77 min read

Monday, 6:40 in the morning, the day after we lost 23–20 in Sacramento. Gus Ferrante's meeting room

Chapter 5 — The Offensive Line: Protection Schemes, Run Blocking, and the Five Players Who Determine Whether Anything Else Matters

The Hook: Six Blockers, Five Rushers, One Free Man

Monday, 6:40 in the morning, the day after we lost 23–20 in Sacramento. Gus Ferrante's meeting room has one window, one screen, and five chairs in a row, and his linemen sit in them in the order they line up: Achterberg, Moss, Szabo, Lorusso, Fitch. Left tackle to right tackle. Gus says it's so he can look down the row and see the line. I think it's so nobody can hide.

I was standing in the doorway with a coffee. I wasn't invited. I came because the clip on his screen was my fault, and I wanted to hear how he'd teach it.

Third-and-7 at our own 38. Six minutes and fifty-one seconds left in the third quarter. Tied 13–13. Eleven personnel, two receivers to each side, Brooks Harlan flexed about four yards off our left tackle into the boundary, Jalen Ruffin in the gun on Darius Vance's left. Our call was a six-man dropback with the line sliding left, toward the boundary, where the crowd was. Our rule against a double-A-gap look on long downs was simple: six-man, back on the Mike. Vance pointed at Marcus Bell: "Fifty-four's the Mike!" Ruffin had Bell.

Then, at about ten seconds on the play clock, the Sentinels' strong-side end, Grant Weller, stood up out of his stance and walked out to the boundary, outside DeShawn Rollins. Now the left side looked like a crowd: Weller, Rollins, the nose head-up on our left guard, a linebacker in each A-gap. Vance did exactly what we'd taught him. He tapped Ruffin and moved him out to the boundary edge to take Weller. That left Bell, in the field-side A-gap, as the one man the protection would not block. If Bell came, Vance would throw hot to Mekhi Powers in the field slot.

Gus ran the snap. He ran it again. By my count he ran it nineteen times before he said a word.

Gus: "How many rushed?"

Aaron Szabo: "Five."

Gus: "How many blockers we got?"

Szabo: "Six. Us and Jalen."

Gus: "So who's free?"

Nobody answered, because everybody knew. Gus walked up to the screen and put his finger on Rashad Coleman, the 3-technique outside Pete Lorusso. At the snap Coleman took one hard step into the B-gap. Lorusso set, punched, did everything right. And Coleman was gone, backpedaling and sliding outside into the window under Powers, exactly where the hot throw was supposed to go.

Pete Lorusso: "I blocked air, Coach."

Gus: "You blocked a guy who left. That's different. Air doesn't punch you first." He moved his finger to the boundary. "And Jalen blocked a guy who left. Weller walks out, Weller drops. So we had six blockers, they rushed five, and two of ours were blocking ghosts. That's four on five. You can't win four on five. Nobody can."

Bell came free through the A-gap. Vance looked hot, found a 300-pound defensive tackle sitting in his window, hesitated for the half-second that a free rusher needs, and went down at our 29. Minus nine. Fourth-and-16. Punt. The Sentinels drove for a touchdown later in the quarter, and we spent the rest of the afternoon chasing.

I said then what I'd say to Russ Kimbrough at the league meetings in the spring: "The end walked at about ten seconds. We had to move the back, and the back was the guy who was supposed to be on the Mike."

Gus nodded. Then he turned to the room and said the thing he says every day, the thing painted above his door: "Five men, one heartbeat." He pointed at the screen. "That wasn't one heartbeat. That was six heartbeats counting six different things. Our job this week is to count the same thing."

Notice what that snap was not. It was not a missed block. Nobody got beat. Achterberg had Rollins, Kendrick Moss had the nose, Szabo had the boundary-side linebacker, Darnell Fitch picked up the cornerback blitzing off the edge. Every lineman did his assignment, and we still gave up a free runner at the quarterback in 1.9 seconds. The defense didn't beat our blockers. It beat our count.

That is what this chapter is about. You can draw the most beautiful play in the world, and it lives or dies on five large men agreeing, in about two seconds, on who they are going to block. The offensive line decides whether the run game is a threat, whether play-action has time, whether the quick game is a choice or a necessity, and whether your quarterback finishes the season. Everything else in this book stands on them.

🏃 Fast Track: If you've coached the line, skim 5.1–5.2 and go straight to the covered/uncovered rules in 5.3, the pass-protection families in 5.7, and the full breakdown of the Game 2 sack in 5.8 — it's the clearest example in this book of protection arithmetic going wrong while every block is "right."

🔬 Deep Dive: This chapter introduces; later chapters own the depth. Inside zone rules live in Chapter 9, gap schemes in Chapter 11, and every protection with its hot and sight-adjust rules in Chapter 22 and Appendix D.

📺 Film Watcher: This Sunday, on one third down, ignore the ball. Watch the center's first step and the running back's eyes. Count how many offensive players block nobody. When the answer is more than zero and the quarterback gets hit, you've just seen the defense win the count.


5.1 The Five: Who They Are and What Each One Is For

Every football fan can name the quarterback. Most can't name the left guard. And the left guard is the reason the quarterback had time to throw.

The offensive line is the five players who line up shoulder to shoulder in the middle of the formation: from left to right, the left tackle (LT), left guard (LG), center (C), right guard (RG), and right tackle (RT). They are ineligible receivers — in the NFL they wear numbers 50 through 79 and cannot catch a forward pass unless they report to the referee as eligible (that's how Rodney Kalu, our sixth lineman, becomes a "tackle eligible" in our Jumbo package). Their job is to block: to move defenders off the ball on a run, and to stand between rushers and the quarterback on a pass.

That sounds like one job. It's five.

The left tackle and the blind side

For a right-handed quarterback — Vance is one — the left tackle guards the blind side, the side the quarterback's back is turned to while he looks downfield to his right. The rusher coming from there is the one he can't see. That is why left tackles are, as a group, among the most highly paid non-quarterbacks in the sport, and why the premier speed rusher on most defenses lines up against the left tackle. Michael Lewis built a whole book, The Blind Side, around that economic fact.

The prototype is long, light-footed, and patient: a man who can kick-slide (shuffle backward and outward while staying square — we'll teach it in 5.5) fast enough to meet a speed rusher at the corner without giving up the inside. Ben Achterberg, our left tackle, is 6-foot-6 with long arms and a quick vertical set. His weakness, which every opponent's film study finds, is that his punch comes a bit late and a bit wide — and that after two or three speed rushes in a series, he starts to overset (set too far outside), opening the inside door. Hold that thought; it's the whole story of DeShawn Rollins in Case Study 1.

The guards

Guards are the strongest, squattest players on the line, and they live in a phone booth. They face the biggest interior linemen, the 3-techniques and nose tackles, on every snap. In the run game they're your pullers — the linemen who leave their spot at the snap and run laterally to block somewhere else. Kendrick Moss, our left guard, pulls on counter and anchors against nose tackles. Pete Lorusso, our right guard, pulls on power and is an aggressive short-setter in pass protection: he doesn't retreat, he attacks the rusher at the line with an early punch. That's a strength until a defensive tackle uses it against him — as Coleman did in the hook, by taking one step at Lorusso and leaving.

The center: the quarterback of the line

The center snaps the ball and then blocks, which makes him the only lineman who has to do two things at once. He is also the line's brain. Before every snap Aaron Szabo identifies the front, confirms which linebacker is the reference point for the protection (the "Mike point," 5.7), and makes the line's calls: which way the slide goes, which double teams are on, who's working with whom against a stunt. A center who is a step slow can survive. A center who is a thought slow gets your quarterback hurt.

Centers tend to be the shortest linemen — leverage matters when the nose tackle is in your face before the ball is back to the quarterback — and the smartest. When I hire a line coach I ask him to tell me about his centers first. If he talks about strength before he talks about communication, I keep looking.

The right tackle

The right tackle used to be the "strong side" mauler, the run blocker next to the tight end, while the left tackle got the athlete. That gap has narrowed. Defenses now move their best rusher wherever the matchup is best, and right tackles see as many speed rushers as left tackles do. Darnell Fitch is a classic modern right tackle: a run blocker first, a technician with the down-step (the short, inside-and-forward first step that lets him cut off a defender aligned inside him on zone runs). Gus drills Fitch's down-step every single day. Fitch can do it in his sleep. That is the point.

The Outlaws' line at a glance

Our fictional Outlaws' line is the one you'll see on every diagram in this book:

Pos Player # Body / style Run-game role Pass-pro note
LT Ben Achterberg 78 6'6", long arms Zone reach, backside cutoff; pulls on GT counter Quick vertical set; punch late and wide; oversets after repeated speed rushes
LG Kendrick Moss 67 Thick, powerful Pulls on counter; combos with the center Anchor vs. nose tackles and bull rushers
C Aaron Szabo 61 Shortest, quickest mind Combos both ways; climbs to the Mike Makes the Mike-point and slide calls; slides to the 3-technique on long-yardage dropbacks
RG Pete Lorusso 64 Aggressive, strong hands Pulls on power Short-setter with an early punch
RT Darnell Fitch 72 Run-first technician Down-step and reach Widens to an edge or corner blitzer when the protection asks
6th Rodney Kalu 70 Swing guard/tackle Jumbo eligible on the goal line Plays any spot in an emergency

🔄 Check your understanding: Why does the premier speed rusher on most defenses line up across from the left tackle — and what single fact about the quarterback changes that answer?

Answer

Because for a right-handed quarterback the left side is the blind side: his back is turned to it while he reads to his right, so a rusher from there is the one he can't see and can't step away from. If the quarterback is left-handed, the blind side flips to the right, and so does the premium on the tackle who guards it. (In practice, modern defenses also move their best rusher to whichever tackle is the weakest matchup — which is the "weakest link" principle in 5.9.)

Gaps and technique numbers: the line's coordinate system

Before you can teach anyone to block, you need a shared map. Football uses two.

Gaps are the spaces between blockers, lettered from the center outward: A (between center and guard), B (guard and tackle), C (tackle and tight end, or just outside the tackle if there's no tight end), D (outside the tight end). Five linemen alone create six gaps — an A, B, and C on each side. Every attached tight end or wingback adds one more. That arithmetic is the reason formations matter to the run game (Chapter 3): attaching a tight end creates a gap the defense must fill with another body.

Technique numbers describe where a defensive lineman lines up relative to the blockers. In the most common system: 0 is head-up on the center; 1 is a shade on the center; 2i is the inside shoulder of the guard, 2 is head-up, 3 is the outside shoulder; 4i, 4, and 5 do the same on the tackle; and on a tight end, 7 is the inside shoulder, 6 is head-up, and 9 is outside. (Some systems swap 6 and 7 — know which one your staff uses and say it out loud in July.)

GAPS (tight end attached on the right)

  [C]  LT  [B]  LG  [A]  C  [A]  RG  [B]  RT  [C]  Y  [D]

TECHNIQUE NUMBERS (right half shown; the left half mirrors it)

      C              RG               RT               Y
      0  1        2i  2   3        4i  4   5        7  6   9

📊 Diagram (described): The top line shows the five offensive linemen and a tight end on the right, with a gap letter between each pair: a C gap outside the left tackle, B between left tackle and left guard, A between left guard and center, A again between center and right guard, B between right guard and right tackle, C between right tackle and tight end, and D outside the tight end. The bottom line labels where a defensive lineman can align on the right half: 0 head-up on the center and 1 on his shoulder; 2i, 2, and 3 on the inside shoulder, nose, and outside shoulder of the right guard; 4i, 4, and 5 on the right tackle; and 7, 6, and 9 on the tight end's inside shoulder, nose, and outside shoulder.

A 3-technique is a defensive tackle on the outside shoulder of the guard — the most disruptive interior alignment in football, because he's in the B-gap and can get upfield before anyone touches him. A 5-technique sits on the outside shoulder of the tackle. A "wide 9" is a speed rusher aligned outside the tight end (or where the tight end would be), the alignment that puts a tackle on an island. You will hear these numbers on every headset in America. Make your linemen fluent in them.


5.2 Stance, Splits, and the First Step

Every block begins before the snap, with how the lineman stands and how far he stands from the man next to him.

Two-point and three-point stances

A three-point stance puts one hand on the ground: weight slightly forward, hips low, ready to fire out. It's the run blocker's stance — you can generate force forward and low, and you look the same on every snap. A two-point stance is upright, hands up, weight balanced or slightly back: the pass protector's stance, because you can kick back instantly without first lifting your body off the ground.

The trade-off is information. If your tackles are in three-point stances on runs and two-point stances on passes, a good defensive end knows the play before the ball moves. That's why shotgun-heavy, pass-heavy offenses often put their whole line in two-point stances on most snaps: the stance stops telling. Many offenses split the difference: tackles in a two-point (they need the kick in pass protection most), guards and center in three-point (they need the forward punch in the run game most, and the rusher across from them is already close).

We let our tackles choose by situation: three-point on early downs when the run is live, two-point on third-and-long. That's a tell. I know it's a tell. On Teo's self-scout report it's listed under "tells we accept," because the alternative — Achterberg in a three-point stance against Rollins on third-and-9 — costs more than it saves. Accepting a tell on purpose is a coaching decision. Not knowing you have one is a mistake.

Splits

Splits are the distances between linemen's feet. A typical NFL guard-to-center split is about two feet, guard-to-tackle a little wider; teams vary. The spacing changes everything:

  • Wider splits make every gap wider. The defense has to widen to cover them, which stretches the front and creates bigger running lanes, and puts more space between defenders who want to twist. The cost: a wider gap is easier for a quick defensive tackle to shoot through, and a lineman has farther to go to help his neighbor. The early Air Raid offenses (Hal Mumme and Mike Leach) are widely known for unusually wide line splits that spread the rush and made it easier for the quarterback to see throwing lanes.
  • Tighter splits shrink gaps, make double teams and combination blocks easier, and give a lineman less ground to cover when he has to pass a stunt to his neighbor. The cost: the defense can squeeze, and a defensive end on the outside shoulder of the tackle can get to the edge faster.

Most offenses use a base split rule and then adjust it on purpose, by play. Gus's base rule for us is "two feet, toes to toes, inside-out" — each lineman sets his split off the man inside him. On outside zone the tackle may widen to stretch the end; on a pass where we expect an inside game, the guards may tighten six inches. Tiny changes. The defense's best interior players watch them.

⚠️ Common mistake: Changing splits by play type — wide on runs, tight on passes — without knowing it. It's the same tell as the stance, only harder for your own staff to see. In Week 2 at St. Louis, Frank Ostrowski's defensive tackles were jumping our run splits all afternoon; Teo found it Monday in the end-zone copy: on run plays our right guard was setting up about eight inches wider. We lost 20–17. The fix is boring and it works: one split rule, adjusted only by an explicit call that is used on run and pass, so the adjustment stops meaning anything.

🔄 Check your understanding: Your tackles use a three-point stance on early downs and a two-point stance on third-and-long. Name the tell, say who on the defense can use it, and give one reason a staff might keep it anyway.

Answer

The stance tells the defense run-or-pass before the snap: a three-point tackle on third-and-long would be a run (or play-action) tip, and a two-point tackle on first down a pass tip. The defensive ends and the linebackers who key them can use it to start their rush or their run fit a beat early. A staff keeps it when the cost of hiding it is higher than the cost of showing it — for example, a tall left tackle who can't get out of a three-point stance fast enough to meet a speed rusher on third-and-9. Accept the tell on purpose, write it on the self-scout, and break it on a planned snap.

The first step

The first step is where the play begins for a lineman, and every scheme has its own. On inside zone, it's a short zone step play-side — six inches, to gain ground and stay square. On outside zone it's a wider reach step or bucket step to gain width on a defender aligned outside. On a down block it's a hard step inside to cut off the defender's penetration. In pass protection it's the kick back and out. A lineman who takes the wrong first step loses the block before he touches anyone, which is why the first step is drilled every day — "steps before hands," Gus says, "and hands before strength."

🏫 Any level: In high school you'll often have one or two athletes on the line and three kids who are big because they grew early. Simplify the stance (everyone in the same stance on every play, no tells), keep one split rule ("one foot apart; widen only on the call"), and teach no more than three first steps: zone step, down step, and pass set. More than that and they'll be thinking when they should be moving. The rules on blocking below the waist also differ by level — high school codes have historically limited it to a zone near the ball at the snap and have tightened it over time — so check your current code before you teach any low block (5.4).


5.3 Run Blocking I: Zone — You Block an Area, and the Defense Picks the Hole

Run blocking comes in two great families. In zone blocking, every lineman steps in the same direction and blocks whoever enters his area; the hole is decided after the snap by how the defense reacts. In gap blocking (also called man/gap or power blocking), each lineman has an assigned defender or gap, linemen block down and pull across, and the hole is designed before the snap. Most NFL offenses run both. We're an inside-zone and duo team from 11 personnel and an outside-zone and duo team from 12, with power and counter as the change-up. This section is zone; 5.4 is gap.

This is an introduction. Chapter 9 and Chapter 10 own the full rules and the running back's read. Here you need the vocabulary every lineman uses on every zone play.

Covered and uncovered

The first question every zone lineman asks before the snap is: am I covered? A lineman is covered when a defensive lineman is aligned on him or in his play-side gap — the gap in the direction the play is going. He is uncovered when there's nobody there; the nearest defender in his area is a linebacker off the ball.

The rule that follows is the heart of zone:

  • Covered: step play-side and block the man who's on you.
  • Uncovered: step play-side and help the covered lineman to your play-side — a combination block, or combo — with your eyes on the second-level linebacker. When that linebacker commits, one of you comes off the double team to block him. That's the climb.

The beauty is that the same two rules work against every front. You don't need a separate assignment for an Over front, an Under front, and a bear front. You need five men who can recognize "covered" the same way every time.

Here's the most common look we see from the Sentinels, Russ Kimbrough's nickel Over front, against our base Gun Doubles Right with Harlan attached:

PRE-SNAP: Gun Doubles Right vs. Nickel Over (who is covered?)

             F                         $
  C                                                  C
           *           W         M
                 E         N        T    E
  X      H         LT   LG   C   RG   RT   Y         Z
                         R   Q

📊 Diagram (described): The Outlaws are in a two-by-two set: split end and slot on the left, tight end attached to the right tackle and flanker on the right; the quarterback is in the shotgun with the back offset to his left. The Sentinels show two high safeties, corners over the wide receivers, the nickel over the slot, and two linebackers off the ball, the Will to the left and the Mike to the right. Their four down linemen are a weak-side end outside the left tackle, a nose shaded on the center's left shoulder, a 3-technique on the right guard's outside shoulder, and a strong-side end on the outside shoulder of the right tackle, inside the tight end.

Now apply the rule for inside zone to the right, the play-side being the tight end's side. Check each lineman's own spot and his play-side gap:

Blocker Who's on him or in his play-side gap? Covered? Assignment
Y (Harlan) Nobody in the D-gap Uncovered Arc release to the next threat outside: the strong safety filling the alley
RT (Fitch) Strong-side end on his outside shoulder Covered Block the end
RG (Lorusso) 3-technique on his outside shoulder Covered Block the 3-technique
C (Szabo) Nose is on his backside shoulder; his play-side A-gap is empty Uncovered Combo with the RG on the 3-technique; climb to the Mike
LG (Moss) Nose is in his play-side A-gap Covered Block the nose
LT (Achterberg) Weak end is outside him (backside); his play-side B-gap is empty Uncovered Combo with the LG on the nose; climb to the Will
Backside end — Left alone Held by the quarterback's fake (and read, once you get to Chapter 12)
POST-SNAP: Inside Zone right vs. Nickel Over

        W           M                      $
        ^           ^                      ^
        |           |                      |
 (E)    |        N  |         T      E     |
        |        X  |         X      X     |
       LT     LG    C      RG     RT       Y
       combo N      combo T       base E   arc to $
       LT climbs    C climbs
                 R . . Q . .> aim: outside leg of the RG

📊 Diagram (described): After the snap the whole line steps right. The left guard and left tackle double-team the nose and the left tackle climbs off to block the Will linebacker; the center and right guard double-team the 3-technique and the center climbs off to block the Mike; the right tackle blocks the strong-side end one-on-one; the tight end releases outside on an arc to block the strong safety coming down into the alley. The weak-side end is left unblocked on the backside. The back takes the handoff aiming at the right guard's outside leg and reads the first down lineman past the center to decide where to cut.

Count it. Six blockers. Six defenders who matter to the play: four linemen minus the backside end (three), two linebackers, and the alley safety. Two double teams that each produce a climber. The math is "even," and the play still works because the double teams move the two biggest bodies backward before splitting to the linebackers. That is the whole economy of zone: two blockers on one defender until the linebacker declares, then one on one at both levels.

🔍 Why this works: The combo block solves a problem no single blocker can. A linebacker five yards off the ball can go anywhere — fill the A-gap, scrape over the top, sit. If you assign one lineman to him at the snap, that lineman has to guess where to go, and the defensive tackle in front of him is unblocked while he guesses. The combo lets two linemen deal with the immediate threat (the down lineman) while watching the linebacker. Whichever way the linebacker commits, the blocker nearest his path comes off to meet him. The defense must declare first; the offense answers second. That's the thesis of the whole offense — the offense knows where the ball is going — compressed into two men and four yards.

The zone vocabulary

Term What it is When you see it
Combo / double team Two adjacent linemen on one down lineman, eyes on a linebacker; one climbs Every zone play, front side
Deuce / Ace Many systems name combos by who's in them — often "deuce" for guard–tackle, "ace" for center–guard. Names vary; agree on yours Line calls before the snap
Climb Leaving the double team to block the second level When the linebacker commits — not before
Reach Blocking a defender aligned outside you by getting your helmet and body to his outside Outside zone; covered play-side linemen
Scoop A backside lineman stepping play-side to cut off a defender aligned in the gap play-side of him Backside of zone, especially outside zone
Cutoff Getting your body between a backside defender and the ball's path, even if you don't move him Backside tackle/guard on zone
Base / drive One-on-one block, straight ahead, moving the man back Covered linemen with no help needed

The 45-yard run: what a combo is worth

Here's what that picture looked like when it worked. Game 1 against the Sentinels, second quarter, 2nd-and-6 at the Sacramento 45, our ball, leading 10–7. Eleven personnel, Gun Doubles Right, Harlan attached right, Ruffin offset. Inside zone to the tight end side. The Sentinels' end, Tavon Greer, squeezed down hard inside, the Will, Jordan Ames, filled the wrong gap, and their strong safety, Tre Holloway, took a flat angle. Ruffin pressed the play-side, saw the front side clogged by Greer's squeeze, and bounced it outside. Forty-five yards. Touchdown. 17–7.

I tell rookies about this run because it teaches the right lesson about blocking. Our line didn't "blow anyone off the ball" on that play. What it did was hold its area long enough that three defensive mistakes became a touchdown instead of a two-yard gain. The combos stayed on the down linemen long enough for the linebackers to declare; Harlan's arc put him in Holloway's path; Fitch's block on Greer let Greer squeeze himself out of the play. Zone blocking doesn't create the hole. It creates the conditions for the defense to give you one.

🛡️ The defense's view: Russ Kimbrough's answer to our inside zone, as I learned from watching him for three games, is to make our combos guess. He'll put the nose head-up on a guard instead of shaded, so the center can't tell whether he's covered. He'll stem the 3-technique into the A-gap at the snap so the guard's "covered" read is wrong. He'll fire the Will into the gap our climber is leaving. Every one of those is aimed at the same thing: the half-second when two linemen have to decide, together, who climbs. Defensive coaches don't attack blocks. They attack decisions.

🔄 Check your understanding: In the diagram above, the nose tackle moves from the center's left shoulder to head-up on the left guard before the snap. The play is still inside zone right. Who is now covered, who's uncovered, and what changes for the center?

Answer

With the nose head-up on the left guard, the left guard is covered (a man is on him). The center now has nobody on him and nobody in his play-side A-gap — he's uncovered, so he still works play-side to combo the 3-technique with the right guard. The left tackle is still uncovered (nobody in his play-side B-gap) and works to combo the left guard's man. Net change: almost nothing, which is the point of zone rules. The one real change is that the left guard–left tackle combo now starts on a man directly in front of the guard, so the guard can drive him rather than reach him.


5.4 Run Blocking II: Gap and Man — Down, Pull, Kick, Wrap, Trap

Zone says "block an area; the defense decides the hole." Gap blocking says "we decide the hole, and we'll bring extra blockers to it." The two ideas aren't rivals. They're the two halves of a run game, and a defense that has seen only one of them will be wrong when the other arrives.

The gap vocabulary

Down block: a lineman blocks the defender aligned to his inside (toward the ball's path), driving him down the line. Down blocks create a wall on the play-side and seal the inside.

Double team (gap version): two linemen drive one down lineman vertically off the ball at the point of attack, then one comes off to the linebacker. Same idea as a zone combo, but the double team is aimed at a specific man, not an area.

Pull: a lineman leaves his spot at the snap and runs laterally behind the line to block somewhere else. The puller's first step is a pull step — open the hip, get depth, run flat.

Kick-out: a blocker (a pulling guard, a fullback, or an H-back) blocks the end man on the line of scrimmage — the last defender on the line — outward, toward the sideline. The kick-out creates the outside edge of the hole.

Wrap (or lead): a second puller, or the first puller if someone else kicked out, turns up inside the kick-out and leads through the hole to the first linebacker who shows.

Back block (back-side block): a lineman blocks the defender on the backside, the opposite way of the play, to fill the space a puller left. The center's back block is what lets the guard next to him pull at all.

Hinge: the backside tackle steps inside and pass-sets to cut off the backside end, so nobody chases the play from behind.

Trap: a puller blocks a defensive lineman who was left unblocked on purpose. The trapped defender sees nobody in front of him, charges upfield into the backfield, and gets hit from the side by a lineman he never saw. The trap uses the defender's aggression against him.

Power: the oldest blueprint

Power is the gap scheme every offense knows: down blocks and a double team at the point of attack, a kick-out on the end, a backside guard pulling to wrap through the hole. We call it "Power," and when we run it from Twenty-one personnel our fullback, Sione Fale, kicks out and Pete Lorusso, our right guard, pulls. Here it is to the left, against a base 4-3 look:

PRE-SNAP: Power Left (Twenty-one, Offset I, Y attached left)
vs. a 4-3 Over

      S             M          W
   E            T          N          E
      Y     LT    LG    C    RG    RT
                        Q
                    B
                        R

📊 Diagram (described): The Outlaws have the tight end attached on the left, five linemen, the quarterback under center, the fullback offset left a few yards behind him, and the running back deeper behind the quarterback. The defense has an end outside the tight end, a 3-technique on the left guard's outside shoulder, a nose shaded on the center's right shoulder, and an end outside the right tackle. Three linebackers stand off the ball: the Sam over the tight end, the Mike between the left guard and center, and the Will to the right.

POST-SNAP: Power Left — down, double, back-block, kick, pull and wrap

      S            M             W
      ^            ^         <---'  (W scrapes over the top)
      |            |
   E  |      T     |      N           E
   X  |      X     |      X           X
   ^  Y     LT    LG    C    RG      RT  <- hinge, cut off the E
   |         \double/   back-block N
   |      LG climbs to M
   B kicks out E
          ^
          |___________________ RG pulls, turns up inside the
                               kick-out for the first backer
                    R ...> takes it to the hole behind the puller

📊 Diagram (described): At the snap the tight end blocks the Sam linebacker. The left tackle and left guard double-team the 3-technique and drive him back; the left guard comes off to the Mike. The center blocks back to his right on the nose to fill the space the right guard leaves. The right guard pulls left behind the line, turns up through the hole just inside the fullback's block, and blocks the first linebacker he meets, usually the Will scraping over from the backside. The right tackle hinges to wall off the backside end. The fullback kicks the end man on the line outward. The back follows the puller through the hole between the double team and the kick-out.

Blocker Power Left rule Against this front
Y Down to backer (block the first threat inside or the linebacker over you) Sam
LT Down / double the first down lineman inside 3-technique, with the LG
LG Double the down lineman with the LT; climb to the backer 3-technique → Mike
C Back block (the backside gap) Nose
RG Pull; wrap inside the kick-out to the first backer who shows Will (scraping)
RT Hinge (cut off backside) Backside end
B Kick out the end man on the line Play-side end
R Aim at the double team; follow the puller —

Count it: seven blockers, seven defenders in the box. Power doesn't win by having more blockers than the defense has defenders. It wins by angles — down blocks are easier than drive blocks, because you're hitting the defender from the side — and by adding a blocker at the point of attack who the defense didn't see coming until the ball was snapped.

🔄 Check your understanding: On Power Left, why does the center block away from the play?

Answer

Because the right guard is pulling. When he leaves, the space he occupied — and the nose tackle shaded toward it — would be wide open for the nose to chase the play from behind. The center's back block fills that space. Without it, the pull is a gift to the defense: the nose follows the puller into the backfield.

Counter and trap, briefly

GT counter ("G" for guard, "T" for tackle) pulls two backside linemen: the guard kicks out the end man on the line, and the tackle wraps through the hole to the linebacker. The back takes a jab step the other way first — the "counter" — to pull the linebackers away from the hole. Joe Gibbs's Washington teams made a version of it, the counter trey, famous in the 1980s, and it remains a staple because it marries a misdirection step to a numbers advantage at the point of attack. For us, Kendrick Moss and Ben Achterberg pull on counter to the right. Chapter 11 diagrams it in full.

A trap asks a lineman to do the hardest thing in football: block a man who is charging toward the ball while you're running across the field at him. It works against penetrating defensive tackles — the 3-technique who wants to get upfield is exactly the man you leave alone and then hit from the side. It's cheap to install and devastating against the right opponent; against a disciplined, read-and-react tackle who sits and looks, it gets stuffed.

Zone vs. gap, side by side

Zone Gap (power/counter/trap)
Who decides the hole? The defense, after the snap The offense, before the snap
Line's first step Everyone steps play-side Down blocks, pulls, back blocks — different steps
What it beats Defenses that flow fast and over-pursue; slanting fronts Defenses that read and squeeze; light boxes the offense can out-angle
What beats it Penetration that kills combos before they form; spill-and-fill fronts Fast flow that beats the puller to the hole; "wrong-arming" the kick-out
Back's job Read the blocks and pick the hole Follow the puller; hit the designed hole
Line's key skill Communication and lateral movement Pulling, angles, and power at the point of attack
Practice cost High (many reps to learn reads together) Moderate (clear assignments, but pullers need reps)

A cut block is a block aimed at a defender's thighs or knees to put him on the ground. Zone teams, especially wide-zone teams in the Mike Shanahan and Alex Gibbs tradition, historically used backside cut blocks to take defensive linemen off their feet so they couldn't chase the play. It's effective. It's also dangerous, and rules at every level have restricted it over the years.

In the NFL, a chop block — one blocker engaging a defender high while another hits him low — is illegal; the league banned it outright in the mid-2010s after years of narrowing it. Blocks below the waist are permitted only in certain situations, mostly close to the line of scrimmage near the snap, and the restrictions have tightened repeatedly. College and high school codes have their own, often stricter, rules about where and when a low block is allowed. The details change. Check the current rulebook for your level before you teach any block below the waist.

🩺 Player safety: A cut block taught carelessly ends careers — the defender's knee and sometimes the blocker's neck. If your code allows a low block, teach it as a block on the near thigh, shoulder across the body, eyes up, never on a defender already engaged high by a teammate (that's a chop), and never from the side or behind. Many high school staffs simply don't teach it, and nothing in this book's run game requires it. Our backside on outside zone uses cutoff and scoop technique — body position, not bodies on the ground.

📋 Try it — Draw it up: Draw inside zone to the left (the weak side) against the same Nickel Over front from 5.3: weak-side end outside the left tackle, nose on the center's left shoulder, 3-technique on the right guard's outside shoulder, strong-side end on the right tackle's outside shoulder, Will to the left, Mike to the right. For each of the five linemen and the tight end, write covered or uncovered and the assignment.

Answer

Play-side is now the left. Check each man's own spot and his play-side (left) gap:

Blocker Play-side check Covered? Assignment
LT Weak end on his outside (play-side) shoulder Covered Block the end (reach/base)
LG Nobody on him; his play-side B-gap is empty Uncovered Combo with the LT on the end, eyes on the Will; climb to the Will
C Nose on his play-side (left) shoulder Covered Block the nose
RG Play-side A-gap empty; 3-tech is on his backside shoulder Uncovered Combo with the center on the nose, eyes on the Mike; climb to the Mike
RT Strong end outside him is backside; his play-side B-gap is empty Uncovered Step play-side and cut off the 3-technique (scoop)
Y Backside — Cut off the backside end, or release on a play-action version

The thing to notice: going weak, the combos move — guard–tackle on the end, center–guard on the nose — and the hardest block on the field becomes the right tackle's scoop on a 3-technique who is already a step closer to the ball than he is. That's why Gus drills Fitch's down-step every day, and why many staffs like inside zone toward the 3-technique's side when their backside tackle can't win that scoop. (Chapter 9 gives the full rule set, including the line calls when the end slants.)


5.5 Pass Protection I: The Individual Craft

Run blocking is about moving people. Pass protection is about not being moved — for about three seconds, against a man who gets to pick his direction, his move, and his timing, while you have to react to all three. The rusher is on offense in that matchup. The blocker is playing defense.

That's why I say pass protection is the most defensive skill on the offense. A good pass protector thinks like a cornerback: keep leverage, don't open the gate, make the rusher go the long way, and never, ever give him your chest.

The kick-slide and the set point

A tackle in pass protection uses a kick-slide: his post foot (the inside foot) stays planted as the pivot while his set foot (the outside foot) kicks back and out; then the post foot slides to rebalance. Kick, slide; kick, slide. His shoulders stay square to the line, his hips stay low, and he never crosses his feet. Crossing your feet means you can't change direction, and changing direction is the whole job.

Where the tackle kicks to is his set point: the spot where he wants to meet the rusher. The set point depends on where the rusher is aligned and where the quarterback will be. Against a wide rusher, the tackle must get deep enough to cut him off before he turns the corner. Against a rusher aligned tight, he can set shorter or even attack at the line. There are three sets every tackle learns:

THREE PASS SETS FOR THE LEFT TACKLE (the set goes BACK, down the page)

 VERTICAL SET            ANGLE (45) SET          QUICK (JUMP) SET
 vs. a wide rusher       vs. a 5-technique       vs. a tight rusher

 E                             E                          E
  \                            |                          |
   \    LT                     LT                         v
    \    |                       \                  LT ---> meets
     \   |                        \                     him at the
      v  v                         v                    line
   [set point]               [set point]
   deep: straight back,      shorter: back and out
   stay square               at about 45 degrees

📊 Diagram (described): Three small pictures of the left tackle against a rusher outside him. In the vertical set, the rusher is aligned wide and the tackle kicks straight back several yards, staying square, to meet him at a deep set point before he can turn the corner. In the angle set, the rusher is aligned closer, on the tackle's outside shoulder, and the tackle kicks back and out at about forty-five degrees to a shorter set point. In the quick set, the rusher is aligned tight and the tackle steps forward to meet him right at the line of scrimmage, taking away his run-up.

Each set has a price. The vertical set protects the corner but concedes ground, and the deeper you go, the bigger the space you leave between you and the guard — the inside door. The angle set is a compromise. The quick set (or jump set) takes away the rusher's runway and surprises him, but if he beats your hands, he's past you instantly, and the quarterback has nowhere to go. Good tackles mix all three, because a rusher who knows your set knows his move.

Hands, punch, and anchor

When the rusher arrives, the protector punches: both hands, thumbs up, into the rusher's chest plate, inside his arms. The punch stops his momentum and gives the blocker control. The two variables are placement (inside, on the breastplate) and timing (the moment the rusher enters striking range, not before and not after). A punch thrown early lets the rusher swat it away. A punch thrown late or wide lets him get his hands into your chest first, and once a rusher's hands are inside yours, he's driving you, not the other way around.

Ben Achterberg's punch is a little late and a little wide. On most snaps, his length covers for it. Against DeShawn Rollins's long-arm — a rush move where the rusher extends one arm straight into the blocker's chest and drives him backward — it doesn't, because Rollins gets his hand to the chest plate first.

Against a bull rush (a straight power rush through the blocker), the protector anchors: drops his hips, widens his base, and gives ground grudgingly — a few inches at a time, never a yard at a time. A guard who can't anchor puts a defensive tackle in the quarterback's lap in two seconds, which is why Kendrick Moss is our left guard. Moss can anchor against a nose tackle who outweighs him.

Mirror, leverage, and the overset

Mirroring means staying in front of the rusher as he moves: he steps outside, you step outside; he fakes inside, you stay square. The protector's leverage rule is inside-out: protect the inside first, because the inside is the shortest way to the quarterback. A rusher who goes outside has to run the long way around, and the quarterback can step up into the pocket to make that route longer still. A rusher who wins inside is in the quarterback's face.

That rule is why the overset is the cardinal sin. An overset is a tackle who, afraid of being beaten around the corner, kicks too far outside. Now the inside is open, and a rusher who has been showing speed outside all game plants and comes back inside: an inside counter, often a spin.

Here is how that looked late in Game 1 against Sacramento. Fourth quarter, Sentinels lead 27–20, our ball at our own 37 on 3rd-and-11 — the third-down snap of the drive that would tie the game. The Sentinels were in their two-high Quarters look with a four-man rush. Rollins aligned wide outside Achterberg.

PRE-SNAP: Game 1, Q4, 3rd-and-11 at the AUS 37 (Sentinels lead 27-20)

           F                                     $
  C                                                       C
           *          W           M
     E             N        T          E
  X      H      LT   LG   C   RG   RT   Y         Z
                          Q
                        R

📊 Diagram (described): The Outlaws are in a two-by-two set with the tight end attached on the right and the quarterback in the shotgun. The Sentinels show two deep safeties, two linebackers, the nickel over the left slot, and four down linemen. DeShawn Rollins, the end on the left, is aligned wide, well outside the left tackle, where a speed rusher lines up to get a running start at the corner.

POST-SNAP: three frames on the left side (LT = Achterberg, E = Rollins)

 FRAME 1 (~0.7 s)      FRAME 2 (~1.5 s)       FRAME 3 (~2.2 s)
 speed outside         overset + spin         the door

  E                                           ^ Vance runs:
   \                         E                |  +12, 1st down
    \  LT                LT  |                |
     v  |               <--' v spin           |   LT     E
        v                     inside          |     \    |
                                              |      \   v
                                              Q <-----'
        Q                     Q              (steps left)

📊 Diagram (described): In the first frame, Rollins runs a speed rush outside and Achterberg kicks back in his vertical set to meet him. In the second frame, Achterberg has kicked too far outside — he has overset — and Rollins plants and spins back inside, toward the gap between the tackle and the guard. In the third frame, Rollins and Achterberg are both inside the quarterback's left side, and the space Rollins left on the outside is empty. Vance steps left through that door and runs up the left side for twelve yards and a first down.

That time we got lucky, because our quarterback is Darius Vance and he saw the spin coming and went out the door Rollins left. On an average quarterback that's a sack. It was the third speed rush Achterberg had seen in the series. Teo's charting over a five-game stretch — four games before Week 6, plus Game 1 — showed 151 pass-protection snaps, 104 vertical sets, 11 pressures allowed, and 21 oversets, and 16 of those 21 came after Achterberg had already seen two or more speed rushes in the same series. A tendency like that is information. Russ's staff found it too.

🔄 Check your understanding: Why is a tackle's overset more dangerous than getting beaten around the corner?

Answer

Because of distance. A rusher who wins around the corner still has to run the long way — outside, then back in — and the quarterback can step up into the pocket to make that path even longer. A rusher who wins inside after an overset takes the shortest path in football, straight at the quarterback, and the quarterback has nowhere to step: the pocket he would climb into is where the rusher is. Protect the inside first; make him go the long way.

📋 Try it — Whose fault? Game 2 at Sacramento, second quarter, 3rd-and-9 at our own 31. Nickel Over, a four-man rush, a two-high Quarters look. Our protection was a half-slide toward the right, and Ruffin was aligned on Vance's right — away from Rollins. Rollins took two speed steps at Achterberg, Achterberg vertical-set hard to cut him off, and Rollins spun back inside: sack, minus 8, punt. Rollins had already had three pressures that half. Whose fault: the left tackle's technique, the back's alignment, or the coordinator's protection plan? And what's the fix?

Answer

All three, in an order that matters. The technique fault is Achterberg's: he oversets after repeated speed rushes, and the spin is exactly what the overset invites. But he's a known quantity; his tendency was on our own charts. The plan fault is mine: on 3rd-and-9 against a rusher who was winning, I left my left tackle alone on an island with the back on the far side, where he couldn't help. The back's alignment was correct for the protection I called, so it isn't Ruffin's fault.

The fix was one of my three halftime changes in that game: chip Rollins with Ruffin. A chip is a back's glancing shot on an edge rusher on his way out into his route — not a full block, just a hit that knocks the rusher off his path and buys the tackle half a second. It costs you a fraction of a second on the back's route; it gives your tackle permission to set shorter, because he knows the outside has help. The deeper fix, which is Gus's, is to mix Achterberg's sets on long downs so that his kick stops being a tell. Rollins's numbers came down in the second half; a chip doesn't make a rusher disappear, it makes him slower, and slower is enough.


5.6 Pass Protection II: Games Up Front — Stunts, Twists, and the Handoff

A single rusher beats a single blocker with a move. Two rushers beat two blockers with a game — a stunt or twist, where defensive linemen exchange gaps after the snap to create confusion about who blocks whom.

The most common twist is the T-E (some call it "TEX"): the defensive tackle crashes outside first, into the space between the guard and tackle, and the defensive end loops around behind him to the inside. The tackle is the penetrator, the end is the looper. Its mirror image, the E-T, sends the end inside first and loops the tackle outside. The goal of either is the same: get one of the two blockers to follow his man across the other blocker's path, so both blockers end up on one rusher and the looper walks in clean.

PRE-SNAP: a T-E twist look, left side

            E             T
      LT          LG          C

📊 Diagram (described): On the left side of the line, a defensive end aligns outside the left tackle and a defensive tackle aligns on the outside shoulder of the left guard. Nothing about the alignment says "twist" — which is the point.

POST-SNAP: T-E twist, passed off ("Switch!")

            E . . . . . . .
            (stab, then loop  .
             behind the T)     .
                   T            v
                  /             E
                 v              |
      LT ====>] T               v
                        LG ===>] E

   LT: stays on his level, takes the crashing T
   LG: feels the T leave, stays home, takes the looping E

📊 Diagram (described): At the snap the defensive tackle crashes outside, toward the left tackle, and the defensive end takes a short step upfield, then loops inside behind him. The two blockers do not chase their original men across each other's paths. The left tackle stays on his level and blocks the tackle crashing into him; the left guard feels his man leave, stays in his spot, and picks up the end looping inside. One of them calls "Switch!" as it happens.

There are two ways to block a twist:

  • Pass it off (zone it): each blocker protects his area, not his man. When the penetrator crosses into the tackle's area, the tackle takes him; the guard, whose man just left, stays home and takes whoever comes into his area next — the looper. It requires both blockers to stay on the same level (side by side, not one deeper than the other) so the exchange can happen.
  • Man it (stay with your man): each blocker follows his assigned rusher wherever he goes. This works if the blockers are athletic and the twist is slow; it fails against a fast penetrator who drags his blocker into the other man's path.

Most lines pass off by rule and man it only by call. Ours does. The communication is one word — Gus uses "Switch!" — said loud and early, the instant one man feels his rusher leave. And the key skill is the guard's, not the tackle's: the guard must feel his man leaving without chasing him, and keep his eyes inside for the looper. Guards who chase their man across the tackle's face are the reason twists work.

⚠️ Common mistake: Uneven depth. If the tackle sets deep (vertical) and the guard sets short (a quick set to attack a 3-technique — exactly Pete Lorusso's style), there's a vertical gap between them, and the looper runs through it. The exchange can't happen because the blockers are on two different levels. Against a team that twists on third down, set your guard and tackle on the same level, even if that's not each man's favorite set. The scoreboard cost of getting this wrong is usually one sack and one drive, and it tends to come on third-and-long, when it costs most.

🛡️ The defense's view: Look at a twist the way Russ Kimbrough would. A rush game attacks whatever the protection promised — and a twist attacks the promise that two blockers will exchange. If a defensive staff's film shows one of my guards chasing his man, it will twist to that side. If it shows my left tackle setting deep against a speed rusher, it will run the game where the tackle has the farthest to come back inside. Defensive line coaches study our blockers' feet the way we study their safeties' eyes.

🔄 Check your understanding: On a T-E twist, which blocker is most likely to cause the sack — the guard or the tackle — and why?

Answer

Usually the guard. The penetrator starts on the guard and crashes outside into the tackle's area, so the guard's instinct is to chase him. If he does, he leaves his own spot empty and the looper comes right through it. The tackle's job is easier — the penetrator arrives in front of him. The guard's job is to let his man go and stay home, which is counter to every instinct a lineman has.


5.7 Protection Systems: The Mike Point and the Four Families

Individual technique decides whether a blocker wins his one-on-one. The protection system decides whether there's a one-on-one to win at all — whether every rusher has a blocker, and if one doesn't, who he is and what the quarterback does about it. That's arithmetic plus communication, and the person running it, before the snap, is the center.

The Mike point

Every protection needs a reference point: one defender from whom everyone else counts. In most NFL offenses that's the Mike ID (or Mike point): the quarterback or center points at one linebacker and declares him the "Mike" for this snap. He may or may not be the defense's actual middle linebacker. He's the man the protection will count from.

When Vance shouts "Fifty-four's the Mike!" he's telling five linemen and a back one thing: this is the dividing line. Everything to one side of him belongs to the slide; he and everything to the other side belongs to the man side; and in our base protection, the back is responsible for him if he rushes. If Szabo sees it differently, Szabo can correct it, and the two of them agree before the snap. If they don't agree, you have six players counting from two different points — which is how you get two men blocking one rusher and another rusher running free.

Why declare a "Mike" who isn't the real Mike? Because the protection only needs a consistent reference, not an accurate label. If the defense puts its middle linebacker over the slot and its outside linebacker in the A-gap, you point at the one in the A-gap. You're not naming the player. You're naming the threat.

The four families

Every protection you'll ever see is a version of one of these. Chapter 22 owns them in full, with hot and sight-adjust rules; here are the ideas.

Slide (zone) protection. The whole line slides one direction, each lineman responsible for the gap to his slide-side. The back takes the first threat on the opposite edge. It's great against twists (a gap-based line exchanges automatically) and against an overload to the slide side. Its weakness is the backside: one man, the back, against whatever comes off that edge.

Man protection ("BOB" — big on big). Each lineman blocks the defensive lineman in front of him, man to man; the back takes the linebacker ("back on backer"). It's simple and physical, and it lets the strongest blockers take on the strongest rushers. Its weakness is games up front — man blockers have to pass off twists by call — and late movement, because a change in the front changes every assignment.

Half-slide. The offense's most common compromise, and ours: one side of the line slides (gap rules), the other side blocks man, and the back is on the man side, responsible for the linebacker there. Our base is "60 Left/Right": a six-man half-slide in which the call names the slide side and the back goes to the other side. "60 Left" means center, left guard, and left tackle slide left; right guard and right tackle block man on the right; Ruffin checks the Mike and anything else that comes on the right.

60 LEFT (half-slide) vs. Nickel Over

                W                  M
                                   ?  <- Ruffin checks the Mike
     E              N         T          E
     v              v         v          v
     |   [C gap] [B gap] [A gap]         |
     LT <--  LG <--  C <--    RG         RT
     \___ slide side: gaps __/  \__ man side: men __/
                         Q  R

📊 Diagram (described): Against a four-man front with two linebackers, the "60 Left" protection splits the line in two. On the left, the slide side, the center, left guard, and left tackle each step left and take the gap to their left — the A, B, and C gaps — blocking whoever comes into it. On the right, the man side, the right guard blocks the 3-technique and the right tackle blocks the end, man to man. The back, aligned on the right, checks the Mike linebacker and blocks him if he rushes. Six blockers, six possible rushers accounted for.

Max protection. Add blockers and subtract receivers. Our 70 keeps the tight end in (seven blockers); 80 Max keeps the tight end and back in, sometimes a second back too (eight blockers, two- or three-man route). You call it when you need time for a deep shot or a deep over, and you pay for it in receivers — which means a defense that drops eight can take away a two-man route. It's also how we beat the Sentinels' six-man Cover 0 pressure on the winning touchdown in Game 1: Ruffin stayed in, picked up the sixth rusher, and Gaines beat Cole Brennan on the max-protect deep over for 52 yards.

And at the other end: 50, a five-man protection with no back, used from empty or for the quick game, where the ball is out before a sixth rusher matters.

Family Who has what Beats Beaten by Our word
Full slide Line: gaps one direction. Back: backside edge Twists; overloads to the slide side Pressure off the backside edge; a back who can't block (by call, rarely)
Man / BOB Line: man on the down linemen. Back: a linebacker Bull and power rushers; simple fronts Twists; late movement; walked-up second-level rushers (by call)
Half-slide Slide side: gaps. Man side: men. Back: man side LB Most four-man rushes; balanced pressure Pressure that makes the back block someone who drops; overloads to the man side 60 Left/Right
Max Seven or eight blockers; two or three receivers Everything up front; Cover 0 with six Eight-man coverage; nobody open 70, 80 Max
Five-man Line only; no back Quick game against four Any fifth rusher the ball can't beat 50

The rule against "more rushers than blockers"

Six blockers can block six rushers. A defense that shows seven possible rushers — say, four linemen, two linebackers in the A-gaps, and a nickel walked up — has more than you can block, and somebody is going to be unaccounted for. The protection's job then is not to block everyone. It's to choose who goes unblocked — the "hot" defender — and make sure the quarterback knows to throw before he gets there.

That's the rule we used against the Sentinels' pressure looks: "Slide to the most bodies, set the back to the same side, make the leftover your hot." The free defender is the one the quarterback can beat with the ball — a quick throw to the area that rusher just left. Protection is arithmetic, and the quarterback is part of the protection. That idea is the threshold concept of Chapter 22, and you should feel it already: when rushers outnumber blockers, the ball is the extra blocker.

🔄 Check your understanding: In "60 Left," which side is the back on, and why does the call put him there instead of on the slide side?

Answer

The back is on the man side — the right in "60 Left." The slide side is already gap-sound: three linemen take three gaps, and anyone who comes into one of those gaps is blocked. The man side has only two linemen for its two down linemen, so a linebacker blitzing on that side would be free. The back fills that hole. Put him on the slide side and you'd have four blockers covering three gaps on one side and nobody for the man-side linebacker.


5.8 Where It Breaks: The Game 2 Sack, Frame by Frame

Now go back to the hook with the vocabulary. It's the best teaching snap I own, because no one missed a block.

Situation: Week 15, Game 2 at Sacramento. Third quarter, 6:51 left, tied 13–13. Our ball, 3rd-and-7 at our own 38 — "long" in our third-down words, which run short, medium, long, and long-long (1–3, 4–6, 7–10, and 11-plus yards).

Our call: Eleven personnel, two-by-two. Sutton (X) wide to the boundary, Harlan (Y) flexed about four yards off the left tackle, Powers (H) in the field slot, Gaines (Z) wide to the field. Ruffin in the gun on Vance's left. A six-man dropback, "60 Left" — sliding toward the boundary — with our rule against a double-A-gap look: six-man, back on the Mike.

The clock: I sent the call in at 27 seconds on the play clock. The coach-to-quarterback radio cuts off at 15. Weller walked at about 10. The ball was snapped with about 3 seconds left. Think about what that means: by the time the defense made its last move, I couldn't say a word. It was Vance and Szabo, alone, with the rules we'd given them.

PRE-SNAP: Game 2, Q3, 3rd-and-7, AUS 38, 13-13 ("60 Left")
(boundary on the left, field on the right)

                             F
                                                 $
 C                                         *                C
               S E    N W   M    T
 X      Y         LT   LG   C   RG   RT           H          Z
                      R    Q

📊 Diagram (described): The Outlaws: Sutton wide left, Harlan flexed about four yards outside the left tackle, five linemen, Vance in the shotgun with Ruffin on his left, Powers in the right slot, Gaines wide right. The Sentinels: one safety (Royce) deep in the middle and the strong safety (Holloway) rolled down to about eight yards on the right; Brennan over Sutton, Simmons about seven yards off Gaines, the nickel (Vo) between the right tackle and Powers. On the line, from left to right: Weller, who has just walked out, standing up outside Rollins; Rollins outside the left tackle; the nose (Tuipulotu) head-up on the left guard; Ames in the left A-gap; Bell in the right A-gap; and Coleman on the right guard's outside shoulder.

Count what Vance saw. On or near the line: Weller, Rollins, Tuipulotu, Ames, Bell, Coleman — six. Off the line but close: Vo and Holloway. That's more possible rushers than our six blockers. So the protection had to choose a free man. Here's how the assignments ended up after Vance moved Ruffin:

Threat Our blocker What the defender actually did Result
Weller (walked out, boundary) Ruffin (moved to the edge) Dropped to the boundary curl/flat Ruffin blocks air
Rollins (boundary edge) Achterberg (LT), slide Rushed Blocked
Tuipulotu (head-up on LG) Moss (LG), slide Rushed Blocked
Ames (left A-gap) Szabo (C), slide Rushed Blocked
Bell (right A-gap) Nobody — the hot Rushed Free
Coleman (3-technique) Lorusso (RG), man Stepped in, then dropped into the field hot window Lorusso blocks air
Simmons (field corner, off) Fitch (RT), first threat outside Blitzed off the edge Blocked, late
POST-SNAP: five rush, six drop — two Outlaws block air

 [DEEP 1/3]              [DEEP 1/3]              [DEEP 1/3]
     C                        F                       $
 [CURL/FLAT]             [HOOK] *              [HOT WINDOW] T
     S                                          (Coleman drops
                                                 under Powers)
             E    N    W      M                     C (Simmons)
             X    X    X      |                    /
   ( )       |    |    |      |   (air)           /
   R-->air   LT   LG   C      |    RG          RT
                              v
                              Q   <- Bell, free: sack at 1.9 s

📊 Diagram (described): At the snap five Sentinels rush and six drop. Rollins, the nose, and Ames are blocked by the left tackle, left guard, and center, who slid left. Simmons blitzes off the right edge from his corner spot and the right tackle picks him up late. Bell rushes through the right A-gap untouched. Coleman takes one step at the right guard and then drops out into the short zone under Powers — the hot window — so the right guard ends up blocking nobody. Weller, the man Ruffin moved out to block, drops into the boundary flat, so Ruffin blocks nobody either. Behind the rush, the Sentinels play three deep (Brennan, Royce, and Holloway) and three under (Weller, Vo, and Coleman). Vance looks to his hot throw, finds Coleman in the window, hesitates, and Bell sacks him.

Read that table again. On paper, the protection was right. Bell was free by design, and Vance had a hot. He made the correct read. The hot was covered — by a defensive tackle we had counted as a rusher. Russ told me in the spring that his staff had timed it off the end-zone film: Vance's shoulders opened to throw at about 1.1 seconds, closed when he saw Coleman, and Bell arrived at about 1.9. Four-tenths of a second of hesitation, and that's the game.

🧩 Productive struggle: Before you read on, solve it. Same formation, same front, same call by the defense — the double-A mug with the corner blitz and the tackle dropping. You have six blockers: five linemen and Ruffin. The defense will rush five (Rollins, Tuipulotu, Ames, Bell, Simmons) and drop two of the men who look like rushers (Weller and Coleman) — but you don't know that before the snap. Write an assignment for each of your six blockers so that if those five come, nobody is free, and if Weller or Coleman rushes instead, you know who your hot is. Then decide what Gaines, on the side of the blitzing corner, should do.

One solution — what we actually used in the playoff

Stop sliding at the crowd. Take the mugged linebackers directly: center on Bell, Ruffin on Ames (the back steps up into the other A-gap). The left tackle and left guard stay on Rollins and the nose. The right guard stays on Coleman — if Coleman drops, the guard is free to help inside. And the right tackle widens to the corner — Simmons — because the field-side threat that matters is the man coming off the edge, not the end-of-the-line spot. That is six blockers on the five most dangerous rushers, with Weller and Coleman as the "extra" threats: if one of them comes instead of dropping, the ball goes to the area he left.

And Gaines: if his corner blitzes, there's no one over him short, so he sight-adjusts — converts his route to a quick hitch at six yards and turns his eyes to Vance immediately. A sight adjustment is a receiver changing his route because of what he sees at the snap; it's how a receiver becomes part of the protection.

That's the answer we took into the divisional playoff in Sacramento. Same situation — 3rd-and-7, this time at our own 41, opening drive of the third quarter, trailing 10–7. Same formation. And Russ, who had held that pressure all game, called it — the only time in the game he did. I didn't know its name until the spring, when Russ told me they call it Mug Cat Fire.

POST-SNAP: Game 3, Q3, 3rd-and-7, AUS 41 — same pressure, new rules

                 [DEEP 1/3]                         [DEEP 1/3]
                     F                                  $
     S (drops)                       T (drops)          ^ hitch at 6:
                                                        |  caught, +10
             E    N    W      M                         |
             X    X    X      X                C        |
             |    |    |      |                X        |
             LT   LG   R      C    RG          RT       Z
                       ^                   (RT widened
                  Ruffin steps up           to Simmons)
                  to Ames              Q .....> ball to Z's hitch

📊 Diagram (described): The Sentinels run the same pressure: Rollins, the nose, Ames, Bell, and Simmons rush; Weller and Coleman drop. This time the left tackle blocks Rollins, the left guard the nose, Ruffin steps up into the left A-gap to take Ames, the center takes Bell head-on, and the right tackle widens to meet Simmons coming off the edge. The right guard's man drops, so he is free to help. Nobody is free. Gaines sees his corner blitz, converts his route to a six-yard hitch, and Vance throws it to him for ten yards and a first down at the Sacramento 49.

Zero free rushers. Gaines, hitch, ten yards, first down. The drive ended in a field goal to tie it 10–10. I'm not telling you this because the playoff version was clever — the next chapters will tell you how that night ended, and it wasn't a clever night for me. I'm telling you because it's the purest example in this book of the line's job: not to win more one-on-ones, but to make sure the one-on-ones exist. In Game 2 every man won his block and we got sacked. In Game 3 the same men, with the same technique, against the same call, protected perfectly — because we changed what they were counting.

🛡️ The defense's view: When we finally sat down at the league meetings, Russ was gracious and specific. The pressure was designed to beat exactly the rule we'd used: slide toward the crowd, leave the Mike, throw hot. The nose kicks out to head-up on the guard so both A-gaps belong to the linebackers; the strong-side end walks to the boundary as late as possible to drag the back out there; the 3-technique drops into the hot window. He'd seen our slide go toward Rollins on long third downs. He called it when we did it. That's not a trick. That's a coordinator who read our rules before we read his.

🎙️ On the headset: Here's what I wanted, Game 2, at 10 seconds: to say "keep Jalen on the Mike, throw the hot to Gaines if the corner comes." I couldn't — the radio was dead at 15. So the real lesson for a play caller is uncomfortable: your protection rules are your voice after 15 seconds. If the rule says "move the back to the crowd," the back moves to the crowd. If the defense knows the rule, it can move the crowd. Write the rule as if Russ Kimbrough will read it, because he will.

🔄 Check your understanding: In Game 2 we had six blockers against five rushers and still had a free rusher. State the arithmetic in one sentence.

Answer

Two of our six blockers (Ruffin and Lorusso) were assigned to defenders who dropped, so only four blockers were on the five men who actually rushed — four on five leaves one free, and he was Bell. Protection math counts the blockers who end up on rushers, not the blockers on the field.


5.9 Why Five Players Decide Whether Anything Else Matters

Every Tuesday, Marisol Vega puts one slide in front of the staff before we start the game plan. It's not a scheme slide. It's a list of the opponent's five best defensive players and, next to each one, the Outlaw who has to block him. Her point, which she makes without saying it: the game plan is a fantasy until that list is answered.

Here's why the line sits underneath everything else in this book.

The run game is a threat only if the line can create a yard before contact. Credibility in the run game isn't 45-yard touchdowns. It's 2nd-and-5 instead of 2nd-and-9, over and over, so that the defense has to keep a safety close to the line. Play-action, the heart of our passing game, works only when the run it imitates has been working — and the run works only when the combos hold. No line, no run; no run, no play-action; no play-action, and our best shots become ordinary dropbacks against a defense that isn't afraid of anything.

The pass game is a menu only if the line can hold up past the quick game. A line that can protect for 1.5 seconds gives you hitches, slants, and screens. A line that can protect for 2.9 seconds — Vance's typical release against four rushers — gives you digs, posts, and deep crossers. A line that can hold for longer than that gives you the shot plays. Every second of protection you can count on adds a row to the call sheet. Every second you can't removes one.

The quarterback's health depends on it. We allowed 31 sacks this season. Each one is a hit on a man whose arm is the franchise.

📈 By the numbers: Two hedges you should know before you blame the line for every sack. First, public charting services generally find that only a minority of pressures become sacks — very roughly one in five, varying a lot by quarterback and by how each service defines "pressure." Second, most analysts find that the quarterback's own play — how long he holds the ball, whether he climbs or drifts — explains a large share of his sack rate. Some public metrics try to separate the line's share: ESPN's pass-block win rate, built on player-tracking data, credits a blocker who sustains his block for roughly two and a half seconds; Football Outsiders' old adjusted-line-yards idea gave the line most of the credit for the first few yards of a run and little for yards past ten. None of these is a verdict. Marisol uses them as questions: if our sack rate is up and our pass-block win rate isn't down, the problem probably isn't the five.

Here is the uncomfortable math of protection: your pass protection is roughly as good as your worst matchup. A defense doesn't need to beat five blockers. It needs to beat one, and it gets to choose which. If your four best linemen are excellent and your right guard is ordinary, the defense will put its best interior rusher on your right guard, twist toward him, and bring its pressures through his gap. That's not cruelty. That's coordination.

The run game is a little more forgiving. A run can survive one lost block if the back reads it and goes somewhere else — that's the forgiveness built into zone. But a pass has only one destination, the quarterback, and one lost block on the way there is often the whole play.

Marisol: "So the question isn't 'how good is our line.' It's 'who's our fifth-best lineman, and what does their best rusher do to him?'"

Wade Harmon: "That's how I'd defend you. I wouldn't game-plan your offense. I'd game-plan Ben's second speed rush." Wade coordinated defenses before he ran a team. He says this sort of thing in a pleasant voice, which makes it worse.

Lyle: "Which is why the chip, and why the slide goes his way on long downs."

Wade: "And which is why Kimbrough blitzed you the moment your slide went his way."

He was right, and you already know how that snap ended. The weakest link isn't only a person. It can be a rule. When the defense knows where your help is going, it knows where your help isn't.

🔄 Check your understanding: Why is pass protection more vulnerable to one weak blocker than the zone run game is?

Answer

A zone run has many possible holes, and the back reads the blocks after the snap, so one lost block can be survived by cutting somewhere else. A pass has one destination — the quarterback — and one lost block anywhere on the line opens a path to it. The defense also gets to choose which blocker to attack, so it will aim its best rusher, its twists, and its pressures at the weakest matchup or the most predictable rule.

🎬 Film room: To evaluate a line on film, use the end-zone camera, not the broadcast. Watch three things on every dropback: (1) the center's first step — which way he sets tells you the slide; (2) the back's first step — toward the man side or the slide side, and whether he chips; and (3) the air blocks — any blocker who sets, punches, and then has nobody. One air block on a four-man rush is a defense that dropped a lineman on purpose. Two is a defense that read your protection. On runs, watch the double teams: do both men keep their hips on the down lineman until the linebacker commits, or does one leave early? Early climbs are among the most common reasons a zone run gains one yard instead of five.

📋 Try it — Make the call: Week 12, home against the St. Louis Stallions and Frank Ostrowski's single-high, eight-man-box defense. First quarter, 3rd-and-8 at our own 42, no score. They've rushed four on every third down so far, but on two of them they walked their strong safety into the box before dropping him. Their best rusher is their right defensive end, lined up over Achterberg, and he has two pressures already. Three protection options: (A) "60 Left," sliding toward the end, with Ruffin on the man side right; (B) "60 Right," sliding away, with Ruffin on the left to chip the end and then release; (C) "70," with Harlan staying in to help on the left. Pick one, say what you give up, and name who's hot.

Worked answer

There's no single right answer — the reasoning is graded.

(A) 60 Left slides toward Achterberg and the end, so the left side is gap-sound; Ruffin checks the man side. Against four, it's clean. If the safety walks down and rushes from the right, Ruffin has him. You give up nothing in the route, but Achterberg is still essentially one-on-one with a rusher who's winning, with only the guard's gap help inside.

(B) 60 Right with a chip is the one I'd lean toward. The slide goes away from the end, so the right side is gap-sound against the safety walk-down; Ruffin, aligned left, chips the end on his way out, which lets Achterberg set shorter. The risk: if a walked-down defender rushes on the left, nobody has him — make him the hot and tell Vance to throw to the area he left. You give up a little of Ruffin's route timing.

(C) 70 keeps Harlan in to help on the end and gives you seven blockers — plenty against four or five — but takes your best third-down tight end out of the route and leaves three receivers against a single-high defense with seven droppers. That's a lot of bodies for few routes on 3rd-and-8.

The coordinator's habit to build: name the hot before you name the play. Whatever you choose, Vance should know before the snap which rusher is his and where the ball goes when that man comes.


5.10 The Room: Communication, Continuity, and the Culture of Five

I've coached in a lot of buildings. In every one of them, the offensive line room was a different country: its own language, its own rules, its own sense of humor. Receivers are judged one catch at a time. Linemen are judged five at a time, which is why the good rooms are tight.

Communication is the scheme

Gus says the line's most important skill isn't strength or footwork. It's agreement. Before every snap, in about three seconds, five men need to agree on the front, the Mike, the direction of the slide, who's combining with whom, and what happens if somebody walks. On a run, the center calls the front and any combo changes; the guards echo; the tackles echo the guards. On a pass, the Mike ID comes from Vance or Szabo, the line echoes it, and the back confirms. In a road stadium on third down, that communication happens by touch, by eye contact, and by a few one-word calls that every man has heard ten thousand times.

That's why you never hear a good line coach say "it's a simple scheme." Every scheme is simple on the whiteboard. It's complicated at 3 seconds on the play clock, with 70,000 people screaming and an end walking out to the boundary.

💡 Coach's point: The fewer words your line has to say, the more snaps it gets right. Every protection call you add is a word that has to be heard over a crowd. Before you install a new line call, ask what it replaces.

Continuity and the cost of one injury

Because the line is five men working as one, it's the position group most sensitive to change. Swap a receiver and the new one runs the same routes. Swap a guard, and the center next to him has to re-learn how fast his combo partner climbs, which way he leans against a twist, and whether he'll hear "Switch!" in a loud stadium. Coaches widely believe that lines with more starts together play better than their individual talent suggests, and that lines shuffled by injury play worse. It's hard to prove cleanly with public data — injuries, schedules, and talent are all tangled together — but you won't find many line coaches who doubt it.

Last season, when Kendrick Moss missed three games with an ankle injury, Rodney Kalu played left guard. Kalu was fine. The line wasn't — not because Kalu missed blocks, but because Szabo kept making calls timed for Moss's feet and getting Kalu's. Gus fixed it by simplifying: for three weeks, we cut the line's call list in half. We ran less, and we ran it better.

Gus: "You don't build a line out of the five best players. You build it out of the five who can hear each other."

The room's culture

Gus's room has rules that sound like superstition and are actually coaching. Linemen sit in line order so they learn to talk to the man next to them. Every clip is watched with all five in the room, even if only one man is at fault, because a lost block is almost never one man's alone — somebody could have helped, somebody could have called it. And nobody is allowed to say "my bad" in the meeting. Gus wants "my rule said X, I did Y, here's what I saw," because "my bad" ends the conversation, and the rule is where the fix lives.

That last one is how the Game 2 sack became the Game 3 first down. Lorusso didn't say "my bad." He said "I blocked air," which is a description, and a description is something you can fix.

🔄 Check your understanding: Gus forbids "my bad" in the film room and wants "my rule said X, I did Y, here's what I saw." What does the second version give a coach that the first doesn't?

Answer

It tells the coach where the failure lives: in the rule (the rule was beaten, as in the Game 2 sack), in the execution (the player didn't follow the rule), or in the recognition (the player saw something different from what was there). Each has a different fix — rewrite the rule, rep the technique, or teach the picture. "My bad" takes the blame and hides the information.

🏫 Any level: At the high school level, the line room is often where the players who will never play college football learn the most about being part of something. Treat it that way. Give your linemen one-word calls, two protections, and a rule sheet they can carry in their helmet. And know your code's ineligible-downfield limit before you install RPOs: the NFL allows an ineligible lineman only 1 yard past the line when a forward pass that crosses it is thrown, while college has historically allowed up to 3 yards and high school 2 — and those numbers have been debated and changed, so check your current code. That one number decides how far your linemen can run-block before the quarterback throws, which is the whole RPO game (Chapter 13). Gus, for the record, grumbles about this rule every week we install an RPO.


Spaced Review

Try each question before you read the reminder under it.

1. From Chapter 3: How is formation strength declared in our offense, and why does it matter to the line? Strength goes to the tight end's side; with no attached tight end, to the trips or passing-strength side. It matters because the defense sets its front off a strength — the 3-technique and the strong-side end usually go to it — and that decides who is covered and uncovered on every zone run. Change the strength with a shift or a flexed tight end and you change the defense's front, which changes your line's rules mid-sentence. In the Game 2 sack, Harlan was flexed, not attached, and the Sentinels set their front to the field.

2. From Chapter 4: What does 12 personnel add to the line's arithmetic? A second tight end is another blocker on the line of scrimmage and another gap for the defense to fill. Against nickel, that's a light box you can run at; against base or big nickel, it's a heavier box and a better play-action picture. For the line, it means a combo partner on the edge — outside zone with two tight ends is a different play from outside zone with one.

3. From Chapter 1: What's the difference between a system and a call? The system is the set of rules and plays that hang together; the call is one choice in one situation. The Game 2 sack was a system problem dressed up as a call problem — the rule ("move the back to the crowd") was beaten, not the play. That's why the fix lived in the rules sheet, not on the call sheet.


Project Checkpoint: Offensive Line Rules Sheet

Last chapter you built your Personnel Packages & Role Cards — your base groupings and what each forces the defense to do. Now you need the five players who make every one of those packages work. This checkpoint produces the Offensive Line Rules Sheet: one page, two halves.

Half 1 — Run-blocking rules. For each run family you'll install (at minimum one zone run and one gap run), write the rule for each position in plain words a lineman can say back to you. Include:

  • The covered/uncovered definition you'll use ("a man on you or in your play-side gap").
  • Your combo rules: who combines with whom, and the climb trigger ("climb when the linebacker commits to a gap — not before").
  • Your reach and scoop rules for the play-side and backside.
  • For your gap run: who pulls, who kicks, who wraps, and who back-blocks.
  • Your line's call words — no more than five.

Half 2 — Base pass-protection identification. Write:

  • Your Mike ID rule: who points, how the line echoes it, and how the back confirms it.
  • Your base protection (slide, man, or half-slide) and its rule for each lineman and the back.
  • Your "more rushers than blockers" rule: who becomes hot, and what the quarterback does.
  • Your stunt rule: pass off by rule, or man it? What's the one-word call?

A worked piece (pro level, our base dropback protection):

Position 60 Left (half-slide) rule
C Slide side: block the left A-gap. Make the Mike call with the QB.
LG Slide side: block the left B-gap.
LT Slide side: block the left C-gap — the first threat outside.
RG Man side: block the first down lineman on or outside you.
RT Man side: block the first threat on or outside you.
RB Man side: the Mike, then the first threat outside the RT.
QB If the Mike and an outside threat both come: throw hot to the area the Mike left.

Choose your level:

  • High school: one zone run, one gap run (power or counter), one protection (a half-slide or BOB), and three line calls. Write it so a sophomore guard can carry it in his helmet.
  • College: two zone runs (inside and outside), two gap runs, two protections plus a max, and a stunt rule. Note your code's low-block and ineligible-downfield rules at the top.
  • Pro: the full sheet, plus your answer to a double-A mug: whom does the center take, whom does the back take, and who is hot? (Reread 5.8 before you answer.)
  • Film-room: pick an NFL team, watch three third downs from the end-zone angle, and reverse-engineer their protection: which way the center set, where the back went, and who was hot. Write their rules sheet from the film.

Next chapter, you'll move from the five men who block to the players who touch the ball: the Skill-Position Role Cards and Route Tree — receivers, tight ends, and backs, and what each must know about protection too, because the back you just assigned to the Mike is one of them.


Chapter Summary

The offensive line is five players acting as one, and its job comes down to two questions on every snap: who is covered, and who is free?

Topic The rule to remember
Positions LT guards the blind side; guards pull and anchor; the center is the line's brain; the RT is a run blocker who now sees speed rushers too
Map Gaps A–B–C–D from the center out; technique numbers describe where defenders align
Stance and splits Every stance and split is information; a tell you accept on purpose is coaching, a tell you don't know about is a mistake
Zone Covered: block your man. Uncovered: combo play-side with eyes on the linebacker, then climb. The defense picks the hole
Gap Down, double, back-block, pull, kick, wrap. The offense picks the hole and wins with angles and an extra blocker at the point
Low blocks Chop blocks are illegal in the NFL; low-block rules differ by level and change — check your code and teach safety first
Pass sets Vertical, angle, quick. Mix them, or the set becomes the rusher's scouting report
Hands and leverage Punch inside and on time; anchor against power; protect inside first; never overset
Stunts Pass off by rule, on the same level, with one word ("Switch!"); the guard who chases his man is the usual culprit
Mike ID Name the threat, not the player; everyone counts from the same man
Families Slide, man (BOB), half-slide (our 60), max (70/80 Max), five-man (50)
More rushers than blockers Choose the free man; the quarterback is part of the protection; the hot must be open, not just assigned
Arithmetic Count blockers who end up on rushers — an air block is a blocker you didn't have
Weakest link The defense chooses your worst matchup — or your most predictable rule

A decision framework for any protection call: (1) Count possible rushers. (2) Count blockers. (3) If rushers are no more than blockers, make sure every blocker's man can actually rush — and plan for a dropper. (4) If rushers outnumber blockers, name the hot, and make sure a receiver is running to the area the hot defender leaves. (5) Ask what the defense knows about your rule — and what it will do with it.

What's Next

The line makes room. Somebody has to use it. In Chapter 6 we meet the players who touch the ball — Trey Gaines, Devonte Sutton, Mekhi Powers, Brooks Harlan, and Jalen Ruffin — and what a coordinator has to teach each of them: releases against press, the route tree, a tight end's two jobs, and a running back's eyes, including the eyes that, in Game 2, had to leave the Mike.