding: In Yankee, what does the post do if the quarterback never throws it?

Answer

It holds the middle safety. As long as the post is a real threat to the deep middle, the only deep safety in a single-high coverage has to respect it, and that keeps him out of the deep over's landing spot. If he leaves the post to jump the over, the post is the throw. A route that's never thrown can still be the reason the play works.

Post-wheel: the post that takes the corner with it

Post-wheel sends #1 on a post and #2 on a wheel: out toward the flat, then up the sideline. It attacks the coverages where the outside corner follows #1 inside: Quarters and man.

Against Quarters, when #2 goes to the flat the safety over him is coached to help on #1, and the corner squeezes #1's post. Now nobody is deep outside. The wheel turns up the sideline behind the flat defender and outside the corner. Against Cover 1, the man on #2, often a linebacker or a nickel, has to run a wheel 40 yards up the sideline. Against Cover 3, post-wheel is weaker: the corner's job is the deep outside third no matter what #1 does, so the wheel runs into him.

POST-SNAP: Post-wheel vs. Quarters (pre-snap: the two-high picture)

                        ^ X post         $ helps on the post
     ^ OPEN              \               /
     | H wheel            \_____________/
     |  (up the sideline)     C squeezes the post
      \
       \__ H out toward the flat
            * chases the flat
                     E   T    N    E
                     O   O    O    O   O
                              Q

📊 Diagram (described): Against Quarters, Sutton runs a post from the left. The corner squeezes it from outside and the safety comes over to help, so both left-side deep defenders end up inside. Powers releases toward the flat, pulling the nickel with him, then turns up the sideline. With the corner and safety both on the post, the sideline behind the nickel is empty, and Powers's wheel is open up the left side.

Scissors: the post and the corner

Scissors crosses a post by #1 with a corner route by #2 (up to 12, then out toward the pylon at about 18). It's the purest Quarters beater we have, because the Quarters safety reads #2. When #2 goes vertical and breaks out, the safety's rules carry him outside with the corner route, and #1's post goes inside behind him.

Gaines's reduced split (we call it Z Nasty) was our scissors tell all season, and Marisol found it in our own self-scout during the Week 9 bye. Russ's staff, he told me later, had it before Game 1.

PRE-SNAP: Game 1, Q3, 2nd-and-9 at the AUS 38 -- "Eleven, Gun Doubles
Left, Z Nasty, Scissors" (ball on the left hash)

          F Royce (11)                          $ Holloway (11)
   C                                                         C
                   W        M           *
                       E   T   N    E
   X           Y   O   O   O   O   O           H      Z
  #18         #87          Q  R                #3    #11

📊 Diagram (described): Austin in two-by-two with Harlan attached left and Sutton wide left. On the right, Powers is in the slot and Gaines is in a reduced split, only a few yards outside him. The Sentinels show Quarters, with Royce on the left and Holloway on the right over Powers, both at about 11 yards.

POST-SNAP: Holloway carries #2's corner route -- the post goes behind

      ^ Z post (+31)                       ^ H corner (to the pylon)
       \                                  /
        \        $ Holloway reads #2     /
         \         vertical, widens --> /
          \___________            _____/
                      \          /
                       \        /
                        \      /
                         \    /
                          \  /
                           \/   routes cross at about 12
                           /\
                          /  \
                         |    |
                         H    Z
                       E   T   N    E
                       O   O   O    O   O
                               Q

📊 Diagram (described): At the snap Powers runs vertically and breaks toward the right pylon. Holloway, reading Powers as the #2 receiver, widens with the corner route as Quarters teaches him. Gaines, starting from his tight split, runs a post that crosses inside Powers and into the space Holloway just left. Vance throws the post. Gaines gains 31 before Holloway recovers and pushes him out.

Gaines +31. It was the kind of play that wins coordinators praise and also, if you keep calling it from the same split, gets them a defensive back's interception in the playoffs. That's why we broke the tell after the bye: the dig, the crack toss, and quick game from the reduced split, and some scissors from a normal split.

📋 Try it — Find the conflict: Against Quarters, name the defender each of these concepts puts in conflict, and say what his two jobs are: (a) Mills, (b) scissors, (c) post-wheel.

Answer

(a) Mills: the safety over #2. Job one is to rob the dig when #2 breaks inside. Job two is to help on #1's post. He can't do both. If he robs the dig, the post is open; if he stays deep, the dig is open.

(b) Scissors: also the safety over #2, in the other direction. He carries #2 vertical and outside on the corner route, which takes him away from #1's post coming inside. If he stays inside for the post, the corner route is one-on-one against a corner who's busy with the post's release.

(c) Post-wheel: the outside corner, together with the flat defender. The corner squeezes the post; the flat defender jumps the out. The wheel goes up the sideline behind the flat defender and outside the corner. If the corner stays outside, the post is one-on-one against the safety who's helping.

In all three, a safety or corner who reads one receiver gets a second receiver running through his responsibility. That's Chapter 15's rule: the quarterback reads a defender, not a receiver.


18.6 Eyes, Protection, and Time: How a Shot Actually Gets Thrown

A deep concept is three things working at once: the routes create the conflict, the quarterback's eyes move the safety, and the protection buys the time. Lose any one and it's a sack, an interception, or a throw-away.

The quarterback's eyes are a route

A deep middle safety reads the quarterback's eyes and shoulders. Good quarterbacks use that. The look-off: the quarterback opens his eyes and shoulders toward one side long enough to pull the safety a step, then comes back to the throw on the other side. One step for a middle safety is about three yards at the catch point, and three yards is the difference between a window and a breakup.

THE LOOK-OFF: All Go vs. Cover 3 -- eyes left, ball right

        ^ H seam           F  <-- one step left,          ^ Y seam
        |                 /       following the eyes      |  OPEN
        |                v                                |
        |                                     .......>    |
        |                              .......            |
                     E   T    N    E
                     O   O    O    O   O
                              Q  eyes: <--- 1, 2   ball: 3 --->

📊 Diagram (described): Against Cover 3, Vance's eyes and shoulders open to Powers's seam on the left for the first two steps of his drop. The free safety takes a step to his left, following the eyes. On the third step Vance resets his feet to the right and throws Harlan's seam, which is now farther from the safety than it was at the snap.

Rome's rule for the look-off is short: "Eyes buy the step. Feet throw the ball." The eyes move the safety, but if the feet don't reset toward the throw, the ball sails or dies short. And the look-off has a cost. It takes a beat, and a beat against pressure is a sack. That's why we don't look off on hot throws, and why the look-off is for four-man rushes with good protection.

🔍 Why this works: A deep safety is coached to "read the quarterback" because the ball comes from the quarterback's eyes about 90 percent of the time. The look-off turns the safety's best habit into his weakness. It works best against the most disciplined safeties, the ones who trust their read. Against an undisciplined safety it's wasted, because he isn't watching your eyes anyway.

Protection for shots

Every shot asks the protection for more time than a normal dropback. The arithmetic is in Chapter 22, and the full protection rules are in Appendix D. Here's the short version for shots.

Protection Blockers Routes When we use it for a shot
60 (base half-slide) 6 (five linemen + the back) 4 (All Go, Mills, dagger, scissors) Four-man rush expected, ball out by about 2.7–3.0 s
70 (tight end stays in) 7 3 A good edge rusher we have to help on; play-action shots from Eleven
80 Max 8 (both TEs, or TE + back) 2–3 (Yankee, the zero-bin deep over) Pressure expected, or a two-route shot that needs 3+ seconds
PA protections ("Inside PA," "Wide PA") 7–8, by the run's rules 2–3 Play-action shots; the protection looks like the run

Our non-negotiable: every protection has an answer for one more rusher than it blocks. For a shot, the answer usually isn't a hot route, because two-route concepts don't have one. The answer is that you picked a protection with more blockers than they can send. The best example of that we had all season was the winning touchdown in Game 1: third-and-8 at our 48, 4:12 left, tied 27–27. The Sentinels sent six with no deep safety, Cover 0. Vance pointed at Bell, the Mike, before the snap. Ruffin stayed in and picked up the sixth rusher. Gaines beat Brennan on the max-protect deep over, the third play in our zero bin, and caught it at the Sacramento 32. Fifty-two yards. 34–27. Rashad Coleman, their defensive tackle, hit Vance as he threw.

🩺 Player safety: Shots get quarterbacks hit, because the ball comes out late and the quarterback has to stand in and finish the throw. That's the most dangerous moment in his game. Coleman hit Vance as he released on the 52-yard deep over, and Vance felt it for two days. Three rules: (1) Never call a deep shot without a protection you've repped that week. Our rule is no new protections after Friday. (2) Count how often your quarterback gets hit on a throw, not just sacked; that number is his real health budget. (3) In practice, the quarterback wears a different-colored jersey and is never hit. At every level, the rules protect a passer in the act of throwing, but the rules don't stop the hit. Your protection does.

The clock: depth and time go together

Route Depth at the catch Typical drop from the gun Ball out
Seam (All Go) 18–25 3 steps + hitch, or 5 ~2.5–2.9 s
Post (on rhythm) 18–25 5 steps ~2.4–2.8 s
Deep dig (dagger) 15–16 5 steps + hitch ~2.8–3.0 s
Deep over (Yankee) 18–22 PA fake + 5 ~3.0–3.3 s
Go / fade (in the air) 25–40+ 5 steps ~2.6–3.0 s
Double move (Sluggo, stop-go) 25–40+ 5 steps + pump ~3.0–3.4 s

These are ranges, not laws. They vary with the quarterback, the protection, and how deep the route really breaks. The point is the match: don't call a 3.3-second concept behind a 2.7-second protection. That mismatch is where most sacks on shots come from.

🔄 Check your understanding: Why do two-route shots like Yankee usually have no hot route, and what replaces it?

Answer

With only two receivers out, there's nobody left to run a quick hot route against a blitz. Two-route shots replace the hot route with more blockers: seven or eight in protection, so the defense can't send one more rusher than you have blockers without leaving someone in coverage. The protection itself is the answer. If the defense can still outnumber it, the shot is the wrong call.


18.7 Isolation Shots: The Fade, the Back-Shoulder, and the Double Move

Not every shot attacks a safety. Some attack one corner. An isolation shot puts your best outside receiver alone on one side, usually the boundary, against a corner with no safety close enough to help, and lets him win one-on-one. For us that receiver is Devonte Sutton, our 6-foot-3 split end. He's the backside "breaker" on many of our concepts for exactly this reason.

Three throws live here.

  • The fade (a go route thrown over the top): the receiver gets even with the corner, stacks on top of him, and the ball drops over his outside shoulder in the fade lane, 4–6 yards from the sideline. It's the throw when the receiver has beaten the corner vertically.
  • The back-shoulder: the receiver runs the same go route, but the ball is thrown early, low, and to his outside (back) shoulder at about 15–18 yards. He turns back toward the sideline and catches it while the corner is still running. It's the throw when the corner is on top and running, with his back to the quarterback. A corner who's running can't stop. A receiver who knows the throw is coming can.
  • The double move: a short route sold hard enough to make the corner jump it, then a go. We use two the most: the Sluggo ("two-nine," slant-and-go) and the stop-go ("zero-nine," hitch-and-go).
Corner's position at 10–12 yards Safety over the top? The throw
Even, or beaten (receiver has stacked him) No Fade, over the outside shoulder
On top, running, back to the QB No Back-shoulder
Squatting, eyes on the QB — Stop-go or the hole shot; nothing else deep
Any Yes No isolation shot. Throw the other side.

That last row is a rule because of a number. Over two seasons, Sutton was 2 of 7 on throws against Cover 2 or with a safety over the top. Against a corner with nobody behind him, he's one of the best receivers we've ever had. With a safety over the top, he's a jump ball we usually lose.

Week 8: the back-shoulder against press Cover 1

The Birmingham Forge (fictional) under Dwight Seldon blitz more than anyone in the league and play press-man behind it, usually Cover 1 with a single free safety. That's the isolation laboratory: one safety, and he can't be on both sides.

Week 8 vs. Birmingham, third quarter, about 8:00, Forge 17–14. 2nd-and-6 at our own 42. "Eleven, Gun Trips Right, 60 Right, Stick, X Fade." Trips right with Sutton alone on the left, against the Forge's boundary corner, Corey Nash (#22).

PRE-SNAP: Week 8, Q3, 2nd-and-6 at the AUS 42 -- Trips Right, X Fade

                                         F (13, shaded to trips)
  C Nash (press)                    *            $          C
                   W         M
                       E   T   N    E
  X                    O   O   O    O   O   Y     H        Z
 #18                           Q  R        #87    #3      #11

📊 Diagram (described): Austin is in Trips Right: Harlan, Powers, and Gaines to the right, and Sutton alone on the left. Birmingham presses all three corners and shows a single free safety at about 13 yards, shaded toward the three-receiver side. The left side, Sutton against Corey Nash, has no safety within about 20 yards of it.

POST-SNAP: Nash on top and running -- the ball to the back shoulder

     ^  Nash runs on top, back to the QB
     |
  .  |   <-- Sutton stops at ~17 and turns back
  :  |       to the sideline: ball on his outside
  :  |       (back) shoulder, +17
  :..:........................
     |                        :          F stays over trips
     X  (release: wins inside, then widens to the fade lane)
                       E   T   N    E
                       O   O   O    O   O   Y stick   H flat  Z go
                               Q

📊 Diagram (described): At the snap Sutton beats Nash's press with an inside release, then widens to the fade lane. Nash recovers and runs on top of him, back to the quarterback. The free safety stays over the three-receiver side, which is running stick on the right. Vance throws early, low, and outside, before Sutton turns. Sutton stops at about 17 yards, turns back toward the sideline, and catches it while Nash is still running.

🎙️ On the headset: Second-and-six at our own 42, down three. Seldon's free safety has been cheating to trips all day. Teo just said it: "One high, seven, free safety shaded to trips." That's Sutton alone on Nash, and Nash has been on top all day, running. If I call a fade, Nash stays on top and we lose the jump ball. If I call the back-shoulder, Nash's best habit is the reason it works. Stick on the trips side gives Vance a 6-yard answer if the safety rolls back. "Stick, X Fade." On our menu, "X Fade" means read the corner: on top, back shoulder; beaten, over the top.

Sutton, +17, to the Birmingham 41. Two snaps later Vance checked to the zero bin's slants on third-and-6 at their 37, and four plays after that Ruffin scored to put us up 21–17. Case Study 1 tells the whole plan for Sutton in that game, including the snap where we didn't throw it.

The same throw scored for us in the playoff. Game 3, second quarter, 3rd-and-6 at the Sacramento 9: Sutton and Powers on the left, Harlan attached right with Gaines, Ruffin blocking. The Sentinels played what Russ later told me was Nickel Over Two Man, so there was a safety deep, but at the 9 the end zone cuts his depth to nothing. Sutton caught the back-shoulder two yards deep at the pylon. 7–3. The same throw also misses: on the final drive of that game, a back-shoulder to Sutton on 1st-and-10 at our 37 came off his fingers. The back-shoulder is a timing throw and a trust throw. When it misses, it's usually because the receiver turned before the ball came out or after it arrived.

Double moves need a history

A double move only works if the defense believes the first route. That means you have to have run the first route, completed it, and let the corner see it on tape and in the game.

Game 2, Week 15 at Sacramento, fourth quarter, a little under eleven minutes left, Sentinels 23–13. 1st-and-10 at our 41. "Eleven, Gun Trips Right, 60 Right, Z Sluggo, H Seam, Y Drag." Teo had told me from the booth that Simmons had pressed on six of the last seven first downs. Gaines had been running slants all season. Gaines sold the slant with a jab and a swipe, Vance pumped, Simmons jumped, and Gaines went. Caught at the Sacramento 25, down at the 15. Forty-four yards. Ruffin chipped DeShawn Rollins, their best edge rusher, on the way out, which bought the extra half second a double move needs. The wild-card game at Oklahoma City had its own version: an "X Stop-Go" for a 38-yard touchdown against a corner who'd been squatting on Sutton's hitches all afternoon.

⚠️ Common mistake: The double move with no first move. A coordinator calls a Sluggo in the first quarter of a game in which his receiver hasn't run a slant, against a corner whose tape shows he plays off and bails. Result: the corner never bites, the quarterback pumps into a four-man rush, and the extra half second becomes a sack. Fix: put the double move on the call sheet next to the route it fakes, with a note: "after the second completed slant," or "after the corner squats twice."

🏫 Any level: In high school and college the hash marks are much wider apart than in the NFL. The NFL's are about six yards apart; college hashes are 40 feet apart and 60 feet from each sideline, and high school hashes are 53 feet 4 inches from each sideline. With the ball on a college or high school hash, the boundary (short side) can be only about 20 yards wide or less, and the field (wide side) can be more than 30. That changes everything here. A boundary fade has very little room to drop into, so many high school staffs throw the boundary back-shoulder or a comeback instead of the fade. The field fade is a long throw that many high school arms can't make on time. And four verticals from the hash isn't one problem, it's two: in the boundary the corner's deep third is so narrow he can sink under the go and squeeze the seam, and in the field the seam is open longer but the throw is much longer too. Check your level's hash rules and measure your field before you draw a single landmark. Case Study 2 shows how I learned this the hard way in college.

🔄 Check your understanding: Sutton is alone on the backside. The corner is on top, running with his back to the quarterback, but the free safety has rotated toward Sutton's side. What's the throw?

Answer

No isolation throw. With a safety over the top, the back-shoulder is still possible in theory, but the rule (and Sutton's 2-of-7 history) says take the other side of the concept. The safety rotating toward Sutton means he left the trips side, so the answer is on the front side: the stick, the seam, or the flat. Isolation shots exist for the snaps where the safety isn't there.


18.8 The Shot Play as a Call-Sheet Category

On our call sheet, shots get their own box. That's a choice. Many offenses scatter their deep concepts through the third-down and first-down columns. We put the best four to six in one box labeled "SHOTS," because a shot isn't a down-and-distance call. It's a situation call. It depends on where the ball is, what just happened, what the defense has been doing, and what an incompletion costs.

A shot play is a concept called mainly for an explosive gain, accepting a lower completion rate in exchange. All Go against Cover 3, Yankee, scissors, the zero-bin deep over, and the double moves are shots. A dig is not a shot, even if it goes for 30.

The "when we call it" rule

Here's the rule on the inside cover of my call sheet. It took me eight seasons and one playoff to write it this short.

Trigger The rule Why
The free down 2nd-and-1 to 3. An incompletion leaves 3rd-and-short. The cost of failure is low.
Sudden change The first snap after a takeaway, or right after an explosive, before the defense resets. Defenses often call their safest coverage right after a big play, and sometimes a player is still sorting out what just happened. We go fast after big plays.
The shot zone Our 40 to their 35. Inside our 15, only play-action shots from max protection. Inside their 35, no shot that risks a sack. Backed up, a sack can be a safety. Past their 35, a sack can take Evan Dorsey out of field-goal range (his range is about 52 yards).
The look A safety has shown us the habit we're attacking, at least twice. The shot is the end of a sequence, not the start.
The never list Never on 3rd-and-medium unless the concept has an underneath answer that converts. Never without a protection we repped that week. Never when our tackle is losing to their best rusher and we haven't helped him. These are the three ways shots turn into sacks and punts.

The "free down" row has a catch. Russ's staff charted our first four games before Game 1 and found that on 2nd-and-1 to 3 we called a play-action shot on 6 of 17 snaps, from Eleven, Harlan attached, Ruffin offset. Six of seventeen isn't a tell by Marisol's standard (she wants about 70% on ten or more snaps), but it's a lean, and a good defensive coordinator plays a lean on a big down. So the free-down row also means we sometimes run on 2nd-and-short from our shot look, and we sometimes shoot from looks that aren't the one Russ's staff charted. "Never let a tendency outlive its evidence" applies to our tendencies too.

The "look" row is the one that matters most, and it belongs to the next chapter. The best shot we threw all season wasn't a shot concept at all. It was play-action off the same inside zone that had made Tre Holloway fill the alley twice in a row on the tying drive of Game 1. On the third snap he bit, and Gaines ran a post behind him for 35 yards. That sequence is Chapter 19's home, and its lesson is this section's lesson: the deep ball is the last sentence of a paragraph you started three plays earlier.

🔄 Check your understanding: Why does our shot zone stop at the opponent's 35 instead of running all the way to the goal line?

Answer

Because past their 35, we're in or near Evan Dorsey's field-goal range (about 52 yards). A sack there can push the ball back out of range and turn three likely points into a punt. Inside the 35, a shot has to be a concept that gets the ball out quickly, like the back-shoulder at the pylon, not a long-developing deep throw that needs three seconds of protection.

📈 By the numbers: Marisol tracked every call from the shots box last season (fictional data; the zero bin is counted separately). 46 calls: 41 throws, 3 sacks, 2 scrambles. 19 completions, 14 of them explosives. 2 interceptions. 4 defensive pass interference penalties drawn. Her summary: "The median shot is an incompletion. The average shot was still worth it, because the hits are huge and the interference flags count. But it's a high-variance play, so call it when you can afford a miss." In public charting over many seasons, deep passes have generally produced more expected points per attempt than short ones, with the caveat that offenses choose when to throw them and defenses choose when to allow them. Her number for the call: a shot is a bet you can afford when the down is free, the protection is real, and the look is confirmed.

The cautionary tale

Curtis Bale and I worked for Walt Dupree together. He's the most creative play designer I know. In his first season as a coordinator, his offense led its conference in explosive plays, and every highlight show ran his shots. In his second season, defenses stopped giving him one-on-ones. They played two deep safeties and dared him to throw underneath. He kept calling the shots, because the shots were who he was. His run game disappeared, his quarterback, who wasn't built to escape, took sack after sack waiting for routes that couldn't come open against two-high, and he was fired before the next season.

Curtis didn't call bad plays. He called plays without reasons. The shot box only works if the rest of the call sheet is the reason the shot is open.

📋 Try it — Make the call: Hypothetical, not a snap from our season. You're the play caller in a regular-season game against a single-high, run-stopping defense like the Stallions'. Second quarter, Outlaws 10, opponent 7. 2nd-and-2 at our 44. Your last two snaps were inside zone for 5 and 3 yards, and on both the strong safety walked down to 7 yards and filled hard. Their free safety has been at 15 yards, centered. Your right tackle is holding up; their best rusher is on the left side against Achterberg, who has had one holding call. Choose from: (a) inside zone again, (b) All Go from Eleven, (c) "Twelve, Under Ace Right, Inside PA, Yankee," (d) Sutton isolation fade from Trips. Make the call and say what you're asking which defender.

Answer

The strongest answer is (c) Yankee off Inside PA, with a case for (a).

Run through the rule. Free down: yes, 2nd-and-2. Shot zone: our 44, yes. The look: the strong safety has filled twice, and the free safety is centered. Play-action from the same run makes the strong safety and the linebackers step up, and the post holds the centered free safety, so the deep over comes open behind them. Protection: Twelve with both tight ends in plus Ruffin after the fake is eight-man protection, which answers their left-side rusher without asking Achterberg to win alone. The question: "Free safety, do you take the post or the over?"

Why not the others? (b) All Go against single-high is a fine concept, but from Eleven with a run-stopping box you're giving up the play-action that the last two snaps bought, and you're blocking their best rusher with six. (d) The isolation fade is a coin flip against a corner with a centered safety who can help. (a) is defensible: if you think the run is working and you want the clock, a third inside zone keeps you on schedule. But the reason to run inside zone twice was to make this snap possible.

🪞 Learning check-in: Stop and take stock. Without looking back, can you say, for each of Cover 3, Cover 2, Tampa 2, and Quarters, how many deep defenders there are and which deep concept attacks it best? Write it out. If one coverage gives you trouble, that's the one to re-read, most likely 18.3, because Quarters breaks most people's intuition that "deep beats deep." Then ask yourself a harder question: when you watch a deep incompletion on Sunday, do you blame the receiver, the quarterback, or the call? This chapter asks you to look at the safety first. Notice whether you actually do it. Rewiring your eyes takes many games, not one chapter.


Spaced Review

Try to answer each question before you read the answer under it.

1. From Chapter 16: what does smash do to a Cover 2 corner, and how is that the same idea as the "hole" throw in All Go against Cover 2? Smash puts the Cover 2 corner, the flat defender, in a hi-lo conflict: a hitch under him and a corner route over him. Whatever he does, one is open. All Go against Cover 2 does the same thing one level deeper. The half-field safety has the go outside him and the seam inside him, a horizontal conflict instead of a vertical one. Both concepts find one defender and give him two jobs. That's the book's second theme, applied twice.

2. From Chapter 7: what's the difference between the shell and the coverage, and which of this chapter's snaps turns on it? The shell is what the safeties show before the snap. The coverage is what they play after it. The Game 3 interception turns on it: a two-high shell became Cover 3 at the snap. So does the 1st-and-10 All Go seven minutes earlier, which beat the same rotation by reading after the snap.

3. From Chapter 13: what's a conflict defender, and who is the conflict defender in Mills against Quarters? A conflict defender has two responsibilities and can only fulfill one, and the offense reads him and goes where he isn't. In the RPO chapter it was Jordan Ames, run fit or slant window. In Mills against Quarters it's the safety over #2: rob the dig or stay deep on the post. Same idea, 12 yards deeper.

If any of those was hard, go back to Chapter 16's first section or Chapter 7's section on rotation before you build your shot package.


Project Checkpoint: Shot Package

Last chapter you built your Man-Beater Package: mesh, the shallow cross, and a legal rub tag for when the defense plays man. This chapter's deliverable is your Shot Package: four verticals, plus two shot plays, each with its protection, and the "when we call it" rule that decides when any of them goes on the field.

Format: three pages, or three cards if you build cards.

Page 1 — All Go. Your four-verticals rules by position (landmarks for #1 and #2, the back's job, the drop), the quarterback's read against Cover 3, Cover 2, Tampa 2, and Quarters, and your conversion rule for the seams against Quarters and match coverage. Include one pre-snap and one post-snap diagram against Cover 3.

Page 2 — Two shot plays. For each: formation and personnel, protection (and why that many blockers), every route with its depth, the defender the quarterback reads, what it beats and what beats it, and your answer when the defense brings one more rusher than you block. Pick two that attack different structures, for example one single-high beater (Yankee or dagger) and one two-high beater (scissors or post-wheel).

Page 3 — The "when we call it" rule. Your free-down rule, your shot zone, your sudden-change rule, the look you need to see first, and your never list. Five lines. If it doesn't fit on an index card, you don't know it well enough yet.

A worked example (pro level, one card):

YANKEE. "Twelve, Under Ace Right, Inside PA, Yankee." Protection: 8 (both TEs, back after the fake). Routes: X post (break at 12); Z deep over (cross at 18–22, landing at the far numbers). Read: the middle safety. Holds the post → over. Jumps the over → post. Neither → throw it away. Beats: single-high, eight-man boxes, linebackers who fly to run fakes. Beaten by: Quarters (four deep), a safety who doesn't bite on run fakes. Plus-one answer: eight blockers; if they show nine, Kill to the run. Call it when: 2nd-and-1 to 3 in the shot zone, after the strong safety has filled the inside run twice.

Levels: - High school: All Go with landmarks measured from your hashes (Case Study 2), plus one max-protect shot from two tight ends. One read per play. Your quarterback's arm decides your shot zone, so mark the throw he can make on time. - College: All Go with hash-specific seam rules, plus one two-high beater. Watch your level's ineligible-downfield rule on any play-action shot with linemen run-blocking. - Pro: the full package, with the conversion rule and a self-scout check on your own shot tendencies (the 6-of-17 problem). - Film room: chart 20 deep throws (20+ air yards) from one team: the shell, what the safeties did after the snap, how many blocked, and whether the quarterback's eyes went to the safety first. Then write that team's "when they call it" rule from the outside.

Next chapter: your Play-Action Package: three play-action concepts, each married to a base run from your Inside Zone, Outside Zone, and Gap Scheme sheets. Your Yankee card will move there, or it will stay here as a pure shot. Decide which, and say why.


Chapter Summary

Concept Attacks Best vs. Weak vs. The read Typical protection
All Go (four verticals) The middle safety (4 on 3) Cover 3, rotation (reads after the snap), Cover 2 Quarters; match Cover 3 unless seams convert Middle safety's hips; vs. Cover 2, one half-field safety 60
Mills (post + dig) The safety over #2 / the middle Quarters, Cover 2 One-high, unless the QB reads the middle and throws the dig Middle open → post; closed → dig 60
Dagger (seam clear + deep dig) Hook defenders and the middle safety Cover 3, Cover 2 Two-man, Cover 1 Seam → dig → checkdown 60
Yankee (PA post + deep over) The single middle safety Single-high, eight-man boxes Quarters, disciplined linebackers Holds the post → over; jumps the over → post 80 / PA (8)
Post-wheel The corner and the flat defender Quarters, man Cover 3 Corner squeezes the post → wheel 60 or 70
Scissors (post + corner) The safety over #2 Quarters Cover 3 (the corner route runs into the deep corner) Safety widens with #2 → post 60
Isolation (fade, back-shoulder, double move) One corner Cover 1, Cover 0, press Any safety over the top Corner beaten → fade; on top → back-shoulder 60 with a chip

The decision framework, five questions:

  1. How many deep defenders will there be after the snap? Not before it. If you can't know, call a concept that reads the middle after the snap (All Go), or tag the call with a post-snap middle read.
  2. Which one safety, or corner, am I asking a question? Name him. If you can't, don't throw deep.
  3. Is the down free, is the ball in the shot zone, and have I seen the look?
  4. Does my protection have one more answer than their pressure has rushers, and does the timing of the concept fit the time the protection buys?
  5. What does an incompletion cost? If the answer is "the drive" or "the game," you'd better be sure about questions 1 through 4.

What's Next

The best deep ball we threw all season wasn't a deep concept. It was a lie. In Chapter 19, the tying drive of Game 1 gets told snap by snap: two inside-zone runs that taught Tre Holloway to fill the alley, a play-action fake that cashed his habit for a 35-yard post, and a fourth snap that scored because he no longer trusted what he saw. The run game is the first half of every play-action pass, and the next chapter is the second half.