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It's a Friday night in the first week of October, about twenty minutes to one, and the only light on

Chapter 23 — The Scouting Report: Film Study, Tendency Analysis, and Knowing the Enemy Before Game Day

The Hook: Fourteen of Eighteen

It's a Friday night in the first week of October, about twenty minutes to one, and the only light on the second floor of our building is coming from the quality control office.

We play our Week 5 game in two days. Teo Arriaga is not watching our Week 5 opponent. Teo works a week ahead, so on this Friday night he's three games deep into the Sacramento Sentinels, the team we play in Week 6. Russ Kimbrough's defense. The best defensive coordinator we see all year, twice a year, and this season it'll turn out to be three times.

I'm carrying the second of two coffees. The first one was mine. Teo doesn't look up when I come in. He has the end-zone copy of a Sentinels game frozen on the big monitor, and he's pointing at a linebacker's feet with a pen.

"Coach. Look at forty-five."

Number 45 is Jordan Ames, Sacramento's Will linebacker, the one who lines up on the side away from the tight end. Teo plays the clip. The offense on the screen runs inside zone. The guards come off the ball, the running back crosses the quarterback's face, and Ames's first step goes straight downhill toward the line, like somebody yanked a rope tied to his facemask.

Teo plays the next clip. Same thing. And the next.

"How many?" I ask. I'm already laughing, because I know where this is going and I love it.

"Fourteen of eighteen. Every inside zone or duo from a two-by-two set where he's the backside linebacker. Fourteen times his first step is downhill. Eyes on the back every time but two."

Fourteen of eighteen is 78 percent. Marisol Vega, our analytics director, has a working rule for when something on film counts as a tell: one look predicting one action more than about 70 percent of the time, on ten or more snaps. Fourteen of eighteen clears it.

Here's what I want you to notice about what I said next, because it's the most important habit in this chapter.

"Show me the four."

Teo blinked. Then he understood, and pulled them up.

The four snaps where Ames didn't come downhill are the real scouting report. The fourteen tell you what he does. The four tell you when he stops doing it, and the defense learns from those four, because that's where it gets beat.

Clip one: Ames took a false step and the back cut it back into him anyway. Nothing there; every linebacker misreads a run now and then. Clip two: Ames sat, and the ball went for six up the middle. Clip three: Ames sat. Clip four: Ames sat.

"Back those up," I said. "One snap each."

Clips two, three, and four had the same thing in common. On the snap before each of them, a ball had been completed behind Ames, into the window he was supposed to protect. Three times he got burned. Three times, on the very next snap, he didn't trigger.

Teo wrote two words in the notes column of his breakdown, and I watched him do it: Burned → sits.

"That," I told him, "is the line that wins the second snap."

Nine days later, Week 6, our first game against Sacramento this season, first snap of our first drive: "Eleven, Gun Doubles Right, Inside Slant." Ames came downhill. Darius Vance pulled the ball and threw the slant to Mekhi Powers in the space Ames left. Plus seventeen. And as we got set for the next snap, Teo's voice came down from the booth: "He'll sit this time, Coach. He just got burned."

People who heard that story later thought Teo was psychic. He wasn't. He was reading his own notes column. He'd seen it three times on film, written it down at one in the morning, and said it into my ear at the one moment it mattered. We ran the same call. Ames sat. Vance handed it to Jalen Ruffin in the space Ames had just left, and we gained seven.

That's what a scouting report is. It isn't a binder. It's a set of answers to questions you're going to have with 40 seconds on the play clock, written down days earlier by someone who had the time to check them properly. This chapter is about how to build those answers: what to watch, how to tag it, how to count it honestly, how to turn counts into calls, how to scout yourself the same way the other team is scouting you, and how to hand all of it to the people who have to use it, which means telling the quarterback three things and not forty.

It's also about the day the report goes stale, because every report does. Ours did, by January, and I'll show you exactly how.

🏃 Fast Track: If you've broken down opponents before, skim 23.2–23.3 (the film diet and the tagging fields) and start at 23.4 ("From Tags to Tendencies"). Sections 23.5 (the "by situation" page), 23.6 (self-scout), and 23.9 (when the report expires) are the ones experienced staffs get the most out of.

🔬 Deep Dive: The full Sentinels packet, the project opponent for the rest of this book, is Appendix G. Blank scouting forms and tendency sheets are in Appendix F. The coverage tells referenced here are drawn out in Appendix E.

📺 Film Watcher: This Sunday, pick one defense and one situation, like third-and-7 or longer, and chart it for a whole game: how many safeties before the snap, how many after, how many rushers. By the fourth quarter you'll have the start of a real tendency, and you'll understand why coordinators guard their third-down calls like state secrets.


23.1 What a Scouting Report Is For

The offense has one structural advantage over the defense: it knows where the ball is going, and the defense doesn't. Everything in this book tries to multiply that advantage. A scouting report multiplies it from the other side. If the defense doesn't know where our ball is going, the next best thing is for us to know where their people are going to be.

A scouting report is the written, organized result of studying an opponent before you play them: what they do, in what situations, with which players, and how often. At our level it's built from film, sorted by situation, and turned into decisions the game plan can use. In high school it might be two pages from one game of film. In the NFL it's a binder for the coaches, a stack of cut-ups for every position room, and one page that the play caller can read while the play clock is running.

Every good report I've ever seen answers three questions. I learned them from Walt Dupree, my first NFL boss, and I've never found a fourth that wasn't really one of these three.

  1. What do they do? Their base personnel, fronts, coverages, and pressures, sorted by down, distance, field position, and our personnel. This is the counting part.
  2. What can't they do? Every defensive structure leaves somewhere it can't be. That's the threshold idea from Chapter 7, the defense tells you where to go, applied to one specific defense. A team that plays two-high safeties on 62 percent of its snaps is a team with a light box on a lot of those snaps. A team that plays a second-year corner on the boundary has a boundary corner who has seen fewer fades than your X receiver has caught.
  3. What do they do when we do X? This is the question that separates a report from a statistics sheet. Not "what do they play on first-and-10" but "what do they play on first-and-10 when a receiver motions across the formation" or "when our second tight end runs on the field." Defenses play rules, and the rules are triggered by what the offense shows them. Find the trigger and you can pull it on purpose.

There's a fourth line, and it's mine, not Walt's. It's the question I ask at the bottom of every report before I start the game plan: What will they leave, and is my guy better than theirs there? The first three questions describe the defense. The fourth is where the report turns into a plan.

Here's how the three questions looked on the Week 6 report against Sacramento, in one line each.

Question The Week 6 answer (Teo's report, four games of film) What it pointed us toward
What do they do? Nickel on about 70% of snaps; two high safeties before the snap on about 62%; four-man rush on most early downs Plan for nickel; plan for two-high; the run game sees six-man boxes
What can't they do? With two high and a nickel, the box is light, and the Will has two jobs on the weak side Inside zone and the RPO that reads the Will
What do they do when we do X? When we motion across, the safeties spin toward the motion unless it's man; when it's man, the nickel runs with it Motion as a diagnostic: if somebody runs, call the man-beater
What will they leave? A second-year boundary corner, Cole Brennan, alone on our X receiver when they rotate Devonte Sutton on the backside, as the "breaker"

None of those four lines is a play call yet. A scouting report describes; a game plan decides. The game plan for Game 1, built from this report, is the subject of Chapter 24. But you can already see the plays forming in the right-hand column. That's the test of a good report: a coordinator reading it should start drawing before he finishes reading.

💡 Coach's point: A report that only answers "What do they do?" is an almanac. A report that answers "What do they do when we do X?" is a weapon, because it tells you which of their rules you can trigger.

🔄 Check your understanding: Teo's report says the Sentinels play nickel on about 70 percent of snaps. Which of the three questions does that answer, and why isn't it enough by itself to call a play?

Answer

It answers "What do they do?" By itself it describes the defense without telling you where the defense is weak or what triggers its changes. To call a play you need the second question (with a nickel and two high safeties, the box is light and the Will has two jobs) and ideally the third (what the nickel does when we motion, or when our second tight end comes on). The counting is the start of the report, not the end.


23.2 The Film: What an Offensive Staff Studies

Before you can count anything you have to decide what to watch. A full NFL game is roughly 60 to 70 defensive snaps. You can't watch a defense's whole history, and you shouldn't try. Here's what goes into an Outlaws opponent breakdown, in priority order.

The film diet

Film How much What it's for Trust level
Their last four games (this season) All defensive snaps; about 240–260 for most opponents The core tendencies: personnel, fronts, coverages, pressure by situation Highest, and the most recent game is weighted most
Their games against offenses like ours Cut-ups from earlier this season or late last season (motion-heavy, 11-personnel teams, RPO teams) "What do they do when we do X?" when X is something we do a lot and their recent opponents didn't High, if the coordinator is the same
Their games against us Last season's two meetings, about 130 snaps What this coordinator thought of our offense a year ago Medium to low; both rosters have changed
The coordinator's history Selected cut-ups from his earlier seasons, only if he's new to this team His beliefs: what he calls on third-and-long when he has to choose Medium; used to fill gaps, not to set tendencies
Situational cut-ups across the league Their red-zone, two-minute, and backed-up snaps from as far back as needed to get 15–20 snaps Situations that happen too rarely to show up in four games Medium; the sample is old by design

Four games is a choice, not a law. It's enough snaps to see patterns in the common situations, and recent enough that the players and the play caller are the same people. It's also the window Marisol uses for our self-scout, because it's what other teams' advance staffs use on us. And the coordinator matters more than the uniform. A team that changed defensive coordinators in the off-season is a different defense wearing the same helmets; a midseason change makes the earlier film close to worthless. Russ was in his fourth Sacramento season in Week 6, so his history was real history.

The three camera angles

  • The sideline view (often called the "All-22," because all twenty-two players are in the frame) is shot from high above the field. It's the angle for coverage: safety depth, where the corners bail, who rotates, where the ball goes.
  • The end-zone view is shot from behind the offense or the defense. It's the angle for the front: alignments, techniques, linebacker depth, gap fits, first steps, and eyes. You can't tell a 2i from a 3-technique from the sideline, and you can't tell how deep a safety is from the end zone.
  • The broadcast copy is fine for down, distance, score, and result. It's dangerous for coverage, because it's tight on the ball and the safeties are often off the screen at the snap.

🔄 Check your understanding: Which angle would you use to tag (a) whether the strong safety rotated down after the snap, and (b) whether the 3-technique aligned on the guard's outside shoulder or head-up?

Answer

(a) The sideline (All-22) view, which shows safety depth and movement. (b) The end-zone view, which shows the front's alignment and techniques. The broadcast copy is unreliable for both.

What goes into the report

Every Outlaws opponent breakdown has the same eight sections: (1) personnel and substitution against each of our groupings; (2) fronts, including which way the strength is set and the box count by situation; (3) coverage, before and after the snap, by down, distance, field zone, and our personnel; (4) pressure, overall and by situation, with the favorite pressures drawn out and their tells; (5) red zone and two-minute, tagged separately because they're different defenses; (6) individual matchups, the five defenders who can beat us and the two or three we want to attack; (7) injuries, updated through the week; and (8) motion and formation answers, what they do when we motion, shift, go empty, or bring in a second tight end.

Field zones

Situations depend on where the ball is, so every snap gets tagged with a field zone as well as a yard line. We use the same words in the scouting report, the game plan, and the call sheet, so a tendency on Monday becomes a call-sheet box on Saturday with no translation.

FIELD ZONES (Outlaws words; offense moving UP the page)

 GOAL LINE      | opp 3 - goal       |  short field, compressed coverage
 LOW RED        | opp 10 - opp 4     |  no deep zones; man and pressure
 HIGH RED       | opp 20 - opp 11    |  the end line becomes a defender
 FRINGE         | opp 30 - opp 21    |  field-goal range; fewer shots
 ---------------+--------------------+------------------------------
 OPEN FIELD     | own 25 - opp 31    |  the base defense lives here
 ---------------+--------------------+------------------------------
 COMING OUT     | own 11 - own 24    |  conservative calls, safety
 BACKED UP      | own 10 - goal      |  run-heavy, QB under center

📊 Diagram (described): A vertical map of the field from the offense's view. From our own goal line moving up: "backed up" is our own goal line to our 10; "coming out" is our 11 to our 24; "open field" runs from our 25 to the opponent's 31, where the base defense lives; "fringe" is the opponent's 30 to 21; "high red" is the 20 to the 11; "low red" is the 10 to the 4; "goal line" is the 3 to the goal line. Each zone carries a note about how defenses usually change there.

Why does this matter for scouting? Because a defense that plays Quarters at midfield may play a completely different coverage on the same down and distance at the 15, where the end line takes away the deep part of the field. If you lump those snaps together, you'll average two different defenses into one that doesn't exist.

🏫 Any level: In most high school leagues, you'll get one or two games of film through an exchange platform, often shot from the press box by a parent or a student manager, sometimes with no end-zone view at all. Scale the diet down, not the method. Tag every snap of the film you have, use the same field zones, and write "?" when the camera misses the safeties instead of guessing. One more difference matters: high school hash marks sit much closer to the sidelines than NFL hashes (53 feet 4 inches from each sideline under NFHS rules, versus 70 feet 9 inches in the NFL), so the wide side of the field is very wide. Field/boundary tendencies are usually the strongest tendencies a high school defense has. Tag the hash on every snap.


23.3 The Breakdown: Teo's Job

Breaking down an opponent means watching every snap and recording, in the same fields every time, what happened. Each recorded field is a tag, and tagging is the unglamorous center of the whole process. Nobody gets hired as a coordinator because of how well they tag. But every coordinator I respect can tag, and every bad scouting report I've seen started with bad tags.

Here are the fields on an Outlaws defensive breakdown. Teo fills in every one of them for every snap.

Group Field What goes in it Example (one Sentinels snap)
Situation Clip # Running number for the game 141
Quarter / time / score Score is from the defense's view: +3 means they lead by 3 Q2, 6:12, −4
Down & distance As called 1-10
Yard line, field zone Where the ball is Own 38, open field
Hash L / M / R L
Their opponent (the offense) Personnel 10, 11, 12, 21… 11
Formation Our words, so it matches our plan Gun Doubles Right
Motion / shift Type and direction None
Play family Run, RPO, PA, dropback, screen Run: inside zone right
The defense Personnel Base, nickel, big nickel, dime Nickel
Front / strength Even or odd, Over or Under; strength to field, TE, or passing strength Over, to the field
Box count Light / neutral / loaded (apex nickel = "half") 6 (light)
Shell pre / post 2H, 1H, 0, with an arrow if it changes 2H
Coverage family Our description, not their name Quarters
Rushers / pressure Number of rushers; who came; drawn if new 4
Notes Eyes / first step For each second-level defender: back, guard, QB, receiver; first step W: eyes back, 1st step downhill
Result Yards, who made the play +2, W makes tackle
Flag Anything new, odd, or worth a cut-up —

That's eighteen fields. Teo had tagged a bit under 250 Sentinels snaps before our first game. The exact number was 243, from their four most recent games. That's somewhere above four thousand individual entries before anyone drew a play.

The marks in the shell column are Teo's, and you've seen them since Chapter 7: 2H (two high safeties), 1H (one high safety), 0 (no deep safety), with an arrow when the shell changes at the snap: 2H→1H means two high before the snap, one high after it. "The arrow column is the one I study hardest," Teo told me in his first season. He was right. Before the snap a defense shows you what it wants you to see. The arrow shows what it actually played.

The box column uses our three words: light (six or fewer defenders in the box), neutral (seven), and loaded (eight or more). An apex nickel, the slot defender aligned halfway between the box and the slot receiver, counts as "half," because he's usually the conflict defender, and we'd rather design for him than argue about which side of the line he's on.

Three passes through the film

Teo doesn't tag a game in one viewing. He makes three passes, each with a different camera angle and a different job.

  1. The situation pass (broadcast or sideline, full speed). Clip number, quarter, time, score, down, distance, yard line, hash, the offense's personnel and formation, play family, and result. This is the fast pass, about an hour per game.
  2. The coverage pass (sideline, slowed down). Defensive personnel, shell before and after, coverage family, rushers. He watches each clip at least twice: once for the safeties at the snap, once for where the corners and nickel went. Two to three hours per game.
  3. The front pass (end zone, frame by frame when needed). Front, strength, box count, and the eyes and first-step notes for every linebacker and the nickel. This is the slow one, and it's where the Ames tell came from. Another two to three hours.

Add it up and a single opponent game costs Teo five to seven hours. Four games is a long week, which is why he works a week ahead.

Unknowns are data

Teo's first rule of tagging is the one I'd teach before any other: when you don't know, write "?" If the broadcast copy cuts away before the safeties settle, the shell column gets a question mark, not your best guess. If a linebacker's first step is hidden behind a guard, the first-step column gets a question mark.

Marisol counts the question marks separately. In the Week 6 breakdown, 9 of the 243 snaps had a "?" in the coverage column, about 4 percent. That's fine. If a column ever has a "?" on more than about one snap in ten, she won't put a percentage on it at all, because a tendency built on guesses is the most dangerous thing a report can hold: it looks exactly like a real one.

⚠️ Common mistake: tagging the shell as the coverage. A two-high shell before the snap isn't a Cover 2 or Quarters call. It's a picture. A defense like Sacramento's, which rotated after the snap on roughly 38 percent of its snaps, will fool any staff that tags coverage from the pre-snap freeze. We once had a young intern tag a whole opponent game from the broadcast copy at the snap. His report said the defense played two-high on 70 percent of third downs. The sideline film said a little over 40. The fix: two separate columns, shell before and shell after, and the coverage column filled in only from the sideline angle, at least one second after the snap.

🔄 Check your understanding: A column has a "?" on 30 of 243 snaps. Why won't Marisol put a percentage on it, even though 213 snaps were tagged?

Answer

Because the 30 unknowns aren't random. The broadcast copy tends to lose the safeties on the same kinds of snaps (deep drops, late rotations, long passes), so the missing snaps may be exactly the ones that would change the answer. At about one snap in eight unknown, the count could be confidently wrong, and a wrong tendency looks exactly like a right one on the page.


23.4 From Tags to Tendencies: Sample Sizes and Honesty

A tendency is a pattern in what a defense does in a given situation, written as a count: "In this situation, they did this, this many times out of this many." Tags become tendencies when you sort them. Sort 243 Sentinels snaps by our personnel and you get one table. Sort them by down and distance and you get another. Sort third downs by our formation and you get a third.

Here's the top of Teo's Week 6 report: the whole defense, all 243 snaps, before we cut it into situations. These are our fictional Sentinels, charted by our fictional staff, but every number in this book's world comes from a count like this one.

Sentinels defense, last four games (243 snaps) Count Share
Personnel: nickel (five defensive backs) 170 70%
Base (four linemen, three linebackers) 41 17%
Dime (six defensive backs) 26 11%
Goal line / other 6 2%
Shell before the snap: two high (2H) 151 62%
One high (1H) 84 35%
No deep safety (0) 8 3%
Shell changed at the snap (any arrow) 92 38%
of which 2H→1H 71
of which 1H→2H 21
Coverage family after the snap: Quarters (Cover 4) 83 34%
Cover 3 72 30%
Cover 1 (man, one deep) 31 13%
Cover 6 (quarter-quarter-half) 22 9%
Cover 2 family (zone and two-deep man) 18 7%
Cover 0 8 3%
Couldn't tell ("?") 9 4%
Five or more rushers 66 27%

You can read the identity of a defense right off that table. Coverage-first: nearly two-thirds of the snaps are Quarters or Cover 3, the two coverages Russ builds everything else around. Two-high with rotation: 62 percent of snaps start with two safeties deep, and almost four snaps in ten change shell at the snap, mostly from two-high to one-high. Pressure on purpose: 27 percent of snaps with five or more rushers isn't a passive defense, but it isn't a blitz-everything defense either.

That's the easy part. The hard part starts when you cut it.

The shrinking denominator

Every time you add a condition, you lose snaps. Watch what happens as we go from "all snaps" to the question I actually need answered on a Sunday afternoon: What do they do on third-and-long against our two-by-two sets?

Cut Snaps left
All snaps, four games 243
Third downs 59
Third-and-7 or longer 26
Third-and-7 or longer against 2x2 formations 14

Fourteen snaps. That's what four games gives you for the most important down-and-distance bucket on the call sheet. And those 14 snaps were spread across four games against four different offenses, with four different quarterbacks, in four different scores.

The denominator is the "out of how many" in a count. It's the number every scouting report should show and most don't. Marisol's first rule, which every one of our reports follows, is simple: write "9 of 14," never "64 percent." A percentage hides how little you know. A count shows it.

📈 By the numbers: Here's why small counts deserve suspicion, in plain English. If a coach truly called something half the time, like flipping a fair coin, how often would you see it at least 9 times in 14 tries just by luck? About one time in five. So "9 of 14" is a lean, not a law. Now take Ames: if he truly came downhill only half the time, seeing it 14 or more times in 18 would happen by luck about one time in sixty-five. That's a real tendency. And Marisol's working threshold of "70 percent on ten-plus snaps" is a floor: seven of ten happens by pure luck about one time in six. She treats 70-on-10 as "worth a cut-up," not as proof. (These are simple coin-flip calculations, not a published model. The point is the size of the uncertainty, not the exact decimal.)

Context is part of the count

A count is only as good as the snaps behind it. Before you trust a tendency, ask what kind of offenses produced it.

🧩 Productive struggle: Here are Teo's raw third-and-long pressure numbers from the Week 6 report. Before you read on, decide what you'd tell Darius Vance to expect on third-and-7 or longer.

Third-and-7+ Snaps Five or more rushers
All four games 26 15 (58%)

Now one more fact: one of the four opponents was starting a rookie quarterback in his second NFL game. Does that change your answer? What would you want to see before you answered?

Here's how the conversation went in our building.

When Teo put that table up on the Monday night of Sacramento week, the first thing Marisol did was split it by opponent. It looked like this:

Third-and-7+ Snaps Five or more rushers
vs. the rookie quarterback 9 8
vs. the other three (veteran QBs) 17 7 (41%)

Marisol Vega: So it's not "they pressure 58 percent on third-and-long." It's "they pressured a rookie almost every time, and everybody else a little under half the time."

Teo Arriaga: Seven of seventeen.

Marisol Vega: Seven of seventeen. Say it that way.

Wade Harmon: And they've seen our tape. Twenty-eight of thirty-six against five or more. If I'm Russ, I'm not blitzing that quarterback on purpose. I'm making him beat me with patience.

Me: So we expect four-man rushes and coverage on third-and-long, with pressure as the surprise, not the plan.

That's the answer to the productive struggle. The raw 58 percent was real, but it was built by one opponent who couldn't handle pressure, and Russ is a coordinator who pressures on purpose, not by habit. Against a quarterback whose numbers against five or more rushers were 28 of 36 for 9.4 yards an attempt with four touchdowns and no interceptions in Marisol's four-game self-scout, the same window Russ's staff was studying, the honest expectation was the 41 percent, or lower.

It was lower. In Game 1, Sacramento blitzed on only about nine of our dropbacks all day. Russ played coverage and made Vance be patient, exactly as Wade guessed. The report didn't predict that by itself. The report plus the question "who were they playing?" did.

🔍 Why this works: Why do defenses have tendencies at all? Why doesn't a smart coordinator like Russ just call everything at random? Because a defense is eleven people executing rules on the same count, and every rule has to be taught, repped, and trusted by Sunday. A coordinator can't install forty pressures a week; he installs a handful and calls the ones he believes in, in the situations he believes in. His personnel limits him too. If his best cover player is his nickel, his third-and-long calls will protect the nickel's strengths. Randomness costs execution, and execution is what wins plays. So tendencies aren't laziness. They're the price of being good at something. That price is what you're scouting.

Exceptions are the report

Remember the four clips. When a tendency has a strong count, like 14 of 18, the exceptions often tell you more than the rule, because they show you what changes the defender's behavior. Ames came downhill unless he'd just been burned. Teo put both halves on the page: the tendency, and the condition that breaks it.

This is the habit I'd most want a young quality control coach to take from this chapter. When you find a number you like, before you put it on the page, watch every snap that doesn't fit. Either the exceptions are noise (a false step, a busted assignment, a different call) or they're a second rule. If they're a second rule, you just found something the other team's coaches may not know their own player does.

🛡️ The defense's view: Russ Kimbrough knows he's being tagged. Every defensive coordinator does. His own staff self-scouts his defense the way Marisol self-scouts our offense, and his staff had charted 247 of our snaps in exactly the way Teo charted 243 of his. When I told him in the spring that the coverage is a contract and I get to read the contract before I sign it, he laughed and said, "That's why we change it after you sign." That's the rotation: a two-high picture before the snap and a one-high coverage after it. A defense that rotates on 38 percent of its snaps is a defense that's been reading scouting reports on itself, and it's built so that your tendency table about its shell is less useful than it looks. The good defensive coordinators don't try to have no tendencies. They try to make their tendencies show up late, after the snap, where your report can't help your quarterback before he decides.

🔄 Check your understanding: Teo's report has "Cover 0 on third-and-7+: 1 of 26." Marisol won't let anybody say "they never play zero on third-and-long." Why not?

Answer

Because 1 of 26 isn't zero, and 26 snaps is a small sample from four games against four offenses. It says Cover 0 on third-and-long is rare for this defense, not that it's impossible. It also says nothing about what Russ will do against us, a team whose quarterback is very good against pressure, in a close game late. The honest sentence is "rare: 1 of 26." The plan still needs an answer for it.


23.5 Turning Data Into Decisions: The "Kimbrough by Situation" Page

Two hundred forty-three tagged snaps produce something like forty pages of tables. Nobody calls plays from forty pages. So the last thing Teo builds every week, before the report goes on my desk Monday night, is one page: the opponent's behavior in the situations that matter most, one row each, in words I can read in two seconds with a play clock running.

For Sacramento, he named it the "Kimbrough by situation" page. It started as a joke; the name stuck. Week 6 was the first version. He built a new one for each of our three games against Sacramento that season, and when Teo left after the season to coach at the college level, the template was one of the things he left behind for his replacement.

Here's the first version, the one I carried in Week 6. I've put each row next to the decision it pointed us to. In-season we didn't know Russ's names for any of his calls; these are our descriptions.

Row Situation Week 6 page (Teo's words) The decision it pointed to
1 1st-and-10 vs. 11 personnel Nickel, Over, two-high, four-man rush. Quarters behind it. Rotates to one-high a little under half the time; the field safety (Holloway) comes down on most rotations. Inside zone and the RPO that reads the Will; play-action that attacks the rotator
2 Our 12 personnel Base on 18 of 31, nickel on 13. No third safety on the field yet. Make base cover Harlan; run against nickel
3 3rd-and-1–3 One-high man, field corner pressed (10 of 14). Zero only on 3rd-and-1, 2 times. Man-beaters; quick game away from the press
4 3rd-and-4–6 vs. 3x1 Trips check: backside corner alone on the X, the Mike takes #3 (9 of 13). A shallow inside safety, a "robber look," on 3. Dig and flood from trips; check Sutton backside first
5 3rd-and-7+ vs. 2x2 Mixed (14 snaps): two-high held with four rushers 5, rotated to one-high 4, five-plus rushers 5. No pattern by hash or score. No single beater; protect first, call a concept with both a two-high and a one-high answer
6 Mug looks Double-A mug on 3rd-and-7+: 10 snaps. Both A-gap backers came on 6, one dropped on 4. Six-man protection, back on the Mike
7 Pressure 27% overall; 7 of 17 on 3rd-and-7+ against veteran QBs. Nickel pressure off the slot is the favorite. Hot rules built around the field slot window
8 Tells Ames downhill on the first zone step, 14 of 18 (sits after he's burned). The nickel inside five yards with his eyes on the QB at :05 is coming, 9 of 12. Royce at 12+ on or inside the boundary hash spins to the middle, 17 of 22. Inside Slant; hot slant when the nickel creeps; middle-of-the-field read keyed to Royce

Eight rows. Every row is a count with its denominator. Every tell clears Marisol's 70-on-10 floor: 14 of 18, 9 of 12, 17 of 22. And every row ends in a decision that the game plan, in Chapter 24, will turn into specific calls.

Now let me draw the four rows that mattered most, because a row on a page is only useful if you can see it on the field.

Row 1: the base look, and where it rotates

This is the picture Sacramento showed us on first-and-10 against our 11 personnel, as Teo tagged it. Russ calls it "Home." I learned that name in the spring. In Week 6 our page just said "nickel, Over, two-high, four-man rush."

PRE-SNAP: Row 1 -- 1st-and-10 vs. 11 personnel (Teo's Week 6 tag)
Gun Doubles Right; ball on the LEFT hash, field to the right

         F (Royce, 12)                     $ (Holloway, 10)

  C           *          W        M                       C
                  E        N       T   E
  X          H       O   O   O   O   O   Y                 Z
                             Q
                         R

📊 Diagram (described): Our Gun Doubles Right: Sutton (X) and Powers (H) on the left, Harlan (Y) attached on the right with Gaines (Z) wide, Vance in the gun with Ruffin offset to his left. The ball is on the left hash, so the wide field is to our right. The Sentinels are in nickel with an Over front: an end outside our left tackle, a nose shaded on the center's left, a 3-technique outside our right guard, and an end outside our right tackle. The Will (Ames) is on the weak (left) side at about five yards and the Mike (Bell) is over the center-right. The nickel (Vo) is over Powers. Two safeties are deep: Royce at about 12 yards on the left (boundary) side and Holloway at about 10 on the right (field and strength) side. A corner is over each wide receiver.

The tag tells you what it looks like. The arrow column tells you what it became. A little under half the time against our 11 personnel, that two-high picture turned into this at the snap:

POST-SNAP: the 2H->1H rotation (Royce spins, Holloway comes down)

   [DEEP 1/3]          [DEEP MIDDLE 1/3]           [DEEP 1/3]
       ^                      F                         ^
       |                     ^                          |
       C           F--------/           $               C
                (Royce starts            \  (Holloway starts
                 at 12, boundary)         v   at 10, field)
                                           $  [CURL/FLAT]
              *          W        M
                  E        N       T   E
  X          H       O   O   O   O   O   Y                 Z

📊 Diagram (described): After the snap, the two corners bail to the deep outside thirds. Royce, the boundary safety, runs from his spot at about 12 yards on the left to the deep middle of the field. Holloway, the field safety, drives down from about 10 yards toward the curl and flat area outside our tight end. The result is a three-deep, one-high coverage built from a two-high picture. Holloway is now an extra defender near the line on the field side.

That rotation is what makes Holloway the most important defender on the page. When he comes down, he's a run defender and a short-zone defender. When he stays up, he's a deep defender. A player with two jobs who has to choose is a conflict defender, and the page told us which way he usually chose: down, hard, early. Hold that thought for the Try-it at the end of this section.

Row 8, first tell: Ames's feet

Here's the hook's tell on the field: the same Home look, and our Inside Slant, the run-pass option from Chapter 13. Inside zone goes right; Powers runs a slant from the left slot; Vance reads Ames at the mesh.

PRE-SNAP: Row 8 tell -- "W downhill on the first zone step" (14 of 18)
Eleven, Gun Doubles Right, Inside Slant; read key = (W), Ames

         F                                 $

  C           *         (W)       M                       C
                        5 yds
                  E        N       T   E
  X          H       O   O   O   O   O   Y                 Z
                             Q
                         R

📊 Diagram (described): The same alignments as the Row 1 picture. The Will linebacker, Ames, is circled in parentheses because he's the read: he's at about five yards on the weak (left) side, responsible for the backside gap if it's a run and the slant window if it's a pass. Vo, the nickel, is over Powers with outside leverage, so the inside window belongs to Ames.

POST-SNAP: Ames triggers (Game 1, 1-10 AUS 32) -> pull, throw the slant

         F
          \  (comes down late, makes the tackle)
  C        \  *
  |         \             ^  slant caught ~7 yds, +17
  |          \           / .
  v go        \         /   .    W
                       /     .   v  (first step downhill)
                      /       .  v
                  E  /     N       T   E
  X          H-----/ O   O   O   O   O-->  Y-->
                             Q
                         R  ====>  (mesh: zone fake to the right)

📊 Diagram (described): At the snap the whole offensive line steps to the right as if it's inside zone, and Ruffin crosses Vance's face for the mesh. Ames does what the tape said he does 14 times in 18: his first step goes downhill toward the backside gap. Vance pulls the ball and throws into the window Ames just left. Powers has taken one step upfield and broken inside on the slant, and he catches it about seven yards downfield. Sutton runs a go to clear the corner; Royce comes down from his deep spot to make the tackle. The gain is 17.

This is the decision column on Row 8 made real. And notice what the rest of that row did on the next snap. "Sits after he's burned" is why Teo said, from the booth, "He'll sit this time." It's why we ran the same call, and why I didn't mind when Ames sat: Inside Slant is built so that whatever the read defender does is wrong. If he comes, throw; if he sits, hand it off. The tell didn't choose the play. It told us which half of the play would be open, and it gave Vance one less thing to wonder about.

Row 6: the mug, and what the page counted

Third-and-long against Sacramento meant this look, ten times in four games:

PRE-SNAP: Row 6 -- double-A mug on 3rd-and-7+ (10 snaps on tape)

         F                                 $

  C           *                                           C
                  E    T   M   W   T   E
  X          H       O   O   O   O   O   Y                 Z
                             Q  R

📊 Diagram (described): Both inside linebackers, the Mike and the Will, have walked up into the A gaps on either side of our center, so six defenders threaten to rush: two ends, two tackles in the B gaps, and the two linebackers. Two safeties are still deep, the nickel is over Powers, and the corners are over the wide receivers.

The page counted two outcomes: both backers rushed on 6 of the 10, and one dropped out on 4. Our rule going into Week 6, built from that count, was "Six-man, back on the Mike."

POST-SNAP: both backers come (6 of 10) -- "Six-man, back on the Mike"

                  E    T   M   W   T   E
                  v    v   v   v   v   v
                  ]    ]   ]   ]   ]   ]
                     O   O   O   O   O
                           R  (Ruffin steps up into the left A gap)
                             Q
       six rushers, six blockers: everyone has a man

📊 Diagram (described): At the snap all six threatened rushers come. Our five linemen take the two ends, the two tackles, and the Will in the right A gap, and Ruffin steps up from his spot beside Vance to block the Mike in the left A gap. Six rushers, six blockers: everyone has a man and nobody is free. If one linebacker drops instead, five rush against six blockers and we have one to spare.

That rule was right for the tape we had. It was also a rule a smart defense could study, because it assigned our back to one specific defender. You've seen what happened in Week 15: a version of the mug that wasn't on this tape, an end who walked out late, a back who had to move, and a defensive tackle who dropped into the window our hot throw depended on. The protection side of that story belongs to Chapter 22. The scouting side is simple and belongs here: the page counted what the defense had done, and a rule built only on what a defense has done is a rule it can plan against. We'll come back to that in 23.9.

Row 8, second tell: the creeping nickel

The third tell on the page came from end-zone film of Kenny Vo, the Sentinels' nickel. When he walked inside five yards with his eyes on the quarterback in the last few seconds of the play clock, he was coming, nine times in twelve. Our hot rule, which Rome Pettaway drilled into Vance all week, was the plainest sentence on the page: late walk, throw hot to the side he walked from.

PRE-SNAP: Row 8 tell -- nickel inside 5, eyes on the QB at :05 (9 of 12)
Game 1, Q3, 3rd-and-6 at the AUS 34

         F                                 $

  C                                                       C
               *  <- Vo walks in to ~4 yds, eyes on Vance
             W         M
                  E        N       T   E
  X          H       O   O   O   O   O   Y                 Z
                             Q  R

📊 Diagram (described): A third-and-6 from our own 34 in the third quarter of Game 1. Two safeties deep. The nickel, Vo, has walked from his spot over Powers to about four yards deep, inside, with his eyes on Vance, in the last seconds of the play clock. The linebackers are at normal depth.

POST-SNAP: nickel fire -- hot slant into the space he left

         F                                 $
  C
  |                    ^  Powers: ball out at ~1.1 s, +16
  |                   / .
  v                  /   .
             W      /     .    M
                   /  *    .
                  /    \\   .
                  E    v   N .     T   E
  X          H---/   O   O   O   O   O   Y                 Z
                             Q  R
        (Vo blitzes ==> from his creep spot toward Vance)

📊 Diagram (described): At the snap Vo blitzes from his creeping spot toward Vance. Powers releases from the slot and breaks inside on a quick slant, into the space Vo just left. Vance throws hot at about 1.1 seconds, before the extra rusher can arrive. Powers catches it in the vacated window and runs for 16 yards and a first down near midfield.

🎙️ On the headset: Game 1, third quarter, third-and-6 at our 34. Teo, in the order we always use: "Two high, six, nickel's creeping." That's shell, box, one thing, and the one thing was a row on the page. I didn't need a new play. Our third-and-medium call already had Powers on a quick slant as the hot. What the page gave me was confidence that the hot was going to be the throw, so the call went in fast and Vance had his eyes on Vo from the moment he broke the huddle. When Vo walked, Vance didn't have to wonder. He'd seen nine of those twelve clips on Thursday.

The four percent

One more row-level decision, because it's the one that won Game 1. Teo's coverage table had Cover 0, no deep safety at all, on 1 of 26 third-and-7-or-longer snaps. Rare. Almost nothing.

We built our zero bin anyway: three or four wristband plays every week against Cover 0, two hot throws and then the max-protect deep over. That week the deep over sat third on the list, because we didn't think Russ would call it. On third-and-8 at our 48, tied 27–27 with 4:12 left, he sent six with nobody deep. Vance pointed at Bell, Ruffin stayed in and picked up the sixth rusher, and Trey Gaines beat Cole Brennan on the deep over: caught at the Sacramento 32, 52 yards, touchdown.

The report didn't predict that snap. It told us Cover 0 on third-and-long was rare, and it was right: it was rare. What the report did was something better. It let us spend our practice time in proportion to the counts, and keep a small, rehearsed answer for the rare thing. A report that only prepares you for the 58 percent will lose you a game on the 4 percent.

💡 Coach's point: Build the plan on the tendencies. Build the bin on the exceptions. A rare call that would beat you badly deserves a few reps no matter what the count says.

📋 Try it — Make the call: It's Game 1, third quarter, third-and-6 at your own 34. You're in 11 personnel. Teo's quiet-window line: "Two high, six, nickel's creeping." Your page's Row 8 says the creeping nickel is coming 9 of 12, and Row 7 says nickel pressure off the slot is their favorite. Your third-and-medium menu has (a) a trips dig with Gaines as the primary, (b) a quick-game concept with Powers on a slant from the slot and a hot rule, and (c) a max-protect deep shot. Which do you call, and what's the one sentence you want in Vance's head?

Answer

(b), the quick-game concept with Powers's slant as the hot. The page says the nickel is coming; the slant goes into exactly the space he leaves, and it comes out at about one second, before the extra rusher can arrive. The trips dig (a) needs time to develop and puts the primary read on the other side of the field from the pressure. The max-protect shot (c) could block it, but it gives away the easy first down for a low-percentage throw on third-and-6. The sentence for Vance is the page's own: "Late walk, throw hot to the side he walked from." In the real game, Powers caught the slant at about 1.1 seconds and gained 16. What gets graded is the reasoning, though: a page row that clears the threshold, a play built to beat it, and one clear sentence for the quarterback.

📋 Try it — Find the conflict: Using only Row 1 of the Week 6 page ("rotates to one-high a little under half the time; the field safety comes down on most rotations") and the Row 1 diagrams, name the conflict defender in Sacramento's base defense against our 11 personnel, describe his two jobs, and name the play-action concept that stresses him.

Answer

The conflict defender is Tre Holloway (#31), the field safety. In the two-high shell his job is a deep quarter of the field. When the defense rotates, his job becomes the alley and the curl/flat, which makes him a run defender. A defender who fills downhill on runs and is also responsible for a deep zone is in conflict: if he fills, the deep zone behind him is empty. The play that stresses him is play-action off the exact run he fills against: inside zone, then "Inside PA, Gaines Post", with the post run into the deep quarter Holloway leaves when he bites. That's Anchor D from the end of Game 1: inside zone +5, inside zone +7 as Holloway filled harder each time, then the same look with the play-action post, Gaines for 35 to the Sacramento 4, then inside zone again for the tying touchdown when Holloway hesitated. Chapter 19 breaks down the sequence. The scouting report found the defender; the sequence beat him.


23.6 The Mirror: Self-Scouting With Marisol

While Teo was tagging Sacramento, Sacramento was tagging us. Russ's staff charted 247 of our snaps from the same four-game window Marisol uses for our self-scout, and that's not a coincidence. A self-scout is a scouting report on your own team, built the way your opponent will build it, so you can see your tendencies before they do. Marisol builds ours from our last four games every week, and the Monday-night meeting where she presents it is the least comfortable hour of my week. That's how I know it's working.

The self-scout uses the same tags, the same field zones, the same denominators, and the same 70-on-10 floor. The only difference is the last column. On the opponent's report, the last column says "what we do about it." On the self-scout, it says "keep it or break it."

Here's the Week 6 version, the five tendencies that mattered most from our last four games before we played Sacramento.

Our tendency (last four games) Count Clears 70-on-10? Keep or break, Week 6
First play of a drive from 2x2: Inside Slant (the inside zone/slant RPO) 7 of 11 No (64%) Keep. Knowing it's coming doesn't help the read defender
2nd-and-1–3: play-action shot (11 personnel, Harlan attached, Ruffin offset) 6 of 17 No Keep, but dress it in a second formation
Man coverage shown on 3rd down → stack, bunch, or mesh 11 of 17 No (65%) Watch; one more and it's a tell
Our 12 personnel → a run or a run fake 42 of 49 Yes (86%) Break. At least one real pass from Twelve this week
Tackles in a two-point stance on 3rd-and-long Every snap Yes Keep. A tell we accept

Three of those rows deserve a word.

Keep the tendency when the play beats the answer. Our opening-play tendency, Inside Slant on the first snap of drives from 2x2, wasn't quite a tell by Marisol's line, but Russ's staff could see it, and a defense doesn't need 70 percent to sit on something. We kept it on purpose. A run-pass option built around a conflict defender is a play the defense can know about and still lose to, because both of the defender's answers are wrong. That's what happened on the first two snaps of Game 1. The rule I take from it: break the tendencies that tell the defense how to beat the play; keep the ones that don't.

Break the tendency with a real play, not a decoy. The Twelve row is the one Marisol stopped on in the Monday meeting you saw in Chapter 4: 42 of our 49 Twelve snaps started with a handoff or a fake to Ruffin, and the RPO column was a zero. The rule Marisol built from that slide the following spring, "kill the zeros," says that every personnel group you use regularly has to show every major play family at least a few times in any four-game window. In Week 6 we didn't have the rule yet, only the slide, and we answered it the way you answer a tendency in a hurry: with a pass that could actually gain yards. In the second quarter, up 17–7, second-and-7 at our 38, "Twelve, Gun Doubles Right, 70, Y Option" against their base defense. Harlan beat the linebacker covering him for 9. One play doesn't fix a tendency, and as you'll see in 23.9, it didn't fix this one. It does put a second kind of clip in the other team's cut-up, and that's the beginning of doubt.

Some tells you accept. Our tackles take a two-point stance on third-and-long because it gets them out of their stance faster against speed rushers. A defense can see it. It tells them we're likely passing on third-and-9, which they already knew. Teo keeps a short list on the self-scout labeled "tells we accept": things that are visible, cost us nothing the situation hasn't already given away, and buy us something real. The list keeps the self-scout honest. Not every tendency is a problem, and a staff that panics over every tendency ends up with an offense too random to execute.

The one we missed

Here's the honest part. The Week 6 self-scout didn't have the most important tendency on it.

Trey Gaines lined up in a reduced split, closer to the formation than usual, on 23 snaps in our first four games. Nine of those were scissors, our post-and-corner concept. And every scissors we ran came from a reduced split. As you saw in Chapter 3, the forward version of that count (reduced split → scissors, 9 of 23) isn't a tell. The reverse version (scissors → reduced split, 9 of 9) is a perfect one. It tells a defense that when Gaines is in a normal split, the post-corner can't come.

Marisol found it during our Week 9 bye. Russ told me in the spring that his staff had it before Game 1. So for three games, including our first game against the best defensive staff we faced, the other team's scouting report on us was better than our scouting report on ourselves.

Why did we miss it? Because our self-scout asked "what does each look predict?" and never asked "where does each play come from?" The fix was one more cut: every concept we've run five or more times, sorted by the formation details it came from. If any concept comes from one look every time, that's a reverse tell, and it goes on the list.

⚠️ Common mistake: self-scouting only the questions you already answered. A self-scout that only sorts plays by formation and down will find the tendencies you knew about. The other team will find the ones you didn't, because it sorts your film every way it can think of. The fix: sort both directions. "What does this look predict?" and "Where does this play come from?" A zero in either direction is a tell.

📋 Try it — Whose fault?: Week 2 at St. Louis. Frank Ostrowski's defensive tackles spent much of the first half jumping our run plays. They weren't guessing. On Monday, Teo found the reason on the end-zone copy: our right guard was setting his feet about eight inches wider on runs than on passes. Whose fault was it: the right guard's, the line coach's, or the self-scout's? What's the fix?

Answer

Mostly the self-scout's, which means the staff's. A guard who takes a slightly wider split to get a better angle on a run block is doing something natural, and a line coach watching from behind in practice can easily miss eight inches. The process should have caught it, and it didn't, because our self-scout tagged our personnel, formation, and play family but never our line splits and stances, and never from the end-zone angle. Ostrowski's staff watched our end-zone film; we didn't. The fix has three parts: add split and stance columns to the self-scout, filled from the end-zone copy every Monday; hold the line to a split rule that doesn't change by play type (Gus's split rule, "two feet, toes to toes, inside-out," checked on film every Monday); and put anything we decide to keep on the "tells we accept" list on purpose. The guard needed coaching. The self-scout needed a new column.

🔄 Check your understanding: Our first-play-of-the-drive tendency (Inside Slant, 7 of 11) and our Twelve tendency (42 of 49 run or run fake) were both visible to Sacramento. Why did we keep one and break the other?

Answer

Because of what the defense can do with each one. Knowing Inside Slant is coming doesn't help the Will: if he plays the run, the slant is open, and if he plays the slant, the run has five blockers on five. Knowing that Twelve means a run does help the defense: it can bring a run-stopping group and fit the run aggressively with no fear of the pass. A tendency is only dangerous when the defense has an answer built for it.


23.7 The Scouting Week: Monday to Saturday

The report isn't written on one night. It's built across two weeks and revised every day of the second one. Here's how the scouting work fits into the Outlaws' normal week, with Week 6 as the example.

When Scouting work Who
The week before (nights) Tag three of the opponent's last four games: situation pass, coverage pass, front pass. Pull the same-coordinator and "offenses like ours" cut-ups. Teo
Sunday Our own game. Sunday night: a quick watch of our game. The opponent's newest game becomes available. Staff; Teo
Monday Grade our game. Teo tags the opponent's newest game by early afternoon and finishes the report. Marisol runs the self-scout meeting. Monday night: the opponent breakdown and the "by situation" page land on my desk. Teo, Marisol, all coaches
Tuesday Players off. Game plan built, usually past midnight. Marisol's slide pairs the opponent's five best defenders with our blockers and receivers. Teo drafts the wristband. Coordinators, position coaches
Wednesday First- and second-down install. Early-down cut-ups to every room. First injury report; Teo updates the depth chart page. All
Thursday Third down, pressure, and the zero bin. Third-down and blitz cut-ups to the QB room. Rome, Teo, Vance
Friday Red zone, goal line, two-minute, four-minute. Final injury report. Wristbands printed. All
Saturday Walkthrough. Call sheet finished; the "by situation" page goes on the back of it. QB meeting on the first 15 calls. Teo's last check: any new injury, any new name on the travel roster. Lyle, Rome, Teo, Vance
Game day Teo in the booth. Every snap he tags the defense live and gives me "shell, box, one thing" between the whistle and my call. Teo

The report has a deadline, and it's Monday night. The game plan starts Tuesday morning; a report that arrives Wednesday is a report the plan was built without. That's why Teo works a week ahead, and why the newest game gets the most weight but the least time. And the report keeps changing after the deadline. Injuries change it on Wednesday; a roster move changes it on Thursday. Teo keeps a "changes since Monday" box on the front page so nobody game-plans off a page that's two days stale.

🔄 Check your understanding: Why does Teo tag three of the opponent's four games the week before, instead of tagging all four during game week?

Answer

Because the game plan starts Tuesday morning and the report has to be on the coordinator's desk Monday night. Tagging one game properly takes five to seven hours across three passes, and Monday also has our own game to grade. Working a week ahead leaves only the opponent's newest game for Monday, which is the one that matters most and can't be tagged any earlier.

🏫 Any level: In high school, the week compresses. You might get the opponent's film Saturday morning, tag it Sunday afternoon with one assistant, and present it to the players Monday at practice. You'll have one or two games instead of four, and nobody to tag the newest game while you grade your own. The order still works: tag Sunday, write the one-page "by situation" sheet Sunday night, install against it Monday through Wednesday, and cut it down to three things for the kids by Thursday. In college, a graduate assistant usually does Teo's job, and the extra variable is the hash: with wider-spaced hashes, the field/boundary split belongs on every row of the page.


23.8 Presenting the Report: Coaches Versus Players

The coaches get everything. The players get three things.

That's the rule, and it took me years to learn it. The coaches' version of the Week 6 report was about forty pages: the profile table, every situation cut eight ways, the pressure drawings, the matchup pages, the injuries, the self-scout, and the "by situation" page on top. Coaches need all of it because coaches make the plan, and a plan built on half the facts makes half-right calls.

Players don't make the plan. They execute it at full speed with a defender in their face. What they need is the small number of things that will change what they see and what they do, and they need those things as pictures, not percentages.

Here's what each room got in Week 6.

Room The three things
Quarterbacks (1) Watch 45's feet: if he triggers, pull it; he sits after he's been burned. (2) The nickel walking in at the end of the clock is coming; hot to the side he walked from. (3) The boundary safety deep on or inside the hash is the middle player when they rotate.
Offensive line (1) 94 spins inside when you overset him. (2) Their front strength goes to the field this week, not to our tight end. (3) Double-A mug on third-and-long: the back is on the Mike; you have the rest.
Receivers (1) 29 is a second-year corner who'll be alone on Sutton when they rotate. (2) 24 presses on the field side. (3) If the nickel runs with your motion, it's man; tell Darius with your eyes, not your mouth.
Tight ends and backs (1) 31 comes downhill into the alley; Harlan arcs to him. (2) On a mug, Jalen is on the Mike. (3) 31 is also the play-action target's best friend: when he fills, the post is behind him.

Look at the quarterback row and you'll see Row 8 of the "by situation" page, the three tells, translated into sentences a quarterback can say back. That translation is the job.

The QB room, Thursday of Week 6

Teo presented the third-down section to the quarterbacks himself, which was a big moment for a second-year quality control coach. Rome Pettaway, our quarterbacks coach, ran the room. Darius Vance sat in the front. Ty Lindgren, our veteran backup and scout-team quarterback, sat behind him.

Teo Arriaga: This is Vo, their nickel. Watch him at the end of the play clock. (Plays a clip.) He walks in. Eyes on the quarterback. Ball's snapped, he's coming.

Darius Vance: How many times?

Teo Arriaga: Nine of twelve.

Darius Vance: And the three?

Teo Arriaga: (Laughs.) That's what Coach asked. Two were him bluffing on second down and backing out before the snap. One was a third down: he walked in, then dropped into the hook at the snap. Watch his hips on that one. They never turn to the quarterback.

Rome Pettaway: Don't tell him the number again. Show him the clip again.

Teo Arriaga: Why?

Rome Pettaway: Because on Sunday he's not going to remember "nine of twelve." He's going to remember what Vo's shoulders looked like. Show him all nine. Then show him the three. Then show him the nine again.

Ty Lindgren: And then let me be Vo in walkthrough so he sees a body do it.

That exchange is the whole philosophy of presenting to players. The number is for the coaches; it's what earns a tell a place on the page. The clip is for the player; it's what he'll recognize at full speed. And the walkthrough rep is what turns the clip into a reaction. By Sunday, Vance had seen Vo walk in a dozen times on film and twice in person. When it happened in the third quarter, he didn't read the defense. He recognized it.

💡 Coach's point: Earn the tell with the count. Teach it with the clip. Lock it in with a rep. A player who has to remember a percentage at full speed has already lost the half-second the report was supposed to buy him.

⚠️ Common mistake: the forty-item handout. A young staff, proud of its report, prints twelve pages for the receivers. The receivers read the first page, if that. On Sunday a receiver misses the one tell that mattered because it was item nineteen. The fix: three things per room, each one a picture with a clip, each one tied to a specific thing the player will do differently. Everything else stays in the coaches' binder, where the people who make the plan can use it.

🔄 Check your understanding: Why does Rome want Vance shown the three clips where Vo walked in but didn't produce a free rusher?

Answer

Because those three are what a disguise looks like. If Vance only sees the nine, he'll learn "walk in = pressure" and get fooled by the bluff. Seeing the three teaches him what a bluff looks like (backing out before the snap, or walking in with the hips never turned toward the quarterback and then dropping) so that he recognizes the real thing by its details, not just by the walk. Exceptions teach discrimination; the rule alone teaches a reflex that the defense can bait.


23.9 When the Report Expires

Every scouting report has a shelf life, and the other coordinator gets to decide what it is.

Here's the Week 6 "by situation" page next to the version Teo built for our divisional playoff game in Sacramento, three months later. The divisional rows are written exactly as they appear in our files, with Russ's names penciled over ours, the way I slid the page across a breakfast table to him on the second morning of the league meetings in the spring. "We had your rules," I told him. We did. That was the problem.

Row Week 6 page (summarized) Divisional page
1 Nickel, Over, two-high, four-man rush; rotates a little under half the time 1st-and-10 vs. 11 personnel: Home; rotates about half the time.
2 Our 12 personnel: base 18 of 31, nickel 13 12 personnel: big nickel every time.
3 3rd-and-1–3: one-high man, field corner pressed; zero only on 3rd-and-1 3rd-and-1–3: Spin 1 with the field corner pressed; zero only on 1–2.
4 3rd-and-4–6 vs. 3x1: trips check (9 of 13), robber look on 3 3rd-and-4–6 vs. 3x1: Lock on most, Robber sometimes.
5 3rd-and-7+ vs. 2x2: mixed, no pattern 3rd-and-7+ vs. 2x2: "stayed two-high, every snap since their bye".
6 Mug on 3rd-and-7+: both backers came 6 of 10 Mug: "Can't call it."
7 Pressure 27%; nickel off the slot is the favorite Pressure: "Low and flat."
8 Three tells: Ames's feet, the creeping nickel, Royce on the hash Tells: "None found… since Week 10."

Read down the right-hand column and you can watch a great defensive coordinator take a scouting report apart over three months.

Rows 1, 3, and 4 held. Those were Russ's foundations, and foundations don't change in-season. A defense can't reinvent its first-down coverage or its short-yardage man scheme in Week 10; it can only disguise them better. The rows that held were the ones built on what the defense is.

Row 2 changed because of us. In Week 6 Russ played base and nickel against our Twelve, and we threw on his base. After Week 6, Twelve got big nickel every time: a third safety, Tre Holloway at the nickel spot, a group built to fit the run and still cover Harlan. Wade Harmon had predicted exactly that in our Monday meeting. The row changed because our own tendency, 42 of 49, told Russ which group to build.

Rows 6, 7, and 8 changed because Russ was scouting his own defense. The mug that both backers came on 6 of 10 times in October was a mug whose rushers Teo couldn't predict by January. The pressure rate against us came down and stopped varying by situation, which is what "low and flat" means: nothing to key on. And the three tells on the Week 6 page were gone. Teo couldn't find a single one after Week 10. I never asked Russ whether he fixed them on purpose. I didn't need to.

Row 5 became a streak, and the streak was the trap. On third-and-7 or longer against our 2x2 sets, the Sentinels had stayed two-high every snap since their bye: twenty-nine straight times. A count of 29 of 29 clears every threshold Marisol has. It also had no exceptions to study, and that should have scared me more than it did. On the thirtieth, third-and-9 at our 38 with 2:41 left in the divisional game, down 20–17, they showed two-high at 13 yards and rotated at the snap. Ike Royce spun to the middle of the field, and Vance threw the post into him. The full decision belongs to Chapter 25. The scouting lesson belongs here.

🛡️ The defense's view: A streak in a defense's film isn't always a tendency. Sometimes it's an investment. A coordinator who shows you the same thing twenty-nine times on third-and-long is either a coordinator who believes in it, or a coordinator who knows your report has it in bold and is waiting for the snap where it matters most. From the outside, you can't tell the two apart. If I were sitting in Russ's chair, here's how I'd say it: you don't need to fool an offense on every snap, only on the one it can't afford to lose.

What do you do with that? You can't stop trusting tendencies; then you'd have no report at all. What we changed is how the page carries them.

  1. Every row now has a "since" column. Not "29 of 29," but "29 of 29 since their bye," with the week the count started. A count with a start date reminds you that it can have an end date.
  2. Streaks with no exceptions get a question mark, not a bold. A tendency with exceptions is one you understand. A tendency with zero exceptions in a big sample, against an opponent who knows you're charting him, is one he may be keeping alive on purpose.
  3. Every third-and-long call gets a post-snap answer. If the page is wrong on the snap that matters, the quarterback still needs a throw that's right. That's the middle-read tag, a post-snap read of the middle of the field built into every third-and-long call. It's been my whole off-season project.

In the spring, at a hotel bar at ten at night with two coffees in front of us, I told Russ the line I'd been saying in my head since the interception: "I can't trust my own notes anymore." It sounds like defeat. It isn't. It's the beginning of a better report. In red marker on my whiteboard, since the spring: Never let a tendency outlive its evidence.

🔄 Check your understanding: Which rows of the "by situation" page held from Week 6 to the divisional game, and what do they have in common?

Answer

Rows 1, 3, and 4: the first-and-10 base look, the third-and-short man coverage with the field corner pressed, and the third-and-medium trips check. They're the defense's foundations, the coverages Russ's whole system is built on and has repped since training camp. Foundations hold in-season; what changes are the rows a coordinator can adjust in a week: personnel answers, pressure packages, and the alignment details that create tells.


Spaced Review

Try each question before you read the answer below it.

From Chapter 22: Row 6 of the Week 6 page counted a double-A mug with six threatened rushers. In six-man protection with the back assigned to the Mike, how many rushers can come before somebody is free, and what has to happen if one more comes?

Six blockers can handle six rushers. If a seventh comes, or if the protection gets moved so that a threatened rusher has nobody assigned to him, the ball has to come out hot. That's the arithmetic from Chapter 22: when rushers outnumber blockers, the quarterback and the hot throw are the extra blocker. The scouting report's job is to tell you how many are likely to come. The protection's job is to have an answer for one more.

From Chapter 13: What's Teo's "first-step test," and why is it a scouting tool and not just an RPO tool?

Freeze a second-level defender on a plain run and on a dropback from the same formation. If he fills the run within a step and needs three or more steps to reach his pass zone, he's a read defender. It's a scouting tool because it's measured on the opponent's film, days before the game, and it produced the 14-of-18 Ames tell that decided the first two snaps of Game 1.

From Chapter 7: Why does Teo keep separate columns for the shell before the snap and the shell after it?

Because the shell is not the coverage. A defense that shows two high and rotates to one high at the snap, as Sacramento did on about 38 percent of its snaps, will poison any report that tags only the pre-snap picture. The arrow column is where the real coverage lives.


Project Checkpoint: Scouting Template + Sentinels Defensive Tendency Report

In Chapter 22 you built your Protection Plan: a base six-man slide, a seven-man max, a five-man empty protection, and the hot and sight-adjust rules that go with them. That plan answers "how many can we block?" This checkpoint answers the question that comes before it: how many are they going to send, and when?

Your deliverable has two parts.

Part 1: the Scouting Template. A reusable breakdown form you'll use for every opponent:

  • At least 14 tagging fields from the table in 23.3, grouped as situation / their opponent / the defense / notes. Include the shell marks (2H, 1H, 0, with arrows), the box words (light, neutral, loaded), and an "eyes / first step" column.
  • Your field-zone map with your own words.
  • Your three-question summary block: What do they do? What can't they do? What do they do when we do X? plus the fourth line: What will they leave, and is my guy better than theirs there?
  • Your honesty rules: denominators on every count, your tell threshold, and how you count "?" tags.

Part 2: the Sentinels Defensive Tendency Report. Using the Sentinels packet in Appendix G (and blank forms from Appendix F), produce:

  1. A profile table (personnel, shell before and after, coverage family, pressure rate), every line a count with a denominator.
  2. An eight-row "by situation" page with a decision column, like the Week 6 page in 23.5.
  3. A four-percent list: the rare calls that would beat you badly, each with a rehearsed answer.
  4. A mirror: your own offense's five most visible tendencies, each marked keep, break, or accept.
  5. Three things per room for the quarterbacks, the line, and the receivers.

Here's one filled-in row so you can see the standard:

Situation What they do (count) Since What we do about it
3rd-and-1–3 One-high man, field corner pressed, 10 of 14; zero on 2 (both 3rd-and-1) Their last four games Man-beaters to the boundary, away from the pressed corner; zero-bin hot on 3rd-and-1

At your level:

  • High school: one or two games of film, eight tagging fields (down, distance, hash, field zone, our formation, front, shell, rushers), a one-page "by situation" sheet with five rows, three things for your quarterback.
  • College: three games, the full field set, and a field/boundary split on every row.
  • Pro: four games plus same-coordinator cut-ups, all five parts, and a self-scout built from your own last four games.
  • Film room: chart one NFL defense for one full televised game, all third downs, shell before and after (write "?" when the broadcast cuts away), and rushers. Write the five-row page and compare it with what the defense did the following week.

Next: in Chapter 24 you'll turn this report into Game Plan v1 and a 15-play opening script against the Sentinels. Every call on that script should trace back to a row on your page.


Chapter Summary

A scouting report turns film into decisions. The process, in order:

Step What you do The rule
1. Choose the film Last four games, offenses like yours, same-coordinator history The coordinator matters more than the uniform
2. Tag Every snap, the same fields, three passes (situation, coverage, front) When you don't know, write "?"
3. Count Sort by situation; every count with its denominator Write "9 of 14," never "64 percent"
4. Test Check the threshold (about 70% on 10+ snaps, as a floor), the opponents behind the count, and every exception The exceptions are the report
5. Decide One page, one row per key situation, each row ending in a decision Three questions plus "What will they leave?"
6. Mirror Self-scout your own last four games, both directions Break the tendencies that help the defense beat the play; keep the ones that don't; accept a few
7. Present Coaches get the binder; each player room gets three things, as clips Earn it with the count, teach it with the clip, lock it with a rep
8. Expire Every row carries a "since"; streaks with no exceptions get a question mark Never let a tendency outlive its evidence

The thing to remember from Week 6 is that the report won us snaps three different ways. A tell decided the first two snaps of the game. A hot rule decided a third-and-6 in the third quarter. And a rare call we prepared for anyway decided the game. The thing to remember from January is that the same kind of report, three months later, helped set up the interception that ended our season. The report didn't get worse. The defense got better at reading it.


What's Next

A report describes; a plan decides. In Chapter 24 we take the Sentinels report and build a game plan from it: the call-sheet categories, the run/pass mix for this opponent, the matchups we hunt and the ones we avoid, and the 15-play opening script that tests Russ's answers before we bet on them.