Monday night of Sacramento week. Week 6. It's a little after eleven, which in a game week means the
In This Chapter
- The Hook: Forty-Nine Snaps and a Jersey Number
- 4.1 Counting to Five: Personnel Notation
- 4.2 Personnel Is Not Formation
- 4.3 The Substitution Game: How Personnel Forces the Defense to Choose
- 4.4 The Rules of the Exchange
- 4.5 Heavy to Throw, Light to Run
- 4.6 The Defense Answers Back: Big Nickel and the Arms Race
- 4.7 Hybrids: The Players Who Make Multiplicity Cheap
- 4.8 Personnel Tendencies and the Self-Scout
- 4.9 Building Your Packages: The League, the Roster, and the Sideline
- Spaced Review
- Project Checkpoint: Personnel Packages & Role Cards
- Chapter Summary
- What's Next
Chapter 4 — Personnel Groupings: 11, 12, 13, 21, 22 — What the Numbers Mean and How They Force Defensive Substitution
The Hook: Forty-Nine Snaps and a Jersey Number
Monday night of Sacramento week. Week 6. It's a little after eleven, which in a game week means the evening is about half over.
Marisol Vega has the clicker. Marisol runs our analytics department, and she has a rule about her self-scout meetings: she builds them from our last four games, because that's what the other team's advance staff will have cut up. If you want to know what a defense knows about you, study the same tape they studied. So the slide on the screen is 247 snaps of the Austin Outlaws, sorted the way Russ Kimbrough's people in Sacramento would sort them.
She skips the first page. She skips the second. She stops on a single line and doesn't say anything.
SELF-SCOUT, LAST FOUR GAMES -- PERSONNEL x PLAY TYPE
Personnel Snaps Run RPO PA Dropback Screen
--------- ----- --- --- -- -------- ------
Eleven 168 38 33 27 59 11
Twelve 49 31 0 11 6 1
Other 30 11 5 6 8 0
📊 Diagram (described): A table from the self-scout. In eleven personnel the Outlaws ran 168 plays spread across every category: 38 runs, 33 run-pass options, 27 play-action passes, 59 dropbacks, and 11 screens. In twelve personnel they ran 49 plays: 31 runs, zero run-pass options, 11 play-action passes, 6 dropbacks, and 1 screen. Thirty other snaps came from other groupings.
Teo Arriaga, my quality control coach, does the math out loud, because that's what Teo does. "Thirty-one of forty-nine. Sixty-three percent run."
"That's who we are," says Gus Ferrante, our offensive line coach, without looking up from his legal pad. Gus is from Pittsburgh. He thinks a 63 percent run rate in two-tight-end sets is the natural order of the universe.
"It's also who they know we are," Marisol says. "Look at the zero."
The zero is in the RPO column. In 49 snaps of twelve personnel, we never once put a pass option on a run. Six true dropbacks. One screen. When our second tight end, Cody Brandt, number 84, jogged onto the field, we were doing one of two things: handing the ball to Jalen Ruffin, or faking a handoff to Jalen Ruffin. That's it.
My next thought embarrassed me. Somewhere on the Sentinels' sideline is a staff member whose game-day job is to watch our substitutions and shout a defensive personnel group before our huddle call is done. The moment number 84 crosses the white paint, that man is yelling — and not a guess. A percentage.
"So when Brandt runs on," Teo said slowly, "they know the play type before Darius knows the play."
"They know the odds of the play type," Marisol said. "Which is most of what they need."
That's the subject of this chapter. Before the formation, before the motion, before the snap count — before the defense knows anything else about the play — your offense announces who is on the field. That announcement is called personnel, and it's the first sentence of every play you'll ever call. The defense hears it first. It answers it first. And it gets to answer with the rulebook on its side, because when you change your people, the officials give the defense time to change theirs.
Personnel is the one part of the call you can't hide. So the question this chapter answers isn't "how do I hide it?" It's "how do I make the defense pay for answering it correctly?"
We figured part of that out in Week 6, and Sacramento paid for it. Russ figured out the rest of it before Week 15, and we paid for that. On my halftime sheet in Sacramento in December, written in my own handwriting in the left margin, are three words I'd love to have back: Twelve isn't working.
By the end of this chapter you'll understand why it worked in October, why it stopped working in December, and what I'd do differently — which is the same as understanding how personnel works at all.
🏃 Fast Track: If you already speak personnel fluently, skim 4.1–4.4 and start at 4.5 ("Heavy to Throw, Light to Run"). Sections 4.6 (the big-nickel answer) and 4.8 (personnel tendencies and the self-scout) are where most experienced coaches find something new.
🔬 Deep Dive: Appendix A has the full personnel notation and the defensive personnel names in one table: Appendix A. For how the Sentinels matched our personnel all season, see the scouting packet in Appendix G. Motion as a personnel weapon is developed fully in Chapter 27.
📺 Film Watcher: This Sunday, watch the players jogging on and off the field between plays — before the broadcast cuts back to the huddle. Count the tight ends and running backs coming on. Then count the defensive backs. You'll know the personnel matchup before the announcers mention it.
4.1 Counting to Five: Personnel Notation
Start with the arithmetic, because it's simple and everything else is built on it.
Every offense puts eleven players on the field. Six of them are fixed: the five offensive linemen (left tackle, left guard, center, right guard, right tackle) and the quarterback. You don't swap those out play to play, except in special packages. The other five are the skill players — the running backs, tight ends, and wide receivers. Which five you send out is your personnel grouping, and coaches describe it with a two-digit number.
THE ELEVEN: SIX FIXED, FIVE YOU CHOOSE
[1] [5]
[2] O O O O O [4]
Q
[3]
O = the five linemen (fixed) Q = the quarterback (fixed)
[1]-[5] = the five skill slots. Personnel counts who fills
them: first digit = running backs, second digit = tight
ends, wide receivers = 5 minus the other two.
📊 Diagram (described): Five offensive linemen across the middle with the quarterback behind the center; those six are fixed. Five bracketed boxes mark the skill slots — two out wide, two near the ends of the line, and one in the backfield. Personnel is simply a count of what kind of player fills those five boxes: the first digit is running backs, the second is tight ends, and the wide receivers are whatever is left over.
That's the whole rule. First digit: running backs (fullbacks and halfbacks both count). Second digit: tight ends. Wide receivers: five minus the sum. So:
| Personnel | Backs | Tight ends | Wide receivers | Outlaws call word | Typical picture |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10 | 1 | 0 | 4 | "Ten" | Four wides, one back — the run-and-shoot shape |
| 11 | 1 | 1 | 3 | "Eleven" | Three wides, one TE — the modern default |
| 12 | 1 | 2 | 2 | "Twelve" | Two tight ends — run power with pass flexibility |
| 13 | 1 | 3 | 1 | "Heavy" | Three tight ends — short yardage, four-minute |
| 20 | 2 | 0 | 3 | "Twenty" | Two backs, three wides — rare, a split-back look |
| 21 | 2 | 1 | 2 | "Twenty-one" | Fullback + back + TE — the classic I-formation group |
| 22 | 2 | 2 | 1 | "Twenty-two" | Fullback, two TEs — power football |
| 23 | 2 | 3 | 0 | "Jumbo" | Goal line; for us, Rodney Kalu (#70) reports eligible as the third "TE" |
| 00 | 0 | 0 | 5 | (we don't use it) | Five wides, empty backfield |
Read the number as two words: "one-one" or "eleven," "one-two" or "twelve." Coaches say both. On our sideline it's always the word — "Eleven!" "Twelve!" "Heavy!" — because our personnel coach is shouting it across a crowded sideline in the second after the whistle, and "Twelve" carries better than "one-two."
A few things about this table matter more than they look.
The notation counts roster positions, not alignments. A tight end lined up as a slot receiver is still a tight end for personnel purposes. A running back split out wide is still a running back. That's the key to everything in section 4.7: if your tight end can play receiver, you can show the defense "twelve" and line up like "eleven." The defense has substituted for one thing and is facing another.
"Empty" is usually not 00. Most NFL offenses that line up with no back in the backfield do it from 10 or 11 personnel by moving the back out — on our team that's the Peel motion. Five true wide receivers on the field is rare at the pro level, because you lose the threat of a run and the sixth pass protector entirely. Our word "Empty" describes the formation; the personnel underneath it is usually Eleven or Ten. In the four games Marisol charted, 19 of our 21 empty snaps came from the back motioning out.
Hybrid players blur the count. Sione Fale, number 44, is a fullback on our roster sheet, but in our Heavy package he lines up as a third tight end. We call that 13, because his job there is a tight end's job. The defense's personnel caller gets two or three seconds to decide what Sione is. That's the point.
Reporting. A lineman wearing an ineligible number — 50 through 79 in the NFL — has to report to the referee to play as an eligible receiver, and the referee announces it. So when Rodney Kalu reports for Jumbo, the defense knows. Jumbo is not a disguise. It's a declaration: we are going to push you backward, and we'd like you to bring your biggest people so we can find out whose are bigger. (College and high school have their own numbering and reporting rules; check your code.)
🔄 Check your understanding: Our Jumbo package has Ruffin, Fale, Harlan, Brandt, and Rodney Kalu reporting eligible. What is the personnel number, and how many wide receivers are on the field?
Answer
Two backs (Ruffin and Fale) and three tight ends (Harlan, Brandt, and Kalu counting as the third "tight end" because he reported eligible) — that's 23 personnel, with zero wide receivers (5 − 2 − 3 = 0). The defense will know it's coming, because the referee announces Kalu's report.
4.2 Personnel Is Not Formation
The most common confusion I see in young coaches — and I saw it in Teo his first week, so this is not an insult — is mixing up personnel and formation. They're related. They're not the same thing.
Personnel is who is on the field. Formation is where they stand. You learned formations in Chapter 3: Doubles, Trips, Trey, Bunch, Empty, Ace, and the rest. Any personnel group can line up in many formations, and many personnel groups can line up in the same formation. That's not a technicality. It's the whole game.
Here is one personnel group — Twelve: Ruffin, Harlan, Brandt, Gaines, and Sutton — in three formations.
ONE PERSONNEL GROUP (TWELVE), THREE FORMATIONS
(top row = on the line of scrimmage; next row = off the line)
(a) Twelve, Pistol Ace -- both tight ends attached
U O O O O O Y
X Z
Q
R
(b) Twelve, Gun Doubles Right -- Harlan flexed as the left #2
X O O O O O U
Y Z
Q R
(c) Twelve, Gun Trey Right -- 3x1, the attached Y is #3
X O O O O O Y
U Z
Q R
📊 Diagram (described): Three formations from the same five skill players. In (a), both tight ends are attached to the line — Brandt on the left, Harlan on the right — with both wide receivers a step off the line out wide and the back directly behind the quarterback in the pistol. In (b), Brandt is attached on the right while Harlan stands off the line in the left slot, like a third receiver; Sutton is on the line at the far left. In (c), Harlan is attached on the right, Brandt stands just outside and behind him like a wing, and Gaines is wide right — three eligible players to the right, Sutton alone on the left. In every picture exactly seven players are on the line.
Same five players, three different problems. In (a) we look like a downhill run with seven blockers. In (b) we look like Eleven, except the "slot receiver" weighs 255 pounds. In (c) we've overloaded the right side, and the defense must decide whether to slide its strength there.
Notice that in (a) both receivers are off the line. That's the legality rule from Chapter 3: seven on the line, and only the two ends (plus the backs) are eligible. If Sutton stepped onto the line outside Brandt, he would cover Brandt and make him ineligible. It happens; we'll drill it in a minute.
Now flip it. Here is one formation — Gun Doubles Right, the silhouette of a two-by-two set with a tight end attached on the right — filled by three different personnel groups.
SAME SILHOUETTE, THREE PERSONNEL GROUPS (Gun Doubles Right)
X O O O O O Y
? Z
Q R
Who stands at "?" Group Who attaches at Y
---------------------- ---------- -----------------
Mekhi Powers (H) #3 Eleven Harlan #87
Brooks Harlan (Y) #87 Twelve Brandt #84
Sione Fale (B) #44 Twenty-one Harlan #87
📊 Diagram (described): One two-by-two silhouette: a receiver on the line at the far left, a question mark standing in the left slot, the line with an attached tight end on the right, and a flanker wide right, with the back beside the quarterback. A table below shows that the left slot can be the slot receiver Powers (eleven personnel), the tight end Harlan (twelve personnel, with Brandt attached), or the fullback Fale (twenty-one personnel, with Harlan attached).
From the press box these three snaps look identical. To the defense they're three different problems, because it substituted for three different groups. Against Eleven, Sacramento has its nickel — Kenny Vo, number 26, their "Star" — over the question mark; against Twelve in Week 6 or Twenty-one, a linebacker. Powers is faster than a linebacker. Harlan is bigger than a nickel. Fale is a lead blocker standing in a receiver's spot, so the linebacker over him must decide whether he's covering or fitting a run.
💡 Coach's point: Formation is what the defense sees. Personnel is what the defense brought. The best plays live in the gap between the two.
📋 Try it — Whose fault? It's 2nd-and-goal at the opponent's 3. You call "Twelve, Pistol Ace, Wide PA." At the snap, Brandt releases into the left flat, Vance hits him for a touchdown — and the flag comes out. Here's the picture before the snap:
text X U O O O O O Y Z Q R📊 Diagram (described): On the left, Sutton (X) is standing on the line of scrimmage outside Brandt (U); then the five linemen; then Harlan (Y) attached on the right; Gaines (Z) is off the line wide right; quarterback and back in the pistol. Eight players are on the line.
Whose fault is the flag, what's the foul, and what's the fix?
Answer
The foul: Sutton lined up on the line of scrimmage outside Brandt. That made Sutton the end of the line on the left and covered Brandt, who became an ineligible player. An ineligible player catching a forward pass beyond the line is a foul (and depending on the code, Brandt going downfield before the throw may be flagged on its own). Touchdown off the board.
Whose fault: Sutton, who aligned on the line out of habit — in Eleven, the X is always on the line — and the coach, because the rule that changes with personnel was never on Sutton's role card.
The fix: A formation rule taught by personnel: "In Ace (both tight ends attached), both receivers are off." Rep it in walkthrough with the referee's eyes: Rome or Cal stands at the sideline and calls "covered!" whenever an end is covered. And Vance gets a pre-snap check: if he sees eight on the line, he signals the X back.
4.3 The Substitution Game: How Personnel Forces the Defense to Choose
Here's the core idea of the chapter. Read it twice.
The offense picks its personnel first. The defense picks its personnel second, in answer. And the defense has a hard problem, because it has to defend two things with one group of eleven: the run and the pass. Big defenders stop the run and struggle in coverage. Small defenders cover and struggle against the run. Every defensive personnel group is a bet on where that trade-off should land, and your personnel tells the defense which bet to make.
The defensive personnel groups
Defenses describe their personnel by the number of defensive backs — cornerbacks and safeties — because that's the number they adjust.
| Defensive personnel | DBs | Front players (DL + LB) | Built to stop | Usually called vs. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Base (4-3 or 3-4) | 4 | 7 | The run | 21, 22, often 12 and 13 |
| Nickel (4-2-5 is common) | 5 | 6 | Three-receiver passing | 11 |
| Big nickel | 5 (the fifth is a third safety) | 6 | 12 personnel that might throw | 12 (some teams vs. 11 too) |
| Dime | 6 | 5 | Four-receiver passing, long downs | 10, third-and-long |
| Quarter / "dollar" (names vary) | 7 | 4 | Hail Marys, prevent | End of half / game |
| Goal line / heavy | 2–3 | 8–9 | Short yardage | 22, 23, Jumbo |
A nickel is the fifth defensive back — the name comes from five cents. In a 4-2-5 nickel, the defense takes a linebacker off the field and puts a cover player on, so it has four linemen, two linebackers, and five defensive backs. Sacramento's nickel defender is Kenny Vo; they call the spot "Star," and most of the league uses some version of that word. A dime is the sixth defensive back (two nickels). Big nickel is the one that matters most for us: instead of a corner-type nickel, the fifth defensive back is a safety — a bigger, more physical player who can fit a run but still run with a tight end.
Russ Kimbrough plays nickel on about 70 percent of snaps. That's not unusual in the modern NFL — most charting services have found nickel to be the league's most common defensive personnel for years now, which follows from offenses living in Eleven.
The matching table
So here is how the conversation goes, in its most general form:
| Offense shows | The defense usually answers | What the defense gains | What the defense gives up |
|---|---|---|---|
| 10 (4 WR) | Dime | A cover man on every receiver | A thin run front; a dime in the run fit |
| 11 (3 WR) | Nickel | A nickel on the slot | One linebacker; a smaller player near the box |
| 12 (2 TE) | Base or big nickel | Size vs. two tight ends | Base: a linebacker covering a TE. Big nickel: a safety in the box |
| 13 (3 TE) | Base / heavy | Bodies at the point of attack | Speed in coverage |
| 21 (FB) | Base | A linebacker to take on the fullback | Coverage vs. the backs and TE |
| 22 | Base / goal line | Bodies | Almost all pass coverage depth |
| 23 / Jumbo | Goal line | Everything at the point of attack | Nothing left for play-action |
Look at the last column. Every answer gives something up. That's not because defensive coaches made a mistake. It's because they have eleven players, and you chose first.
🧩 Productive struggle: Before you read on, solve this yourself. Suppose a defense always answers Eleven with nickel and always answers Twelve with base. You have three tight-end-capable players and a quarterback who can throw. You can choose your personnel AND your formation. Where are the two biggest advantages available to you, and what would you call to get them? Write down an answer before you look at section 4.5.
(Hint: think about what each defensive group is bad at, then ask how your formation can force it to do exactly that.)
Why the defense can't just ignore you
A fair question Teo asked in his first month: why does the defense have to substitute at all? Why doesn't Russ just play nickel every snap and dare us to run?
🔍 Why this works: The defense substitutes because the math of the run fit forces it to. In a one-back run, the offense has a certain number of blockers at the point of attack — five linemen plus each attached tight end or fullback. The defense needs at least one defender for every gap the run creates, plus ideally one extra. Every attached tight end adds a gap (the C or D gap outside him). When we put two tight ends on the line, we've created two more gaps than a bare five-man line. If the defense stays in nickel, it either puts a 190-pound nickel into one of those gaps — where a 255-pound tight end is waiting to block him — or it leaves the gap empty and pulls a safety down to fill it, which costs it a deep defender. Either way, a pass threat gets better. So the defense wants bigger bodies against bigger personnel. The substitution is its way of keeping its gap math honest. Your personnel is a lever on its gap math.
That's why I tell rookies personnel is a lever, not a label. You pull it, and something on the other side of the ball moves.
🔄 Check your understanding: The Sentinels play nickel on about 70 percent of snaps. When we come out in Eleven and they answer with nickel, which defensive position has left the field, and which has replaced it? Why does that matter for a run toward the nickel?
Answer
A linebacker leaves (base has three linebackers; a 4-2-5 nickel has two), and a fifth defensive back — the nickel, Kenny Vo — replaces him. It matters for the run because the nickel is now the defender closest to the box on his side. He's built to cover slot receivers, not to take on a tight end or a pulling guard, so a run aimed at his side asks a cover player to be a run fitter.
4.4 The Rules of the Exchange
Personnel is the one part of football strategy that's governed by an explicit fairness rule, and you need to understand it to play the game.
Substitution and the defense's right to match
In the NFL, when the offense substitutes — sends new players on or old players off — the officials make sure the defense gets a reasonable chance to respond with its own substitutions. In practice, the umpire will stand over the ball and won't let the offense snap it until the defense has had that chance. Describe the rule to your staff in those terms; the exact mechanics and the language live in the current rulebook, and they've been adjusted over the years, so read the current version.
The flip side is the most important strategic fact in this chapter: when the offense does not substitute, the defense gets no such protection. If you keep the same eleven on the field and hurry to the line, the defense is stuck with whoever is out there. That's the foundation of tempo, which Chapter 32 develops in full. For now, just hold the idea: substitution is a negotiation, and if you don't open it, the defense can't reply.
Three practical consequences:
- If you like the matchup, freeze it. When Sacramento is in nickel and we're in Eleven and the nickel has been struggling with our run game, we don't substitute. We go hurry-up, not because we're a tempo team — we aren't — but because staying put denies Russ a chance to bring a linebacker back.
- Two-minute personnel is a decision, not a default. In a two-minute drive you'll usually stay in one personnel group, because every substitution stops your clock management and hands the defense a free adjustment. Pick the group that gives you the most plays.
- Late substitutions are a risk. A rushed or deceptive substitution can draw a flag, and officiating emphasis on substitution timing varies — coach it with your officials' guidance.
The personnel signal on both sidelines
Here's what actually happens, at speed, after every snap:
| Clock | Offense | Defense |
|---|---|---|
| Whistle | Coordinator decides the next call; personnel coach hears the grouping | DC looks at the down and distance |
| ~3–5 s | Personnel coach shouts "Twelve!"; players run on and off | Defensive personnel caller watches who's running on |
| ~5–8 s | Players arrive at the huddle | Defensive personnel caller shouts the answer ("Base!" / "Big!"); defenders run on |
| ~10–15 s | Call goes in on the radio until the 15-second cutoff | DC signals the call to the green-dot linebacker |
| Break | QB breaks the huddle | Defense aligns to the formation |
The defense is watching who runs on before it knows anything else. So the substitution itself is a tell. When I say "the defense hears personnel first," this is what I mean: number 84 jogging onto the field is information that reaches Russ's sideline before our huddle has even formed.
🛡️ The defense's view: From Russ's side, the personnel moment is the cleanest information he gets all game. Formations shift and motions fake, but a 255-pound tight end running onto the field is a fact, so a good staff builds its answers in advance and the personnel caller never has to think. Russ told me in the spring that after Week 6 his rule was simple: when our second tight end came on, his third safety came on. Every time. His word for that group was "Big." You'll see in 4.6 what it did to us.
🔄 Check your understanding: We're in Eleven, Sacramento is in nickel, and our last two runs at Vo's side gained 7 and 9. Should we substitute into Twelve for the next snap? What does the rulebook give the defense if we do?
Answer
Probably not. The current matchup — our Eleven against their nickel — is the one our runs are winning. If we substitute, the officials give the defense time to substitute too, and Russ can bring a linebacker (or a big nickel) on to fix the problem we just exposed. If we stay in Eleven and get to the line quickly, the defense is stuck with its nickel personnel for at least one more snap.
4.5 Heavy to Throw, Light to Run
Here's the answer to the productive struggle, and it's the oldest trick in the personnel book. It has two halves, and they're mirror images.
Heavy to throw. Bring heavy personnel — Twelve, Twenty-one, even Heavy — so the defense brings big people. Then spread your heavy people out and throw the ball. Now the defense's big people are covering in space, which is what they're worst at.
Light to run. Bring light personnel — Eleven or Ten — so the defense brings small people. Then squeeze your formation together and run the ball. Now the defense's small people are taking on blocks in the box, which is what they're worst at.
That's it. Everything else in this section is detail. But detail is where the games are decided, so let's draw both halves with real snaps.
Heavy to throw: Twelve spread against base
In Week 6, before Russ changed his rule, Sacramento answered our Twelve with base on 5 snaps and with nickel on 9. When we got base, the Sentinels' base package took Kenny Vo off the field and brought a third linebacker on: Grant Weller, number 58, who usually plays on the line as the strong-side edge, stood up as the Sam linebacker, and Tavon Greer, number 95, took Weller's spot on the edge. That's a heavier front, and it's a good run defense. It also meant Grant Weller — a 6-foot-4 edge player who can drop into coverage — was the man responsible for whoever stood in our left slot.
So on one of those base snaps we put Brooks Harlan in the left slot.
PRE-SNAP: Twelve, Gun Doubles Right vs. Base 4-3, single-high
(Week 6, Q2, 2nd-and-7 at the AUS 38, Outlaws lead 17-7)
F
C C
S M W $
E T N E
X O O O O O U
Y Z
Q R
📊 Diagram (described): Our two-by-two set with Sutton on the line at the far left, Harlan standing off the line in the left slot, Brandt attached at right tackle, and Gaines wide right; Vance in the shotgun with Ruffin beside him. The defense is in a base 4-3: four linemen, three linebackers, one deep safety in the middle, and the strong safety rolled down outside Brandt at about eight yards. The Sam linebacker, Weller, has walked out to the left, a step inside Harlan.
Count what the defense has done. To cover Harlan in the slot, it has a linebacker out of the box. To cover Brandt's side, it has dropped the strong safety down. That leaves one deep safety — a closed middle of the field, in the language Chapter 7 teaches as MOFC — and Weller alone on Harlan's side of the field with an underneath zone.
The call was "Twelve, Gun Doubles Right, 70, Y Option." "70" is our seven-man protection: the five linemen, Brandt staying in to block, and Ruffin staying in. That leaves three receivers in the route, and only one of them matters.
POST-SNAP: Twelve, Gun Doubles Right, 70, Y Option (vs. Cover 3)
^ F [DEEP MIDDLE 1/3]
| go
| <---+---> 6 yds: break AWAY from the Sam's leverage
| | <-------------------+
| (S) M W dig 12 |
| | |
X | O O O O O U] |
Y Z
Q R]
📊 Diagram (described): After the snap, Sutton runs a straight go route on the left to clear the corner deep. Harlan pushes up the field six yards right at Weller, the Sam linebacker, who is the read defender. At six yards Harlan breaks away from Weller's leverage — outside if Weller is inside of him, inside if Weller has widened. On the right, Gaines runs a dig at 12 yards to hold the deep middle safety and the Will linebacker. Brandt and Ruffin stay in to block, giving seven blockers.
Weller played it the way an edge player plays coverage: he sat inside, guarding against a seam into the middle, and turned his hips late. Harlan broke out. Vance threw on Harlan's break. Harlan +9, first down at the 47. That drive ended in a punt three plays later, but the play did its job. It was one of only two passes we threw against base that day, and it told Russ exactly what he already suspected: base was a bad answer to a tight end who could play receiver.
Light to run: Eleven compressed against nickel
Now the mirror. When we're in Eleven, Sacramento is in nickel. The nickel is a fine coverage player and a smaller run defender, and the two-high shell Russ loves puts both safeties at 10 to 11 yards. So the box — the defenders aligned within roughly five yards of the line and inside the tight ends — is light.
The cleanest example of the season is a run you'll meet again in this book.
PRE-SNAP: Eleven, Gun Doubles Right vs. Nickel Over, two-high
(Week 6, Q2, 2nd-and-6 at the SAC 45, Outlaws lead 10-7)
F $
C * W M C
E T N E
X O O O O O Y
H Z
R Q
BOX: E T N E W M = 6 BLOCKERS: 5 OL + Y = 6
📊 Diagram (described): Our Eleven personnel in a two-by-two set: Sutton on the line left, Powers in the left slot, Harlan attached on the right, Gaines wide right, Vance in the gun with Ruffin offset to his left. Sacramento is in its nickel: four down linemen, two linebackers (Ames the Will and Bell the Mike), Kenny Vo as the nickel over Powers, and two safeties deep at about ten to eleven yards — Royce on the left, Holloway on the right. Six defenders are in the box against six blockers.
Count it the way Gus counts it. Six blockers: five linemen plus Harlan. Six box defenders: four linemen and two linebackers. Vo is outside the box, over Powers. The two safeties are deep. So the offense has six on six, with each safety having to come downhill from 10 or 11 yards to make it seven.
When numbers are even, a run play doesn't need to be clever. It needs every blocker to win and one defender to be a step late.
POST-SNAP: Inside zone right -- the 45-yard run
F $ Holloway:
/ flat angle,
W fills the v overruns
wrong gap M
\ | ^ Ruffin
E \ T N E<--squeezes | bounces
^ v^ ^ ^ | outside
O O O O O Y--] / -> 45 yds
R ..> Q ----------------'
📊 Diagram (described): At the snap the whole line and Harlan step to the right on inside zone. Ruffin takes the handoff aimed at the right guard. The defensive end on Harlan's side, Greer, squeezes inside, closing the planned hole. Ames, the Will linebacker, fills a gap he wasn't responsible for, leaving his own empty. Holloway, the safety on that side, comes downhill on a flat angle and overruns the play. Ruffin bounces the run outside Harlan's block and outruns everyone to the end zone.
Ruffin 45 yards, touchdown, 17–7. I won't pretend I designed the bounce. Ruffin made a one-cut zone runner's decision, and three defenders made small mistakes at the same moment. But the conditions were designed: Eleven drew nickel; two-high meant the safeties started deep; six blockers matched six box defenders; and the run went toward Harlan's side, where Sacramento's edge had to fit against a tight end. Light personnel, run the ball. You'll see the blocking rules in Chapter 9.
Light personnel, compressed further
The stronger version: compress Eleven — tighten the splits (our Nasty tag) or put a receiver in a wing spot — so the nickel has to come inside the box to stay aligned. Now he's in the run fit, against a block from someone 30 or 40 pounds heavier. Chapter 27 draws those formations, where motion does most of the compressing.
Twelve against nickel: the October lesson
In Week 6, Sacramento answered Twelve with nickel on 9 snaps. Here is what happened:
| Week 6, our Twelve vs. … | Snaps | Runs | Rush yards | Yards per run | Passes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nickel | 9 | 7 | 52 | 7.4 | 2 |
| Base | 5 | 3 | 8 | 2.7 | 2 |
| Total | 14 | 10 | 60 | 6.0 | 4 passes, 44 yards |
Read the table carefully. Against nickel, our Twelve ran for 7.4 yards a carry. Against base, 2.7. The four passes — including Harlan's 22-yard play-action dig on the opening drive, off the outside-zone look we'd shown the snap before — went for 44 yards. In other words: when Sacramento sent a small group against our big group, we ran over it. When it sent a big group, we threw over it. Either way they were wrong on half the snaps. That's the dream.
One of those nickel runs is worth slowing down for.
🎙️ On the headset: First quarter, about 7:30 left, 2nd-and-4 at our own 46, up 7–0. I've got Twelve on the field, and I've lined Harlan up in the left slot — Doubles Right, the same silhouette we use in Eleven. Their personnel caller saw two tight ends run on, but Harlan standing in the slot looks like a receiver, and Russ's staff answered with nickel. I can see Vo walking out over Harlan. Good. That's a 255-pound tight end against a nickel. Now I'm going to Zip him — short motion back toward the ball — into a wing spot on the left tackle's hip, a yard off the line so Sutton doesn't cover him, and set for a full second before the snap. When he gets there, we have seven blockers: five linemen and two tight ends. Their box is six plus a nickel who just followed a tight end into a blocking position. I want Ruffin running at Vo's gap. Inside zone left. The call is "Twelve, Gun Doubles Right, Zip, Inside Left." Snap. Harlan seals Vo. Ruffin +4, first down at midfield.
Four yards isn't a highlight. It's a first down on second down, which is what Marisol's success-rate chart rewards and what keeps you out of third-and-long. Two snaps later, Gaines ran the 41-yard post.
🔄 Check your understanding: Why did Harlan's Zip motion change the run math on that 2nd-and-4, even though the personnel never changed?
Answer
Before the motion, Harlan was a "receiver" in the slot, and the defense covered him with its nickel, Vo — outside the box. When Harlan motioned back to a wing spot on the tackle's hip, he became a blocker, raising our blocker count to seven. Vo followed him into the run fit, so now a nickel built for coverage was standing in a gap, facing a 255-pound tight end's block. The personnel stayed Twelve; what changed was where the defense's smallest player had to stand.
4.6 The Defense Answers Back: Big Nickel and the Arms Race
If this chapter ended at 4.5, you'd think personnel is a cheat code. It isn't. It's a conversation, and the other half of the conversation is played by people like Russ Kimbrough.
After Week 6, Sacramento's staff had our Twelve tape against both of its answers. Base got thrown on. Nickel got run over. So Russ built a third answer, and from Week 15 on he used it every single time number 84 ran onto the field.
Big nickel. Keep five defensive backs — so you can still cover a tight end who flexes out — but make the fifth one a safety, not a corner-type nickel. In Sacramento's version, Tre Holloway, number 31, their strong safety and best run fitter among the defensive backs, moved down into the nickel ("Star") spot, and their third safety, Elijah Pruitt, number 39, came on to play deep. Kenny Vo went to the sideline.
PRE-SNAP: Twelve, Pistol Ace vs. Big Nickel (Week 15)
F (Royce) F (Pruitt)
C W M * C
E T N E * = Holloway,
U O O O O O Y a safety
X Z
Q
R
BOX: E T N E W M * = 7 BLOCKERS: 5 OL + U + Y = 7
📊 Diagram (described): Our Twelve personnel in Pistol Ace: Brandt attached on the left, Harlan attached on the right, both receivers off the line out wide, Vance in the pistol with Ruffin behind him. Sacramento's big nickel has four linemen, two linebackers, and Holloway — normally a safety — standing in the nickel spot just outside Harlan, with Royce and Pruitt as the two deep safeties. Seven defenders are in the box against seven blockers.
Look at what big nickel does to both of our levers at once.
Against "heavy to run": we have seven blockers. Russ has seven box defenders, and the seventh is not a slot corner — it's Holloway, an aggressive alley player who triggers downhill on run reads. Our attached tight end is now blocking a safety who wants to be in the run fit.
Against "heavy to throw": if Harlan flexes into the slot, he isn't facing Weller or a linebacker. He's facing Holloway, a safety who covers tight ends for a living. The mismatch we beat base with is gone.
POST-SNAP: Duo -- seven on seven, and the seventh man is a safety
W M *
^ ^ | Holloway triggers
| | v into the alley
E T N E *
^ ^\\ //^ ^
U] O O O O O Y]
Q ...> R
\__ reads the Mike
📊 Diagram (described): On duo, our two-tight-end run, the line works two double-teams on the interior linemen, intending to climb to the two linebackers; Brandt and Harlan block the ends. Ruffin takes the handoff and reads the Mike linebacker. But there is no free hole: Holloway, playing the nickel spot, triggers downhill into the alley outside Harlan, so Sacramento has a seventh run defender for our seventh blocker, and the extra defender is a safety built to make exactly this tackle.
The numbers from Week 15 tell the rest:
| Week 15, our Twelve vs. big nickel | Result |
|---|---|
| First-half snaps in Twelve | 9 of 33 |
| Runs vs. big nickel (whole game) | 8 for 29 yards (3.6 per carry) |
| Our 12-play, two-tight-end drive in the second quarter | Mostly duo and outside zone; a play-action seam to Harlan broken up by Pruitt; a 3rd-and-1 incompletion; field goal, 10–10 |
That drive is the one I keep coming back to. It ended in points, and a casual observer would call it good. But it was three-yard runs into a perfectly sized answer, one shot a third safety broke up, and a third-and-1 we didn't convert — points earned in spite of the personnel, not because of it.
At halftime I wrote three things on my sheet. One of them was: Twelve isn't working. One of my three changes for the second half was simply less Twelve personnel. We lost that game 23–20.
🛡️ The defense's view: What Russ did is what good defensive coordinators do with personnel: he stopped matching our personnel and started matching our intentions. Base matched our bodies; nickel matched our formation. Big nickel matched what our Twelve was actually for — mostly runs, with play-action off them — while keeping a coverage player on Harlan. The lesson for you isn't "big nickel beats Twelve." It's that once a defense knows why you use a personnel group, it can build a personnel group to answer the why. Your answer then has to change the why.
What the offense does next
This is the arms race, and it never ends. When a defense finds a good answer to one of your personnel groups, you have four honest moves:
| Your move | What it does to big nickel | Cost |
|---|---|---|
| Go heavier (Heavy, Twenty-two) | Big nickel is now too light for the run; the defense must go to base | You've shown a very loud run tell; you need a pass off it |
| Spread the Twelve wider (both tight ends detached) | Forces a linebacker or safety to cover a TE in space; empties the box | Only works if both tight ends threaten as receivers (Brandt doesn't) |
| Attack the safety in the box (counter, kick-out, RPO off him) | Makes Holloway choose between the run fit and the pass | Needs a play we haven't shown from Twelve — we had zero Twelve RPOs |
| Change the why (use Twelve to throw more) | Breaks the tendency the defense built its answer on | Costs some run efficiency while you rebuild credibility |
We tried the third move in Week 15 with counter twice; neither went over 5 yards, and that's a fair result against a team that had prepared for it. The fourth move is the real one, and it's the subject of section 4.8.
⚠️ Common mistake: Staying married to a personnel group the defense has solved. In the first half of Week 15 we ran nine snaps of Twelve into a defense that had a perfect answer for it. The result: a slow, low-yield drive and a first half where our most dangerous player group — Eleven, with Powers in the slot — was on the field less than it should have been. The fix: chart personnel vs. defensive personnel live. Teo now keeps a two-line chart in the booth: "Our Twelve vs. their Big: runs/yards" and "Our Eleven vs. their Nickel: runs/yards." When one line goes cold for a series, the booth says so on the headset before I've noticed it myself.
🔄 Check your understanding: Big nickel took away both "heavy to run" and "heavy to throw." Name the defensive player who made it work and explain, in one sentence for each, why he answered both.
Answer
Tre Holloway, the strong safety playing the nickel spot. Against the run, he's an aggressive alley player who triggers downhill, so our seventh blocker faced a real seventh run defender instead of a slot corner. Against the pass, he's a safety who can cover a tight end, so flexing Harlan out no longer produced a linebacker-on-tight-end mismatch.
4.7 Hybrids: The Players Who Make Multiplicity Cheap
Every personnel group costs you something to install: snaps in practice, a set of plays everyone has to know, a substitution pattern the players have to execute in five seconds without twelve men in the huddle. That's why most offenses live in two or three groups. And that's why the most valuable players on a modern roster are the ones who make one personnel group look like another.
I call them hybrids. Every coaching staff has its own word. Here are ours.
Brooks Harlan, the move tight end
Harlan is a Y — an in-line tight end who can attach to the tackle and block a defensive end. He's also a seam runner who can stand in the slot and beat a linebacker. That combination is the whole reason Twelve can look like Eleven. When Harlan is in the slot, the defense has to decide whether it's facing a tight end or a receiver, and either decision is wrong for half of what we can do.
Football has done this a long time. Joe Gibbs's Washington teams of the 1980s are widely credited with popularizing the one-back offense built around an H-back, a tight end who moved around the formation; the modern "move" tight end descends from that idea. The principle: one player who can do two jobs lets you show the defense one personnel group and play another.
Cody Brandt, and the honest limitation
Now the other side of the coin. Cody Brandt is a good football player. He's a tough in-line blocker who does the dirty work on duo and outside zone. He is not a receiving threat the defense fears, and every defensive staff in the league knows it.
So when Brandt runs on, the defense isn't really facing Twelve. It's facing Eleven plus a sixth blocker. That's the root of our 63 percent problem: our second tight end is the tell. You can't flex Brandt out to the slot and expect a defense to cover him with a safety. They'll leave a linebacker on him, or a corner, and roll their help elsewhere.
That doesn't make Brandt a mistake. It makes him a role. His role card says what he does well, and our job is to call plays that use those things, without pretending he's Harlan.
Mekhi Powers, the slot who can play outside
Powers is our H — jet motion, option routes, the RPO slant target, the first hot read against pressure — and he can line up outside as a #1 in Trips or Empty. If Powers can line up anywhere, Vo has to cover him anywhere, or Russ has to give him help that costs a defender somewhere else.
Jalen Ruffin, the back who splits out
Ruffin is a running back. He's also a receiver the defense has to respect, which means he can Peel — motion from the backfield out to an empty formation — without the defense being able to ignore him. When he does, the defense that substituted for Eleven with a back in the backfield is suddenly facing five receivers and no run threat, and it has to decide who covers him.
The best example came against a different kind of defense.
PRE-SNAP: Eleven, Gun Doubles Right, Peel (Week 8 vs. Birmingham)
(Q2, 3rd-and-6 at the BIR 41, Forge lead 10-7)
F
C * W M $ C
E T N E
X O O O O O Y
H R Z
<~~~~~~~~~~ R Q
📊 Diagram (described): Eleven personnel in two-by-two: Sutton on the line far left, Powers in the left slot, Harlan attached right, Gaines wide right, Vance in the gun with Ruffin to his left. Before the snap, Ruffin motions out to the left, ending just inside Powers. The Birmingham Forge show one deep safety and a nickel over Powers, with two linebackers inside.
The Birmingham Forge (our fictional Week 8 opponent) play under DC Dwight Seldon, and Seldon blitzes more than anyone we face and plays a lot of man coverage behind it — Cover 1 and Cover 0, press corners, "come get us." Against a man defense, Peel motion is a lie detector. If a linebacker runs out with Ruffin, it's man coverage, and he's covering a running back in space. If nobody goes, it's zone, and there's a hole where the back used to be. We call that kind of motion "motion for information," and Chapter 27 owns it.
On this snap their Will linebacker, Quentin Marsh, number 48, ran with Ruffin all the way out.
POST-SNAP: Empty 3x2 after Peel -- 50 protection, Ruffin's option
F
^ ^
| go | seam
| |<--+ R: out at 5, away from Marsh
| | |
| | (W) M
| | | E T N E
X | | O] O] O] O] O] Y--> Z-->
H R Q
📊 Diagram (described): After the motion the formation is empty with three receivers on the left — Sutton, Powers, and Ruffin — and Harlan and Gaines on the right. The five linemen block in "50," our five-man protection; there is no back left to help. Sutton runs a go, Powers a seam, and Ruffin, with Marsh the Will linebacker over him in man coverage, runs an option route at five yards and breaks away from Marsh's inside leverage to the outside. Harlan and Gaines run routes on the right.
Marsh lined up inside Ruffin, so Ruffin broke out. Ruffin +11, first down at the BIR 30. We scored a touchdown on the drive, and we won the game 24–20.
Notice what happened to the defense's personnel logic. Birmingham substituted for Eleven: nickel, two linebackers. One of those linebackers was supposed to be a run defender. Peel turned him into a cover man on a running back with receiver skills, and it took away the run threat that justified keeping him in the game. The hybrid changed the personnel without a substitution. That's exactly the kind of change the substitution rule can't protect the defense from.
Sione Fale, the fullback
The fullback has had a modest revival. As Eleven took over, many NFL teams stopped carrying one; in recent seasons a handful of offenses — several in the Shanahan tree you'll meet in Chapter 29 — have used a fullback as a multi-purpose player: lead blocker, H-back, motion man, receiver. Whether that's a trend or a few teams with the right player is debatable.
Our version is Sione Fale. He's a lead blocker on Twenty-one and Twenty-two runs, a wham and insert blocker, and in Heavy he lines up as a third tight end. Because he can do all three, Twenty-one doesn't have to be the I-formation, and the defense's personnel caller doesn't get to assume "fullback = run between the tackles." In the four games Marisol charted, we played only 8 snaps of Twenty-one and 5 of Heavy. That's small. But those snaps forced Sacramento's base defense on the field, which, as you saw in 4.5, is the defense that gets thrown on.
🩺 Player safety: Hybrids absorb more contact than their labels suggest — a move tight end blocks a 270-pound end on one snap and runs a seam on the next. Track their contact reps separately from their position room, and in heat or late in the season cut their full-speed blocking reps first. A hybrid worn out on Wednesday can't be two players on Sunday.
📋 Try it — Find the conflict: Week 15. We come out in Twelve, Gun Doubles Right with Harlan in the left slot and Brandt attached right. Sacramento answers with big nickel: Holloway is standing over Harlan, Royce and Pruitt are deep, and Weller is on the line outside Brandt. Ruffin is offset left. Who is the defender in conflict if we run inside zone left, toward Harlan, and what simple pass could we attach to the run to make him wrong either way?
Answer
Holloway. He's lined up over Harlan in the slot, so he's responsible for Harlan in coverage, but he's also Sacramento's best alley run defender, and the run is coming to his side. If he triggers on the run, Harlan is open behind him. If he stays on Harlan, the run has one fewer defender in the alley.
The attachment: a run-pass option with Harlan running a short route behind Holloway — a stick, a glance, or a seam — with Vance reading Holloway at the mesh. (Our RPO words are taught in Chapter 13: "Inside Stick" or "Inside Glance" would be the call shape.) The point is that big nickel's strength — a safety who both fits the run and covers the tight end — becomes a weakness the moment one play asks him to do both.
🔄 Check your understanding: Why is Cody Brandt, a good player, the main reason our Twelve was a run tell?
Answer
Because the defense doesn't fear him as a receiver. When Brandt is on the field, defenses can treat our Twelve as "Eleven plus a sixth blocker" — they don't have to cover him with a premium cover player — so the personnel group signals run more loudly than a Twelve with two receiving tight ends would. The limitation is in the role, not the player: we built our Twelve around what Brandt does, and that told the defense what we wanted to do.
4.8 Personnel Tendencies and the Self-Scout
Back to Marisol's slide, because now you can read it the way Russ's staff read it.
| Personnel | Snaps | Run | RPO | Play-action | Dropback | Screen | Starts with a run fake or handoff |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Eleven | 168 | 38 (23%) | 33 (20%) | 27 (16%) | 59 (35%) | 11 (7%) | 98 of 168 (58%) |
| Twelve | 49 | 31 (63%) | 0 | 11 (22%) | 6 (12%) | 1 (2%) | 42 of 49 (86%) |
Eleven is spread across every family. A defense can't load up against any one thing without giving something else away. Twelve is not. And the honest number isn't the 63 percent. It's the last column. Forty-two of our forty-nine Twelve snaps started with Ruffin taking a handoff or Vance faking one. That includes our play-action, which only works if the defense believes the run, and the defense believed it because, 31 times out of 49, it was true.
So here's what a good defensive staff concludes from that slide: "Against their Twelve, play the run first, and put someone who can cover Harlan on the field so the play-action doesn't hurt us." That sentence is big nickel. Russ didn't outguess us. He read our self-scout before we acted on it.
The staff room, the Monday before Week 6
When Marisol put that slide up, I didn't like it, and I'll show you the conversation, because the disagreement is the useful part.
Gus Ferrante: We run the ball out of Twelve because we're good at running the ball out of Twelve. You want me to throw it more so a chart looks prettier?
Marisol Vega: I want the chart to stop telling Sacramento what to bring. Sixty-three percent isn't the problem by itself. The zero is the problem. Zero RPOs. Six dropbacks. That's a sample of forty-nine, so I wouldn't bet the house on any single number — but nothing in it says "pass" loudly enough to make them respect it.
Wade Harmon: I'll tell you what I'd do if I were Russ. First time eighty-four jogs on, I put a safety out there instead of a linebacker. Big enough to fit the run, fast enough to run with Eighty-seven. And I'd dare you to throw it to Eighty-four.
Teo Arriaga: Has he done that to anybody this year?
Marisol Vega: Not on the tape we have. He's played base or nickel against two tight ends.
Me: Then this week we make him pay for base and nickel. And we fix the zero before he fixes us.
We did the first half of that sentence. We beat his base with Harlan in the slot and his nickel with Ruffin up the middle, 34–27. We didn't do the second half fast enough. By December, Wade's hypothetical had become Russ's rule, and we were still a Twelve team that mostly ran.
Here's my recurring mistake as a play caller, and you'll see it more than once in this book: I trust a tendency longer than the defense lets it stay true. Personnel is where that mistake is easiest to make, because your personnel tendencies feel like identity. "We're a two-tight-end running team" sounds like a philosophy. Sometimes it's just a tell with good branding.
💡 Coach's point: A personnel tendency isn't bad because it's lopsided. It's bad when it's lopsided and the defense has a personnel answer built for the lopsided part. Run 63 percent from Twelve all season if the defense can't find a group that stops it. The day it can, your tendency becomes its game plan.
Marisol's rule: kill the zeros
What we changed, starting in the spring, is a rule Marisol now runs on every self-scout. We call it "kill the zeros." For every personnel group we use more than a handful of times, every major play family — run, RPO, play-action, dropback, screen — has to show up at least a few times in any four-game window. Not equally. Just not never.
The logic is the defense's logic turned around. A defense can live with a 60–40 tendency, because 40 percent is enough to keep it honest. What it builds personnel around is a zero, because a zero means it can bring a group that's bad at the thing you never do. Our Twelve had a zero in the RPO column and almost a zero in dropbacks. Big nickel is a group that's bad at nothing a Twelve team without RPOs or dropbacks will ask it to do.
Here's what killing the zeros looks like in the Twelve section of our spring install:
| Family | Twelve call (spring install) | What it makes the big nickel do |
|---|---|---|
| RPO | "Twelve, Gun Doubles Right, Duo Pop" — Harlan's pop pass behind the safety who fits the run | Holloway must choose run fit or Harlan |
| Dropback | "Twelve, Gun Empty" — both tight ends detached, Ruffin Peels | A safety on Harlan, a linebacker or corner on Brandt, five in the box |
| Screen | "Twelve, Y Screen" off duo action | Punishes a defense that triggers on run reads |
| Play-action | Keep our 22 percent — it was our best Twelve pass | Still needs the run to be real |
📈 By the numbers: In public charting over many seasons, running plays against light boxes have generally gained more per carry than runs into loaded boxes, and heavier offensive personnel tends to draw heavier boxes — which is why the "light to run" idea has a real basis. But be careful: both sides choose. Defenses play light boxes when they expect a pass, and offenses run when they see a light box, so the raw numbers mix the play with the decision to call it. The same caution applies to our own Week 6 numbers: 7 runs against nickel and 3 against base is a story, not a proof. Use the data to ask a question, then go watch the film.
📋 Try it — Make the call: Week 12, home against the St. Louis Stallions. Third quarter, 2nd-and-3 at the STL 34, Outlaws lead 13–10. St. Louis (DC Frank Ostrowski) is a single-high, safety-down defense: Cover 3 and Cover 1, eight-man boxes on early downs, and it answers every personnel group by rolling a safety into the box. Your scouting shows they play base against Twelve and nickel against Eleven, and they've given up two play-action completions over the top of that rolled-down safety in the last three weeks. You have all your personnel available. What personnel, formation, and play family do you call, and why? (The reasoning is graded, not the answer.)
Answer
One strong answer: "Twelve, Gun Doubles Right" with Harlan in the left slot, play-action off inside zone, Harlan on a seam or Gaines on a post behind the rolled-down safety.
Why: 2nd-and-3 is a down where the defense must respect the run — three yards is easy to get on the ground. St. Louis answers Twelve with base, which puts a linebacker on whoever is in the slot, and they already roll a safety down, so the middle of the field is guarded by one deep player. Twelve draws the heavier group; flexing Harlan puts a linebacker in coverage; play-action pulls the rolled-down safety and the linebackers forward. Even if the shot isn't there, Harlan against a linebacker is a good checkdown. You're using heavy personnel to throw, on a down when they have to fear the run.
Another defensible answer: Eleven with an RPO ("Inside Slant" or "Inside Glance") — St. Louis's rolled-down safety and eight-man box make the conflict defender easy to find, and Eleven draws a nickel, which makes the run half of the RPO healthier.
🔄 Check your understanding: Marisol said 63 percent wasn't the real problem. What was, and why does it matter more for personnel than for formations?
Answer
The real problem was the zeros — no RPOs and almost no dropbacks from Twelve — which meant 42 of 49 snaps started with a run action. It matters especially for personnel because the defense gets to substitute in answer to personnel. A zero lets the defense bring a whole group (big nickel) that's bad only at the thing you never do. A formation tendency can be adjusted by alignment; a personnel tendency lets the defense change its players.
4.9 Building Your Packages: The League, the Roster, and the Sideline
Where the league is
Personnel usage has moved in waves, and it helps to know the wave you're standing in. Treat everything in this paragraph as a hedged picture of trends, not a set of precise numbers.
For much of football history, base offenses used two backs, which is why base defenses were built to stop two-back runs. The run-and-shoot offenses of the late 1980s and early 1990s (Mouse Davis's system, June Jones, the Oilers and Lions of that era) made four-receiver, one-back personnel — Ten — their identity. Over the 2000s and especially the 2010s, Eleven became the NFL's default. Most charting services have found Eleven on well over half of league snaps in recent seasons, varying a great deal by team. Defenses followed: nickel became, in practice, the new base.
Then the counter-trend. Once defenses were living in nickel, some offenses deliberately went heavier again — more Twelve, more Twenty-one, even Thirteen — to run at the lighter defensive groups and throw off play-action when the defense brought its heavy players back. The 2019 Ravens' run game, built around Lamar Jackson and a heavy use of multiple-tight-end groupings, is the most famous recent example; it set the NFL single-season team rushing record. Some Shanahan-tree offenses did something similar with a fullback. None of that made Eleven obsolete. It made the ratio a weapon.
The league trend doesn't tell you what personnel to use. It tells you what personnel the defense expects and what groups it built its roster around. If every team you face plays nickel 70 percent of the time, a heavy group is worth something simply because it's unusual.
Where your roster is
You don't choose personnel groups from a menu. You choose them from your players. The question for each group is: who are the five, and what do they make the defense do?
Here is our core package chart, the one on the wall of our meeting room:
| Group | The five | Season share | What it forces | Our main attack | The risk |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Eleven | Ruffin, Harlan, Gaines, Sutton, Powers | ~66% | Nickel | Everything: IZ/RPO, quick game, dropback | None big — it's balanced |
| Twelve | Ruffin, Harlan, Brandt, Gaines, Sutton | ~21% | Base (Wk 6); big nickel (after) | OZ, duo, play-action | Run tell; Brandt isn't a pass threat |
| Ten | Ruffin, Gaines, Sutton, Powers, Jaylen Cross | small | Dime | Quick game, empty, draws | Light protection; Cross is a WR4 |
| Twenty-one | Ruffin, Fale, Harlan, Gaines, Sutton | small | Base | Lead runs, PA, Fale in motion | Few snaps; easy to tag |
| Heavy (13) | Odom or Ruffin, Harlan, Brandt, Fale, Sutton | small | Base / heavy | Four-minute, short yardage, PA | Very loud run tell |
| Jumbo (23) | Odom, Fale, Harlan, Brandt, Kalu (reports) | goal line | Goal line | Sneak, QB power, Fale lead, Kalu pass | Everyone knows |
Notice that the Eleven and Twelve rows differ by one player: Powers out, Brandt in. That's the whole substitution. It's fast, it's simple, and it changed the defense's personnel every time. The less your players have to move on a substitution, the more often you can make one without risking a penalty or a rushed huddle.
Substitution plans and the sideline
Every personnel group needs a substitution plan that the players can execute without thinking:
- One personnel caller. On our sideline, one assistant hears the personnel from my call sheet and shouts the word. Nobody else shouts personnel. Two voices means twelve men.
- Pairs, not lists. Players learn substitutions as pairs: "Twelve: Brandt for Powers." "Heavy: Brandt and Fale for Powers and Gaines." A player only has to know his own pairs.
- A personnel board and injury rules. Every player's groups and backups are on a board behind the bench, decided in advance. When Harlan missed a series in one of the four games Marisol charted, our "Twelve" became Brandt plus Fale as the U — a louder run tell — so the board sends us to Eleven.
- Tempo freeze. When I like the matchup, the call comes in with "no sub," and our players know not to rotate.
⚠️ Common mistake: The one-play specialist. Jaylen Cross, number 15, is our fastest player, and for the first month of the season his arrival on the field meant one thing: jet sweep or a gadget. A defense doesn't need a chart to see that — the personnel caller just watches number 15 run on and yells "Jet!" The fix: every player who enters in a special group gets at least three jobs on his role card, and we call all three. Cross now runs the jet, runs a clear-out go off jet action, and blocks the nickel on an inside run to Powers's side. If a substitution predicts a play, it isn't a package — it's an announcement.
🎬 Film room: On the All-22 (the wide coaches' film angle), start each clip a few seconds early and watch the substitution. Count backs and tight ends by body type and alignment, not jersey number — under current NFL numbering rules, receivers, backs, and tight ends share many number ranges. Then count the defensive backs. Chart offensive personnel, defensive personnel, and play type for every snap; after one game you'll see whether the offense is winning the substitution battle.
🏫 Any level: Most high school defenses don't carry true nickel and dime specialists — the same eleven kids play every snap — so the substitution game mostly disappears and formation with the same people does the work. Build personnel from who you have, not who you want. If your best eleven include a 210-pound tight end who can catch and a fullback who's also your middle linebacker, your "Twelve" and "Twenty-one" are limited by conditioning and by the defensive snaps those kids also play. Two personnel groups, maybe three, is plenty. In college, the wider hash marks (60 feet from each sideline, versus the NFL's 70 feet 9 inches) give you a much bigger field side and boundary side, which changes where a flexed tight end is most dangerous — in the boundary, he's close to the box and a linebacker has to cover him; in the field, he has space a linebacker can't defend. At every level, know your code's substitution procedures.
🔄 Check your understanding: Why does it matter that our Eleven and Twelve groups differ by exactly one player?
Answer
Because the substitution is quick and simple — Brandt in, Powers out — the offense can change personnel often without risking a penalty or a rushed huddle, while still forcing the defense into a different personnel answer each time. The cost of the substitution is small for us and large for the defense, which has to change linebackers and defensive backs. Cheap substitutions let you ask the personnel question more often.
Spaced Review
Answer each question before you open it.
🔄 From Chapter 3 (Formations): In "Twelve, Gun Trey Right," which player is #3 to the right, which is #2, and what rule makes the formation "Right"?
Answer
Receivers are numbered outside-in on each side: Gaines (Z) is #1, Brandt standing just outside as the wing is #2, and Harlan — the attached tight end — is #3. The formation is "Right" because strength is declared to the tight end's side (with no tight end, to the passing strength). Strength rules matter because defenses set their fronts and coverage rotations to that side.
🔄 From Chapter 1 (Offensive Philosophy): Where does personnel sit in the hierarchy philosophy → system → playbook → game plan → call sheet → call?
Answer
In all of them, at different scales. Your philosophy decides which personnel groups you believe in (we believe in Eleven for balance and Twelve for run credibility). Your system and playbook decide what each group can run. Your game plan decides which groups you'll use against this defense. The call sheet organizes plays by personnel so the substitution can be shouted in time. And every single call begins with personnel — the first word of the call grammar.
🔄 From Chapter 2 (The Evolution of Offense): The run-and-shoot lived in one personnel group. Which one, and what did it give up to get its advantage?
Answer
Ten personnel — one back and four wide receivers, no tight end. It gained a receiver on every defender's side and forced defenses into extra defensive backs, but it gave up the tight end's blocking and the extra run gap he creates, which limited the run game and the protection options. In this chapter's language: Ten draws dime, and dime is weak against the run — but only if you can still run the ball from Ten.
Project Checkpoint: Personnel Packages & Role Cards
Where you are: In Chapter 3 you built your Formation Family — 6 to 8 named formations with alignment rules, strength rules, and the defensive problem each creates. Now you'll decide who stands in those formations.
This chapter's deliverable has two parts.
Part 1 — The Personnel Package Chart (one page). List your 3–5 base groupings plus at most one special package. For each one, fill in six columns: (1) the five skill players by name or role; (2) which formations from your Formation Family the group may use; (3) what defensive personnel you expect in answer; (4) your main attack against that answer; (5) your "kill the zeros" check — which play families (run, RPO, play-action, dropback, screen) the group can run, with no family at zero unless you write down why; (6) the substitution pair (who comes on, who goes off) and the injury replacement.
Part 2 — Role Cards (one per skill player, 5–8 cards). Each card holds: name and position letter; every slot he can fill (X, Z, H, Y, U, R, B); his jobs in each package; his two best strengths; his honest limitation and the tell it creates; his backup.
Here's one filled-in card from ours:
ROLE CARD -- BROOKS HARLAN, #87, Y (about 255 lb)
Slots: Y (attached) / H (slot) / U (wing) / B (offset, rare)
Eleven: attached Y -- IZ, duo, arc and wham blocks; seam,
PA dig, stick
Twelve: attached OR flexed -- the reason Twelve can look like
Eleven; Y Option vs. a linebacker
Heavy: attached -- base blocks; PA flat/dig
Strengths: seam vs. linebackers; run blocking on the edge
Limit: not a press-beater outside; vs. a safety (big
nickel) the size edge disappears
Tell risk: low -- the defense can't guess run or pass from him
Backup: Brandt (blocker only: Twelve becomes a run tell)
📊 Diagram (described): A sample role card for Brooks Harlan listing the slots he can play (attached tight end, slot, wing, and rarely offset back), his jobs in Eleven, Twelve, and Heavy, his strengths and limitation, a note that he creates little tendency risk, and a warning that his backup, Brandt, turns Twelve into a run tell.
Choose your level:
- High school: Two or three groups. Your role cards will show who also plays defense; note the snap limits and conditioning in the "limitation" line.
- College: Three or four groups plus a short-yardage package. Note the hash effect on where your hybrid aligns.
- Pro: Four or five groups plus specials. Add a column for the defensive answer you expect after the opponent adjusts (the big-nickel column).
- Film-room: Pick one NFL offense and chart one full game: personnel per snap, the defense's personnel answer, and play type. Build their package chart and one role card for their most important hybrid. Then mark their zeros.
Next: In Chapter 5 you'll build your Offensive Line Rules Sheet — the run-blocking rules and the pass-protection identification that the five players who never substitute must know.
Chapter Summary
Personnel is the first sentence of every play. It's the count of the five skill players: first digit running backs, second digit tight ends, wide receivers are the remainder. The defense hears it first, answers it first, and — when you substitute — gets the rulebook's protection to do it.
| Offense shows | Defense usually answers | The lever you hold | Watch out for |
|---|---|---|---|
| 10 | Dime | Run at a dime; quick game vs. six DBs | Thin protection |
| 11 | Nickel | Light to run: compress and run at the nickel; balanced menu | Few risks — your base |
| 12 | Base or big nickel | Heavy to throw vs. base; run vs. nickel | Big nickel answers both; zeros become tells |
| 13 / Heavy | Base / heavy | Forces the biggest group on; PA vs. it | Loud run tell |
| 21 | Base | Fullback as runner, blocker, motion man; PA vs. base | Few snaps = easy to scout |
| 22 / 23 | Base / goal line | Short yardage power | Everyone knows |
Decision framework — before you call a personnel group, ask:
- What will they bring? (Your scouting report's personnel-answer table.)
- What is that group bad at? (Size, speed, a linebacker in coverage, a nickel in the run fit.)
- Can my formation force them to do it? (Spread heavy, compress light, flex the hybrid.)
- Do I want to freeze the matchup? (If yes: no sub, get to the line.)
- What does my tendency in this group tell them? (Kill the zeros before they build an answer.)
- When they adjust, what's my next group or tag? (Big nickel → RPO off the safety, empty, Y screen.)
Personnel is not formation. One group can line up many ways; many groups can share one silhouette. The best plays live in the gap between what the defense brought and what it sees.
What's Next
Five players never leave the field no matter what personnel you call: the offensive line. In Chapter 5, Gus Ferrante takes over the board — "Five men, one heartbeat" — and you'll learn how the line blocks the runs this chapter's personnel was built to run, and how it identifies the rushers that the protections in your package have to pick up.