Case Study 1 — Three Rows, One Afternoon: The Week 6 Report on the Field

The Austin Outlaws and Sacramento Sentinels are fictional. Every snap below is part of the Outlaws' Week 6 game as this book tells it.

Setup

The game. Week 6, Sacramento at Austin, our first meeting with the Sentinels that season. Russ Kimbrough's defense: coverage-first, nickel on about 70 percent of snaps, two high safeties before the snap on about 62 percent, the shell changing at the snap on about 38 percent, five or more rushers on 27 percent.

The report. Teo Arriaga had tagged 243 Sentinels snaps from their four most recent games, three of them the week before and the newest on Monday morning. The "Kimbrough by situation" page that sat on the back of my call sheet had eight rows. This case follows three of them through one afternoon:

Row What the page said The player rule
8 (tell 1) Ames, the Will, comes downhill on the first zone step, 14 of 18; sits after he's been burned "Watch 45's feet."
8 (tell 2) The nickel inside five yards, eyes on the QB at :05, is coming, 9 of 12 "Late walk, throw hot to the side he walked from."
3, 5 (the rare call) Cover 0 only twice on third down, both on 3rd-and-1; 1 of 26 on 3rd-and-7+ The zero bin stays on the band anyway

Personnel. Eleven personnel for all three: Darius Vance (QB, #7), Jalen Ruffin (RB, #22), Mekhi Powers (H, #3), Devonte Sutton (X, #18), Trey Gaines (Z, #11), Brooks Harlan (Y, #87).


What Happens

Row 8, tell 1: the first two snaps

First drive, 1st-and-10 at our 32. "Eleven, Gun Doubles Right, Inside Slant." Teo, from the booth: "Two high. Six in the box. Will at five, eyes on the back."

Ames came downhill on the first zone step, as he had 14 times in 18. Vance pulled the ball and threw the slant to Powers in the window Ames had left. Seventeen yards, to our 49.

Teo again: "He'll sit this time, Coach. He just got burned." That was the other half of the row.

1st-and-10 at our 49, same call. This time Ames shuffled and bailed toward the slant window. Vance read it and handed off.

PRE-SNAP: 1-10 AUS 49, same call; read key = (W), Ames

         F                                 $
  C           *         (W)       M                       C
                  E        N       T   E
  X          H       O   O   O   O   O   Y                 Z
                             Q
                         R

📊 Diagram (described): The same Gun Doubles Right as the first snap: Sutton and Powers on the left, Harlan attached on the right with Gaines wide. Ruffin offset to Vance's left. Two deep safeties, the nickel over Powers, the Will (Ames, circled as the read) at about five yards on the weak side, the Mike over the right side, and a four-man Over front with a 5-technique end on the right.

POST-SNAP: Ames sits -> handoff into the space he left (+7)

                        W  (bails to the slant window)
  C           *        /                                   C
              |       v                     $
              |                            /
                  E        N   M   T   E  / Harlan arcs to him
                  X        X   X   X   X /
                     O   O   O   O   O   Y
                             Q
                           R ====> into the backside gap Ames left

📊 Diagram (described): At the snap Ames steps back and outside toward the slant window instead of coming downhill. Vance sees it and hands the ball to Ruffin. The five linemen account for the four down linemen and the Mike, Harlan arc-releases to the alley safety, and there are five blockers on five with nobody in the gap Ames was supposed to fill. Ruffin gains seven to the Sacramento 44.

Two snaps, two different answers by the same defender, both wrong. The scouting didn't choose the play; the play was built to win either way. What the scouting did was tell Vance which half to expect, so his eyes were ready before the ball was snapped.

Row 8, tell 2: third-and-6 in the third quarter

Third-and-6 at our 34. Teo: "Two high, six, nickel's creeping."

Kenny Vo had walked inside to about four yards with his eyes on Vance in the last seconds of the play clock. In the Thursday QB room, Teo had shown Vance all nine clips where Vo walked in and came, then the three where he didn't, then the nine again. Rome Pettaway's instruction: "Don't tell him the number again. Show him the clip again." Ty Lindgren had played Vo in walkthrough.

Our third-and-medium call already had Powers on a quick slant as the hot. Vo came. Vance threw at about 1.1 seconds into the space Vo had left. Powers caught it and ran for 16, first down near midfield.

🎙️ On the headset: I didn't need a new play. I needed the call in fast so Vance had time to look at Vo. The page had already told me what the one thing would be. When Teo said "creeping," the only question left was whether Vance would recognize it, and he'd seen it twelve times that week.

The rare call: third-and-8 with 4:12 left

Tied 27–27, third-and-8 at our 48, 4:12 to play. Teo's report had Cover 0 on third-and-7 or longer once in 26 snaps. Rare. We built our zero bin anyway: two hot throws, then the max-protect deep over, third on the list because we didn't think Russ would call it.

He called it: six rushers, both inside linebackers in the A gaps, man coverage everywhere, nobody deep. Vance saw zero and went to the bin. He pointed at Marcus Bell, Ruffin stayed in and picked up the sixth rusher, and Gaines beat Cole Brennan on the deep over. Caught at the Sacramento 32, 52 yards, touchdown, 34–27. Rashad Coleman hit Vance as he threw.


Analysis

Why the first tell worked. The count was strong (14 of 18 clears Marisol's threshold, and by simple coin-flip math it would happen by luck about one time in sixty-five) and it came from the right camera angle: the end-zone view, where first steps are visible. But the part that won the second snap was the exceptions. Teo watched the four snaps that didn't fit and found the second rule, burned → sits. Most scouting stops at the tendency. This one went through it.

Why the second tell worked. The count earned it a place on the page; the clips taught it. Vance didn't remember "9 of 12" on Sunday. He remembered what Vo's shoulders and hips looked like when he was really coming, because he'd seen the bluffs too. That's the difference between presenting a report to coaches and presenting it to a quarterback.

Why the rare call worked. The report was right about Cover 0 being rare, and the plan didn't treat rare as never. A report should set the plan's proportions: where practice time goes, what sits first on the band. The bin is where you put the things that are rare but would beat you badly. One rehearsed answer to a 4 percent call was the difference between a tie and a win.

What the report didn't do. It didn't call any of these plays. Inside Slant, the quick-game slant, and the deep over were all in our offense before Teo tagged a single Sentinels snap. The report decided when to call them and what the quarterback should watch when we did. That's the right job for a report.

What it missed. Our own self-scout that week didn't have the reduced-split scissors tendency on it, and Russ's staff did. Within the same week, the other side's report on us was better in one place than ours on ourselves. Good scouting doesn't mean you won the scouting battle everywhere.


Discussion Questions

  1. The Ames tell was 14 of 18. Suppose it had been 9 of 12. Would you still have built the opening call around it? What would you have wanted to see first?
  2. Why was it important that Teo tagged Ames's first step from the end-zone view and not the sideline?
  3. Rome said "Show him the clip again" instead of repeating the number. When is a number the right thing to give a player?
  4. The zero bin's deep over sat third on the list "because we didn't think Russ would call it." Was that the right order? What would you have needed to see to move it up?
  5. Russ adapted to two of these three rows by January (the tells were gone after Week 10). Which of the three would you expect a defensive coordinator to fix first, and why?

Your Turn

Pick one defense you can watch on film or television. Chart one linebacker's first step on every run from one formation for a full game, from the end-zone view if you can get it. Write the count with its denominator. Then watch every exception and write one sentence about what the exceptions have in common. If you can't find anything, write that down too: "no second rule found in N exceptions" is a real scouting result.