Case Study 2 — Game 2 at Sacramento: The Flood That Stopped Short
A failure, seen from both sidelines. The offense ran a good concept at the wrong distance against the coverage built to stop it. The Outlaws, the Sentinels, and every person and number here are fictional.
Setup
The concept's history. Flood was one of our best third-down calls going into the season's second Sacramento game. Before Week 6, the Sentinels' staff had charted our four previous games, and one line of their chart (Russ Kimbrough slid it across a table to me in the spring) read: "3rd-and-4 to 6 from 3x1: dig or flood, 14 of 22." Nine digs, five floods. We'd converted eight of them.
Then, in Game 1 at home, flood gave us two of our best third-quarter plays:
- 2nd-and-7 at our 30: Vance's hard count made Tre Holloway start his rotation early, and Vance killed to flood left. Holloway jumped the flat; Harlan's sail went for 19. (That's the flood in 16.6.)
- 3rd-and-5 at the Sacramento 39: trips flood against what I'd call "Quarters with the corner locked on #1." Marcus Bell, the Mike, turned to the middle, and Harlan caught the flat and cut it back for 11 to the Sacramento 28.
So we came into Week 15 believing two things: flood beats the Sentinels, and on third-and-medium from three-by-one, it's one of our two best calls. Both were true in October. That's the trouble with true things.
The opponent's plan, as I learned it in the spring. The Sentinels' base coverage is Quarters from a two-high shell. Against three-by-one on third-and-medium, they had a version where the corner locks onto
1 man-to-man, the safety takes #2 if he goes vertical or outside deep, and the nickel or the Will drives
on anything short to the outside. In-season we called it "Quarters, corner locked." Russ told me later that they call it Lock.
The game. Week 15, at Sacramento. The Sentinels won 23–20.
What happens
Second quarter: the first one
Third-and-five at our own 41. Trips, dig and flood paired — the dig on one side, flood on the other — so Vance could read the coverage and pick. The Sentinels played Lock. The dig was matched. The flood's clear-out was locked; the sail was carried by the safety. Ruffin was in the flat, the only level open, and Vance threw it, which was the right read.
Ruffin +2. Fourth-and-three, punt.
On the headset I said what coordinators say: "They got us." I wrote "flat short" in the margin of the call sheet. I didn't change anything.
Fourth quarter: the second one
Early in the fourth quarter, down 20–13 after Sacramento's touchdown late in the third. Third-and- four at our own 33. At halftime I'd moved to Trips with Sutton alone into the boundary and the tight end as #3 — one of my three halftime changes — so the flood came from that look: Gaines clear, Powers sail, Harlan in the flat.
POST-SNAP: Trips Right Flood vs. "Quarters, corner locked" (Lock)
(Game 2, early Q4, 3rd-and-4 at the AUS 33, SAC leads 20-13)
F Royce $ Holloway
takes #2 (sail) ^
___> H sail
W M _/ (matched)
|
| C locked on
X (alone, | Z, man ^
boundary) ( * ) nickel | | Z clear
DRIVES on | |
the flat v | |
<== slide left ___> Y flat (+3, 2 yds deep)
X O O O O O Y ______/ H Z
Q R
sticks: AUS 37 -----------------------------
📊 Diagram (described): Austin is in Trips Right with Harlan as the inside receiver, Powers in the middle, Gaines outside, and Sutton alone on the left. The Sentinels play Quarters with the right corner locked man-to-man on Gaines's clear-out, the right safety, Holloway, carrying Powers's sail, and the nickel driving on the flat. Harlan releases to the flat at about two yards. The first-down line is at the Austin 37, four yards away. The only open level is the flat, and the nickel is coming downhill at it as the ball arrives.
Vance threw the flat. It was the right read again. Harlan caught it at about the 34 and was driven back to the 36 by Kenny Vo, the nickel, coming downhill.
Harlan +3. Fourth-and-one at our own 36. We punted. Sacramento added a field goal on its next possession to make it 23–13.
Monday
Marisol had the two plays on one slide.
MARISOL: Two floods, two third downs, two right reads. Combined: five yards. Both ended within a yard of the sticks. Both against the same coverage.
LYLE: We got matched.
MARISOL: You got matched twice. The first time was a fact. The second time was a trend you already had.
TEO: In Game 1 the flat beat Lock because Bell turned to the middle. In Game 2 the nickel never turned. He knew the flat was the only thing he had.
LYLE: And the flat was two yards deep on a four-yard down.
Analysis
The mechanism
Flood is a hi-lo on one defender. It works when the curl/flat defender has to choose between the sail and the flat. Against Lock, the Sentinels didn't ask anyone to choose. The deep defenders took the clear and the sail man-to-man in a zone shell, so the curl/flat defender — here the nickel — had one job: the flat. A defender with one job and a running start wins.
The distance made it worse. A flat route at two yards on third-and-four needs two yards after the catch. Against a defender who is already driving on it, that's a coin flip at best. Both floods died within a yard of the line to gain.
The Game 1 success fooled us. In Game 1, the trips flood flat went for eleven against Lock because Bell turned to the middle and opened a lane. That was a defender's mistake, not a weakness of the coverage. We banked it as evidence that flood beats Lock. It was evidence that flood beats Bell turning the wrong way.
The defense's view
🛡️ The defense's view: In the spring, Russ explained it in about two sentences over breakfast. On third-and-medium from three-by-one, his staff had seen us throw to the level nearest the sticks: the dig, or the flat when the flat could reach. So they built Lock to match everything above the sticks and let their flat player drive on everything below them. "We weren't stopping flood," he said. "We were stopping the short end of it and daring you to throw the long end into a man." He was right. And Lock is a fine example of a coordinator answering a tendency rather than a play.
My mistake
This is the mistake I make more than any other: I trusted a tendency longer than the defense let it stay true. The fourteen-of-twenty-two line was real, the Game 1 sail was real, and the trips flood cutback was real. None of it was about Lock on third-and-four, and the second-quarter punt told me so. I wrote "flat short" in the margin and called the same concept again in the fourth quarter, in a bigger moment. The whiteboard line in my office — "Never let a tendency outlive its evidence" — is in red for a reason.
What we changed
Three things went into our third-down package that winter:
- The sticks rule. On third-and-medium, the flat route's landmark is the line to gain, not two yards. Lonnie Briggs teaches it as an arrow: flat release, width first, but finishing at the sticks. It makes the flat a little slower to arrive and a lot more useful when it does.
- The answer to Lock lives in the middle. A coverage that matches #1 and #2 deep with its corner and safety is thin between the hashes. Levels, on rhythm, with Harlan's seam inside, attacks that space.
- The "two strikes" note. When a concept fails twice against the same coverage in a game, Teo flags it on the booth sheet, and I don't call it again in that game without a new piece. "Without a new piece" is the important part; a new piece is allowed.
Discussion questions
- Marisol said, "The first time was a fact. The second time was a trend you already had." What should a coordinator do in the minutes after the first failure, before the second one?
- Explain in your own words why Lock left the nickel with only one job, and why that's the opposite of what flood needs.
- The Game 1 trips flood gained eleven against Lock. Why was that a misleading piece of evidence? How would you tag a play on your self-scout to separate "the concept beat the coverage" from "a defender made a mistake"?
- Compare this case with Case Study 1. Lyle's levels failure at Portland was a concept missing a piece. Was the Game 2 flood a concept missing a piece, or a whole concept that was the wrong choice? Defend your answer.
- Russ said his staff built Lock to answer a tendency, not a play. Name one tendency in your own offense (or a team you study) that a smart coordinator could answer the same way.
Your turn
Draw a third-and-four call from Trips Right against the same Lock look that would have converted, using only concepts from this chapter. Label the defender you are putting in conflict, show where the line to gain is, and write the one-sentence read you'd give Vance. Then name the defensive adjustment that would beat your call, and the concept you'd go to after that.