Chapter 25 Exercises — Play Calling
Difficulty legend: ⭐ basic recall and explanation · ⭐⭐ applying the idea to a described situation · ⭐⭐⭐ judgment with trade-offs and no single right answer · ⭐⭐⭐⭐ extension: film study and original research.
Situations labeled "hypothetical" are practice scenarios, not games from the Outlaws' season. All teams and players are fictional composites. Selected answers appear in Appendix J.
Part A — Conceptual ⭐
A1. Define a play call in one sentence using the four parts Chapter 25 gives it. Which of the four parts do people outside the job most often forget?
A2. Lay out the 40-second timeline from 40 to the snap. Which seconds belong to the play caller, and which belong to the quarterback and the rules?
A3. What does Teo say in the quiet window, and in what order? Why is the third item the hardest one for a booth coach to get right?
A4. State the "ten-word rule." What problem does it solve, and when did the Outlaws learn they needed it?
A5. Why is our call sheet sorted first by down, distance, and field zone, and only then by coverage?
A6. State the threshold concept of this chapter in your own words. Then give the "before" and "after" understanding in one sentence each.
A7. What is resulting? Give an example from any sport, not football.
A8. Name the four boxes of the process-and-outcome grid. Which box is the most dangerous for a staff that grades only by results, and why?
A9. What are the three letters in Lyle's result column? What does each one tell him to fix, and when?
A10. Who owns fourth downs and timeouts on the Outlaws' staff? Explain why the play caller still needs to know the fourth-down decision before he calls third down.
Part B — Film & Diagram Recognition ⭐⭐
B1. On film you see this sequence on a 3rd-and-8: the huddle breaks at 16 on the play clock; two linebackers walk into the A-gaps at 11; an edge player walks across the formation at 9; the quarterback points at a linebacker, then taps the running back and sends him to the edge; snap at 2. Name the moment where the offense's rules decided the play, and explain why the coordinator couldn't have intervened.
Short answer
The rules decided it at about 9 seconds, when the edge player walked and the quarterback moved the back to him. That was a rule ("a late walk-up moves the back"), applied correctly, and it changed who was blocking the A-gaps after the radio had cut out at 15. The coordinator's last chance to speak was before the huddle broke. Everything after that was the rule sheet. If the moved back leaves a mugged linebacker free, the sack belongs mostly to the rule, not to the call or to the quarterback.
B2. Read the diagram and describe what the offense's protection is doing.
POST-SNAP (hypothetical): five rush, two drop
E N W M C ==>
X X X X X
LT LG R C RG (helps) RT (widened)
Z (hitch at 6)
Q ..................................>
📊 Diagram (described): Five defenders rush: the left edge, the nose, two inside linebackers, and a corner off the right edge. The left tackle and left guard block the edge and the nose. The running back blocks the left inside linebacker, the center blocks the right inside linebacker, and the right tackle widens to the corner. The right guard has no rusher and helps inside. The quarterback throws quickly to the flanker, who has stopped at six yards.
(a) Which protection rule from Chapter 25 is this? (b) Which receiver adjusted his route, and why? (c) If the corner had stayed home and the nickel had blitzed from the slot instead, who would be free and where should the ball go?
Short answer
(a) The Outlaws' playoff mug rule: center on the Mike, back on the other A-gap linebacker, right tackle widens to the corner, and a guard whose man drops helps inside. (b) The flanker (Gaines in the Outlaws' version). His corner blitzed, so he sight-adjusted to a six-yard hitch and got his eyes to the quarterback immediately. (c) The right tackle has widened to a corner who isn't coming, so the nickel blitzing from the slot is the free man unless the right tackle's rule is "widen to the widest threat." The ball goes hot to the area the nickel left: the slot receiver's quick slant or quick out under the vacated spot.
B3. A defense shows two high safeties and a quiet front on third-and-9. At the snap, the strong safety rotates down and the free safety spins from the hash to the deep middle. The quarterback throws a post at 2.4 seconds. Name the coverage after the rotation, the defender who intercepts in the most likely version of this play, and the throw the post-snap read should have produced instead.
Short answer
After the rotation it's single-high, a Cover 3 or a three-deep pressure shell, with the middle of the field closed. The free safety spinning to the deep middle is the likeliest interceptor of a post thrown on the pre-snap read. The post-snap read should send the ball to the dig (now in front of the spinning safety and behind the rotated-down safety) or to the flat or checkdown. "Middle closes → dig or flat, never the post" is the line the Outlaws added as the middle-read tag.
B4. You're watching an All-22 clip of a 3rd-and-6. Before the snap: two-high, nickel defense, the nickel aligned inside the slot at five yards with his eyes on the quarterback. At the snap the nickel rushes. The slot receiver runs a quick slant into the space the nickel left and catches it at 1.0 seconds for 14 yards. Which Outlaws rule describes the throw? Was this a sight adjustment or a hot throw?
B5. On a broadcast, a team runs inside zone right three times from the same formation for +5, +7, and +2. On the fourth snap, from the same look, the quarterback fakes the handoff and throws a post behind the safety who has been filling the alley. Identify (a) the investment calls, (b) the "receipts," and (c) the call where the investment paid off.
B6. A coordinator's call sheet has a box labeled "3rd LONG — QUIET / MUG." Describe what each half of the box is for and why a mug can't be answered by a single "play" in that box.
Part C — Make the Call / Draw It Up ⭐⭐–⭐⭐⭐
C1. Make the call (hypothetical). Next season, home against Sacramento. Q3, 9:10 left, Outlaws lead 17–14. 3rd-and-3 at the Sacramento 37. Eleven personnel on the field; Sacramento in nickel. Teo's page: on 3rd-and-1–3, one-high man with the field corner pressed on most snaps; zero only on 1–2. Wade's fourth-down chart says go on fourth-and-2 or less from here. Make the call and write it out of ten against the two likeliest defenses. Then say how Wade's fourth-down rule changes the value of a two-yard gain.
Short answer
A strong answer gets the quick game a free release against press: for example, zoom motion by the Z into a quick out, or a stack release with a slant and a quick out. Against one-high man with a pressed field corner, motion starts the receiver on the move and makes press harder. Against zero, the zero bin is on Blue. Out of ten: roughly 6–7 conversions against man with a free release. Because Wade will go on fourth-and-2 or less, a two-yard gain on third down leaves a fourth-and-1 he'll go for. A "failure" that gains two yards is worth much more here than in a punt situation. That makes a high-floor call (a run or a quick throw that almost always gains two) more attractive than a low-floor shot.
C2. Draw it up. Draw "Eleven, Gun Doubles Left, Y Off, 60 Right, Mills" against (a) a quiet front with two-high Quarters and (b) a double-A mug with a corner fire zone (five rushers: the left edge, the nose, both mugged linebackers, the field corner; the walked-out end and the 3-technique drop). Label the slide, the back's assignment, the right tackle's rule, every route with a depth, and the throw in each picture.
Short answer
(a) Quarters: Sutton go, Harlan flat, Powers dig at 12, Gaines post at about 12, Ruffin in. The center, right guard, and right tackle slide right; the left tackle and left guard are on the man side; Ruffin is on the left. The read is the field safety: dig if he stays on the post, post if he jumps the dig. (b) The mug: center on the Mike, Ruffin on the other A-gap linebacker, right tackle widens to the corner, right guard helps when the 3-technique drops. Gaines sight-adjusts to a six-yard hitch when his corner blitzes; the ball is out at about 1.1 seconds.
C3. Make the call (hypothetical). A home game next season against Birmingham's blitz-heavy Cover 1 and Cover 0 defense. Q2, 4:30 left, tied 10–10. 3rd-and-8 at your own 44. Teo's one thing: "Banks has been in the A-gap on every third down." Your Blue panel holds a zero bin (two hot throws and the 80 Max deep over) and the third-long box holds Shallow and Mesh. Give your call, what it bets on, and its answer if the Forge walk zero inside 10 seconds.
Short answer
One defensible answer: Shallow from 2x2 with 60 protection and Ruffin's eyes on Banks, betting on Cover 1. Banks in the A-gap on every third down is a man-coverage linebacker who's either rushing or spying, and the shallow cross runs away from him. If the Forge walk zero inside 10 seconds, Vance doesn't need permission: he goes to the zero bin on the Blue panel. The first two calls there are hot throws (for example, Slants), and the ball comes out at about a second. The call sheet's job is to make sure the zero answer exists before the play clock gets to 10. The play caller's job is to make sure the quarterback knows it's his.
C4. Make the call (hypothetical). Trailing 20–17 with 3:50 left in the fourth quarter, you have 3rd-and-6 at the opponent's 41. Your kicker's range line is the opponent's 35. Your head coach will go for it on fourth-and-3 or less here and kick at fourth-and-4 or more only if inside the 35. Explain how this fourth-down rule turns a five-yard gain into a near-success, and choose a call that maximizes the chance of gaining at least six or at least three.
Short answer
With the head coach going on fourth-and-3 or less, the outcome "gain three to five" becomes a manageable fourth down instead of a punt or a long field goal. With the range line at the opponent's 35, a six-yard gain from the 41 also puts your kicker in range even if the next play fails. So you want a call with a high floor of three or more yards and a real chance at six or more: a stick or snag concept with a flat (the flat gets three almost every time; the stick gets six against zone), or a quick-game call with run-after-catch room. A deep shot with a low floor is the wrong shape, because it turns a likely partial gain into a punt.
C5. Draw it up: the 40 seconds. Write the full 40-second script for one of your own third-and-long calls, second by second: what the booth says, when the call goes in, how many words it is (or its band number), when the huddle breaks, what the quarterback says at the line, and which rule handles a late walk-up.
C6. Make the call (hypothetical). First quarter, 0–0, against a defense you've never faced. Your script has eight calls left. On the first third down of the game, 3rd-and-5 at your own 35, you get an unscouted look: three linebackers stacked behind a five-man front, with one safety deep. Write the call you'd make and the question it asks the defense. Then write what your next third-down call will be if the answer is "man" and if it's "zone."
Short answer
A strong answer is a "both"-style call: a concept with a zone beater on one side and a man beater on the other, with motion before the snap to ask whether anyone travels. For example, motion the Z across; if a defender runs with him, it's man, and the ball goes to the man-beater side (a rub or a slant against a trailing defender); if the defense slides, it's zone, and the ball goes to the zone side (a stick or curl-flat). The question is "man or zone on third-and-medium?" If the answer is man, the next third-down call is a stack or bunch release. If it's zone, it's a concept that puts the hook defender in conflict. Either way, the call is an investment whose payoff is the next third down.
Part D — Judgment & Trade-offs ⭐⭐⭐
D1. Chapter 25 ranks four third-and-7 calls out of ten. Call B (80 Max) carries less sack risk than Call D, which has the highest of the four, yet the chapter prefers D. Write a one-paragraph argument for Call B that an honest staff member could make, and identify the single piece of information that would make B the right call.
Short answer
An honest case for B: the protection rule had never been on the field in a game, and a new rule's first live rep in a playoff is exactly where it can fail. Two receivers and eight blockers make a sack very unlikely, and a punt from the 41 keeps a 10–7 game a one-score game with most of the half to play. The information that would make B right: evidence that the defense had a pressure built to beat the new mug rule (both mugged linebackers dropping, edge rushers coming free). If you believed Russ had that answer ready, the fat tail on Call D becomes the likeliest outcome, and safety wins.
D2. Your analytics director's model says go for it on a fourth-and-1 at your own 36 in the fourth quarter. Your head coach punts. The opponent drives for a field goal. On Monday, how do you raise the disagreement without resulting? Write the three sentences you'd say in his office.
D3. A young quarterback has thrown two interceptions in a half. Your call sheet's third-down boxes are full of reads that ask him to throw between zones. Is it tilt to simplify the second half, or good process? Describe the evidence that would tell you which.
D4. Booth or sideline? You're a first-year coordinator with a veteran quarterback and a young offensive line. Choose where you'll call from and defend it with two things you gain and one you'll have to replace with a staff member.
D5. Marisol tags Lyle's "gut" calls (the ones made against the sheet's first choice) and finds they succeed at about the same rate as the sheet's calls, on a small sample. What should Lyle do with that finding? Is "about the same" good news or bad news for a play caller?
Short answer
Mostly good news, read carefully. It says Lyle's gut isn't costing the offense anything, so the art adds unpredictability (the defense can't chart the sheet's first choice) without lowering success. It also says the gut isn't a superpower, so it shouldn't overrule a strong numbers case on a high-stakes snap. Given the small sample, the right move is to keep tagging and to treat "gut" as one input with a modest weight, not to stop using it or start trusting it more.
Part M — Mixed / Interleaved ⭐⭐–⭐⭐⭐
M1. (Chapters 22 and 25) In Week 15 Austin had six blockers and one hot throw; two blockers blocked air and the hot was covered. Restate the sack as protection arithmetic (Chapter 22), then explain why Chapter 25 says most of the failure belongs to the rule sheet rather than to the call.
M2. (Chapters 24 and 25) Chapter 24's contingency table had a blank row: "rotate out of two-high on 3rd-and-7+ from a quiet front." Translate that blank row into Chapter 25's language: what probability did it assign to the rotation, and what does that do to the out-of-ten estimates for Mills?
M3. (Chapters 8 and 25) The Anchor C call was nine words. Write two alternative calls for the same situation, one that would have broken the ten-word rule and one that uses a band number. What is lost and gained with each?
M4. (Chapters 19 and 25) Explain the "two receipts" rule as an investment problem: what is the cost of cashing a play-action after one receipt, and what is the cost of waiting for a third?
M5. (Chapters 7 and 25) "The shell is not the coverage." Explain how that Chapter 7 rule becomes a play-calling problem when the call goes in before the defense aligns. Use the Mills interception as your example.
M6. (Chapters 23 and 25) Teo's divisional page said "Mug: Can't call it." Explain why that row was honest scouting (Chapter 23) and how the play caller turned an unpredictable tendency into a predictable answer (Chapter 25).
Part E — Research & Film Study ⭐⭐⭐⭐
E1. The third-down clock study. Choose one NFL game with All-22 available. For every third down, record: the play clock when the huddle broke (or the offense reached the line), the play clock at the snap, any defensive walk-up after 15 seconds, and the result. Look for a pattern: do late defensive changes after the radio cutoff produce more sacks or incompletions than early ones? Write a one-page report with a table and a caution about sample size.
E2. Grading a coordinator by process. Pick one real offensive coordinator and one game. Chart all of that offense's third downs. For each, write what a reasonable caller would have known at the moment of the call (down, distance, field, score, time, personnel on both sides), the defense you think was most likely, and the call. Assign a process grade before you watch the result, then assign the result grade. Report how often the two grades disagreed and what that suggests about how broadcasts judge play callers.
E3. Fourth-down owner study. Using public play-by-play (the nflverse community's data is a common starting point) and one season of a team's games, find every fourth-and-1 to fourth-and-3 between the offense's own 30 and the opponent's 40. Compare what the team did with what a published fourth-down model recommended. You can't know who made each decision, but you can ask: does the gap between the model and the team change after the team's offense fails on third down? Describe what you'd need to know to call that "tilt."