Chapter 25 Quiz — Play Calling
20 questions. Answers and explanations are inside each Answer fold. The Outlaws, Sentinels, and
their players are fictional composites.
Multiple Choice
1. On a normal snap, in which window of the play clock does the Outlaws' play caller choose and send the call?
- A. 40–34
- B. 34–20
- C. 20–15
- D. 15–5
Answer
B. The result and Teo's booth read come in from 40 to 34; the call is chosen from 34 to 28 and goes into the quarterback's helmet from 28 to 20. The huddle breaks around 15, when the radio cuts out, and from 15 to the snap the rules take over.
2. What does the booth coach say in the "quiet window," in order?
- A. Coverage, blitz, call
- B. Shell, box, one thing
- C. Down, distance, field position
- D. Personnel, formation, motion
Answer
B. Shell (what the safeties showed), box (how many defenders were near the ball), and one thing (the single most useful fact for the next call). Nobody else speaks on the play caller's headset between the whistle and the call.
3. Why does a play caller usually call the play without knowing the defense's front and coverage?
- A. NFL rules forbid the offense from seeing the defense before the snap.
- B. The defense usually aligns and declares after the offense's call has gone in.
- C. Booth coaches aren't allowed to report coverage.
- D. Coverage doesn't matter on third down.
Answer
B. The offense's call goes in around 28–20 seconds on the play clock, typically before the defense has aligned, and the pre-snap shell may be a disguise anyway. That's why calls have to be good against the defenses you might get.
4. In the Week 15 sack, what was the decisive event that happened after the radio cut out?
- A. Vance changed the play to a different concept.
- B. Weller walked out to the boundary, and the rule moved Ruffin off the Mike to the walker.
- C. The center snapped the ball early.
- D. Gaines ran the wrong route.
Answer
B. At about ten seconds Weller walked across to the boundary. The old rule told Vance to move the back to a late walk-up, which left Bell, the Mike, free. Coleman dropped into the hot window, so the hot throw was covered too.
5. In the divisional game's 3rd-and-7 at the Austin 41, which protection assignment was not part of the mug rule?
- A. Center on the Mike
- B. Running back on the other A-gap linebacker
- C. Right tackle widens to the corner
- D. Running back moves to any late walk-up
Answer
D. That was the old rule, the one that failed in Week 15. Under the new rule, a late walk-up was an extra, not a reassignment: no blocker moved. The quick answer lived in the route instead. When the corner, Simmons, blitzed, Gaines sight-adjusted to a six-yard hitch in the space behind him.
6. Which statement best expresses the chapter's threshold concept?
- A. A good call is one that gains yards.
- B. A play call is a bet on a distribution; judge it by the decision process, not the single result.
- C. Analytics should decide every call.
- D. Feel is more reliable than data.
Answer
B. One snap is one draw from a range of outcomes. A good call is one whose range, given what the caller knew, was better than the alternatives.
7. In the process-and-outcome grid, a call with bad process and a good result is called:
- A. Earned
- B. Bad beat
- C. Dumb luck
- D. Earned, unfortunately
Answer
C. Dumb luck: the decision was poor, but the draw went your way. It's the most dangerous box, because a results-only staff will put that call back on next week's sheet.
8. Why did Lyle call Call D (the Week 15 formation with the mug rule) instead of Call A (the same concept from the usual Mills look)?
- A. Call D was faster to signal.
- B. He believed showing the Week 15 picture made the mug more likely, and the mug against his rehearsed protection was his best third-and-7 that day.
- C. Call A was not on the call sheet.
- D. Wade ordered it.
Answer
B. The two calls are about equal against a quiet front. D wins only on the mug branch, where the protection holds and Gaines's hitch is nearly free because his defender is rushing. Lyle accepted a slightly fatter sack tail for a slightly higher conversion rate.
9. "Tilt" in play calling means:
- A. Leaning the formation toward the field
- B. Making decisions because of what just happened rather than what's about to happen
- C. Running to the side of the tilted nose tackle
- D. Changing protection after the radio cuts out
Answer
B. Revenge calls, panic shots, abandoning the run, and freezing after an interception are all forms of tilt.
10. On the Outlaws' staff, who owns fourth-down decisions?
- A. Lyle Petrakis, the offensive coordinator
- B. Marisol Vega, the analytics director
- C. Wade Harmon, the head coach, with input from Marisol and Lyle
- D. Darius Vance, the quarterback
Answer
C. Wade owns fourth downs and timeouts. Lyle states a preference once on the headset and argues, if he needs to, on Monday.
11. Which is the best reason to keep two calls ready before the ball is spotted?
- A. It confuses the defense's signal-stealers.
- B. It moves the choice out of the seconds needed to get the call in, so the snap isn't rushed.
- C. NFL rules require two calls.
- D. It lets the quarterback pick either one.
Answer
B. The spot only tells you which of the two to use. Deciding at the spot eats the time the call needs to travel and the time the quarterback needs to apply the rules.
True / False (with a one-line justification)
12. The radio to the quarterback's helmet cuts off when the play clock reaches 15 seconds.
Answer
True. That's why everything after about 15 must be handled by rules installed before the game.
13. If a call converts, the call was good.
Answer
False. A conversion is one result. The call is judged by the information and alternatives the caller had; a bad call can convert because the defense busted.
14. On the Outlaws' staff, the analytics director's fourth-down chart decides fourth downs.
Answer
False. The chart is an input. Wade, the head coach, decides.
15. A tendency is dangerous only if the defense knows it, it's strong enough to bet on, and the defense has a call that punishes it.
Answer
True. All three conditions are necessary; check them before spending a good call to break a habit.
16. Calling from the booth gives a coordinator a better view of the safeties but a worse view of his quarterback's demeanor.
Answer
True. That's the trade. Sideline callers like Lyle replace the booth's view with a booth coach (Teo) and the quiet window.
Short Answer
17. Name two things a play caller learns from the Outlaws' one-letter result marks at halftime.
Answer
Any two: three or more C marks mean his model of the defense is wrong; two R marks mean a rule needs changing immediately; X marks tell him which position rooms have execution work. The marks also keep him from re-arguing a failed call during the next call's forty seconds.
18. Explain in two sentences why the same concept, Mills, converted at 11:30 of the third quarter and was intercepted at 2:41 of the fourth.
Answer
At 11:30 the defense chose the mug branch, which Austin had rehearsed all week, and the protection and sight-adjust turned it into a ten-yard hitch. At 2:41 it chose a rotation from two-high that the plan had never practiced, and the quarterback threw the post he'd read before the snap into the middle that closed after it. The routes were the same; the distribution under them had changed.
19. Why does a sideline play caller want the head coach's fourth-down decision before third down?
Answer
Because it decides what a third-down failure costs. If the head coach will go on fourth-and-short, a call that reliably gains most of the distance is worth much more than in a punt situation.
Applied Scenario
20. A coordinator, down 20–7 in the third quarter against a two-high defense, calls a reverse (−2), a seven-step double move (sack), and a draw on 3rd-and-20 (punt). After a dig gains 14 on his next drive, he calls a flea-flicker (sack). On 3rd-and-6 near midfield, his slot runs a choice route, breaks inside, and a safety dropping into the middle intercepts it. Diagnose the failure. Name at least two tilt patterns, the defensive structure that the earlier calls made safe, and where in the process-and-outcome grid the final call belongs.
Answer
Tilt patterns: the panic shot (a deep drop after a failed gadget; a gadget right after the first success), abandonment (no early-down runs), and arguably revenge (a second gadget against a deep defense). The earlier calls let the defense keep two safeties deep without an eighth man in the box, sit in zones while the rush worked against deep drops, and spare a robber on third down to jump inside breaks. The final call by itself is borderline: a choice route has no answer to a robber the defense had shown most of the day. It belongs in "bad process, bad result," and the larger process failure is the seven calls that built the defense's third-down advantage.
Scoring Guide
| Score | What it means |
|---|---|
| 18–20 | You've crossed the threshold. You grade calls by process without being reminded. Move on to Chapter 26. |
| 14–17 | Solid. Reread 25.5 (the out-of-ten table and the grid) and redo questions you missed out loud. |
| 10–13 | You know the routine but still lean on results. Do Part D of the exercises before moving on. |
| Below 10 | Reread 25.2 through 25.5, then retake the quiz in two days without looking back. |
Scoring: 1 point per question. For short answers, award the point if the core idea is present.