Case Study 1 — Fifty-Two Yards: The Zero Bin Against Sacramento
An Outlaws case that worked, told from Austin's sideline. The Outlaws, the Sentinels, and every player, snap, and number here are fictional.
Setup
The game. Week 6, at home against the Sacramento Sentinels, the division leaders and the best defense we'd play all year. Their coordinator, Russ Kimbrough, plays coverage first and pressure on purpose: two high safeties before the snap, a lot of rotation after it, and blitzes saved mostly for third-and-long.
The situation. We'd tied it 27–27 on a 75-yard drive that ended with 7:31 left. The Sentinels went three-and-out. We got the ball back at our own 30 with about 5:48 to play.
What the scouting said. Teo Arriaga's "Kimbrough by situation" page didn't have a single snap of Sacramento Cover 0 on third-and-long against us. Their zero pressures lived in short yardage and near the goal line. Marisol Vega had a different number on her slide, the one every defensive coordinator in the league had on his: in our first four games, Darius Vance was 28 of 36 against five or more rushers, for 9.4 yards an attempt, with four touchdowns and no interceptions. Coordinators who'd seen that number tended not to blitz us. We were betting Russ was one of them.
The zero bin. We build it every week regardless. On Thursday, after the third-down period, Teo puts three or four plays in the top-left box of the Blue panel on Vance's wristband: the plays he can go to on his own the instant he sees Cover 0, because defenses usually show it after the radio has cut off. That week:
| Order | Play | When it's right |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Hot throw: slants | More rushers than blockers; ball out at ~1.1 s |
| 2 | Hot throw: quick option by Powers | Same, against a defender playing off or outside |
| 3 | Deep over to Gaines | Every rusher has a blocker; the corner on Gaines has no help in the middle |
The deep over sat third because we didn't think Russ would call zero on a third-and-long. We'd repped it four times on Thursday. All four were completions against the scout team, which proves nothing except that Gaines knew where to go.
Personnel. Eleven personnel: Vance at quarterback, Jalen Ruffin at running back, Brooks Harlan at tight end, Trey Gaines (Z), Devonte Sutton (X), Mekhi Powers (H). Five linemen: Ben Achterberg, Kendrick Moss, Aaron Szabo, Pete Lorusso, Darnell Fitch.
What happens
1st-and-10 at our 30. Ruffin, inside, sixteen yards. Our sideline gets loud; I don't. A sixteen-yard run with five minutes left means Russ's next call will be careful.
1st-and-10 at our 46. A dig to Powers behind the nickel, Kenny Vo. It hits Powers in both hands and falls out, because he turned his head to find Vo before he had the ball tucked. Rome Pettaway, our quarterbacks coach, said nothing on the headset. Cal Boateng, the receivers coach, said one word I won't print.
2nd-and-10 at our 46. Ruffin, two yards.
3rd-and-8 at our 48. 4:12 left. 27–27.
Eleven personnel, two by two. The ball was on the left hash, which made the left side the boundary (the short side of the field). Gaines was wide to the boundary with Harlan attached on that side. Sutton and Powers were to the field. Ruffin was offset to Vance's right.
The Sentinels walked both linebackers, Marcus Bell and Jordan Ames, into the A gaps beside our center. Both safeties came down: Ike Royce to about six yards over Harlan, Tre Holloway to about eight in the middle, over Ruffin. Nobody was deep. Brennan, their second-year boundary corner, was off Gaines.
Up in the booth, Teo said it before I could: "That's zero."
PROTECTION (Game 1, Q4, 4:12, 3rd-and-8 at the AUS 48)
Six possible rushers, six blockers. "Fifty-four's the Mike!"
$ (Royce) $ (Holloway, over R)
C (Brennan) W M <- Ames, Bell (A gaps)
E T N T E
Z Y LT LG C RG RT H X
Q R
LT: Rollins (E) LG + C: Big V (N) and Ames (W)
RG: Coleman (T) RT: Weller (E) R: Bell (M)
📊 Diagram (described): The protection picture before the snap. Gaines is wide left with Brennan off him, Harlan is attached on the left, Powers and Sutton are to the right. Both Sentinels linebackers stand in the A gaps beside the center; four linemen are down. Royce is six yards over Harlan and Holloway eight yards over Ruffin. The assignments: the left tackle on Rollins, the left guard and center on the nose and Ames, the right guard on Coleman, the right tackle on Weller, and Ruffin on Bell, the linebacker Vance identifies as the Mike. Six rushers, six blockers.
Vance looked at the two linebackers, pointed at Bell, and yelled, "Fifty-four's the Mike!" He said something short to Szabo. Ruffin stayed beside him. Whatever else happened in the next three seconds, the count was settled: if all six came, all six had a name.
The snap.
All six came. Ruffin stepped up into the right A gap and met Bell head-on. Holloway, the safety over Ruffin, saw his man block and settled into the low hole at about ten yards, eyes up, hunting a crosser.
Harlan gave him one. He released inside and ran a shallow cross at about six yards, from left to right, with Royce trailing. Holloway's eyes went to him.
Sutton and Powers ran straight up the field on the right. Simmons and Vo had to run with them, because in man coverage you go where your receiver goes. The whole field side emptied.
Gaines pushed straight up the field at Brennan's outside shoulder like a man running a go route. With no safety behind him, Brennan had to protect the deep ball; he opened his hips toward the sideline. At about fourteen yards, Gaines broke across his face and climbed away from him toward the right side of the field, rising to about twenty yards.
Rashad Coleman got off Lorusso's block late and hit Vance as he threw. The ball was already gone. Gaines caught it in stride at the Sacramento 32 near the right hash, a step and a half clear of Brennan, with nobody between him and the goal line.
Fifty-two yards. Touchdown. 34–27.
The Sentinels got the ball back with a little over four minutes left and didn't score.
On the headset, after the extra point, Teo said one thing: "Third on the list."
Analysis
Why it worked — the mechanism. Against Cover 0, everyone is covered, so you're not throwing to the open man. You're throwing to the man who is going to get open, and using the other four to make sure nobody can help when he does. Every route had a job:
| Player | Route | Job | What his defender did |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sutton | Go | Clear the field side | Simmons ran with him |
| Powers | Seam | Clear the field side | Vo ran with him |
| Harlan | Shallow (hold route) | Give the lurker a crosser to hunt | Royce trailed; Holloway watched |
| Gaines | Deep over | The target | Brennan protected deep, then trailed |
| Ruffin | Block the Mike | Make six against six | Picked up Bell |
The routes that weren't thrown decided the play as much as the one that was. In zone, a clear-out may not clear anyone, because the zone defender can let him go. In man, the clear-out takes his defender with him by rule.
Why it was third on the list. Most zero pressures bring one more rusher than six blockers can handle, so the first two zero-bin plays are hot throws that beat the free rusher with time. The deep over is the answer only when the count says every rusher has a blocker. When Vance saw a safety over Ruffin at eight yards, he knew that safety was either covering Ruffin or sitting underneath. Either way he wasn't rushing fast enough to matter, and he wasn't deep.
What would have beaten it. When Russ and I talked about this snap over breakfast at the league meetings, he asked me that question, and I gave him the honest answer: a seventh rusher or a safety in the middle. A seventh rusher — his nickel off the edge, or the safety over Ruffin rushing the moment Ruffin blocked — and somebody is free; then the deep over is a sack, and the right play is the hot. A safety in the middle, and Gaines runs into him. Russ told me later that his safety's rule was a lurk: sit in the low hole if the back stays in. He'd built the call to take away our hot throws, and he'd done it. The play that beat him was the one he'd given up on purpose.
Execution, not genius. I want to be clear about what scored. Vance identified Bell correctly before the snap. Ruffin, a running back, stoned a linebacker in the A gap. Five linemen held just long enough against rushers who knew it was the game. Gaines sold a go route for fourteen yards with the game on the line, when every instinct says break early. Vance stood in and threw it knowing Coleman was coming. If any one of those fails, the same call is a strip-sack and you're reading about it in a different chapter. "You were betting on us making a mistake," I told Russ. "I was betting on us not making one."
Discussion Questions
- The deep over sat third on the zero-bin list because the staff didn't expect Cover 0 on third-and-long. Should the order of a zero bin change with the situation, or should it stay fixed so the quarterback never has to think? Defend your answer.
- Holloway did exactly what his lurk rule said. Was the defensive call wrong, or was the rule wrong? What rule would you give a lurk player against a team that runs hold routes?
- Coleman hit Vance as he threw. Count the time: if the ball needs about three seconds and a defensive tackle arrives at about three seconds, what does that tell you about the margin on this play? What would you change in practice to widen it?
- How does the deep over illustrate the chapter's idea that man coverage still contains defenders who can be put in conflict?
- If you were Russ, what would you call the next time Austin faced third-and-8 near midfield in a tied game?
Your Turn
Build your own zero bin of three plays for your offense at your level. For each, write: the formation (it must match a formation your team uses on third down, so nobody moves at the line), the protection count, the target, the job of every other route, and the trigger ("six or fewer coming and the back can block the sixth" or "seven coming: hot"). Then write the one-sentence rule your quarterback uses to choose among the three in the last eight seconds of the play clock.