Case Study 1 — Seventy-Eight and Ninety-Four: One Matchup, Three Games
A season-long weakest-link study. The Outlaws, Sentinels, and every player and number here are the book's fictional composites.
Setup
Every offense has one matchup it thinks about on the drive home. Ours, for three games against Sacramento, was number 78 against number 94: our left tackle, Ben Achterberg, against the Sentinels' weak-side edge, DeShawn Rollins.
Achterberg (LT, #78). Six-foot-6, long arms, a quick vertical set — on most snaps the best pass protector on our line. Two known flaws. His punch is a little late and a little wide, so a rusher with a good long-arm can get to his chest plate first. And he oversets: after two or more speed rushes in a series, he starts kicking too far outside, opening the inside.
Rollins (weak-side edge, #94). The Sentinels' premier rusher. Three moves that matter: a speed-bend around the corner, a long-arm (one arm locked into the blocker's chest, driving him back), and an inside spin, the counter he saves for a tackle who has started to overset.
What our own charting said. Teo's chart on Achterberg covered a five-game stretch — four games before Week 6, plus Game 1: 151 pass-protection snaps, 104 vertical sets, 11 pressures allowed, and 21 oversets. Sixteen of the 21 oversets came after Achterberg had already seen two or more speed rushes in the same series. One more line on Teo's sheet: on third-and-7 or longer, Achterberg's first kick was about a yard deeper than on other downs.
Gus Ferrante: "That's not a flaw, that's a habit. Flaws you fix in a week. Habits you fix in a season."
Marisol Vega: "And their staff has this chart too. Assume they do. Our own numbers are their scouting report."
She was right. Russ Kimbrough's staff had charted the same snaps.
What Happens
Game 1 (Week 6, home, W 34–27): The matchup we won by not playing it
Rollins rushed 31 times in Game 1 and got two pressures and no sacks. That sounds like Achterberg won. He mostly didn't have to.
Our plan was to turn Rollins's speed against him. Twice we ran our running back screen, and twice the linemen on Rollins's side let him go on purpose — a screen asks the line to "sell" pass protection for a count and then release the rusher upfield while the back slips out behind him. In the second quarter, on 2nd-and-12 at our 29, Rollins and Coleman ran right past the screen and Ruffin went for 16. In the third, on 2nd-and-10 at our 40, we ran it to Rollins's side again; Achterberg let him go, Rollins kept going, and Ruffin went 17 yards to the Sacramento 43.
A rusher who has been run past two screens rushes the next pass a half-step more carefully. That half-step is worth more to a left tackle than any technique coaching.
Then, on the tying drive in the fourth quarter — 3rd-and-11 at our 37, down 27–20, a four-man rush from Quarters — the habit showed up. Rollins had run speed at Achterberg twice in the series. On the third rush, Achterberg kicked deep and wide, Rollins planted and spun inside, and the pocket collapsed from the left. Darius Vance saw it, stepped left through the space Rollins had left, and ran 12 yards for a first down. The drive tied the game.
Gus, on Monday: "Darius bailed us out. That's a sack against anybody else's quarterback."
Game 2 (Week 15, at Sacramento, L 20–23): The matchup we lost, then fixed
In the first half of Game 2, Rollins rushed 17 times and got five pressures and a sack. The sack came on 3rd-and-9 at our own 31 in the second quarter: a four-man rush, our half-slide going right, Ruffin aligned on Vance's right — the far side from Rollins. Two speed steps, Achterberg's deep kick, the spin back inside. Minus 8. Punt.
My halftime sheet said three things, and the second one was "94 is beating our left tackle." My three halftime changes included chipping Rollins with Ruffin.
PRE-SNAP: the chip (left side only), 11 personnel, gun
E (Rollins, wide)
N W
Y LT LG C
R Q
📊 Diagram (described): On the left side of the formation, Rollins is aligned wide outside the left tackle. Harlan, the tight end, is flexed out to the left. Ruffin is in the shotgun on Vance's left — on Rollins's side — instead of on the far side.
POST-SNAP: Ruffin chips Rollins on his way to the flat
flat route
E <------------.
\ |
\ <=== R chips him here |
\ (one shot, then out) ---'
v
Y LT <- sets SHORTER (angle set),
protects the inside first
Q
📊 Diagram (described): At the snap Rollins starts his speed rush around the left tackle. Ruffin steps toward him and hits him once with his shoulder and hands — not a full block — knocking him off his path, then releases into the left flat as a checkdown. Because the back has the outside for that first moment, Achterberg can take a shorter angle set and guard the inside, which takes away the spin.
Ruffin's first chip came on the opening drive of the third quarter, 2nd-and-6 at the Sacramento 45. The pass fell incomplete, but Rollins never got near Vance. Over the full game, Rollins finished with 33 rushes, 7 pressures, and 1 sack — which means that in the second half he rushed 16 times for 2 pressures and no sacks. The chip worked.
But the chip came with prices.
The first price was the back. A back who chips arrives in his route a beat late, so our checkdowns came out a beat late. The second price was a penalty: in the fourth quarter Achterberg was called for holding on Rollins, on a snap without the chip. The third price we didn't see until the spring: the Sentinels' halftime plan included making their double-A mug pressure live on third-and-long when our slide went toward Rollins. Our help for Achterberg became information. On 3rd-and-7 at our 38 with 6:51 left in the third quarter, the slide went his way, the back went to the crowd, and Marcus Bell came free for the sack you read about in this chapter's hook. Rollins, that snap, was blocked perfectly by Achterberg.
One more Game 2 detail: late in the third quarter we ran the back screen to Rollins's side again. This time he stopped, turned, retraced, and tackled Ruffin for a one-yard loss. Rollins had learned too.
Game 3 (divisional playoff, at Sacramento, L 17–20): The matchup that doesn't go away
First quarter, 3rd-and-3 at the Sacramento 38. Our call: a slant to Gaines against a pressed corner. The quick game is supposed to be out in 1.0 to 1.3 seconds; that's its whole contract with the line — "hold for one second, and we'll do the rest." But the corner won at the line and the slant wasn't there, and Vance held it. At about 2.9 seconds, Rollins got home. Sack, minus 7, punt.
It would be easy to put that one on Achterberg. Gus didn't.
Gus: "The play told Ben to block for one second. He blocked for almost three. You want to grade him? Grade him on the one second we promised."
Analysis
1. The weakest link isn't always the worst player. Achterberg is a good left tackle. He was our weakest matchup because the defense put its best rusher on him and knew his habit. A protection is as good as its most exploitable matchup, and the defense gets to choose which one that is.
2. Every answer to a rusher is a trade. Screens punished Rollins's speed in Game 1 — and taught him to retrace by Game 2. The chip took him out of the game in the second half of Game 2 — and cost us the back's route timing and a predictable protection tendency that Russ turned into a sack. A slide toward him protected Achterberg perfectly on the mug snap — and left the Mike free. None of these was wrong. Each one changed what the defense could see.
3. Tendencies are information for both sides. The overset-after-two-speed-rushes habit was on our chart and theirs. The best answer is not to hide it (you can't hide film) but to break it on purpose: mix in angle and quick sets on downs where a vertical set is expected, so the third speed rush meets a tackle who isn't where Rollins expects him.
4. Grade protection against the play's promise. A quick-game play promises the line it will need to block for about a second. A shot play may need three. When a sack comes at 2.9 seconds on a play built for 1.3, the protection didn't fail; the play did. Separating those two is the difference between a coach who fixes things and one who yells at tackles.
Discussion Questions
- Rank the four tools we used against Rollins — screens, the chip, the slide, the set mix — by how much information each one gave the defense. Which would you use first next season, and why?
- Gus says habits take a season to fix. What could a line coach do during a game week to reduce Achterberg's overset tendency without changing his technique?
- Rollins learned to retrace on the screen between Week 6 and Week 15. What does that tell you about how long any "answer" lasts against a good defense, and how should that change the way you sequence screens across a season?
- Was the Game 3 sack (3rd-and-3, about 2.9 seconds) the left tackle's fault, the receiver's, the quarterback's, or the play caller's? Defend a split of the blame.
- If your opponent's best rusher is on your right tackle instead, how does the "blind side" change the urgency of the plan for a right-handed quarterback?
Your Turn
You coordinate a team whose left tackle has given up 9 pressures in his last two games to speed rushers, and next week you face a team whose best rusher plays on your left. Write a half-page matchup plan with: (1) the protection tendency you'll show on early downs and the one you'll break on third down; (2) when you'll chip and when you won't; (3) one screen and one quick-game call that use the rusher's aggression; and (4) a one-sentence note for your line coach on how to grade the tackle — by what each play promised.