Case Study 1 — The Rollins Arc: Two Screens That Worked, and the Two That Didn't

An Outlaws case across two games against the same pass rusher. It's about how a screen teaches a defense, and what happens when the play caller doesn't notice the lesson has been learned. All teams, players, and numbers are fictional.


Setup

The rusher. DeShawn Rollins, number 94, the Sacramento Sentinels' weak-side edge, is the best pass rusher Austin sees all year. His moves are speed-bend, a long-arm, and an inside spin, and he lines up across from our left tackle, Ben Achterberg, number 78. Ben is 6'6" with long arms and a quick vertical set, but his punch comes a bit late and wide, and Marisol Vega's chart says he oversets after two or more speed rushes in a series.

The plan for Week 6 (Game 1, at home). Lyle's plan against Rollins had four tools: the chip, the slide, a mix of Ben's sets, and the slip screen. The screen was the cheapest, because it doesn't ask Ben to win. It asks him to lose on purpose.

LYLE (Tuesday night, game-plan meeting): I don't want to beat Rollins. I want to use him. Every time he wins, I want him a step farther from the ball.

GUS: Ben'll hate it. He hates letting a man go.

LYLE: Tell him it's the only snap all day he can't lose.

The call. "Eleven, Gun Doubles Right, Slip Left." Harlan attached right; Sutton and Powers left; Gaines wide right; Ruffin on Vance's left. Screen-side linemen: Achterberg (kick), Moss (lead), Szabo (wall).


What happens

Game 1, second quarter: second-and-twelve at the AUS 29

The Sentinels were in Home: nickel, Quarters, four rushers. Rollins came off the edge at full speed. Coleman, the 3-technique, came hard at Pete Lorusso. Both of them won, as far as either could tell. Ben punched, opened the gate, and let Rollins go. Vance drifted three extra steps, and Rollins and Coleman both ran at him. Vance lofted the ball over them to Ruffin, who caught it two yards behind the line with three linemen in front of him and nobody inside them. Sixteen yards.

TEO (booth): Ninety-four ran all the way to the quarterback. He never looked back.

LYLE: He will. Not today, I hope.

Game 1, third quarter: second-and-ten at the AUS 40, tied 17–17

Lyle had watched Rollins run speed at Ben twice on the series. He called the slip to the same side. Ben set hard for two steps and let Rollins go; Moss and Szabo released flat to the left. Rollins kept going, still rushing when the ball left Vance's hand. When he turned around and saw two linemen in front of Ruffin, he jogged. The nose tackle, Big V, retraced about fifteen yards and arrived second. Royce came down from his deep half and made the tackle at the Sacramento 43. Seventeen yards. The drive ended in a field goal, 20–17.

Two screens, 33 yards. And something better than yards: on the tying drive in the fourth quarter, Rollins was rushing with half an eye on the back. Ben's long arms had a half-step more time. (Rollins still got one good move in, the spin on third-and-eleven at our 37 that Vance escaped by stepping left for 12 yards. Nobody stops Rollins for a whole game.)

The Monday after

TEO: Clip forty-one. Ninety-four, after the second screen. Watch him. He's jogging.

MARISOL: Their staff will see that before we do.

LYLE: They saw it in the stadium. Write it down, Teo: "Rollins vs. slip, Week 6: ran past, twice." Next time we play them, we check whether that's still true.

Teo wrote it down. It went into the "Kimbrough by situation" file, and it stayed there for nine weeks.

Game 2, second quarter: second-and-ten at the AUS 30

Same call, same look: Home, four rushers. Ben, Moss, and Szabo let Rollins, Big V, and Coleman run past. But Will linebacker Jordan Ames yelled "Screen!" the instant Moss stood up out of his set. Ames hit Moss with his hands, stayed square, and forced Ruffin to cut back inside. Rollins was standing there: he had stopped, found the back, and retreated. Two yards.

Vance came to the sideline and said one sentence: "Forty-five called it before I threw it." (Ames, number 45, is the Will. Bell, number 54, rallied from the other hook.)

Game 2, late third quarter: first-and-ten at the AUS 22, trailing 20–13

Here's the call Lyle tells this story to confess.

🎙️ On the headset (Lyle, looking back): We're down seven after their touchdown. First-and-ten at our 22. I'm thinking about Rollins: five pressures and a sack in the first half, and Ben's still struggling. I want him to slow down. And I have a note in my file that says "Rollins vs. slip: ran past, twice." It's a nine-week-old note, and the Q2 screen had already told me it was out of date. I called the slip to his side anyway.

POST-SNAP: Slip Left, Game 2, late Q3 -- the retrace -- Ruffin -1

          F                                       $
  C                W (hook: rallies)       M
        * (force: squeezes)
           [LT] [LG] [C]  released left
     R <== catch, 2 yds behind the line
       ^
        \ Rollins: turns ON the release, retraces
         \ inside-out, tackles from behind
          E <------ (did not rush past)
                  N ==>      T ==>
                         Q

📊 Diagram (described): The same slip screen to the left. Our left tackle sets and lets Rollins go, and the left guard and center release left. Ruffin catches the ball two yards behind the line. But Rollins doesn't keep rushing. He turns the moment Achterberg releases him and runs back toward the line on an inside-out angle. He reaches Ruffin from behind as the nickel squeezes from outside and the hook linebacker rallies. Ruffin loses a yard.

Ben set and let him go. Rollins turned on the release, retraced, and tackled Ruffin from behind for a loss of one. Austin finished Game 2 with four screens for nine yards.


Analysis

Why the first two worked. The mechanism was the rusher's incentive. Rollins is paid to win his rush, and in Week 6 nothing on his card told him a free path was a trap. Our sell was honest: Ben punched before he released, and Ruffin set up as a protector for a full count before he slipped. The rush ran past, and Austin had the best ratio a screen can have, three blockers against one late safety.

Why the second two didn't. Russ explained it to Lyle at the league meetings in the spring. The Sentinels' defensive line coach added one sentence to Rollins's rush card after Week 6: "Tackle lets you go → screen → turn and run." They call it the free-lunch rule. Every Sentinels call also named a screen player: in a four-man rush, the hook linebacker on the back's side. In Game 2 that was Ames. Neither change was a new defense. Both were cheap. Together they turned our slip from a play that punished Rollins into a play Rollins punished.

What the defense paid. The free-lunch rule isn't free. A rusher who turns around every time his tackle stops blocking is a rusher who rushes every pass with one eye on his blocker. In Game 2 Rollins had seven pressures and one sack on 33 rushes. That's a lot, but in the second half, after Lyle's halftime switch to chipping him with Ruffin, the pressures dropped. The screens had stopped gaining yards, but they hadn't stopped costing Rollins something.

What Lyle got wrong. Not the second-quarter call. Testing whether a defense has fixed something is a reasonable use of a second-and-ten. The mistake was the third-quarter call, made after the test came back. It's the same mistake Lyle names as his own throughout this book: trusting a tendency longer than the defense let it stay true. The note in the file was from Week 6. The evidence on the field was from forty minutes earlier. "Never let a tendency outlive its evidence" went on his whiteboard in red that spring, and this screen is one of the reasons.

What he should have called. The chapter's "their answer → our partner" table gives the options. Against a retracing rusher, throw the screen to the other side, or use the Double to move the screen player. Or skip the screen and take what the retrace gives you: a rusher with one eye on his blocker is slower to the quarterback, so a quick-game throw or a draw gets more time.

🛡️ The defense's view: From Russ's side, the Game 1 screens were a scouting report. He told Lyle the yards didn't bother him; the jogging did. The fix was cheap on purpose, a sentence instead of a scheme, so that he didn't have to give up any of his rush plan to stop a play Austin might call twice a game. "You called it twice in Week 15," Russ said over breakfast. "I'd have been happy if you'd called it six times."


Discussion Questions

  1. Lyle calls the second-quarter screen in Game 2 "a reasonable test" and the third-quarter screen "a mistake." What's the difference? Could the same call be right on one snap and wrong forty minutes later with nothing else changed?
  2. The free-lunch rule cost Rollins "a half-step of rush on every pass." How would you measure that cost on film? What would you chart?
  3. Russ said he'd have been happy if Austin had called the screen six times in Week 15. Why would a defensive coordinator want the offense to keep calling a play he has fixed?
  4. Teo's note said "Rollins vs. slip: ran past, twice." Rewrite it so that it would have warned Lyle in the third quarter of Game 2.
  5. Which of the three jobs of a screen (constraint, blitz defeat, rhythm) did the Game 1 screens do? Which did the Game 2 screens do, if any?

Your Turn

You're Teo, the Monday after Game 2. Build a one-page screen card for the Sentinels for a possible playoff meeting. Include: (1) the two defensive changes you saw (alert and retrace) with the clips that show them; (2) the screens you'd remove from the plan; (3) one screen you'd keep, with its "call it when" trigger; and (4) the partner play that punishes the retrace. Then write the one sentence you'd say to Lyle about the third-quarter call, the sentence a good quality-control coach says to his boss the day after.