Case Study 2 — The Lateral That Hit the Ground: Curtis Bale's Double Pass
Fictional. Curtis Bale and his team, like the Outlaws, are part of this book's invented world. His team and its opponent are never named. This is the failure that sits beside Case Study 1's success: the same family of play, the opposite process.
Setup
Curtis Bale and I worked two seasons together on Walt Dupree's staff, both young coaches who didn't call plays yet. Curtis drew gadgets at night the way some people do crossword puzzles. When he got his first coordinator job, his offense led its conference in explosive plays, and a good number of those came on trick plays that nobody had seen before.
This case is from his second season, the year he was fired. The spring after he lost the job, I charted four of his mid-season games. One of them had the play I want to walk you through: a double pass, the same family as our H Bubble Pass. The same idea, almost the same drawing. The difference is everything around it.
The opponent played a two-high shell and rotated late, like most of the defenses Curtis saw that year. I went back and watched the four games that opponent had played before it faced Curtis. Here's what its film said about bubble screens, which were the parent play for Curtis's double pass:
| Opponent vs. bubble screens, previous 4 games (12 bubbles) | Count |
|---|---|
| Field corner sat at 5–7 yards and played the stalk from depth (didn't attack) | 10 of 12 |
| Nickel came downhill hard at the bubble catcher | 11 of 12 |
| Bubbles that gained 5+ yards | 2 of 12 |
Compare that to the habit a double pass needs: a corner who attacks the stalk and leaves his deep area. This corner did the opposite on 10 of 12. He sat. The habit the film showed was the one that beats the gadget.
Curtis's own team: I learned at our long dinner, a year later, that his gadgets were practiced mostly in the Saturday walkthrough: "a few reps at three-quarter speed, so nobody gets hurt." His quarterback had thrown the lateral in a real game twice all season.
What Happens
Second quarter, tied 10–10. Curtis's offense had just gone three-and-out. His defense held, and the offense got the ball back at its own 22. On the first snap of the drive, he called the double pass: quarterback lateral to the slot receiver on a bubble; the outside receiver sells a stalk for two steps, then runs a go; the slot catches, sets, and throws deep.
I've watched the snap more times than I'd like. Here's what the film shows.
PRE-SNAP (Bale's double pass, simplified: 2x2, slot to the field;
vs. a two-high shell)
F F
C C
* W M
E T T E
X H O O O O O Y Z
Q R
📊 Diagram (described): Before the snap, the offense has two receivers on each side (the right slot is a flexed tight end) and the back beside the quarterback in the shotgun. The defense has two deep safeties, a nickel over the left slot, two linebackers, and corners on both sides. The left corner is aligned at about six yards. On film, he sat on bubbles 10 of 12 times.
POST-SNAP (the corner sits; the nickel attacks; the lateral is low)
X ^ (sells, then go: the corner sits on him and runs with him)
| C (sits at 6, then carries X deep)
|
* ---> (straight at H)
H <. . . . . . . . Q (lateral thrown low; hits the turf
o (ball on the ground: LIVE) a yard in front of H)
\__ H stops, thinking "incomplete"; the nickel scoops it
O O O O O
📊 Diagram (described): After the snap, the slot runs his bubble path. The outside receiver sells the stalk, but the corner never attacks: he sits at six yards, then turns and runs with the receiver on the go. The nickel comes straight at the slot. The quarterback, seeing the nickel arrive, hurries the lateral, throws it low, and it hits the ground a yard in front of the slot. The slot stops, thinking the pass is incomplete. The nickel picks up the loose ball.
A backward pass that hits the ground is a live ball. Under the rules that game was played under, the defense could recover it and advance it. The nickel scooped it at about the 17 and ran it in. Two of Curtis's linemen were jogging back toward the huddle when he crossed the goal line. Opponent 17, Curtis's team 10.
They lost 24–20. It was one of the two gadget turnovers in my four-game chart.
At the long dinner, he brought it up before I did.
BALE: You saw the lateral game.
LYLE: I charted it.
BALE: Of course you did. (laughs) Go ahead.
LYLE: Their corner sat on ten of twelve bubbles before you played them, Curtis. The play needs a corner who jumps.
BALE: I didn't look at their corner. I looked at our scoreboard. We'd gone three-and-out, the stadium was quiet, and I wanted the building back.
LYLE: From your own 22.
BALE: From my own 22. (pause) The worst part isn't the touchdown. It's that my slot stood there. We never practiced the ball hitting the ground. In my head, it never hit the ground.
Analysis
All three conditions failed
Hold the play up against the three conditions from 33.2.
| Condition | What the gadget needed | What Curtis had |
|---|---|---|
| 1. The habit is on film | A corner who attacks the stalk (the trigger for a double pass) | A corner who sat on 10 of 12 bubbles: the opposite habit. Curtis didn't check |
| 2. The situation pays | First down between the 35s, or a down where the normal play's odds are poor | First down at his own 22, a tied game, after a three-and-out: a loss or turnover gives the opponent a short field |
| 3. Affordable failure, practiced execution | Twelve clean reps at full speed, plus live-ball reps | A few three-quarter-speed walkthrough reps; the ball on the ground never practiced |
And underneath all three was the real cause: the reason for the call. Curtis called it to change a feeling. In my chart, five of his nine gadgets came right after something bad had happened: an opponent score or his own three-and-out. Those are the moments when a coordinator most wants a gadget, and when the defense's coordinator, who knows his opponent is rattled, is most likely to have a trick alert on.
The same play, the other way
Here's what makes this case worth teaching. Our H Bubble Pass is nearly the same play. If you put Curtis's drawing and ours side by side, you'd have trouble telling them apart. But our card says:
- Victim: the field corner who attacks the stalk; evidence required on film above ~70%;
- Trigger: he attacks the stalk on two bubbles in this game;
- Kill: if he's sitting or bailing at the snap count, Vance kills it to a plain bubble;
- Never: backed up inside our 25; right after a turnover or a three-and-out;
- Practice: twelve clean in a row, plus two live-ball reps a week with a coach rolling a ball on the ground.
We carried it most of the season and never called it, because no corner gave us the trigger twice in one game. On the day Curtis called his, the opponent's corner had been telling everybody on film, for four weeks, that the play wouldn't work.
The defense's side
🛡️ The defense's view: A defensive staff preparing for an offense that loves gadgets doesn't need to guess which gadget is coming. It needs rules: the corner plays the stalk from depth on bubbles, the nickel attacks the catcher, everybody treats a ball on the ground as a fumble. When Russ Kimbrough talked about trick plays in the spring, he said a gadget-heavy offense is one of the easiest to prepare for in one way: "They tell you when it's coming. It's coming when they're upset." That opponent's nickel didn't make a great play. He followed his rule, picked up a loose ball, and ran.
Discussion Questions
- Curtis said he "wanted the building back." Is there ever a legitimate reason to call a play for the crowd or for your own team's emotions? If so, what would such a play look like, and would it be a gadget?
- The opponent's corner sat on 10 of 12 bubbles. Which other play did that habit invite? (Hint: think about what's open when a corner sits at six yards against a receiver who runs past him.)
- Curtis's slot stopped when the ball hit the ground. Write the coaching sentence you'd teach every player on every lateral play, and describe the drill that makes it automatic.
- Two of Curtis's linemen were jogging to the huddle during the return. What does that say about how the play was practiced?
- Compare this case with Case Study 1. Both involve laterals. Why was Boise State's hook-and-lateral a good call and Curtis's double pass a bad one, apart from the result?
Your Turn
Take one gadget from your Gadget Package and write its "Never" and "Worst case" fields as if Curtis Bale were going to try to call it on your staff. List at least four "never" situations (score, field zone, down, emotional state of the game), and describe the worst realistic outcome in one sentence with a field position ("lateral recovered at our 17 and returned for a touchdown"). Then add one practice line that would prevent that worst case from happening because of your own team, rather than the defense.